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“La philosophie d’Aristote, tombée depuis deux siècles environ dans un discredit général et 
presque dans l’oubli, commence à s’en relever” 
 
Félix Ravaisson 




Although the word “teleology” was coined in modernity, the main philosophical claims about 
it can be traced back to ancient thought. The Greek term “τέλος” (“télos”) defines the 
fulfillment of a natural capacity. In philosophy this term is traditionally also referred to as 
‘final causality’ and the most frequent translations of télos are goal, end, completion, 
perfection and function. The very notion of teleology also presents a challenge to 
philosophical materialism, according to which nature is reduced to homogeneous elements 
which move in “blind”, non-perfective ways or even according to chance. Teleology can also 
be associated with certain theological frameworks. This use of teleology can be found from 
Plato’s Timaeus onwards. It means that every goal in nature is due to a god, so it may involve 
theological concepts such as the providence of a hypothetical demiurge that arranges this 
world rationally, Christian creation ex nihilo or, in modern times, pre-design theories. These 
are different versions of what I call transcendental teleology.1 
 
Yet, beyond and partially in opposition to this transcendental teleology, there also exists an 
immanent approach to teleology. Aristotle is the founder of the model of immanent teleology, 
and it pervades his vast oeuvre. Since in Aristotle’s corpus there is neither theological 
creation nor providence, the final cause is exclusively an immanent cause. Thus, it cannot be 
the trace of one transcendental producer that introduces perfection in matter. According to 
Aristotle the télos is nature itself: “nature is an end and for the sake of which” (he dè physis 
télos kaì hou héneka, Phys.II. 2.194b29). Aristotle extends the idea of goal from the realm of 
the intellect to that of nature, which means that not only gods, humans, and their crafts have 
goals corresponding to intellectual plans. Within the non-rational living individuals there is 
an inner tendency towards survival, reproduction and also well-being. In Aristotle, the first 
two are innate goals of every living being from the moment it is alive and the third, well-
being, can be found in superior species. For instance, in the case of humans, well-being may 
mean happiness, but humans are just one case among others. Every development of every 
specific organism has its own goal, its own flourishing, irreducible to others, inscribed in its 
specific form. The immanent teleological model understands nature in a pluralistic way, 
according to which it is full of different entities with their innate goals. Against absolute 
anthropocentrism (according to which there are only human goals among natural beings and 
everything in worldly nature is for the human’s sake), immanent teleology recognizes in 
nature a diversity of forms, developments and perfections. There is a rich diversity of ways of 
understanding what perfection is, irreducible neither to human or divine use nor also 
homogeneous material compounds.2  
 
                                                
1 For this vision of the history of teleology, see André Ariew, Chapter 9: “Teleology.” The Cambridge 
Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press, 2015; John Cooper, “Aristotle on natural 
teleology”. In Language and Logos. Ed. M. Schofield & M. C. Nussbaum. Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 
221; also Sedley, David. “Teleology, Aristotelian and Platonic”, in Nature and life in Aristotle: Essays in honor 
of Allan Gotthelf, ed. James Lennox and Robert Bolton. Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 28. See more 
detail in Chapter 2. Introduction. 





In a few crucial texts Aristotle also conceived nature as a whole, as a compound of 
substances. Every particular being and its specific goal is seen in those passages as a 
contribution to a general order, a general télos. This complementary perspective of teleology 
does not emphasize plurality, but instead the convergence of that plurality. This overarching 
aspect of Aristotelian teleology is still perfectly immanent, since it does not involve a god’s 
providence or activity, but merely the good immanent work of nature as a whole.  
 
In this dissertation I argue that the influential 20th century French philosopher Henri Bergson 
subscribed to the immanent conception of teleology. Bergson was a teleologist, although in a 
singular and original way. Against the usual readings of Bergson,3 I interpret his work as 
deeply rooted in the Aristotelian tradition, which he knew and taught.4 In order to substantiate 
this interpretation I provide the first systematic book-length comparison between Aristotle 
and Bergson.  
 
In more general terms, Bergson’s view of the world was not that of the flux of pure 
becoming, progress without end. On the contrary, Bergson had a dynamic view of living 
beings, human psychology and history that may be considered finalist. In this framework, the 
organic world should be considered a directed tendency towards adaptation and ultimately, 
the fulfillment of natural potencies. Bergson’s conception of human beings and their societies 
involves a teleological approach as well. His conception of the world as a whole is 
teleological too. In this case, the goal is not order or stability but the growth of freedom. In 
Bergson there are many more examples of global teleology than in Aristotle, but its 
perspective is equally immanent and, hence, non-theological. Behind every Bergsonian 
approach to nature, from a single embryo to the cosmos, there is always the search for a 
natural function. Here there is not pure becoming, but becoming for the sake of the 
fulfillment of one specific potency.  
 
In comparing Aristotle and Bergson, first, I aim to highlight the latter’s original approach to 
immanent teleology, an approach which was developed in the era of Darwin, modern physics 
and the philosophy of history. Within Bergsonian scholarship, I want to challenge the reading 
according to which Bergson’s philosophy is a “refusal of mechanism and finalism”.5 I 
attempt to challenge the usual understanding of Bergson among scholars, according to which 
every kind of “finalism is not an alternative to mechanism, but only its inverted image”.6 This 
means that finalism has in the end the same problems as mechanism. According to this, the 
label ‘vitalism’, when applied to Bergson, may be seen to stand equidistant from those 
options. Bergson rejects not only modern mechanicism, according to which the world is 
composed of atoms whose movements and relations are governed by deterministic causal 
laws, but also hard theories of chance, since he finds that pure chance is an intellectual 
illusion. On the other hand, the case of final causality is different. Teleology was not a relic 
of the past for Bergson but an open field for fresh new speculation. This does not mean that 
Bergson held an uncritical stance toward theories of teleology. His critical remarks, however, 
are addressed to specific kinds of final causality.  
 
                                                
3 Chapter 1.  
4 Chapter 2, first section: “Bergson: Aristotelian scholar”. 
5 “Creativité comme tendancialité”. Vollet, Matthias. Bergson. Ed. Camille Riquier. Cerf, Paris, 2012, p. 371. 
6 “Time, life, concepts: the newness of Bergson”. Paola Marrati. Vol. 120. nº5. The John Hopkins University 





Bergson himself wrote that final causality “will never be definitively refuted”7 and that his 
own doctrine will “necessarily partake of finalism to a certain extent”.8 On the contrary, he 
rejects “vitalism”.9 
 
Finalism is not a doctrine, Bergson says, “with rigid outlines”, it is “flexible”, it is 
“extensible”, it is “comprehensive”.10 He held the perspective of a reformer. In the end, 
Bergson claims “not to stop at the classic conception of finality, still less to contract or 
attenuate it, but, on the contrary, to go further”.11 An essential aim of my dissertation is to 
clarify systematically the meaning of the last two words in italics. 
 
As I explain in detail in Chapter 1, some brief remarks by Étienne Gilson and Henri Hude 
have been more useful than certain studies on Bergson’s teleology.12 In From Aristotle to 
Darwin and back again, Gilson claims that Bergson’s global teleology is “purified of its 
vices” which “owed its novelty to what was a return of the ancient immanent teleology of 
Aristotle”.13 Unfortunately, he did not clarified why.  
 
Even from outside Bergsonian scholarship, this dissertation sheds light on the extraordinary 
richness and flexibility of the old Aristotelian philosophical model. I seek to offer a clear 
understanding of immanent teleology and its philosophical possibilities in modern times.14 
We can gain considerable knowledge by emphasizing the tension between the old master and 
the ambitious reformer.  
 
The doctrine of immanent teleology contains a pluralistic account of life: it understands 
nature for the sake of itself and not for the sake of anything else. At the same time, its world-
view is hierarchical, so it understands life as standing on an axiological scale. This double 
vision of nature (horizontal and vertical, democratic and monarchical) is projected in human 
beings too. Human beings fall under the whole world of nature and its perfections, but they 
also possess certain faculties that put them, by far, at the top of that natural scale. In the case 
of Aristotle it is intellect, in the case of Bergson it is, ultimately, freedom. In both, human 
beings are rooted in the rich realm of life. This pluralistic account of the living world and this 
naturalistic view of human beings challenge the most powerful trends of modernity, like 
Cartesian anthropocentrism or Darwinian relativism. From the perspective of global 
teleology, the question is different. The eternal cosmos of Aristotle (which includes 
everything) the overarching élan of Life (which includes biological evolution and human 
progress) are visions of reality as a whole. It is more difficult to explain how to apply them to 
contemporary problems. The two express different ways of understanding totality as such 
since they belong to different epochs. From the point of view of history, I wish to show the 
Aristotelian roots of modern ordinary terms, like ‘progress’. It is enriching to see how, after 
immense lapses of time, old philosophical models are suddenly revived again.  
                                                
7 EC, p. 40. 
8 EC, p. 40. 
9 EC, p. 42. 
10 EC, p. 40.   
11 EC, p. 53, my emphasis. 
12 On Bergson’s bibliography on finalism see Chapter 1.1.  
13 Gilson, Étienne. D'Aristote à Darwin et retour. Essai sur quelques constantes de la biophilosophie. [From 
Aristotle to Darwin and back again.] Trans. John Lyon. Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 99, my emphasis. 
14 In this way: Spaemann, Robert and Löw, Reinhard. [Die Frage Wozu] Fini naturali. Storia & riscoperta del 
pensiero teleologico. Trans. it. Leonardo Allodi and Giacomo Miranda Ares, Rome, 2013 and Weiss, Helene. 






From the point of view of philosophical enquiry, I think is extremely enlightening to see how 
Bergson tries to combine global historical teleology with contingency, human freedom, and 
creativity. This problem, alien to Aristotelianism, is a conceptual tension that goes through 
Bergson’s mature works. Furthermore, it remains quite relevant in the contemporary 
philosophical scene.  
 
In Chapter 1 I introduce various important scholarly interpretations of Bergson’s work. The 
rest of the dissertation is devoted to comparing the two models of immanent teleology. In 
Chapter 2 I deal in detail with Aristotle’s classic view of immanent teleology. This chapter 
establishes the structure of the whole work: my overview of Aristotle’s notion of teleology in 
section 2.1 lays the groundwork for a comparative treatment of Bergson in Chapter 3 and my 
treatment of the domains of immanent teleology in Aristotle’s model, presented in section 
2.2, correspond to a comparative treatment of such domains in Bergson’s model, presented in 
Chapter 4. More specifically, in 2.1 I show the structural elements of the classic teleological 
argument (perfection, hierarchy, analogy, regularity) and I compare them with Bergson’s 
modern approach in Chapter 3. The two main problems to be tackled in Chapter 3 are 
anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. In 2.2 I lay out the different domains of application 
for teleological arguments in Aristotle, from embryology to ethics to cosmology. In that same 
section, I deal with the twofold vision of teleology. This means that among the many 
applications of the model to different phenomena, we can distinguish between the two main 
domains noted above.15  Then correspondingly, in Chapter 4 I turn to Aristotle, as seen from 
the perspective of Bergson’s reform. In this final chapter I again survey the different domains 
of his teleological argument, from embryology to ethics to cosmology. Just as I do with 
Aristotle, I distinguish two complementary domains of teleological explanation in Bergson.  
 
Let me now briefly deal with some of these major philosophical topics of the dissertation 
following its order in the text. First, I address the structural affinities between Aristotle and 
Bergson, then their structural differences. The reader can find both similarities and 
differences in 2.1 and 3 respectively. Subsequently I address the contrast between the two in 
terms of empirical domains, as we find in 2.2 and 4.  
 
Structural affinities: anthropomorphism, biomorphism and anthropocentrism  
 
The Aristotelian and Bergsonian teleological frameworks defend a pluralistic vision of nature 
and both understand mankind as an essential part of it. Consequently, they both admit the 
possibility of establishing analogies between human consciousness and natural entities or 
even nature as a whole. As I show in Chapter 2 on Aristotle and Chapter 3 on Bergson, 
analogy is the methodological basis for immanent teleology and implies the rejection of the 
critique of anthropomorphism, according to which the use of analogy means automatically 
transferring human psychological features to nature in an illegitimate way. Note that both 
Aristotle and Bergson reject the possibility of establishing arbitrary analogies between the 
natural world and us, but they still defend that there are goals in nature beyond our 
intellectual goals, hence there is room for some sorts of analogies. They do not support the 
radical critique of anthropomorphism when it is held in every case: there is for them a way of 
establishing correct analogies. Teleology describes life as such, and not merely human life. It 
understands psychology in its original and genuine sense: the limits of the psyche are nothing 
                                                
15 Kullmann, W. “Different concepts of the final cause in Aristotle” in Aristotle on nature and living things. Ed. 





less than the limits of life. Analogy accepts a certain kind of anthropomorphism, provided 
that it describes life as such. In the end, teleology aims to be biomorphism. We share with the 
other living beings our internal perfective drive towards the fulfillment of innate potencies. 
Here is the teleological element: perfection.16 Perfection is the ontological basis for teleology. 
Analogy is its method. 
 
Regarding perfection and analogy, as dealt with in section 2.1 and Chapter 3, there are 
different problems at stake. From perfection and analogy the question of the status of human 
nature arises. Thus, behind these two structural elements of the teleological approach stands 
philosophical anthropology. In accordance with the positions of pluralism and biomorphism, 
both the ancient and the reformed teleological model of immanent teleology reject absolute 
anthropocentrism. In Aristotle and Bergson the world does not exist for the sake of human 
beings. Living beings have their own sake and coexist with human goals. From this 
perspective, teleology is actually compatible with a naturalistic conception of human beings. 
But at the same time, it is important to note that these two pluralistic accounts of nature and 
naturalistic accounts of human beings do not entail that human beings are just equal to other 
species. In fact, that is not the case at all. In the two cases there is an irrefutable hierarchical 
superiority of human beings over the rest of earthly nature. In both, the best human beings do 
not just represent the whole scale of nature through their different faculties but also possess 
unique faculties: Aristotle’s wise man can think like gods do; Bergson’s man can be free and 
creative like the original élan vital. As we can see, these special faculties permit human 
beings to establish special analogies between them and superior levels in the cosmos. Both 
Aristotle and Bergson reject anthropocentrism, since there are not only human goals in 
nature, but they also defend a definite hierarchical scale. This scale offers a nuanced 
pluralism, because, given that there are many different goals in nature, some of these goals 
are simply better.  
 
I claim that in Aristotle there is a “mitigated anthropocentrism”, to the extent that human 
beings are superior to the rest of nature. At the same time, this pluralistic position permits that 
the centrality of humans does not entail the reduction of the rest of goals in nature to human 
goals. 17  In the case of Bergson the problem becomes quite different because of his 
evolutionary perspective, but Bergson also defends a mitigated anthropocentrism.18 Against 
the ancient Platonic world and the modern Cartesian world, Aristotle and Bergson defend 
anthropomorphism: the two have pluralistic approaches to nature and both agree on the 
essential superiority of humans. 
 
Structural distance: the forms, freedom, evolution and time 
 
Until now we have seen some general agreements between Aristotle and Bergson. Now, it is 
time to look at the distance and the clash between them. 
 
In Aristotle the goal is related to the form, which is an indestructible constitutive of every 
substance. According to Aristotle the final cause is intimately linked and sometimes equated 
with the formal cause, thus to the form or eidos. At other times it is related to some specific 
activity, function or érgon (ἔργον). In Bergson there are not forms. We can say that he 
defends a more pragmatic view of individual teleology, one which is more concerned with 
                                                
16 See Chapter 2.1.a. 
17 There is one tension in this reading, as I indicate in the last passage from Aristotle in 2.2.b. 





the function of every living being and not with indestructible items. Bergson considers that 
the function as such can be considered perfection. 
 
In Bergson we have the idea of freedom. He understands freedom as a capacity for self-
creation, for creating newness and overcoming past limits. Bergson attributes this freedom to 
a cosmic force that he calls élan and also to individual human beings. This is a key subject in 
Bergson and cannot be found in Aristotle. While this certainly affects the types of analogies 
employed by Bergson, it does not render the method of analogy invalid altogether. Actually, 
it is part of his reform.19 
 
There is a third difference between them: evolutionary thought. This can be found in the 
problem of Bergsonian mitigated anthropocentrism and the Bergsonian theory of time, both 
discussed in Chapter 3. As I mentioned, evolution challenges the Aristotelian conception of 
an eternal world, composed of perishable individuals and everlasting species. Thus, this 
perspective is a source of philosophical disagreements between the two philosophies. 
 
Within Bergson’s framework there is, as I said, a hierarchy, like there is in Aristotle. But at 
the same time, this hierarchy is substantially different from the Aristotelian one. Bergson was 
born in 1859, the year of the publication of The Origin of Species and thus he grew up in 
Darwin’s world. What we have in Bergson is a historical understanding of the scale of 
beings, which means that plants, basic animals and developed animals lead to human beings, 
chronologically speaking. Human beings are still on the top of this general development, 
although the reasons of that superiority, as I mentioned above, are not exclusively related 
with intellect but also with freedom. In comparison with plants, animals are more 
spontaneous. Humans are essentially the only genuinely free beings, since they can change 
their habits, their ideas, and the face of the earth. Bergson understands the Aristotelian scale 
of freedom not in a vertical static way, but in a horizontal historical way. He also adds 
important additions to the scale, in accordance with his reformative view. The consciousness 
of Life reaches its apex only with human beings. In accordance with the teleological 
argument, the other livings beings represent different “directions” of Life and they have their 
own irreducible goals. The human form is not the goal of the universe, since the goal of the 
universe is freedom. Everything is subordinated to it. To the extent that humans take part in 
freedom to an incomparable extent, they have exclusivity. In Bergson there is pluralism and 
hierarchy, and his evolutionary mitigated anthropocentrism adds fundamental differences to 
Aristotle’s.20 
 
In the comparison between Chapter 2.1 and Chapter 3 we see a great deal of difference 
between these two frameworks that seek to make human beings and their faculties part of the 
natural world, while at the same time giving exclusive privileges to human beings. Privileges 
that are analogous to the contemplative God, in Aristotle, or the Bergsonian élan, which is 
more related to the concept of the soul of the world.  
 
Apart from analogy and perfection, there is another structural element in teleology: 
regularity. This concept is definitely transformed when seen from the evolutionary 
perspective. As we will see in Chapter 2.1, part of the Aristotelian argument in favor of 
teleology as found in Phys.II.8 rests on the notion of regularity. The fulfillment of goals in 
nature, such as the correct growth of teeth among animals, is something regular. Natural 
                                                
19 See 2.1. a and b and 3.1. 





things happen usually or always for the good. Teleological processes happen all the time. 
This is what I call primary teleology. However, in this section I also comment on Phys.II.4-6, 
where Aristotle talks about how to understand things that happen only once. These events are 
produced by chance or fortune, so they are unpredictable and do not happen according to 
forms. There is not the necessity of an ultimate fulfillment. The lucky or unlucky changes are 
not inscribed by nature in the entity. Around these events, according to some scholars, 
Aristotle leaves room for a secondary teleology. These events mean the retrospective 
interpretation of singular and unpredictable events as if they were naturally perfective.  I call 
this narratology. It plays a notable role in Bergson’s global teleology.  
 
In Chapter 3 I show that in Bergson there are two dimensions of temporality regarding 
teleology, both rooted in Aristotle. Primary teleology and secondary teleology are to be 
applied to Bergson’s model too. The adaptive process of an organism in nature is something 
regular. This can be derived from Bergson’s early work MM and also LR. On the contrary, 
the general history of Life and of mankind is not something to be repeated. There are neither 
evolutions nor universal histories. Since they are singular, they are composed of singular 
events that happen only once: this is the realm of freedom in Bergson. This panoramic 
historical vision of Life and human beings related with Bergson’s mature philosophy of the 
élan vital in EC, CV and DS could neither use nor imply the Aristotelian regularity argument. 
Hence, I propose that Aristotle’s theory of chance can find a place in Bergson’s theory of 
finality, too.  
 
I have emphasized the feature of the singularity of history, but the other one, unpredictability, 
is even more important for Bergson. This second understanding of the “time of teleology” 
expresses one of Bergson’s main concerns: to avoid a fatalist global teleology. The 
combination of primary teleology and secondary teleology is one of the major elements of 
Bergson’s reform. Contingence comes to the center of Bergson’s view of nature, in the end, 
for the sake of leaving room for human freedom.  
 
Two domains of teleology: individual function and common function  
 
After talking about the structural affinities and differences between the two teleological 
models, it is still necessary to clarify the different grounds of application. While in the whole 
of Chapter 3 I bring my treatment of teleology in Aristotle into conversation with Bergson’s 
by addressing general philosophical topics in the latter, such as anthropomorphism, 
anthropocentrism, regularity and fatalism, in the fourth and last chapter my approach is more 
concrete and illustrative. I will examine the examples found in these philosophers’ treatises. 
In this way, I aim to make clear how the previous philosophical claims measure up to the 
relevant phenomena. In 2.2, I lay out my twofold understanding of Aristotle’s teleology. In 
Chapter 4 I set up another confrontation between Aristotle with Bergson. I also point out two 
areas in which Bergson’s notion of teleology finds application. However, the twofold view of 
teleology may become evident earlier on its own, in Chapter 3, where I distinguish two main 
areas of the application of analogy, two main types of perfection and two main types of time. 
The general task in Chapter 4, on the other hand, is to make the general ideas more concrete 
by way of multiple examples. 
 
In 2.2 I survey a large variety of phenomena. Basically, I defend the claim that in Aristotle 
we find two main domains of application for the argument regarding the notion of immanent 
teleology. As I said earlier, there is a paradigmatic model: an individual organism is 





of grounds of teleological explanation in Aristotle I start from the biology of living beings 
and move upwards in the Aristotelian scale of being. 
 
As said above in 2.2 I also analyze the few problematic but still crucial passages in Aristotle 
that do not follow the individual model of teleology, but rather the global one, where the télos 
has to do with imitation and participation. The craft analogy is not so present here, but still 
Aristotle proposes analogies with the intentional world, like the army, the household, or 
analogical terms like “imitation”.  
 
I defend a comprehensive view of Aristotle’s teleology because I really find no problem, as 
many scholars do, in admitting two domains of teleology, the individual and the big-scale 
teleology.21 I call the first one the teleology of development. The second, the cosmic one, is in 
my account called the teleology of contribution, a term that I prefer over the recurrent 
expression of the “aim”. In short, I find that these are the two basic irreducible meanings of 
télos behind the different passages in the corpus. Note that the second global meaning is an 
addition to the first individual meaning of perfection, and does not diminish it. Undeniably, in 
terms of his doctrine, Aristotle poorly develops the cosmic understanding of the term télos. 
Also, the texts are few in comparison with the innumerable accounts of individual teleology 
in Aristotle. However, the passages which speak to a global teleology are indeed present in 
Aristotle’s work and their content is both important and clear. 
 
As we move upwards in the scale of being, in Chapter 4, I systematically deal with the 
phenomena that can be applied to teleology in Bergson. In the exhaustive set of examples I 
examine in this regard, I start from simple living beings. The main thing to note about 
Chapter 4 is that I also follow a twofold teleological scheme; in Bergson I distinguish a 
developmental teleology, which I call conservative teleology. This concerns individual living 
entities, including humans (regarding certain human faculties), as well as transgressive global 
teleology. The last one involves some exclusively human faculties as well as overarching 
tendencies, such as the élan vital, which runs through evolution and human history. 
Conservative teleology may include concepts such as survival, reproduction and well-being. 
It addresses the conservation of the individual and the species.  
 
Let me refer here only to one particularly illustrative example. In the organic context of MM, 
Bergson says that action is the “fundamental law of life,”22 and living corporeal beings are 
“centers of action,”23 namely of “useful”24 and “effective action.”25 There is a main aim for 
this activity: “to adapt ourselves to a present situation.”26 And, finally, the “purpose and 
function of our nervous system” is adaptation.27 From this arise Bergson’s concepts of 
regularity and of “attention to life”, which contain teleological assumptions.  
 
Some Aristotelian scholars have already claimed that behind the Darwinian concept of 
adaptation there is, in the end, a root of Aristotelian teleology, since being adapting in order 
                                                
21 For the scholars that defend global teleology in Aristotle, see 2.2.b.  
22 MM, p. 150. 
23 MM, pp. 228 and 242. 
24 I mean “vital utility”, for the sake of life itself.  
25 MM, p. 154. 
26 MM, p. 151. 





to survive is the goal of all living beings as well as each species.28 Famous historians of 
biology have endorsed the Aristotelian background of the concept of adaptation.29 To this 
extent, my work on Bergson follows this line of thinking. “Function” and “adaptation” are 
part of Bergson’s new model of immanent teleology. I comment in detail on these and other 
passages concerning adaptation in Chapter 4.1. 
 
The sort of progress which falls under transgressive teleology is brought about thanks to 
certain biological and historical trends (the ones that lead towards the progress of the 
locomotive functions and the development of the brain); religious, philosophical or cultural 
trends (especially, Christianity); normal humans and spiritual heroes (artists, saints, 
philosophers). Progress should be understood here as a gradual common good, it implies 
change (not conservation) for the better.  
 
In the case of the teleology of individuals or in ethics, Bergson calls the goal “destination”. It 
means, on one hand, self-development, and on the other, enhancing the world. Bergson 
writes: “Nature warns us by a clear sign that our destination is attained. That sign is joy”, and 
adds “wherever there is joy, there is creation; the richer the creation, the deeper the joy.”30 
Individual freedom is a combination of the two domains of teleology in Bergson. It implies 
an individual beneficiary (the personal fulfillment), and at the same time, it refers to the 
concept of creation which, as I show later on, means a contribution to more general orders.  
 
Bergson’s cosmology is teleological when he says that “the impetus of life (…) consists in a 
need for creation” and adds that the cosmos “strives to introduce into it the largest possible 
amount of indetermination and liberty.”31 The passage deals with one natural tendency: its 
need points to its goal, to how it would be satisfied. To some extent, human beings represent 
an attainment of that goal. The human being “continues the vital movement indefinitely.”32  
Human beings are the “culminating point of evolution and they are nearest the source.”33 I 
note again that this does not mean that humans are the overarching goal of nature understood 
as a whole. They are not. To be sure, the only goal of nature is freedom. That is the télos, the 
perfective feature here. This statement has a major status in Bergson’s philosophy of nature. 
 
While the need for nature is stated categorically as something regular, the rest of Bergson’s 
large-scale account of Life and history, found scattered over different places, emphasizes that 
these are an unpredictable by-product of contingency. He defends a perfective panoramic 
vision but he does not claim that this is a matter of necessity. Bergson reforms the 
Aristotelian vertical scale of beings. He interprets the “chain of being”34 in horizontal and 
                                                
28 Lennox, James. “Darwin was a Teleologist”. Biology and Philosophy. 8. 1998 and Gotthelf, Allan. “Darwin 
on Aristotle”.Journal of the History of Biology. Volume 32, March,1999. Also: Judson, Lindsay. “Aristotelian 
teleology”. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29:341-66, 2005, p. 355. 
29 See Mayr, Ernst.”The idea of teleology”. Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 53, No. 1. Jan.-Mar, 1992. 
“Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology”, Ayala, Francisco. Philosophy of Science. Vol. 37, No. 1. 
Mar., 1970, and Ruse, Michael. “Teleology: yesterday, today, and tomorrow?”. Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part C Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31(1): 
2000.  
30 ES, p. 29. 
31EC, p. 251. My emphasis. In the translation there is “need of creation”, while I prefer “need for creation”. I 
will put always “for”. Also  EC, p. 261.  
32 EC, p. 266. 
33  “Life and consciousness” (CV) in ES, p. 32. Also EC, p. 264. 






historical terms. The vegetable form first, the animal form next, and finally the human form 
describe a progress directed toward indetermination, which, at the same time, is contingent. 
The vegetable, animal, and human forms were not inscribed in any plan. They are not 
necessary as such and there is merely retrospective teleology in the singular and 
unpredictable event of Life and also history. In addition, Bergson defends the branching 
pattern of Darwinism, according to which evolution is illustrated by the “tree of life”. There 
is then a plurality of branches and lineages in Life. But singularity, unpredictability, and the 
branching pattern do not mean that Bergson overcomes the model of the scale of beings. In 
4.2.b I offer a detailed a teleological reading of his history of life. In sum, he combines 
secondary teleology and the tree of life with the ladder of perfection and mitigated 
anthropocentrism. What is central, in regard to Bergson, is that despite contingencies and 
irregularities there is one cosmic goal, invariable and constant: indetermination. That is what 
I understand when he, cryptically, says that “the essential function of the universe” is to be a 
“machine for the making of gods.”35  
 
Thus, what in Aristotle is táxis or order, in Bergson is progress. To some extent these notions 
are as opposite as stability and change, but the two of them employ the same contributive 
teleological model. In this respect, the two cosmic-army passages are quite illustrative: in 
Aristotle we have a static general arrangement of different substances, in Bergson’s army 
there is an army in “space and time” which moves forwards.36 Again, in Bergson the wide-
scale teleology is much more common than in Aristotle. Also, in Bergson the analogy of the 
self/Nature as microcosmos/macrocosmos is widely used, while it is not Aristotle. As I said, 
Bergson is an original interpreter of the model of immanent teleology, which means that he 
offers new paradigms for both analogies and perfection, two notions that, implicit or 
explicitly, he used massively.  
 
While I said that the model of adaptation has gained attention from Aristotelian scholars, the 
model of progress has been mostly ignored. It is understandable since we have now moved 
far beyond Aristotle’s framework, although prominent interpreters such as Guthrie37 and 
                                                
35 DS, p. 317, my emphasis.  
36 I comment on this both in 2.2.b and in 4.2.b, respectively. In Aristotle see Met. XII.10.1075a10-25. In 
Bergson see EC, pp. 270-271.  
37 Guthrie says this in two different books. I transcribe the two passages because they are clear and useful: “in 
introducing the conception, one must say first of all that teleology as Plato and Aristotle understood it demanded 
the actual existence of the télos or end, that is, of a perfection under whose influence the activity of the natural 
world takes place. This is not a necessary presupposition of the idea of ordered progress. Ordered progress is a 
perfectly possible conception without the assumption that the perfection, or goal to which it is tending already 
exists somewhere. This is indeed the idea favoured by a modern evolutionary biologist like Julian Huxley”. The 
Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle. Routlege, London, 2006, pp. 130-131. 30 years later, Guthrie 
reformulates the same comparison, Aristotle/Huxley, so useful for our purpose, since it can be applied to my 
comparison Aristotle/Huxley. In the following passage, Guthrie adds a metaphor which can complete our 
conception of global teleology with no télos: “For him [Aristotle] there could be no progress that was not 
towards something and you could not progress towards something unless it existed. In the (evolutionist) 
metaphor in which emergent is intended here to suggest we cannot picture a light object as in the process of 
rising from the bottom of the sea to the surface unless there is a surface always ahead of it, up to which it is 
progressing. In Aristotle’s view, we and the world are like that object, ever trying to reach the surface, which 
remains ever above us. To apply the same metaphor to [Julian] Huxley’s, we should have to say that the world is 
like the level sheet of water itself, which is rising and rising –but rising into nothingness, or at least, into what 
was nothingness before and only exists as nature reaches it “. A history of Greek philosophy. VI. Cambridge 





Owens38 have noted the affinity between Aristotle’s global teleology and global evolutionary 
teleologies. My argument follows their brief remarks.  
 
My intention throughout the work will never be to force the similarity between the two. 
Bergson has to face his own problems, which are absent from, if not contradictory with, the 
whole framework of Aristotle.39 Let me highlight two here. First, Bergson has to leave his 
transgressive teleology open, since transgression implies overcoming but not arriving at 
anything definite. Regarding individual transgressive teleology there is only one example: 
human beings. As any teleologist approach to the human being, Bergson’s defends 
eudaimonology. The fulfillment of the human goal means happiness, and in this case, the 
goal is precisely to create oneself. Personal maturity involves attaining your personal goal. 
Although this perspective is quite regular nowadays, I believe it harbors a paradox: i.e., the 
possibility of a teleology towards non-existing items. Bergson’s global teleology only 
expands the creative paradox. The teleology of the “wave which rises”40 has a natural origin 
and a natural need but, again, there is no fixed télos to attain. This leaves room for 
unpredictability and freedom in the world, but also entails a paradoxical claim: namely, a 
teleology without a télos.41 The second issue I believe to be more serious, because Bergson 
seems to not be aware of it and because it menaces the core of his entire philosophy: 
individual responsibility. Given that there is freedom in Life, Bergson didn’t differentiate 
clearly between this overarching impetus and us, mere individuals. As we will see, Bergson 
sometimes talks about the freest human individuals as if they emerged from nature. The 
notion of self-creativity presents a stringent vision of freedom and human capacities, and it 
can be difficult to make it fit with a more general freedom in a compatibilist way, as we have 
in Aristotle. One can ask, finally, to whom belongs this freedom that goes through history, 
the progressive impetus that prolongs the biological élan vital. The problem of naturalizing 
humans (they all have goals, like any other being) and spiritualizing nature (the particular 
goal of nature, understood as a whole, is like the human’s goal: freedom) is that they can 
easily become conflated and confused.  
 
While I enter into the highly controversial field of Aristotle’s scholarly publications with a 
comprehensive understanding, I concentrate the polemic side of my research on the 
Bergsonian flank. I affirm that this topic is not merely something to be found in Bergson, but 
even that it permits us to read his entire work as a continuous development of the same core 
idea.42 Moreover, I see that in Bergson’s work the two types of teleology, the “two irreducible 
                                                
38 For instance, Owens compare Teilhard De Chardin’s “noophere” evolutionary notion with Aristotle’s human 
historical stage. Owens, Joseph. “Teleology of nature in Aristotle”. Some philosophical issues in moral matters. 
The collected ethical writings of Joseph Owens. Ed. Billy-T.Kennedy. Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae. 
Edalcalf, Roma, 1996.  
39 Bergson himself says: “the idea of creation doesn’t exist in any degree in the ancient philosophy”. Bergson, 
Henri. L’évolution du problème de la liberté. Cours au collège de France. 1904-1905. PUF, Paris, 2017, p. 298. 
See overall the sessions of the 27th of January 1905 and 3th of February of 1905.  
40 EC, p. 293 
41 Deleuze noted this idea, although he does not seem to see any paradox: “There is finality because life does not 
operate without directions; but there is no ‘goal’, because these directions do not pre-exist ready-made, and are 
themselves created ‘along with’ the act that runs through them.” Deleuze, Gilles. Le bergsonisme. [Bergsonism] 
Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Zone Books, NY, 1991, p. 106. 
42 According to Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis. “Bergson’s secret,” that is, the original intuition of all his 
philosophy, is the idea of unity of spirit and duality of the self. This author is applying to Bergson the theory of 
the original intuition found in “The philosophical intuition”, in PM. Le secret de Bergson. Éditions du Félin, 





senses of life,”43 are finally articulated in his last important work, DS. Thus, I hold a not only 
continuist but even a progressivist reading of Bergson’s career. I deduce teleology from some 
aspects in DI, such as personal maturity. Yet, properly speaking the teleological model, based 
on functions and efficiency, appears in MM with regard to individual conservative teleology. 
EC is, in every sense, much more focused on transgressive global teleology, although it 
contains some important passages on conservative teleology like embryology and ethology. 44 


































                                                
43 Worms, Frédéric. Bergson ou les deux sens de la vie. PUF, Paris, 2004, p.18-19. 
44 Viellard Baron, Jean-Louis. Le secret de Bergson. Op. cit., p. 162. Vieillard-Baron notes three ways of 
understanding the whole work of Bergson. First, the most common, he says, is to study all his essays as a 
succession of independent works. Secondly, there is Alain De Lattre’s and, I add, Kolakowsky’s account, which 
finds rupture in his works. In short, Bergson starts elaborating a philosophy of consciousness or phenomenology 
and turns to continue within a cosmology or philosophy of life. Thirdly, there is a “continuist” account.44 The 
author mentions Thibaudet and Jankélévich,44 and could have mentioned the more recent Riquier and Worms. 
Riquier, Camille. Archéologie de Bergson. PUF, Paris, 2009. Worms, Frédéric. Bergson ou les deux sens de la 
vie. PUF, Paris, 2004. My vision is partially continuist. I think there is a dualistic vision of teleology in Bergson. 











1. The reform of immanent teleology 
 
 
1.1. Anti-teleological readings of Bergson  
 
In section 1.1, I will deal with two main issues, to be addressed in the following two 
subsections, 1.1a and 1.1b. First, I want to lay out my overall view of Bergson in comparison 
with general accounts of his philosophy. I want to emphasize concepts such as substance, 
function, order and hierarchy in Bergson against the depiction of Bergson’s world like a 
chaotic, blind Heraclitean flux of pure becoming or any kind of mysticism. I seek to 
introduce our topic, teleology, through that general set of traditional concepts. To be sure, 
Bergson is a philosopher who held a dynamic vision of the world and life, but at the same 
time he is a philosopher of order, which means directedness. That is, order and dynamism are 
both part of his philosophy.  
 
Second, I will tackle the main issue: the anti-teleological readings of Bergson. Such 
interpretations, as already mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, consider the 
pages in which Bergson discusses teleological questions with regard to its method and 
ontological status. These scholarly readings rely upon concrete passages in EC.I and II. These 
two chapters are the only texts where Bergson talks about teleology as a philosophical 
problem. Furthermore, he is there concerned only with global teleology, not individual 
teleology (as one could find in MM). The anti-teleological interpretations emphasize 
Bergson’s criticism of finalism in EC.I and II. Apart from the relevant readings of these texts, 
there are two short late Bergsonian texts that have attracted the attention of certain scholars: 
PR, an article published in 1930, and one important private letter to Floris Delattre, written in 
1935. These two texts certainly deserve attention for they contain important claims.  
 
After critically examining the anti-teleological readings, I will address my own interpretation 
in 1.2. Basically, I do not play down the importance of these critical accounts by Bergson, but 
I place them within a broader context, the context of a reform of the classical view of 
teleology In 1.2 I discuss the textual basis for holding this assertion. 
 
1.1.a. General vision of Bergson: persistence of substances and global hierarchy 
 
It is true that in some parts of Bergson’s works can be found statements in which 
consciousness and the universe are described as “pure becoming”, “pure progress” with no 
direction, substances, or goals.45 Bergson uses the metaphor of the river and the flux on 
several occasions talking about inner consciousness. Apparently, this has given rise to the 
temptation to interpret his philosophy as a certain kind of modern development of Heraclitus’ 
theory of the universal flux of pure becoming:46 indeed, the critical accounts written in the 
40’s by Bertrand Russell and Garrigou-Lagrange bring up Heraclitus  when talking about 
                                                
45 “There are changes, but there are underneath the change no things which change: change has no need of a 
support. There are movements, but there is no inert or invariable object which moves: movement does not imply 
a mobile”. PM, p. 304. Note 19.  
46 This interpretation of Heraclitus can be found in Plato (Cratylus, 402a). See: “Excursus I: On traditional 
interpretations of the cosmic cycle”, in Kahn, Charles. The art and thought of Heraclitus. An edition with the 
fragments with translation and commentary. Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 147. See also JLuce, J. V. An 





Bergson. 47 In fact, this has become a regular assumption. In my opinion, this leads to a 
misinterpretation of Bergson’s view of movement and time. It only emphasizes one aspect of 
our individual experience of the world and disregards the complete picture.  
 
Bergson was aware of this Heraclitean reading. During his lifetime, namely, in his later years, 
Bergson publicly rejected the philosophical Heraclitean-flux genealogy. 48  According to 
Fruteau de Laclos, 49  in response to Jacques Maritain’s attack in “La philosophie 
bergsonienne”, 50  Bergson added these words in a footnote to the re-publication of 
Introduction to Metaphysics: 
 
“From the fact that a being is action can one conclude that its existence is evanescent? What more 
does anyone say than I have said, in making it reside in a “substratum”, which has nothing determined 
about it, since, by hypothesis, its determination, and consequently its essence, is this very action? 
Does an existence thus conceived ever cease to be present to itself, real duration implying the 
persistence of the past into the present and the indivisible continuity of an unfolding?”51. 
 
In order to know the possible nature of that “evanescent” existence’s doctrine it is necessary 
to read the subsequent note to the same text. In his later complaint, Bergson completes the 
earlier one, by attributing the theory to the philosopher Heraclitus: 
 
“Let me insist I am thereby in no way setting aside substance. On the contrary, I affirm the 
persistence of existences. And I believe I have facilitated their representation. How was it ever 
possible to compare this doctrine with the doctrine of Heraclitus?”52  
I think this particular case is, actually, illustrative of a certain kind of assumed general vision 
of Bergsonism, which is still active nowadays. But Bergson had a more moderate conception 
of being as flux. It is a more dynamic conception of substances and, we saw, a functional 
conception of that dynamism.53 This functional conception relies on two notions: persistence 
and action. One could add, action for the sake of persistence. Persistence in time means 
persistence of the continuity of the past in the present. That is, persistence has to be 
understood as that which is for the sake of existence.  
 
On several occasions, Bergson called this active dynamism “progress”. He used the term in 
his first essay onwards. It became one of his most used mantras: “We have to do here not 
with an object, but with a progress”.54 He repeated in similar forms that substances should 
actually be called progresses, since they are continually changing. Thus, our self is a progress 
                                                
47 Russell, Bertrand. Chapter 28. “Bergson” in The history of Western philosophy. Routledge, London, 2004, 
and Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald. Le réalisme du principe de finalité. [El realismo del principio de finalidad] 
Trans. Joaquín Ferrandis.  Desclée de Brouwer, Madrid, 1949. See the First Part, “The being, the becoming and 
the finality”. These two books were published for the first time in 1946 and 1949, respectively. 
48 On “temporalism” Bergson refers also Heraclitus. Letter of 4 juilet 1911 to Lovejoy. Bergson, Henri. Écrits 
philosophiques, PUF, Paris, 2011, p. 405.  
49 PM, Notes, 2012, p. 442. 
50 “La philosophie bergsonienne” published by Jacques Maritain in Études critiques in 1913. Apparently, 
according to Fruteau de Laclos the article appeared in 1903. Notice that Bergson’s note was added in 1934. That 
is, 31 years after. A pretty long period for a response.  
51 Footnote 19. PM, p. 304. 
52 Footnote 23. PM, p. 304, italics are mine. 
53 I take the expression from Lacey. “He [Bergson] seems to want the more moderate flux doctrine that 
everything is always changing in certain respects –certain definite respects, not just that everything is always 
changing in at least one respect”. Lacey, R. Bergson. Routledge, London, 1989, p. 110.  





in constant change. He also describes the tendency of the spirit to move throughout the brain 
and body for the sake of efficiency as a progress. Individual beings, substances, can also be 
progress.55 And there is in Bergson the idea of common change towards better new stages in 
life and in cultures. That is the genuine idea of progress. 
 
In DI, when Bergson is talking about the continuum of duration of the human soul, he seems 
to talk about an a-teleological stream. Especially in DI.II, duration seems to be just a flux of 
time. However, even there I find one hint of perfectiveness. Among the different features of 
human consciousness, Bergson emphasizes irreversibility and a tendency toward maturity. 
This is surely clearer in the third chapter. Only DI.III (the last chapter of the essay) shows 
what is the goal of this irreversible progress: freedom. Even in DI it can be deduced that 
maturity and personal growth are meant to be the flourishing point of the process. The idea of 
pure becoming does not fit in my view with the whole scheme of DI. It is true, on the other 
hand, that Bergson emphasizes throughout the text, and specially in DI.II, the idea of progress 
in the sense of pure becoming. Bergson keeps using the term progress in MM, and EC, and 
DS, for other purposes. In those essays, this term implies efficiency or growth toward some 
better stage. Progress is most of the times a teleological notion in Bergson.56 His dynamic 
vision of reality does not entail an evanescent flux of pure becoming, but a teleological 
progress.57 
 
In general, progress is a directed movement. Progressive vision of movement presupposes an 
optimistic vision of natural movements, since progress is meant to be for the better. In this 
sense, progress has to do with the notion of the good, the end, perfection, and completeness. 
In Bergson there is progress everywhere. Something with no efficiency is unnatural, since 
being and functioning is the same thing.  
 
In Bergson’s view, “that which does nothing is nothing” (“ce qui ne fait rien n’est rien”).58 
Things are not mere objects, static structures. They are constantly changing. They are 
progressing. This progress has some direction, according to Bergson. This direction is 
efficacy or function. All throughout Bergson’s works, progress goes hand in hand with 
another concept which is significantly teleological. This concept is that of ‘destination’. 
‘Destination of the body’, ‘destination of the soul’, ‘destination of laughter’, ‘destination of 
life’ are some of his concepts. I examine their meaning in 4.1. 
 
In Bergson we also find a clear hierarchy of beings, suggested by a number of claims in his 
texts. Despite his many concerns regarding physics, I would say that he was mainly focused 
on biology and anthropology.59 The theory of action and substances has to be understood 
regarding biological and ethical beings, which are their paradigm. He considered the 
biological world as a hierarchy: amoebas, humans, dogs, Cambrian animals, wolves, 
Hymenopterans, carnivorous plants are considered in different degrees from the bottom to the 
top. So, while they are alive, as an individual or as species, they persist on earth. While they 
occupy different levels of the general scale, they are more or less perfect. There are thus 
                                                
55 For another approach to Bergson and substances: Waszkinel, Romuald et Hejno, Eugeniusz. “L’inspiration 
aristotélicienne de la métaphysique de Bergson”. Revue Philosophique de Louvain. vol. 89, nº82, 1991 
56 Against my interpretation of progress A. François in Note 12 to the first chapter of EC. EC, 2009, p. 396.  
57 For the opposite view of “progress” in Bergson, Arnaud François in EC, 2007, note 12, p. 396.  
58 “In such a doctrine, time is still spoken of: one pronounces the word, but one does not think of the thing. For 
time is here deprived of efficacy, and if it does nothing, it is nothing” EC, p. 39.  





different levels of persistence, which Bergson understands in hierarchical terms. Again, there 
are no evanescent fluxes of pure becoming and nature can be rationalized.  
 
At some point, around 1900, Bergson becomes an evolutionary thinker, but he remained 
strongly hierarchical in his view of nature. He reintegrates hierarchy together with change or 
evolution. In historical evolutionary terms, this hierarchy can be found in the progress from 
plants to animals, and that from animals to humans. In DS he does not believe those humans 
described at the time as primitives are by nature biologically inferior to modern citizens (and 
he emphasized that), but he believed that societies or cultures in history should be understood 
according to the biological scale of perfection. Industrial democracy is ranked on the top of 
the scale, and the primitive societies reported by Lévy-Bruhl or Durkheim stand at the lowest 
end. On the other hand, he saw a clear, but peculiar, continuity between the prehistoric 
hatchets discovered in Moulin-Quignon, in the 19th century, and the machine Newcomen. 
Each epoch fits into one hierarchical category. Despite his democratic approach to the human 
being, it is a matter of fact that he establishes a sharp natural distinction among humans: on 
one hand, there is the regular human, on the other, the spiritual genius. His anthropology and 
sociology cannot be understood without this distinction. It seems to me that he inherited it 
from his milieu in that century. Socrates, Christ, Jean of Arch, Shakespeare, San Juan de la 
Cruz or Rousseau all have by nature a specific task to fulfill within societies: they create the 
future and we, regular people, imitate them. This is Bergson’s historical view, according to 
which the genius creates newness, we transform it in habit, and ultimately the newness is lost 
again.  
 
On one hand, we have seen that, for Bergson, everything has a specific action, and there is a 
plurality of actions. On the other hand, there is a hierarchy of those active beings. This means 
both that all living beings are meant to fulfill some function and that there is a scale of 
activities and living beings.  
 
1.1.b. Bergson criticizes finalism 
 
With the foregoing in mind, I will now highlight Bergson’s critiques of finalism. Afterwards, 
I will address the scholarly commentaries on Bergson. They are representative of the usual 
reading of Bergson regarding this topic. Since the discussion of teleology appears exclusively 
in EC.I and II, his position and the commentaries are addressed exclusively to transgressive 
global teleology and not conservative individual teleology. This is important, since only one 
part of my claims have been discussed openly by Bergson and, subsequently, his 
commentators. Note that my interpretation in 1.1 and 1.2 regarding the idea of critique and 
reform of finalism has to be addressed to global transgressive teleology, and not to 
conservative teleology. I claim that Bergson also was a reformer of the latter, and as far as I 
can tell, other commentators haven’t held this opinion.  
 
In 1.1 and 1.2, global transgressive teleology—or, in other words, the élan vital—will attract 
almost all our attention, given its importance for the usual interpretations of Bergson in this 
regard, which is  the focus of this section. The concrete context is thus exclusively global 
teleology and evolution.  
 
The question is whether the elán vital is a version of finalism or whether it is ultimately 
incompatible with finalism. According to a number of scholars in EC.I and II, Bergson rejects 
finalism, in the name of his own position. There, Bergson criticizes modern mechanism and 





equidistantly from the positions of philosophical mechanism (his lifelong enemy) and global 
finalism, a masked global mechanism. On this view, Bergson’s views are just alien to 
teleology. For Bergson, as Jankélévich points out, finalism is an “insincere defender of life”.60 
General accounts agree on this, such as Jankélévich’s, Troitignon’s, or more recently 
Pearson’s. According to them, the Bergsonian vision of evolution is just different from global 
teleology. Bergson’s vital impulse is just Bergsonism, an original point of view, and the two 
other “isms” are equally alien to it. Even the title of the first chapter of the text leads us to 
think that this is correct: “The Evolution of Life: Mechanism and Finalism”. This “and” is 
thus a geometrical midterm.  
 
Thus, the label “finalism” cannot be applied to the author of EC. Therefore, Bergson’s idea of 
élan vital or of psychological agency among insects in EC.II have then nothing to do with 
matter, atoms and inertial causal laws (mechanism). Equally, they have nothing to do with 
perfectiveness, general progress and the analogy between human consciousness and natural 
entities (teleology). Life, then, is sheer spontaneity with neither direction nor order. 
Directedness is not compatible with freedom and contingency. Moreover, Bergson’s method 
has nothing to do with finalism, and it is just his own method, based on intuition and 
sympathy. Such are the upshots of this interpretation. 
 
In my view, this frequent interpretation of the book is not just obscure, but inconsistent. It is 
rooted in Bergson’s eventual ambivalence regarding the topic.61 In light of this, I will now 
check the precise texts in which Bergson attacks finalism or teleology and I will address his 
claims. 
 
- Critique of fatalism.  
 
The main passage on the topic of fatalism is the following. If everything is directed towards 
something, then there is no room in nature for contingency and, thus, for human freedom.  
 
“Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs from the same postulate, with this 
sole difference, that in the movement of our finite intellects along successive things, whose 
successiveness is reduced to a mere appearance, it holds in front of us the light with which it claims to 
guide us, instead of putting it behind. It substitutes the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the 
past” (EC, pp. 37-38, italics are mine). 
 
EC was published in the years of the “eclipse of Darwinism”.62 Primarily, the book attacks 
the positivist and scientific conception of life itself and evolution: i.e., mechanism. According 
to Spencer, who represents the “false evolutionism”63, Charles Darwin and Thomas Huxley 
conceive living beings as mechanisms, that is, part of a great mechanism, composed by 
matter. Bergson says: 
	  
 “But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again. As 
in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given”.64 
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“All is given” is the mechanistic “postulate” referred to in the previous text above. The 
philosophers and biologists, in Bergson’s opinion, conceive living beings as physical matter. 
That is, an elementary substance, decomposable into atoms, moved basically by inertial 
forces of causality. This point of view posits a continual passivity in the cosmos and, in 
Bergson’s opinion, also denies the possibility of real change. Everything is predesigned in 
the constitution of matter, so change does not actually occur. Therefore, thanks to this view, 
we humans tend to disregard the immediate data of our life: the pure progress or pure change 
of the deep self. The mechanistic view clashes with human consciousness, and the problem of 
change is close to the problem of freedom. The “all is given” assumption leads to serious 
problems according to Bergson. Quite temerariously, I would say, Bergson extends the “all is 
given” point of view to philosophers of evolution and also mere biologists of different kinds.  
 
At this point, one might ask where exactly Darwin says that the cosmos is matter in which all 
is given, and that every living being is a mechanism. Very opportunely, Bergson finds a 
quotation by the Darwinian Thomas Huxley, sometimes known as “Darwin’s bulldog”:  
 
“If the fundamental proposition of evolution is true, that the entire world, living and not living, is the 
result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of 
which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed, it is no less certain that the existing 
world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapor, and that a sufficient intellect could, from a knowledge of 
the properties of the molecules of that vapor, have predicted, say the state of the Fauna of Great 
Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapor of the breath in a 
cold winter's day”.65 
According to Bergson, the mentioned “sufficient intellect” is a 19th century version of 
“Laplace’s demon”.66 The demon is, in Bergson’s insight, the great paradigm, moreover the 
myth of science. Laplace’s demon is “a superhuman intellect [that] could calculate, for any 
moment of time, the position of any point of the system in space. And as there is nothing 
more in the form of the whole than the arrangement of its parts, the future forms of the 
system are theoretically visible in its present configuration”.67 By this “sufficient intellect”, 
Huxley is then included in the lineage of philosophers of mechanicism, which ultimately 
includes the various classical approaches to evolution, Spencer and Darwin among them.  
In Bergson’s opinion, positivism and science tend to think that the “… living body might be 
treated by some superhuman calculator in the same mathematical way as our solar system, 
this has gradually arisen from a metaphysic which has taken a more precise form since the 
physical discoveries of Galileo”.68 Thus, Bergson holds that the mechanistic view leads to 
fatalism. Evolutionary theories are, in general, mechanistic. Evolutionary biologists such as 
Huxley and evolutionary philosophers such as Spencer tend to elaborate a fatalist doctrine. 
Bergson considers it a “false evolutionism”.  
Up until now, we have seen the context of EC. With regard to his criticism of teleology, on 
the other hand, Bergson holds that it can lead to fatalism. General teleology, considered as a 
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cosmic program of God, is what Bergson considers “radical teleology” and it is represented 
by Leibniz, who, in Bergson’s opinion, did not made room for real freedom.69  
If we go back to the first quotation of the section, a quotation underlined by many scholars, 
we see that he is exclusively referring to teleology qua fatalism. As we saw, Bergson writes: 
“Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism”. He is actually referring to the 
sentences immediately preceding that one:  
“(…) radical finalism is quite as unacceptable [as mechanism], and for the same reason. The doctrine of 
teleology, in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibniz for example, implies that things and beings merely realize 
a program previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time 
is useless again. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given”.70 
The lineage of thinkers who endorse the “all is given” claim becomes even broader now: 
Leibniz-Laplace-Spencer-Darwin-Huxley. Before Laplace, we had fatalist theology. 
Afterwards we have fatalist biology. Huxley represents the mechanistic view of the universe, 
in which all is given. Leibniz represents the finalistic account of the universe in which all is 
given. Huxley inverts Leibniz’s attraction to some already finished program, made by god, 
with the impulsion of a material world, devoid of god.  
Leibniz’s finalism, “thus understood”, is, as we have seen, an “extreme form” of finalism. 
The “inverted mechanism” label is regularly stressed by Bergson’s commentators, but it is 
clearly applied to Leibniz, in the framework of an extrinsic and transcendent vision of 
teleology. Finalism is not always “inverted mechanism” but only “thus understood”. Bergson 
is here referring to Leibnizian nature understood as a “plan of god”. 
This is the main feature for Bergson’s most common anti-teleologist characterization. 
According to this scholarly reading, in Bergson there are not natural goals, since they 
constrain real becoming, since they imply that all is given. In my view this doesn’t prove 
anything other than the fact that Bergson rejects extrinsic teleology, whereby God governs 
the world by imposing a rigid order on the material becoming.  
 
This shows that Bergson, like Aristotle, does not believe in a providential teleology, but in an 
immanent one. This also shows that in Bergson’s interpretation, there is a philosophical 
genealogy that roots materialism within mechanical theology. Leibniz’s theological vision 
leads to fatalism. Equally, Spencer’s materialistic account of evolution leads to fatalism. 
Between them there is Laplace, who is the founder of the myth of science: the demon. 
Laplace’s demon, naturally, leads to fatalism. Thus, if teleology leads to fatalism, then it is 
indeed a reverted mechanism.  
 
Throughout his works, fatalism is the main focus of his worries, even at the very beginning of 
his work.71 Bergson’s main concern is to distinguish the general tendency toward perfection 
that he calls élan vital from fatalism. Bergson considers that teleology, understood as 
providentialist philosophical fatalism, has “humiliated” mankind. He says this in a short text 
called “The possible and the real”, which deals again with the topic of global teleology: 
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“Humbled heretofore in an attitude of obedience, slaves of certain vaguely-felt natural 
necessities, we shall once more stand erect, masters associated with a greater Master”.72  
 
- Critique of anthropomorphism 
 
In EC we also have a critique of the finalistic method. It consists in extrapolating structural 
features from the intentional and rational mind to unconscious nature. Bergson is then 
criticizing “finalism” as an illusion based on our intellectual experience of nature. The name 
Leibniz is not mentioned here and it seems that this criticism can be applied to many finalist 
philosophers apart from Leibniz. Bergson is criticizing the finalist’s method: 
anthropomorphism. 
“The error of radical finalism, as also that of radical mechanism, is to extend too far the application of 
certain concepts that are natural to our intellect. Originally, we think only in order to act. Our 
intellect has been cast in the mold of action. Speculation is a luxury, while action is a necessity. Now, 
in order to act, we begin by proposing an end; we make a plan, then we go on to the detail of the 
mechanism which will bring it to pass. This latter operation is possible only if we know what we can 
reckon on. We must therefore have managed to extract resemblances from nature, which enable us to 
anticipate the future. (…) We are born artisans as we are born geometricians, and indeed we are 
geometricians only because we are artisans. Thus the human intellect, inasmuch as it is fashioned for 
the needs of human action, is an intellect which proceeds at the same time by intention and by 
calculation, by adapting means to ends and by thinking out mechanisms of more and more 
geometrical form. Whether nature be conceived as an immense machine regulated by mathematical 
laws, or as the realization of a plan, these two ways of regarding it are only the consummation of two 
tendencies of mind which are complementary to each other, and which have their origin in the same 
vital necessities. For that reason, radical finalism is very near radical mechanism on many points. 
Both doctrines are reluctant to see in the course of things generally, or even simply in the 
development of life, an unforeseeable creation of form”.73 
This passage is to be understood as complementary to the previous one. It can be conceived 
as a confirmation of the first critique regarding fatalism. In short, the analogical method leads 
to fatalism. Our need to foresee, our project of controlling the environment, is the origin of 
the problematic assumptions. The text shows the empirical basis of the illusion of finalism.  
 
We can ask, then, whether Bergson is against the extrapolation of mind to nature. We can 
wonder whether Bergson, like other philosophers, thought that the analogy between humans 
and the natural world is illegitimate. This rejection cannot be possible. This is obvious, since 
Bergson constantly proposes the analogy between the human mind and life. He even talks 
about consciousness and consciousness in general. “The first chapter [of EC] it is structured 
around a vast analogy” says Arnaud François.74 I believe that is the case. The book would not 
propose to criticize analogies in general then. The critique consists in two ideas.  
 
First, the difference stated in the text between luxury and necessity has to be considered. That 
is the sense of the two sorts of teleology I will develop. The artisan, the geometer, and the 
intellect are linked together as adaptation, and adaptation is necessity and action. That is one 
kind of progress. The structural basis of the technician, the thinker, and the adapted are 
basically the same type of tendency. On the contrary, speculation, luxury and the 
“unforeseeable creation of form” are left aside. They seem to be apart from action itself. They 
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seem not to be needed for the sake of adaptation, they are better understood as a surplus. We 
can see here two types of conscious experience: one is derived from action and the other is 
not.  
 
At the same time, there is in EC a critique of a certain kind of anthropomorphism, related to 
“radical finalism”, although the method described could fit well within different kinds of 
finalist methods. But the possibility of establishing analogies between consciousness and 
nature can’t be attacked, since the whole book relies upon a vast analogy.  I will show 
examples of this in 3.1. 
 
Here Bergson is saying that the “unforeseeable creation of form” and the work of an artisan 
are not the same thing. Also, he is saying that if there is luxury in nature, it is not for the sake 
of adaptation. The analogy does not grasp the central aspect of creation. Thus, in this text, 
Bergson is restricting the use of the analogy. If we read the passage closely we can conclude 
that he is merely saying that nature, understood as a whole, does not function according to 
intellectual and technical plans. He is saying that not every analogy is correct. 
 
Analogy can be used, but they cannot be used ever. Thus, Bergson believes that finalism can 
be rigorous but is a matter of fact that many times is not.  
 
Fatalism and anthropomorphism are just examples of a dysfunctional finalism. The first one 
constrains the real immanent change in nature. The second proposes an incorrect analogy 
between mind and nature. I think this idea is well expressed in this text: 
“But, if the evolution of life is something other than a series of adaptations to accidental 
circumstances [mechanism], so also it is not the realization of a plan [finalism]. A plan is given in 
advance. It is represented, or at least representable, before its realization. The complete execution of it 
may be put off to a distant future, or even indefinitely; but the idea is none the less formulable at the 
present time, in terms actually given. If, on the contrary, evolution is a creation unceasingly renewed, 
it creates, as it goes on, not only the forms of life, but the ideas that will enable the intellect to 
understand it, the terms which will serve to express it. That is to say that its future overflows its 
present, and can not be sketched out therein in an idea”.75 
The previous passages came from the first chapter of EC; in the subsequent excerpts the 
notion of “radical finalism” has disappeared. In EC.II, entitled “The divergent directions of 
the evolution of life, torpor, intelligence, instinct” Bergson talks plainly about “finalism”. 
Bergson’s criticism becomes more extended, it seems. One can think whether the second 
approach does or does not look like an exclusive reference to “radical finalism”. It seems that 
the critique has expanded to any kind of finalism. It is difficult, however, to specify whom 
exactly Bergson is referring to in the previous passages, as well as the following ones. He 
seems, again, to be comparing finalism to mechanism. For example: 
 
“This favor the finalists consider as dispensed to them all at once, by the final cause; the mechanists 
claim to obtain it little by little, by the effect of natural selection”.76 
 
Thus, as I said, he seems to still be referring exclusively to Leibniz, although the term does 
not include the adjective “radical”.  
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- Critique of the illusion of harmony 
 
In the above passage on the “plan”, Bergson talks about the delusional analogy of 
extrapolating rational characteristics to nature as a whole. Nature is not intelligent and, 
therefore, it has no plans. Saying that it has plans would be anthropomorphism and Bergson 
would not support it. “There is the first error of finalism,” he says. “It involves another, yet 
more serious.”77 This seriousness comes from the vision of nature we should have if we 
considered nature as an intelligent designer.  
I will divide the text into three parts. In the first part, Bergson raises an empirical critique of 
the idea of ‘plan’. 
“If life realizes a plan, it ought to manifest a greater harmony the further it advances, just as the house 
shows better and better the idea of the architect as stone is set upon stone. If, on the contrary, the unity 
of life is to be found solely in the impetus that pushes it along the road of time, the harmony is not in 
front, but behind”.78 
 
Surely still thinking about Leibniz, Bergson states that there is no manifestation of harmony 
in nature. He is not talking now about adaptation, but about evolution. The history of 
evolution is something disordered. At the same time, he concedes a sort of unity. Every living 
being is part of that unity. Thus, life, considered as a unity, is one substance composed of 
many parts.  
 
There is not an ordered tendency in evolution. Harmony is thus related to that original 
oneness. The tendency of the process is not harmonious in itself, since there is no “greater 
harmony the further it advances”. Here he elaborates on this idea.  
 
“The unity is derived from a vis a tergo: it is given at the start as an impulsion, not placed at the end 
as an attraction. In communicating itself, the impetus splits up more and more. Life, in proportion to 
its progress, is scattered in manifestations which undoubtedly owe to their common origin the fact that 
they are complementary to each other in certain aspects, but which are none the less mutually 
incompatible and antagonistic. So the discord between species will go on increasing. Indeed, we have 
as yet only indicated the essential cause of it. We have supposed, for the sake of simplicity, that each 
species received the impulsion in order to pass it on to others, and that, in every direction in which life 
evolves, the propagation is in a straight line. But, as a matter of fact, there are species which are 
arrested; there are some that retrogress. Evolution is not only a movement forward; in many cases we 
observe a marking-time, and still more often a deviation or turning back. It must be so, as we shall 
show further on, and the same causes that divide the evolution movement often cause life to be 
diverted from itself, hypnotized by the form it has just brought forth. Thence results an increasing 
disorder”.79 
 
Thus, “complementarity” is the finalistic feature. Antagonism is the non-finalistic one. 
According to Bergson, harmony is not the essential element in evolution, but, on the contrary, 
disorder is. There is, in Bergson’s opinion, an “increasing disorder” in spite of the important 
deal of complementarity. For this author that is a matter of fact. Apart from that, there is 
something important and new in Bergson’s insight. The idea of divergence, later called 
“dichotomy” in DS. Bergson writes in this text: “the same causes that divide the evolution 
movement often cause life to be diverted from itself, hypnotized by the form it has just 
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brought forth”. This means that there is a plurality, and new goals arise. There is, then, no one 
line of evolution or “unilinearity”. Evolution itself is a tree of divergent branches. The 
involution of certain species is a “matter of fact” and the “deviation” of certain branches from 
the tendency towards perfection is something, he claims, we can “observe”. That is said as 
something discovered by science, something undeniable in 1900’s. Further on he also claims:  
 
“But one of the clearest results of biology has been to show that evolution has taken place along 
divergent lines”.80 
 
We now reach an important section. In this long passage, the author nuances his general idea 
regarding evolution:  
 
“The philosopher, who begins by laying down as a principle that each detail is connected with some 
general plan of the whole, goes from one disappointment to another as soon as he comes to examine 
the facts; and, as he had put everything in the same rank, he finds that, as the result of not allowing for 
accident, he must regard everything as accidental. For accident, then, an allowance must first be 
made, and a very liberal allowance. We must recognize that all is not coherent in nature. By so doing, 
we shall be led to ascertain the centers around which the incoherence crystallizes. This crystallization 
itself will clarify the rest; the main directions will appear, in which life is moving whilst developing 
the original impulse. True, we shall not witness the detailed accomplishment of a plan. Nature is more 
and better than a plan in course of realization. A plan is a term assigned to a labor: it closes the 
future whose form it indicates. Before the evolution of life, on the contrary, the portals of the future 
remain wide open. It is a creation that goes on for ever in virtue of an initial movement. This 
movement constitutes the unity of the organized world—a prolific unity, of an infinite richness, 
superior to any that the intellect could dream of, for the intellect is only one of its aspects or 
products”.81 
 
The “facts”, he claims, just deny the idea of a general plan. At the same time, there is an 
original impulsion or progress. Progress implies perfection. Since it is original, we can say it 
is natural. There is a natural tendency towards perfection. But its model is not the plan-model.  
 
“Nature”, I quoted “is more and better than a plan in course of realization. A plan is a term 
assigned to a labor: it closes the future whose form it indicates. Before the evolution of life, 
on the contrary, the portals of the future remain wide open”. In my opinion, here Bergson is 
saying that intellect imitates nature. In addition, he is implying that every analogy between 
mind and nature may not work. It is a matter of perfection. The goal directed activity of the 
artisan is not the most perfect feature of humans. This means that the teleological model is 
not sufficiently perfect. “Nature is more and better than a plan in course of realization”. This 
affirms that we should use another model according to its perfection.  
 
He also thinks that there is something such as wholeness. But his problem is that harmony is 
not the term to express it. There is unity, in his view, but not harmony. He talks about the 
tendency towards perfection, about progress. “This movement constitutes the unity of the 
organized world”.  
 
These passages give a name to fatalism and anthropomorphism regarding evolution: 
retrospective illusion. They also construct a sort of Bergsonian positive theory around some 
data from science. The origin of life and its divergence—that is, the Darwinian “tree of 
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life”—confronts global teleology. This “general form” of evolution in time shouldn’t be 
considered harmony. 
 
Regarding Bergson’s criticism, it is important to recall two other important texts, dealt with 
on occasion by commentators. They deal with the same questions as EC.I and II, but in short 
extension.  
 
- The possible and the “freedom of the world” 
 
First, there is the article “The possible and the real”, in PM. In this text, the “possible” is, so 
to speak, the future form of the “real”, and according to Bergson the concept of the possible 
is an “illusion”. In his view, philosophers have privileged the “future” over the present. That 
turns back into the question of teleology, prediction, and the lack of freedom. Although in the 
text he talks about personal freedom, he finally reaches the question of global evolution. Over 
one paragraph he addresses same question of EC.I and II.  
 
“If we put the possible back into its proper place, evolution becomes something quite different from 
the realisation of a program: the gates of the future open wide; freedom is offered an unlimited field. 
The fault of those doctrines, rare indeed in the history of philosophy, which have succeeded in leaving 
room for indetermination and freedom in the world, is to have failed to see what their affirmation 
implied. When they spoke of indetermination, of freedom, they meant by indetermination a 
competition between possibles, by freedom a choice between possibles, as if possibility was not 
created by freedom itself! As if any other hypothesis, by affirming an ideal pre-existence of the 
possible to the real, did not reduce the new to a mere rearrangement of former elements! As if it were 
not thus to be led sooner or later to regard that rearrangement as calculable and foreseeable! By 
accepting the premiss of the contrary theory one was letting the enemy in. We must resign ourselves 
to the inevitable: it is the real which makes itself possible, and not the possible which becomes real”.82 
Fatalism, from 1.1.b.1, is found here, as is the illusion, 1.1.b.3, and the idea of contingency, 
implied in divergence. The future has to be “open”. The implied assumption is this: the future 
has to be open, for human beings are free.  
 
- Between Lamarck and Darwin 
 
In his non-teleological account of EC.I and II, Pearson recalls one letter from Bergson to F. 
Delattre. It dates back to December 1935, so almost 30 years after the publication of EC. 
Bergson responds to a letter by Delattre in which EC’s élan is compared with the “life-force” 
of the anti-Darwinian Samuel Butler. This force is an impetus that works teleologically 
throughout evolution. Butler is then understood as a follower of global teleology. Bergson 
denies sharply the kinship between his notion of “élan vital” and Butler’s “life-force”: “… 
Butler (…) denies Darwin’s position and supports Lamarck’s one. But to do philosophy is to 
create the position of the problem and to create the solution”.83  
 
Lamarck is here understood as a finalist author. Darwin, according to this distinction, is 
understood as a mechanistic author. So, Lamarck is situated beside Butler, for both describe 
nature, and, namely, biology, as a spontaneous tendency towards perfection. Contrarily, 
Darwin is conceived as a materialistic author, according to which everything is inertia and 
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causality. In this text, Bergson seems to affirm that his global account of Life is alien to both 
mechanism and finalism equally. This may reinforce the main anti-teleological reading.  
 
When Bergson refers to mechanism and finalism he affirms:  
 
“I don’t accept both of these points of view, which correspond to concepts made by human spirit not 
for the sake of an explanation of life. One has to place somewhere between the two concepts. How 
can determinate the place?”84   
 
This letter also gives a response to this “place”: 
 
“… if there is finality in evolution, it is not in the sense that the philosophical tradition has given to 
the word ‘teleology’, but in a different and new sense, that biology and philosophy have to create, 
none of the ancient concepts can define it”.85 
 
This last passage is relevant for us. We have a word (“teleology”) and we have a “new 
sense”. Scientific biology has to give the data to philosophy and philosophy has to erect the 
doctrine. Also, we have the word “if”, at the beginning. The ancient notion of finalism or 
teleology is not useful.  
 
- Scholarly interpretations 
 
Based on these passages, the so-called regular reading concludes that for Bergson “finalism is 
not an alternative to mechanism, but only its inverted image”.86 This idea of the inverted or 
reverted mechanism is conclusive for the anti-teleological reading of Bergson.  
 
The book “Responses to evolution”, written by M. Vaughan, K-A Pearson and P. A. Miquel, 
is representative of this position. In their vision, EC.I and II, Bergson rejects “both 
mechanism and finalism”.87 And when it comes to the moment in EC in which Bergson talks 
about the “signification” of evolution, he is not, they affirm, “reintroducing teleology or 
anthropomorphism”. 88  Shortly afterwards, they said that Bergson “is not reintroducing 
teleology when he locates man as the ‘end’ of evolution”.89 In their view, “exigency of 
creation”90 is that which moves the vital global impulse. It is strictly unpredictable, and, thus, 
the place of man in the cosmos is due sheerly to a-teleological creation. For these authors 
teleology implies anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism.  
 
The non-teleological contemporary readers defend the view that in Bergson’s vision of 
biological evolution there is neither global teleology nor historical progress since every 
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process of development is led to divergence in the two branches.91 I recall 1.1.b.3. This 
means, again, “refusal of mechanism and finalism”.92  
 
In my vision, none of these insightful readings demonstrate necessarily that, in terms of the 
global understanding of evolution and the place of the human being in the cosmos, Bergson 
was not a teleologist. But it is certain that Bergson saw a problem in global teleology and 
finalism. It is clear that he rejected certain aspects of finalism. As I show in the next section, 
1.2, these statements have to be understood in a larger framework.  
 
In the last subsections we have seen that global teleology or finalism was a real philosophical 
problem from 1907 to 1935, in Bergson’s framework.  My claim is that it was part of his 
approach from much earlier. I would like to recall the only writings specifically devoted to 
our subject and their conclusions. It is not, however, a large set of publications.  
 
In the 30’s one monograph on finalism and Bergson was published: La finalité morale dans 
le bergsonisme.93 To my knowledge, this is the first and the last monograph on this subject 
addressing Bergson. It is a book on practical finalism, regarding exclusively human actions in 
the context of his first book, DI. E. Rolland, the author, states that the theory of freedom 
developed there is not a theory of freedom, but of spontaneity. That is, morals and virtues are 
not the concern here, but unpredictability or indetermination.94 Rolland considers that the 
Bergsonian position is a kind of finalism that pretends to situate itself halfway between the 
“traditional integral finalism” and the “materializing mechanism”,95 although Bergson stays 
closer to finalism.  
 
I agree with this interpretation: Bergson keeps himself close enough to finalism in its basic 
conception of teleology in ethics. There is a eudaimonist context at stake and also 
irreversibility, which composes with freedom a perfectivist schema of human life. But none 
of these claims are openly stated. These are hints of what Bergson’s philosophy of nature, on 
analogies and functions, is going to be.  
 
In the approach of DI ideas such as pure becoming and no teleological progress are more 
stressed than that of function, perfection or analogy. In short, his naturalistic approach is still 
to come in 1889. Rolland’s notes, however, that although Bergson does not mention 
Aristotle, he is an author towards whom Bergson “reacts” in his own theory of duration.96 
Although this approach is the only one that devotes a long extension to the subject, it remains 
inconclusive to me and I do not follow it. In my view, the moment in which Bergson starts to 
elaborate a teleology is when he starts a philosophy of nature, beyond his early 
phenomenological approach.  
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As far as I am concerned, there are four published texts entirely focused on the question of 
natural finalism in Bergson. The four of them are exclusively focused on the first chapter of 
EC. That is, albeit focused on natural teleology in Bergson, these texts do not consider MM 
or LR as containing teleological approaches. DS is neither included in the analysis. These 
papers comment on Bergson’s account of global evolutionary finalism.  
 
The oldest of the articles I know about finalism and Bergson was written by Cunningham97. It 
has to be said that it is not really a scholarly approach, but a polemic paper, published shortly 
after the publication of EC. The author denies the idea of creative evolution and, against it, 
defends a creative finalism. The latter is, in my opinion, closer to Bergson’s opinion than 
Cunningham himself thinks.98 
 
Apart from this, two scholars have published three contributions to the topic recently. All of 
them are focused on the global evolutionary teleology, that is, on the élan vital. Pearson has 
written exclusively about this topic in two separate places,99 and the third one has been 
written by Montebello.100  
 
Pearson considers that “in exposing the limits of mechanism Bergson does not go on to 
embrace a finalist position. He argues that finalism is merely an inverted mechanism that also 
reduces time to a process of realization”.101 We have discussed the textual basis for such a 
claim just now. In this sense, Pearson follows a general assumption. Both, mechanism and 
finalism, are situated as extremes to the central position of Bergson. Both imply fatalism, an 
all-is-given world.  
 
But some lines after, Pearson says “the only notion of finality Bergson will permit, contra 
Leibniz and Kant, is a strictly external finality”.102 This is new for us. It means that “nature 
exists neither purely internal finality nor absolutely distinct individuality”.103 So, everything 
is coordinated but does not tend toward any pre-programmed goal. “The directionality and 
movement of life are not, however, to be understood in terms of a simple mechanical 
realization of pre-existing goals”.104 There are natural and non-mechanical tendencies for 
Bergson. These tendencies are external in one sense: they involve more than individuals. 
These tendencies go throughout groups of individuals. One can talk about Life emerging 
from individuals, according to this assumption.  
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Pearson also refers to divergence in nature: “The evolution of life becomes intelligible when 
it is viewed in terms of the continuation of this impetus that has split up into divergent 
lines”,105 and the idea of a “common impulsion, not common aspiration”.106  
 
If I have understood correctly, in Pearson’s view, the élan vital is a Kantian reflexive 
judgment. But against Kant, Bergson does not consider individual beings but Life in general. 
According to Pearson, the élan vital is a hypothesis of Life in general. By using an important 
statement, taken from a letter of 1835 to F. Delattre, Pearson considers the élan not a 
vitalistic Butlerian “life-force”, but a reflexive judgment or a sort of progress as if: the élan is 
an “image of thought”.107  
 
In Pearson’s view there is an “irreducible pluralism”108 in nature and biology, so every 
hypothesis is just a hypothesis, and there are no trends which, so to speak, lead Life’s path 
through matter.  
 
Pearson thinks that: “In Bergson’s model no dominant tendency within evolution can be 
identified”.109 Pearson thinks that divergence of trends and contingency of the tendencies 
means just creation with no goal. And granting that, if there is no “dominant tendency” in 
evolution, all my claims about Bergson’s global teleology have to be dismissed. On the other 
hand, it is difficult for me to understand that “the only notion of finality” Bergson permits is 
“external finality”,110 whereas in the end, according to the same writing, there is no finality at 
all.  
 
Montebello’s account also gives importance to the idea of external finalism, but he does not 
question that Bergson’s vision is realistic. The Kantian link is absent here. In Montebello, 
Bergson’s external finalism is real, constitutive and not reflexive.  
 
The idea of complementariness in nature is emphasized in this account. Montebello stresses 
the unpredictability as an essential element of the Bergsonian conception of nature. Any kind 
of pre-programmed end in nature is an illusion, for the sake of unpredictability. Montebello 
says: “In Bergson the surprising double acceptation of a real finalism and external becomes a 
double rejection of intellectual finalism. The first type is translated to our living participation 
in the movement of life conceived as a whole, while the two other types of finalism translate 
a limitation of our life regarding an internal monadic life or its projection as an end of a 
planified general life”.111 As Montebello affirms rightly, neither monads nor intellectual plans 
should be considered in Bergson’s framework. By admitting a real non-reflexive external 
drive Montebello may have admitted a certain general tendency towards something in nature. 
He does not clarify that, though. He merely stresses the element of commonality in Bergson’s 
vision of nature: everything is linked. This is only one part of what Bergson says.  
 
I agree with Montebello in regard to these remarks, since I also think that Bergson’s vision of 
teleology is not reflexive, but realistic. It is not individual or monadic, but external. It is not 
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theological, but natural. And he does reject the intellectual model regarding its finalistic 
proposal.  
 
I disagree with Pearson when he states that: “In Bergson’s model no dominant tendency 
within evolution can be identified”. I will come back to this statement in 1.2. I have to say I 
am much closer to Pearson’s vision in 1999, more than ten years before the text I quoted, 
when he admitted a “residual perfectionism and anthropocentrism” in Bergson. This time, I 
would only question one word of the statement: I do not think it is “residual”, and I do not 
think that pluralism is threatened.  
 
Pearson asks in the text: “but is he [Bergson] in danger of taking the invention of the form of 
man too seriously?”112 Teleology and, specifically, anthropocentric teleology, seems to be 
something regrettable, something to be ashamed of. “Undeniably, he [Bergson] admits a 
certain finalism”, says one of the most brilliant recent commentators of the French 
philosopher, Riquier. 113  Old commentators, like Tonquédec, Berthélot 114 , Lovejoy, 115 
Chevalier,116 or Le Roy,117 did not have so many problems with that.  
 
However, I concede a certain “ambivalence” in Bergson regarding our subject, as Lacey 
says.118 In the only place where Bergson deals with this philosophical issue (EC) there is a 
lack of terminological stability. Sometimes he refers to teleology in a critical way, as we have 
seen in 1.1, and in other times he refers to it in a positive way, as I show in the next section. 
At one point, he also attributes some of his teleological terms to a “manner of speaking”.119 
On the one hand, Bergson was not a systematic author, and on the other, this nominal 
ambivalence can be clarified from the context of the passages in the text.  
 
 
1.2. ‘Creative evolution’ as a treatise on the reform of the concept of 
teleology 
 
Bergson is certain that he is “not coming back to the old notion of finality”. 120 In this section 
I explain why EC is a reform of the notion of immanent teleology, regarding psychology, 
flexibility, effort and external finalism.  
 
Bergson’s thought involves the reform, and not the destruction, of this “old notion of global 
teleology”. The early reader of EC, William James, observes that Bergson utilizes the concept 
of goal-directedness “within full rights” in a new vigorous form.121  
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Is time to read the textual evidence. In EC Bergson writes: 
 
“… the philosophy of life to which we are leading (…) claims to transcend both mechanism and 
finalism; but, as we announced at the beginning, it is nearer the second doctrine than the first”.122 
 
It “transcends”, he says. I want to emphasize that Bergson is here talking about reform. He is 
trying to reform finalism, and not mechanism. In this sense he is not equally far from both. 
Now I quote both in English and in its original language two texts in which the idea of reform 
is much clearer.  
 
“We must now show that if mechanism is insufficient to account for evolution, the way of proving 
this insufficiency is not to stop at the classic conception of finality, still less to contract or attenuate it, 
but, on the contrary, to go further”.123 
 
“Le moment est venu d’établir que, si le mécanisme ne suffit pas à rendre compte de l´évolution, le 
moyen de prouver cette insuffisance n’est pas de s’arrêter à la conception classique de la finalité, 
encore moins la rétrécir ou de l’atténuer, mais au contraire d’aller plus loin qu’elle”.124  
 
This sentence gives us a clear idea of the “reform” in a genuine sense. It is a reform, because 
it does not attempt to contract or attenuate the classic conception of finality, but to overcome 
it. It means that classic finalism is, according to Bergson, right from the start. But, apparently, 
it is necessary to apply its principles beyond its origins, whatever they are. 
 
The next passage has to be read in accordance to the previous statement, since it completes it. 
It is also philosophically richer for us:  
 
“[a]Yet finalism is not, like mechanism, a doctrine with fixed rigid outlines. It admits of as many 
inflections as we like. The mechanistic philosophy is to be taken or left: it must be left if the least 
grain of dust, by straying from the path foreseen by mechanics, should show the slightest trace of 
spontaneity. The doctrine of final causes, on the contrary, will never be definitively refuted. If one 
form of it be put aside, it will take another. [b] Its principle, which is essentially psychological, is very 
flexible. [c] It is so extensible, and thereby so comprehensive, that one accepts something of it as soon 
as one rejects pure mechanism. The theory we shall put forward in this book will therefore necessarily 
partake of finalism to a certain extent”.125 
  
“[a]Toutefois le finalisme n’est pas, comme le mécanisme, une doctrine aux lignes arrêtées. Il 
comporte autant d’infléchissements qu’on voudra lui en imprimer. (…) La doctrine des causes finales 
ne sera jamais réfutée définitivement. Si l’on en écarte une forme, elle en prendra une autre. [b] Son 
principe, qui est d’essence psychologique, est très souple. [c] Il est si extensible, et par là même si 
large, qu’on en accepte quelque chose dès qu’on repousse le mécanisme pur. La thèse que nous 
exposerons dans ce livre participera donc nécessairement du finalisme dans une certaine mesure”.126 
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Just after conceding this point to finalism, Bergson adds: “For that reason it is important to 
intimate exactly what we are going to take from it, and what we mean to leave”.127 In the end, 
I believe, he does not indicate exactly what is he going to take and what he means to leave, as 
he promises. Neither did he explain the differences between different types of finalism that 
one can find in his work. From now on, despite this absence in the text, in this section I show 
how Bergson addresses those items.  
 
In [a] we saw that for Bergson the theory of final causes in nature is “irrefutable”. This major 
claim might shed light on any “ambivalence” in the text. If Leibniz’s philosophy is “radical 
finalism”, it is evident that here finalism and mechanism are opposed. Once one wants to 
speak against mechanism (for whom the world is a sum of atoms, moved by inertial forces), 
one automatically becomes a finalist. Bergson is here included in that list of opponents of 
mechanism. There is not equal distance between both trends.  
 
In [b] we can see why: he thinks that there is a “psychological” essence in teleology. This is 
crucial for us too. In mechanism there is no appeal to psychology. Moreover, in his opinion, 
psychology is, for the mechanists, a sort of illusion. Atoms and inertia do not compose 
psychology. On the contrary, finalist thinkers put psychological features at the very center of 
the problem and they want to give an account of that. Human consciousness or psychology 
can extrapolate certain aspects of itself to the world: directedness, for instance. In this sense, 
Bergson is clearly a finalist thinker. After DI his books are rich in analogies. He wants to 
challenge the problem of anthropomorphism, although he criticized some forms of analogy 
(see 1.1). In [c] we find that analogy is impossible to avoid and also that finalism has many 
forms. It seems that he is referring to history of thought there. In [a] he refers to this idea: 
finalism admits many inflections. In [c] he adds extensibility and comprehension as some 
other features. 
 
According to [a] and [b] Bergson considers himself a finalist thinker. We are in awe that in 
his letter to Delattre he considers that a philosopher has to re-create its own terms, but at the 
same time, finalism is for him “irrefutable”. [b] shows the extraordinary affinity between 
finalism and Bergsonism: mind, as we experience it, has to take part of the psychological 
account. If we want to think about evolution, we definitely have to make room for the mind, 
since “life is of the psychological order”.128 Also, as we saw in the critical section above, it 
has to be done according to exigent paradigms. One cannot make, for instance, the analogy 
between an artisan and nature itself. [c] shows clearly that Bergson is aware of the many 
possibilities of teleological thought. He sees it as having no rigid limits [a] and doctrinally 
admits inflections [a], as he previously said. In [c] Bergson returns to that idea. Moreover, he 
stresses his positive acknowledgement of finalism and its possibilities, since he talks about 
extensibility and comprehension. [c] links this discourse with the until now vague idea of 




Besides these two doctrinal teleological statements, the following passages clarify the project 
of going further beyond classical finalism. They illustrate Bergson’s position regarding 
psychology, perfection and regarding the extension of teleology.  
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The first one explains something of his conception of psychology noted in [b]. We will see 
what is his conception of “being flexible” and “comprehensive” is. Namely, the text reveals 
Bergson’s dialogue with one American neo-Lamarckian, Edward Cope, and the latter’s 
conception of “effort”. Bergson refers to the idea of the spontaneous effort for the sake of 
adaptation to certain habitats.   
 
“For it is quite conceivable that the same effort to turn the same circumstances to good account might 
have the same result, especially if the problem put by the circumstances is such as to admit of only 
one solution. But the question remains, whether the term “effort” must not then be taken in a deeper 
sense, a sense even more psychological than any neo-Lamarckian supposes”.129 
 
In DI Bergson thinks that “effort” is a suitable expression for giving a real account of what 
consciousness is, but in EC the meaning of that word becomes quite different. In one 
conceptual shift far beyond DI, in EC Bergson relates the effort with American neo-
Lamarckism. Thus, every living being strives to adapt: according to Bergson, for giving a 
philosophical account of what life is, one has to give to the term effort a “more psychological 
meaning”.  
 
The term is clearly psychological, given that “life is of the psychological order”. Bergson 
concedes that even in the neo-Lamarckian framework there is something psychological. But 
we need, he claims, something more psychological. Here Bergson is defending the view that, 
although it is right to transfer these anthropomorphic features to living beings, it is possible to 
go further than Cope. It is possible to find something “deeper” and more psychological than 
effort for the sake of adaptation.  
 
As I said, the context of every passage is very important. Here Bergson is thinking of his 
general account of evolution. In this sense, effort could describe a tendency towards 
adaptation. Bergson does not deny the effort of conservation regarding a single niche. In this 
context, effort or adaptation is a second-degree force. There is something deeper. Creation is 
the deeper sense of effort and of psychology that he is actually talking about. The creative 
evolution is a deeper effort, which has to do with psychology.  
 
We can see here that Bergson is remodeling the psychological principle found in neo-




Finalism is extensible and comprehensive, since it has many forms. They all are 
psychological, but change regarding one thing: the understanding of perfection. In the 
passage above we saw that Bergson was asking for a “deeper” sense of psychology, which 
means a more essential and perfect sense of psychology or life. Effort was not the most 
perfect feature, although it can be admitted for a second degree.  
 
The first-degree-force of human psychology and, by analogy, of biology and cosmology is 
creation. Creation here is one of the bases for the reform of classic teleology. In the 
cosmologic domain, Bergson says that nature, understood as the whole, “is more and better 
than a plan in course of realization. A plan is a term assigned to a labor: it closes the future 
whose form it indicates. Before the evolution of life, on the contrary, the portals of the future 
                                                





remain wide open. It is a creation that goes on forever in virtue of an initial movement. This 
movement constitutes the unity of the organized world—a prolific unity, of an infinite 
richness, superior to any that the intellect could dream of…”130 
 
The text could not mean a rejection of final causality, since it is irrefutable, but also rejects an 
intellectual model as analogy. In a way, he is claiming that intellect is one form of bad 
anthropomorphism. That is, nature has no plans. Plans are part of human intelligence and 
nature is “more and better than that”. As for Aristotle, nature is better than human techniques. 
Nature has to be the best. We can see how one cannot propose any analogy between nature 
and consciousness.  
 
It is pretty clear that human labor, here linked to intellect, is not the best. Effort, and, 
especially in this context, creation are the best. The best means perfection, natural télos. 
Bergson emphasizes dynamic features of the telos, always using a perfectivist language. 
Natural entities strive to accomplish their natural tendency. In this case, we see that in EC he 
uses the terms effort and the more psychological and more perfect one, called creation. He is 
not a systematic author, so the same teleological concept of goal or end has other names too. 
Notably, in the cosmic context, in EC, the concept of progress can be found too. Bergson 
mitigates the anthropocentric and fatalistic element of the philosophical notion, as he finds it 
in previous philosophers. Thus, this natural progressive or perfective tendency towards 
completion is defended in an open framework, where deviations, contingency and only 
relative accomplishment:   
 
“No doubt there is progress, if progress means a continual advance in the general direction 
determined by a first impulsion; but this progress is accomplished only on the two or three great lines 
of evolution on which forms ever more and more complex, ever more and more high, appear; between 
these lines run a crowd of minor paths in which, on the contrary, deviations, arrests, and set-backs, are 
multiplied”.131 
 
Life is plural, unpredictable and wasteful, not harmonious. But it is still perfective, and can 
be explained teleologically. As we saw “flexibility” and “comprehensibility” are features of 
immanent teleology, historically understood. This other excerpt becomes even clearer 
regarding the notion of perfection or télos. But now the key term is not progress or goal, but 
“impetus”: 
 
Bergson attacks mechanism or materialism because “[a] it excludes absolutely the hypothesis 
of an original impetus, I mean an internal push that has carried life, [b] by more and more 
complex forms, to higher and higher destinies. [c] Yet this impetus is evident, [d] and a mere 
glance at fossil species shows us that life need not have evolved at all, or might have evolved 
only in very restricted limits, if it had chosen the alternative, much more convenient to itself, 
of becoming ankylosed in its primitive forms”.132 
 
Sentence [b] is clearly talking about one teleological trend “by more and more complex 
forms, to higher and higher destinies”. It refers to a qualitative conception: high and complex 
are here forms of perfection. A “higher destiny” is to be read as a better destiny.  
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1.2.c. Individual and global teleology 
 
Still we can give ourselves a definitive hint of what he is trying to point out by saying “to go 
further”. Montebello, Ansell-Pearson and Lacey have already noted the curiosity of one 
passage in which Bergson dialogues with the neo-vitalist philosopher Hans Driesch around 
the latter’s doctrine of the entelechy in individual organic beings. This will be the last text of 
the section.  
 
We see that Driesch defends only individual teleology. Focused on embryology, he thinks 
that there is within every organism one immaterial element called ‘entelechy’ that leads and 
coordinates the relation between whole and parts towards perfection. At the same time 
Driesch rejects external or global teleology. Bergson criticizes Driesch. Bergson argues 
against Driesch not because of the use of final causality but because of the restricted 
boundaries of his conception of teleology. Now we will read a long quotation of that passage, 
which is the real basis for the theory of the élan. This text evidences that Bergson knew that 
he was reforming teleology, namely, global teleology: 
“But, though finality cannot be affirmed either of the whole of matter or of the whole of life, might it 
not yet be true, says the finalist, of each organism taken separately? Is there not a wonderful division 
of labor, a marvellous solidarity among the parts of an organism, perfect order in infinite complexity? 
Does not each living being thus realize a plan immanent in its substance? -This theory consists, at 
bottom, in breaking up the original notion of finality into bits. It does not accept, indeed it ridicules, 
the idea of an external finality, according to which living beings are ordered with regard to each other: 
to suppose the grass made for the cow, the lamb for the wolf- that is all acknowledged to be absurd. 
But there is, we are told, an internal finality: each being is made for itself, all its parts conspire for the 
greatest good of the whole and are intelligently organized in view of that end. Such is the notion of 
finality which has long been classic. Finalism has shrunk to the point of never embracing more than 
one living being at a time. By making itself smaller, it probably thought it would offer less surface for 
blows. 
The truth is, it lay open to them a great deal more. Radical as our own theory may appear, finality is 
external or it is nothing at all. 
Consider the most complex and the most harmonious organism. All the elements, we are told, 
conspire for the greatest good of the whole. Very well, but let us not forget that each of these elements 
may itself be an organism in certain cases, and that in subordinating the existence of this small 
organism to the life of the great one we accept the principle of an external finality. The idea of a 
finality that is always internal is therefore a self-destructive notion. An organism is composed of 
tissues, each of which lives for itself. The cells of which the tissues are made have also a certain 
independence. Strictly speaking, if the subordination of all the elements of the individual to the 
individual itself were complete, we might contend that they are not organisms, reserve the name 
organism for the individual, and recognize only internal finality. But every one knows that these 
elements may possess a true autonomy. To say nothing of phagocytes, which push independence to 
the point of attacking the organism that nourishes them, or of germinal cells, which have their own 
life alongside the somatic cells—the facts of regeneration are enough: here an element or a group of 
elements suddenly reveals that, however limited its normal space and function, it can transcend them 
occasionally; it may even, in certain cases, be regarded as the equivalent of the whole. 
There lies the stumbling-block of the vitalistic theories. We shall not reproach them, as is ordinarily 
done, with replying to the question by the question itself: the "vital principle" may indeed not explain 
much, but it is at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance, so as to remind us of this occasionally, 





difficult by the fact that, in nature, there is neither purely internal finality nor absolutely distinct 
individuality”.133  
The text is crucial since it shows plainly that Bergson defends a sort of finalism not only 
regarding individual living beings, but also regarding all living beings as a whole. So 
“breaking up the original notion of finality into bits” is “self-destructive” because pure 
individuality in the organic realm is nothing but illusion. The evolutionary framework 
implied in EC leads “to suppose the grass made for the cow, the lamb for the wolf—that is all 
acknowledged to be absurd”. But what about “phagocytes, which push independence to the 
point of attacking the organism that nourishes them, or of germinal cells, which have their 
own life alongside the somatic cells?” Pure individuality is hard to find here. 
 
Bergson has nothing against teleology: “All the elements, we are told, conspire for the 
greatest good of the whole. Very well, but let us not forget that each of these elements may 
itself be an organism in certain cases...”. Bergson agrees with Driesch in internal finalism, but 
not about rejecting the external one. Cells, reproduction and evolution overcome the concept 
of the individual, taken from mathematics, as he defended in DI. Organisms are composed of 
other organisms.  
 
“Finality will not go down any easier for being taken as a powder. Either the hypothesis of a 
finality immanent in life should be rejected as a whole, or it must undergo a treatment very 
different from pulverization”. 134  It is very different indeed. Regarding the notion of 
psychology and the notion of perfection, he reforms the contents coherently between each 
other. And now we see that he accepts both individual and global teleology.  
 
The problem of reading the anti-teleological passages as if they were addressed to any kind of 
teleology whatsoever is that they leave these important texts unexplained. The entire world is 
defined by Bergson as one “exigency of creation”.135 And “with the human being life of 
consciousness reaches, at least potentially, its highest state of emancipation from the 
restrictions imposed on it by matter”.136 This leads to immanent perfectivism. He also says 
that “consciousness lies at the origin of life”,137 which in a way links human psychology with 
the rest of the natural beings. Human psychology is natural, hence humans have perfective 
features in common. The text on Driesch makes evident that Bergson was an exhaustive 
teleologist, since not only individual entities can be explained teleologically, but also all of 
them as a whole.  
 
The above quoted interpreters think that despite Bergson’s description of the natural history, 
Life “remains contingent in every aspect”.138 I think there is a great deal of contingency 
involved, but I wouldn’t say that is the case in every aspect. Nature is always an exigency of 
creation. When Pearson says that “on Bergson’s model no dominant tendency within 
evolution can be identified”,139 he is then not being accurate. Although, maybe his reading of 
Bergson fits better with the current concerns among biologists. In Bergson some species are 
conceived as “culminating points” of evolution: namely humans.140 The difference between 
                                                
133 EC, pp. 40-42, italics are mine. 
134 EC, p. 44. 
135 Vaughan, M, Pearson, K-A, Miquel,P-A, “Responses to evolution”. Op. cit, p. 360. 
136 Ibid., italics are mine. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Pearson, Keith-Ansell. Philosophy and the adventure of the virtual. Bergson and the time of life. Op.cit, p.81. 





humans and these animals is of “kind”, not of “degree”.141 In EC and with more emphasis in 
CV and DS there is a dominant tendency in nature. This, again, doesn’t lead necessarily to 
absolute anthropocentrism. As we know, the model of immanent teleology rejects it. At the 
same time, there is not fatalism involved. A great sum of contingency (although not “in every 
aspect”) contributes to making nature unpredictable.  
 
1.2.d Scholarly interpretations 
 
As I mentioned in the “Introduction” some of these ideas have already been pointed out. In 
the chapter IV of his book From Aristotle to Darwin and back again entitled “Bergsonism 
and teleology”, Étienne Gilson says something worth mentioning now. Gilson links 
“inadequate finalism” with “pre-determined ends”. He does so by comparing it to “true 
finalism”, according to which “forms [that are] immanent in nature”, forms “working from 
within to incarnate themselves there by modelling in matter according to their law”. 
According to Gilson, Bergson and Aristotle affirm a “true finalism”.142 Gilson says: “Perhaps 
Bergson himself was not, moreover, so far from Aristotle’s finalism as he imagined. Quite 
different from the false Aristotelism which he rightly critized, Bergson finalism is rather 
close to the truth. Evolutionism separates them”.143  
 
Some pages after, Gilson completes this statement with another one, not less interesting: 
“Seeing that he [Bergson] rejected a mechanical finalism, he did not have any other choice than to 
have recourse to any other notion of teleology purified of its vices. This new notion owed its novelty to 
what was a return of the ancient immanent teleology of Aristotle, less the forms which made the latter 
possible. This necessarily, raised new difficulties for the doctrine”.144   
 
Apart from the link between the two philosophers with respect to immanent teleology, the 
last passage contains some important general ideas for this investigation. Novelty may be 
understood as reinterpreting the classics and not any Adamistic a-historical creativeness. It 
can imply some purification, but also new problems for the reformer. Now it is time to turn to 
the classic source.   
The relation between Aristotle and Bergson, has barely been studied and, as far as I know, 
never extensively.145 Apart from Gilson, the Bergsonian scholar Henri Hude has also noted 
this influence. In Hude’s edition of the course on Greek philosophy of 1894-1895 given by 
Bergson at the Lycée Henry IV we can read in footnotes enlightening remarks. Namely, it is 
                                                
141 EC, p. 200. 
142 But Bergson “overlooks the possibility of an Aristotelian universe without Platonic ideas and without a 
Demiurge to impose them on matter from without”.  Gilson, Étienne. D'Aristote à Darwin et retour. Essai sur 
quelques constantes de la biophilosophie. Vrin, Paris, 1971. Trans. John Lyon. Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 99. 
143 Gilson, Étienne. From Aristotle to Darwin and back again. Trans. John Lyon. Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 
97. 
144 Ibid., p. 99, italics are mine. 
145 Hude in Bergson, Henri. Cours IV. Ed. Henri Hude. PUF, 2000, pp. 110-112. “Cette contribution n’est le lieu 
ni d’une analyse du rôle de Plotin chez Bergson, ni de celle, peut-être encore plus nécessaire à entreprendre, du 
rôle d’Aristote” says Vollet, Matthias. “Bergson historien de la philosophie”, L´évolution créatrice. Études & 
Commentaires. Ed. A. François. Vrin, Paris, 2010. p. 333. Also: Chedin, Jean-Louis, “ Deux conceptions du 
possible : Bergson et Aristote “, in Revue de l’enseignement philosophique, t. XXXVII, n° 2, décembre 1986-
janvier 1987.; and Waszkinel et Hejno, Eugeniusz. “ L’inspiration aristotélicienne de la métaphysique de 





important for us since Hude comments on Bergson’s lessons on Aristotle. In Bergson’s lesson 
on Physics.II and the idea of teleology, Hude makes this commentary: 
 
“Toute cette page est très suggestive pour la préhistoire de L´evolution créatrice. [a] On y trouve, 
d'une part, une comparaison, un rapprochement, pas encore nettement problématique, entre l'action de 
la nature et celle de l'art; [b] d'autre part, une idée de finalité, aristotélicienne sans doute, mais déjà 
retravaillée, et qui comprend dans ses possibles approfondissements l'idée d'un finalisme à la Bergson, 
(op. cit, 528 sq.) c'est-à-dire, où l'acte créateur est un acte analogue à l'acte de l'artiste et non plus à 
celui de l'ouvrier, un acte qui vise l’œuvre elle-même comme fin, et non plus une fin extérieure à 
l’œuvre dont l’œuvre ne serait que le moyen, un acte, enfin, qui tend à la perfection de l’œuvre à 
travers de multiples ébauches”.146 
 
This finalism à la Bergson completes Gilson’s statements in noting that Bergson takes part in 
the history of teleology and that his model of immanent teleology is ultimately Aristotelian. 
Gilson and Hude are thus the forerunners of my work. In the text by Hude [a] there is the idea 
of analogy between the natural being and the artificial craft or human artisans found in Phys. 
II.1, 2, 3, 7 and 8. I agree that it is a prehistory of EC. Bergson defends there the analogy 
between natural beings and human consciousness. Also in that passage [section b], Hude 
notes that in Bergson there is natural directedness, which means a notion of perfection. As I 
said, only in EC the problem of teleology is faced as such, but in MM and in LR a 
teleological approach can also be found.  Hude also considers MM to be an essay where the 
hylomorphic Aristotelian paradigm is implied. In this dissertation I follow up on the 























                                                





Conclusion of Chapter 1 
 
As we have seen in this chapter, the texts in EC regarding teleology must be understood as 
part of a reform of the model of immanent teleology. In 1.1 we have seen that Bergson rejects 
some teleological approaches to nature and in 1.2 I have laid out his positive account of final 
causality. Because of the context of EC almost all these passages are devoted to discuss 
global teleology. Although the book does not have a systematic order and clarity, some 
elements of the reform of immanent teleology are clear enough. I summarize by way of 
conclusion: 
 
[A] The essence of Life is an immanent impetus. Its origin is to be found in nature.  
 
[B] The impetus can be found in living beings and in Life itself, including all the individuals 
and their generation, since there is a common descent.  
 
[C] The impetus tends toward effort, regarding adaptation, and toward creation, regarding 
evolution. Creation is the key aspect here, since it involves transgression, indetermination and 
freedom. This is the goal of nature, since it is described as exigency of creation. There are 
some lineages in evolution that lead to a relative accomplishment of the original need. 
Relatively speaking, human beings are the “highest” beings on earth.  
 
[D] The impetus can be found in ourselves. Bergson claims that its nature is psychological, 
which implies that human psychology is natural. Effort is a natural term for describing the 
living, regarding their tendency to fit within a niche, but there is another term, which Bergson 
finds to be “deeper”: creation.  
 
[E] The impetus does not fulfill a pre-determined plan. Conceiving this impetus as a plan-
making intellect would be anthropomorphism and wrong. The empirical data show that the 
impetus is not based on a growth of harmony, but still involves finality. 
 
[A] and [B] support immanent individual teleology as well as global teleology. [C] introduces 
the model of perfection or télos as a requirement. [D] is the basis for analogy. [E] is to be 
understood as a result derived of the four previous elementary points. [A], [B], [C] and [D] 
are the theoretical bases of the reform of the model of immanent teleology. [E] advances a 







2. Aristotle: the model of immanent teleology 
 
 
In this first chapter I first will show that Bergson developed a deep understanding of 
Aristotle’s doctrine of immanent teleology. Next, I will provide a systematic account of 
Aristotle’s own teleological thought. I shall find four elements in Aristotle’s teleological 
argument (section 2.1) and two basic domains of application for teleology in Aristotle 
(section 2.2). This dual structure, composed of an structural section and a section on 
empirical domains will return in my account of Bergson in chapters 3 and 4.  
 
Bergson’s knowledge of Aristotle 
 
Although Bergson’s books contain discussions with contemporary scientists and 
philosophers, it can be said that ancient thought is always there. During the whole of the first 
part of his professional life (1883-1904) he taught, translated and commented on classical 
philosophy. At the same time, he did not consider ancient philosophy as something archaic, 
unrelated to philosophical contemporary issues. In this sense, his speculative accounts of 
different problems always retain a historical and genealogical perspective. 
 
      At the very beginning of his career, in 1883, we have his translation and commentary of 
Lucretius entitled The Philosophy of Poetry. The Genius of Lucretius (EL). In this account, 
Bergson links genealogically ancient materialism and Darwin genealogically.147 Some years 
later, he devoted his Latin dissertation exclusively to Aristotle. The title of this academic 
work is Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit or On the idea of place in Aristotle (QA), defended 
in 1889. The whole text is about the first six chapters of the Phys.IV, devoted to the notion of 
place. The first seven sections of the dissertation are a sober commentary on Aristotle’s 
writings, using Simplicius and Philoponus as ancient commentators, Félix Ravaisson and, 
especially, Eduard Zeller, as contemporary interpreters. In §8 Bergson gives a wider 
interpretation of the notion of tópos, in reference to On the heavens, and from § 9 to 10 the 
historical perspective becomes much broader. In section §9 he confronts Aristotle’s 
conception of space with the modern conceptions of Leibniz and Kant. Bergson puts Aristotle 
in dialogue with the modern theories of place, proposed many centuries after.  
 
Although later on Bergson devoted short texts to different authors (such as William James, 
Claude Bernard or Félix Ravaisson), this early writing, celebrated by Burnett,148 is Bergson’s 
sole rigorous scholarly commentary on any other philosopher’s doctrine. Bergson has a place 
among Aristotelian commentators of the late XIX century. The importance of QA should not 
pass unnoticed,149 although final causality is not involved. Only in §8, from a cosmic 
perspective, Bergson discusses two imitative passages of global teleology, on elementary 
transformation, that we will see in 2.2. 
                                                
147 EL, pp. 18 and 46.  
148 Burnet, John. “Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit by H. Bergson”. The Classical Review, Vol. 6, No. 7. Jul., 
1892, p. 322. 
149 In Being and time § 82 Heidegger underlines the influence of Aristotle in Bergson’s notion of duration in DI. 
Apart from the interesting link between Aristotle and Bergson, I do not deal with Heidegger’s interpretation 
since my research is focused on the topic of teleology, not on time. Moreover, I do not trace the Aristotelian 
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Hejno, Eugeniusz. “L’inspiration aristotélicienne de la métaphysique de Bergson”. Revue Philosophique de 






Apart from that, Bergson taught ancient thought throughout his life. First, working at a high 
school, in general courses on ancient philosophy, like the 1894 one of Hude. These are still 
general introductory courses in which Aristotle did not occupy a distinctive place, so there 
was no place for focusing on specifics (immanent teleology, for instance). That comes later at 
the Collège de France. Between 1900 and 1904 Bergson occupied the chair of Ancient 
Philosophy. In this period, Bergson studied Aristotelian texts in which teleology plays a 
central role. During the academic year 1900 to 1901 he gave a course at the Collège de 
France on the Aristotelian ancient philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias, on his book On 
fate. The following year, Bergson taught the second book of Physics, the most important 
Aristotelian treatise on causality and teleology. The subsequent one, from 1903 to 1904, he 
taught Aristotelian theology in a course on the book XII of Metaphysics, one of the crucial 
texts on global teleology, as we will see soon.   
 
This information shows that Bergson had familiarized himself with Aristotle many years after 
his thesis. He was a lifelong reader of Aristotle.  Alexander of Aphrodisias is also a relevant 
figure here. This philosopher, active in the late second and early third century, was the most 
important of Aristotle’s commentators in Ancient times and, at the same time, he wrote 
creative philosophy by using Aristotelian concepts to solve new problems, originally alien to 
Aristotle. Namely, On fate is a treatise written against the Stoic philosophers of his time 
where freedom of action is pushed beyond anything in Aristotle.  
 
More relevant for us is that in the two courses of 1902-1903 and 1903-1904 we can find 
Bergson to be a mature philosopher who is now shedding light on crucial texts of Aristotelian 
teleology. Notice that EC is published in 1907. Unfortunately, nowadays the contents of those 
lectures are lost. The same happened with most of Bergson’s unpublished works, such as 
academic courses or conferences.  
 
Yet, interestingly, at the Bibliotèque Littéraire Jacques Doucet in Paris, one can find the 
manuscripts that Bergson used. He had two copies of Physics, both edited only in Greek by 
Eduard Zeller and Hermann Bonitz in Teubner, and one copy of Metaphysics, edited by 
Wilhelm von Christ in the same German publishing house. Bergson also had Bekker’s classic 
Aristotelian edition. One of the copies of Phys.II and the book Met.XII are both translated 
into French, from the beginning till the end, in pencil between lines, and annotated by 
Bergson himself. The other copy of Phys.II is translated in the same way although only 
between chapter 4 and chapter 6, the section on chance and fortune.150 This last fact is also 
significant since those chapters will have a great deal of relevance for my interpretation.151 
 
Recently, two of Bergson’s courses from this era on general historical accounts were 
published, which contain interesting commentaries on Aristotle. They are Histoire de l’idée 
de temps. Collège de France. 1902-1903 and L’évolution du problème de la liberté. Cours au 
Collège de France. 1904-1905. In the first one there are a number of lessons devoted to 
Aristotle, concerning time and theology. These Aristotelian meditations were summarized 
                                                
150 Regarding secondary teleology in this chapter and afterwards in 3.3, see specially BGN. 927 and 298 in 
Bergson Manuscripts et notes d'Henri Bergson. Bibliothèque littéraire Jacques Doucet. II-BGN-V-10 BGN 928 
is the edition of the Physics with the complete translation and annotation of the Book II. The other volume of 
Phys., II-BGN-V-9 BGN 927, has the translation of the three chapters on chance and luck. Also, there is II-
BGN-V-8 BGN 926, with annotations in the first four chapters of the second book. BGN. 924 is the edition of 
Metaphysics, with annotations.  





and included in EC, in its fourth chapter. In L’évolution du problème de la liberté. Cours au 
Collège de France. 1904-1905 Aristotle is the most quoted author, and plays a central role 
among the defenders of freedom.152  
 
Among Bergson’s published works, the “Life and work of Félix Ravaisson” contains notable 
general remarks on Aristotle. This article (first a lecture) for the French Academy of Moral 
Sciences focused on Ravaisson, is connected to Aristotle. Ravaisson’s book on Aristotle, 
entitled Essai sur la Metaphysique d’Aristote, was published for the first time in 1837, and by 
1900 was an important general commentary of Aristotle. Bergson himself mentions it in 
positive terms in the first page of his dissertation, in 1889. Ravaisson was both an 
Aristotelian commentator and a creative philosopher and was considered by Bergson himself 
one of his three masters.153  
Bergson has some general words for Essai sur la Metaphysique d’Aristote in the Academy 
text that can be useful for his historical view of the Greek philosopher. Aristotle is considered 
the philosopher of movement and intuition. Ravaisson even talks about the whole of nature in 
Aristotle as moved by one élan.154 In general Bergson praises Ravaisson’s work.155 Pierre 
Aubenque has defended the importance of the Essai and also noted that Ravaisson’s 
depiction of Aristotle is influenced by Romanticism and, even more surprisingly, is close to 
Bergson’s own philosophy. 156  That is: for Aubenque, Ravaisson’s Aristotle resembles 
Bergson. It is like a Bergsonian system avant la lettre. Ravaisson addresses Aristotle as the 
philosopher of intuition against Platonic conceptualism.  
Leaving this striking association aside, Bergson notes that Ravaisson offers too much of a 
“closed system”, while Bergson considered that Aristotle was an open system: 
“Aristotle, a systematic genius if ever there was one, did not build up a system at all. He proceeded by 
analysis of concepts rather than by synthesis. His method consists in taking the ideas stored up in the 
language, in adjusting or renewing them, in circumscribing them in a definition, in cutting out their 
extension and comprehension according to their natural articulations, in pushing their development to 
its farthest possible limits. Yet he rarely accomplishes this development all at once: he comes back to 
it again and again, in different treatises on the same subject, following over again the same road, 
always advancing a little further”.157 
                                                
152 Bergson, Henri. L’évolution du problème de la liberté. Cours au collège de France. 1904-1905. PUF, Paris, 
2017. See e.g. the sessions of the 27th of January 1905 and 3th of February of 1905.  
153 Together with DeBiran and Plotinus. Maire, Gilbert. Bergson, mon maître, Editions Bernard Grasset, 
Paris,1936. p. 222.  
154 Ravaisson, Félix.  Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote. Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2007, p. 406. 
155“When he contrasts Aristotle with the physicists, who saw in things only their material mechanism, and with 
the Platonists, who absorbed the whole of reality into general types, when he shows us in Aristotle the master 
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156 Aubenque, Pierre. “Ravaisson interprète d’Aristote”, Les etudes philosophiques, 4/ 1984. Also in ed. 
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often, between points which seem to us about to touch, when we flatter ourselves that all we have to do is to 
remove a few more shovelfuls of sand, we strike bedrock. Ravaisson did not stop at any obstacle. The 
metaphysics he sets forth at the end of his first volume is Aristotle's doctrine unified and reorganized. He 





This idea of openness reappears in two texts. In the aforementioned course of 1905 and much 
afterwards, in the “Introduction II” to PM. The variety of meanings in Aristotle’s works 
refers for Bergson to the idea of open system, where everything does not fit necessarily.158 
This is emphasized when he ponders Ravaisson’s interpretative work: “Ravaisson did not 
stop at any obstacle. The metaphysics he sets forth at the end of his first volume is Aristotle's 
doctrine unified and reorganized”.159 Bergson also finds that all the Ravaissonian ideas come 
from this book on Aristotle.160  
Afterwards I will propose how Ravaisson could have influenced both Bergson’s reading of 
Aristotle and Bergson’s own view of cosmos. I will address that question in regard to 
Bergsonian teleological cosmology in 4.2.d. For the moment, I believe that this idea of 
Aristotle’s philosophy as an open system—that is, as a system which is not definitively 
closed and which thus remains susceptible to further developments—may be enlightening for 
our reformist scope.  
Some of the Aristotelian texts mentioned above, the PhD thesis, and the courses at high 
schools pertain to an early period of Bergson’s career. They are prior to MM, the first book in 
time where we start to find teleology. The other texts, lessons at the Collège and the latter 
article were produced after MM and in the years prior to the publication of EC. That is, 
between 1900 and 1907. As we can see, both in his early years and in his maturity, Bergson 
taught, read and commented on Aristotle. In one case, the text from one lecture on Aristotle 
was even synthesized and included in EC.  
 
In fact, EC is the book where Bergson increasingly quotes the name “Aristotle”. It is, by the 
way, the most quoted philosopher in the entire essay, closely after the word “Darwin”. That is 
remarkable for a book of 1907 with the word “evolution” in its title.  
 
In Chapter 4 I will show that in EC Aristotle plays the roles of founder of biological 
thinking,161 as well as the role of founder of natural theology.162 Since EC deals with, on the 
one hand, biology, and, to a somewhat lesser degree, with cosmology, on the other hand, the 
place given to Aristotle is then difficult to overstate. Bergson openly confronts Aristotle. In 
                                                                                                                                                  
through, where the abstractions come alive and live as they lived in Aristotle's thought. It has been possible to 
dispute the material correctness of some of his translations; doubts have been raised concerning certain of his 
interpretations; especially have we asked if the historian's role was really to push the unification of a doctrine 
further than the master wished to do, and if, by readjusting the pieces so perfectly and drawing the gears so 
tightly, we are not in danger of distorting some of them. It is none the less true that our mind demands that 
unification, that the undertaking had to be attempted, and that no one after Ravaisson has dared to repeat it”. 
PM, pp. 262-263.  
158 “… intuition, as I describe it, is nothing beside the multiplicity of meanings the words "essence" and 
"existence" have in Spinoza, or the terms ‘form’, ‘power’, ‘act’ . . . etc., in Aristotle. Glance over the list of 
meanings of the word eidos in the Index Aristotelicus: you will see how much they differ. If one considers two 
sufficiently divergent meanings, they will almost seem to be mutually exclusive. They are not exclusive because 
the chain of intermediary meanings links them up”. PM, p. 37. 
159 Also, Bergson considered that the Ravaissionian opposition of Plato against Aristotle was artificial. “Perhaps 
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opposition, the frequently light and superficial, if not to say verbal, difference separating Aristotle from Plato” 
PM, p. 265. 
160 “What are the facts, what are the reasons which led Ravaisson to judge that the phenomena of life, instead of 
being explained wholly by physical and chemical forces, could, on the contrary, throw some light on them? All 
the elements of the theory are already found in the Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle”. PM, p. 284. 
161 In 4.2.b, on EC, p. 135 and p. 174. 





my reading, there is an attack and also an original appropriation of Aristotle’s ideas in EC. 
Later in 1932, Aristotle’s theology also plays again the role of the paradigm of natural 
theology or philosophical theology in DS.III.163   
 
Until now my aim has been to demonstrate that Bergson mastered Aristotelian philosophy in 
general and had intimate knowledge of the doctrine that I will set out in the pages that follow. 
 
Aristotelian immanent teleology: general model, elements and domains 
The origin of teleology as of many other Aristotelian concepts must be looked for in Plato. 
Ariew explains very well the relation between Plato’s teleology and Aristotle’s: Aristotelian 
teleology “eschews Platonic designers for an inherent purposive or goal-directed force that 
resides in the material properties of living entities. Good arrangements are not the handiwork 
of a creator; rather they are due to some inner principle of change within living organisms”.164 
In Aristotle, teleology becomes immanent in nature.  
 
Despite the usual disputes, all the current scholars agree that Aristotle is the founder of 
natural teleology. As Balme says: “The novelty in Aristotle’s theory was his insistence that 
finality is within nature”, that is, “part of the natural process, not imposed upon it by an 
independent agent like Plato’s world soul or Demiourgos”.165 Both Aristotle’s traditionalism 
and his originality can be defended (as I hold also with regard to Bergson). The first does not 
exclude the second. As Sedley says, “most can be learnt by emphasizing, rather than 
minimizing, Aristotle’s Platonic background and training”.166 
 
Aristotle revises the Platonic purposive structure in the Timaeus. However, Aristotle, perhaps 
proud of his own originality, considers himself the real discoverer of the final causes in 
nature. At least, there is not reference to his master in the historical account of this topic (Met. 
I. 7. 988b6-8).167  
 
In Plato, goal-directedness implies an intelligent divine entity. Plato’s demiurge produces and 
administrates the world, including teleology. In this schema there is providence, in Greek, 
prónoia (Timaeus, 30b-c). The demiurge’s goodness is the principle or archè of the 
intelligent creation of the world’s soul and body (Timaeus, 29d-30b). That is, the cause of the 
creation of the world in the best possible way is to be found in his goodness. Ultimately, the 
teleological explanations in Plato (see the case of the head in Timaeus, 44d-45b) may be 
referred to the divine good work. This means that the providential schema works with 
extrinsic teleology.168  
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164 Ariew, André. Chapter 9: “Teleology“. The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, p.161. 
165 Balme, D. M. “Teleology and necessity”, in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle Biology. Ed. A. Gotthelf and J. 
G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 275. 
166 Sedley, David. “Teleology, Aristotelian and Platonic”, in Nature and life in Aristotle: Essays in honor of 
Allan Gotthelf. Ed. James Lennox and Robert Bolton. Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 5. 
167 For a sharp distinction between Plato and Aristotle see Bolton, Robert. “The origins of Aristotle’s natural 
teleology in Physics II” in Aristotle’s ‘Physics’. A critical guide. Ed. Mariska Leunissen. Cambridge University 
Press, 2015.  
168 For providence regarding human beings in Plato, see Laws.X. 899d and 905d. For the conception of the 





In Aristotle there is no prónoia, although he accepts directionality. Natural substances tend 
toward the good and the best, but there is no divine intellect responsible. Thanks to this lack 
of providence, Aristotle’s teleology is always immanent. That is, purposiveness does not 
mean any intentional divine predesign, theological arrangement or plan (logismòs, in 
Timaeus, 34a), but a feature of the natural beings as such. As we will see in due course, even 
Aristotle’s vision of the relation between god and the world is not providential. He himself 
does not address an ultimate reason for that, but we can infer it, first, because of his idea of a 
contemplative god, and second, because in his view there is no need for evoking divine 
intention. Thus, Aristotelian teleology is an obvious part of nature as such, which includes 
human beings.  
 
Aristotle maintains the doctrine of directedness in a sophisticated way. For Plato heavenly 
beings and human beings (especially males) are intelligent beings, and thus they have their 
own goals. But the rest of the animals are, so to speak, decadent human beings: following the 
literal word of Timaeus, 90e-92c we can say that human females, birds, quadrupeds, snakes 
and fishes were male human beings in the past. They became what they are through 
reincarnation. Aristotle rejected providence and developed the living world in an immanent 
way. Aristotelian teleology is more developed, richer and more complex than his master’s. 
Aristotle is or should be a model for every philosopher who wants to defend or attack 
teleology. 
 
Within Aristotle’s framework, the question of teleology is a key philosophical concept. 
Teleology is found throughout almost all his works on natural philosophy, from ethics to 
biology, from biology to cosmology, from cosmology to aesthetics. One can verify the 
importance of teleology in general approaches to Aristotle made by scholars: almost every 
portrait of Aristotle tackles the “discovery” of final causes,169 and still today Aristotelian 
teleology is the subject of a great deal of scholarly research, as I will show soon. 
 
While accepting the importance of teleology in Aristotle it has to be said that nowadays the 
scholarly field concerned with Aristotle’s natural teleology is highly controversial. Given the 
weight of teleology in Aristotle’s philosophy, its importance is interpreted in divergent ways. 
One of the problems of addressing Aristotle’s teleology is the lack of agreement, since there 
are as many exegetical hypotheses as investigations studying the topic. 170  My general 
perspective is comprehensive, to some extent. Let us attempt to give an overview of 
Aristotle’s immanent teleology nonetheless.  
 
According to Aristotle, there are three types of beings in the supralunary and infralunary 
realm in which he divides the whole of beings,171 and two of these three are naturally in 
movement. Being in movement in this sense means, for Aristotle, that “each [individual] has 
in oneself a source of change and remaining unchanged, whether in respect to place, or 
                                                
169 See for Guthrie, G. K. “The mind of Aristotle. Teleology and its defense”. A history of Greek philosophy. 
Op. cit. 97-98. Also see: Mansion, Augustin. Cap.VII. 3. “La nature comme fin et la finalité” Introduction à la 
physique aristotélicienne. Éditions de l´institut supérieur de philosophie. Louvain-la-Neuve, 1987, p. 35. In a 
book on Aristotle’s general vision of nature, Mansion says that finalism “dominates” his understanding of the 
world. In his classic essay on the philosopher, Jaeger talks, in general, about Aristotle’s “teleological conception 
of the world”. Jaeger, W. José Gaos. Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. 
[Aristóteles]. Trans. José Gaos. FCE, México, 2001, p. 185, 384, 437-8.  
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growth and decay, or alteration” (Phys.II. 1. 192b14-16).172 This source of change is what 
Aristotle understands physis or nature to be.  
In Aristotle every individual moving being has in view its own perfection, completeness and 
nobility. There is an innate tendency of natural beings towards what is the best for them, that 
is, the télos (τέλος). The télos can be translated as end, goal, perfection, function, completion, 
flourishing, good, the better, beauty or nobility. It is also called “that for the sake of which” 
or “what something is for” (hou héneka). “Further, it belongs to the same study to know the 
end or what something is for, and to know whatever is for that end. Now nature is an end and 
what something is for” (Phys.II. 194a28-29).  
The main text in which Aristotle gives a doctrinal exposition of this topic is Phys.II, which is 
among other things a study of immanent causality. Contrary to Bergson and EC, the main text 
in which Aristotle addresses the question of immanent teleology is focused on individual 
teleology. In one case Aristotle says that the end considered as the better has to be put in 
relation to each substance (hekástou ousían). He writes: “because better thus—better not 
simply, but in relation to the reality of the thing concerned” (Phys.II.2. 198b8-9).173 As I will 
show this statement is used by the defenders of individual teleology. It makes clear that in the 
context of the Physics he is referring exclusively to the goals of individuals. Another 
important approach to teleology can be found in PA.I, a general treatise on biology, again 
exclusively focused on individuals. Namely, it addresses the issue around individuals with a 
soul.  
The concepts of the goal and the ‘for the sake of which’ are intimately related to other terms 
too, especially in the domain of individual teleology. These other terms complete and enrich 
the original one. I will mention the two most important ones: form and function. In some 
passages both are used as synonyms for télos.  
 
In Phys.II, final causality is presented along with a fourfold division: final cause, formal 
cause, efficient cause and material cause.174 They are defined altogether in Phys.II.3 and 
again in Phys.II.7. Aristotle adds that there is a cooperation, if not coincidence, between some 
of them, in some instances.175 Namely, it is stated that the télos of something coincides with 
its specific form, morphé (µορφή) or eidos (εἶδος). “What a thing is, and what it is for, are 
one and the same” (Phys. II. 7. 198a17). From this point of view, the form is the goal of 
change and movement. It has to be understood then as perfection, completeness and 
nobility.176 
 
Almost all modern scholars agree that the Aristotelian forms have an ontological status. That 
is, whatever they are, forms are real and not merely heuristic tools and Aristotle’s teleology is 
                                                
172 Aristotle distinguishes six types of movements or kinéseis in Cat. XIV. 15a13-14. 
173 This can be related with the ethical view in NE.I. 1152b6-27, as Johnson does. With regard to the passage 
from Phys. I. 2, see Sedley, David. “VI. Aristotle”. Creationism and its critics in Antiquity. California 
University Press, 2007, p. 197.  
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not reflective, but constitutive.177 As D. Balme says, against Nussbaum and Wieland: “causes 
are objective things and events”.178 I adopt this understanding of Aristotle’s ontology. The 
end and the form are thus real. The forms are found in beings composed of matter,179 where 
matter is relative to them.180 For Aristotle forms are not generated and indestructible.181 
 
In other places, the télos is related to the érgon (ἔργον). This term means one specific natural 
function, activity or task. As Aristotle claims:  
“… a thing is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when it can perform its 
function; an eye, for instance, when it can see. When a thing cannot do so it is that thing only in name, 
like a dead eye or one made of stone, just as a wooden saw is no more a saw than one in a picture” 
(Meteor. IV.12.3909.10-21).182  
In this context we can see that the goal as function is one type of action. In sum, we can see 
that for Aristotle a natural being is necessarily in movement or change.183 Movement or 
change always or most of the times tends towards its specific form. The form is for the sake 
of an activity or function. This function is identified as the fulfillment, flourishment or 
summit of an individual being. Hence, the concepts of goal, for the sake of which, function 
and form are intimately related. They display what we call Aristotelian final causality.  
 
According to a classical line of contemporary interpretation, 184 M. Bastit wrote recently that 
“the final cause in act is the first regarding the other causes”. 185  Against this view, 
commentators such as Wieland or Boeri say that final cause is one among the four causes and 
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Lennox. Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 281.  
179 Phys.II. 194b13-15 
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184 I mean Düring or Mansion and Jaeger. Ingemar Düring says “La dottrina dei quattro aitia è in certo modo una 
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[Aristotele] Trans. Pierluigi Donini. Mursia, 1976. p. 275. Jaeger talks about the “teleological doctrine of the 
four causes”. Mansion, Augustin. Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne. Cap.VII. 3. “La nature comme fin 
et la finalité”. Éditions de l´institut supérieur de philosophie. Louvain-la-Neuve, 1987, p. 35: “…l’explication 
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185 Bastit, M. “Les quatre causes de l’être selon la philosophie première d’Aristote”. Louvain-la-Neuve, Ed. 
Peeters, 2002, p. 348, my translation. 
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2.1 Structural elements in Aristotle’s teleology 
Aristotle’s argument for teleology relies upon three structural elements: the notion of 
perfection, the notion of analogy and the notion of regularity. These three ideas compound 
the teleological argument as it can be found in Phys.II. 1-3, 7-8 and partially in PA.I. 1, 5. I 
call them elements, because they are part of the structure of the teleological argument. 
Perfection as such is an ontological claim. In the context of immanent teleology, it is linked 
with the idea of plurality. Analogy is essential for the teleological method. The use of 
analogies challenges the critique of anthropomorphism. Both perfection and analogy refer 
one to each other in Aristotle’s writings. After analyzing them, I will discuss one implicit 
question: the status of human beings, the “analogy-makers”, in the Aristotelian framework. 
Although the problem of anthropocentrism is not explicit in the texts by Aristotle, I believe it 
is necessary to include this philosophical issue as an element. The section “Hierarchy and the 
problem of anthropocentrism” completes the accounts on perfection and analogy. I develop 
some ideas of Johnson.  
Regularity also plays the role of a structural element in Aristotle. In addition, I have added a 
subsequent issue in 2.1.d. Following some interpreters, I distinguish two temporal dimensions 
for teleology: regularity and irregularity. Primary teleology, based on regularity, is to be 
applied to individual teleology and global teleology. Secondary teleology is an alternative 
model in Aristotle for explaining lucky events. These phenomena can be interpreted and 
reconstructed by retrospective teleology of singular events. It does not play an important role 
in my account on Aristotle, who focused on regular events, but it has a role to play in Chapter 
3 on Bergson.  
2.1.a. Perfection and pluralism 
The term télos has a qualitative accent and it can mean nobility. Aristotle clearly states that: 
“Yet the final cause (tò hou héneka) and the good (tò kalòn) are more fully present in the 
works of nature than in the works of art” (PA.I. 639b19-21). This qualitative element means 
that an end or goal is not every ending limit or conclusion of a process. The télos is always 
the flourishment of a particular nature. The télos is something good for the individual being 
involved in the process. As we have read above: “because better (béltion) thus—better not 
simply, but in relation to the reality of the thing concerned (pròs tèn hekástou ousían)” 
(Phys.II. 7.198b8-9). Also: 
“And there are the things which stand to the rest as their end and good; for what the other things are 
for tends to be best and their end” (Phys.II. 195a23-25). 
In general terms, we see that: 
“Nature is for the sake of the better and the end” (héneka dè tou beltíonos kaì tou télous he physis. 
GA. II. 4.738a37-b1) 
In the following passage Aristotle refers to the notion of télos also in a qualitative way (the 
Greek term kalós can be translated as “beautiful”): 
 
“ (…) in not one of them [researches concerning animals of every sort and kind] is nature (physikou) 
or beauty (kalou) lacking. (…) in the works of nature purpose and not accident is predominant; and 





formed has its place among what is beautiful (tou kalou).” (PA.I. 5.645a24-27). 
The concept of télos involves perfection, so not just any way whatsoever of finishing a 
process is necessarily télos. That is why non-perfective endings are named by him “escháton” 
or “péras”.  
This sharp distinction between end (télos) and limit (péras) becomes clear, in my opinion, in 
Met. V. In this book, a philosophical dictionary, Aristotle devotes to the goal and the limit 
two subsequent entries. In Met.V. 16 Aristotle talks about the téleion, which means “finality” 
or “completeness”, and also “perfection”.187 In Met.V. 17 Aristotle tries to clarify the notion 
of péras.   
In Met. V.16 the philosopher says that anything complete or perfect is: 
 “that which in respect of excellence and goodness (to kai aretèn kaì tò eu) cannot be excelled in its 
kind; e.g. we have a complete doctor or a complete flute-player, when they lack nothing in respect of 
the form of their proper excellence (…) And excellence is a completion; for each thing is complete 
and every substance is complete, when in respect of the form of its proper excellence it lacks no part 
of its natural magnitude. The things which have attained their end, this being good, are called 
complete; for things are complete in virtue of having attained their end. (…) Things, then, that are 
called complete in virtue of their own nature are so called in all these senses, some because in respect 
of goodness they lack nothing and cannot be excelled and no part proper to them can be found outside 
them, others in general because they cannot be exceeded in their several classes and no part proper to 
them is outside them; the others [other senses] presuppose these first two kinds, and are called 
complete because they either make or have something of the sort or are adapted to it or in some way 
or other involve a reference to the things that are called complete in the primary sense” (Met.V. 16. 
1022a3-1021b15my emphasis). 
Being complete means attaining excellence and goodness and not just any end implies 
excellency and goodness. Aristotle considers that in Met.V. 16: 
“Therefore, since the end is something ultimate, we transfer the word to bad things and say a thing has 
been completely spoilt, and completely destroyed, when it in no wise falls short of destruction and 
badness, but is at its last point. This is why death, too, is by a figure of speech called the end, because 
both are last things” (Met.V. 16.1021b25-30).  
I can be more concrete. In the biological realm, for instance, death cannot be a télos since it 
has nothing to do with the actual excellence of the substance, but with its destruction. In the 
next chapter of Met.V, where Aristotle ponders the meaning of limit or péras: the first 
meaning he offers is that it “means the last point of each thing (péras légetai to te éschaton 
hekáston)” (Met.V. 17). This definition is precisely the one he has for an end with no 
perfection implied. The limit is éschaton. In one enlightening remark, Aristotle links the non-
perfective end or limit with biology, meaning death.  
We read in Phys.II:  
“Now nature is an end and what something is for. For whenever there is a definite end to a continuous 
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change, that last thing is also what it is for (touto <tò> éschaton kaì tò hou héneka); whence the 
comical sally in the play 'He has reached the end for which he was born'—for the end should not be 
just any last thing, but the best (boúletai gàr ou pan einai tò éschaton telos, allà tò béltiston)” (Phys. 
II. 2.194a29-33).  
In contrast with this non-perfect end, we can figure out how important the notion of goal is 
for Aristotle. The idea of télos involves, as we have seen, “excellence”, “completion”, also 
the “better”, the “best”, and also the “good”, which also can be considered as “beautiful”. In 
contrast with the notion of limit, the télos implies a specific perfection of the entity involved 
in the particular movement or change. Aristotle says “the process is for the sake of the actual 
thing (he gar génesis héneka tes ousías), the thing is not for the sake of the process” (PA.I. 
640a10-19). So, there is a “for the sake of” for life, but it cannot be death, because it would 
not be the “for the actual thing”. 
Still within the biological realm, the goal has to be maturity and never extinction. Maturity is 
the goal of every change or growth. That is how we should understand this passage in Met. 
XII: 
“Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that supreme beauty and goodness are 
not present in the beginning, because the beginnings both of plants and of animals are causes, but 
beauty and completeness are in the effects of these, are wrong in their opinion. For the seed comes 
from other individuals which are prior and complete, and the first thing (próton) is not seed but the 
complete being (téleion); e.g. we must say that before the seed there is a man” (Met. XII.7. 1073a).  
It is the man and not the seed that lives according to its nature, properly speaking. For the 
same reason the goal of a man could not be decay, illness or, in ethics, vice. These suggest 
precisely a lack of physical or moral completeness. For every organism maturity may imply 
survival, reproduction and well-being in all its varieties.188  
The notion of télos is relevant beyond biology. In Aristotle’s ontology and his hylomorphic 
doctrine we can find the use of teleology. The process of moving or changing towards the 
specific form is a process of actualization, which in Aristotle’s ontological framework is 
capital.  
“For the function (érgon) is the end (télos), and the actuality (enérgeia) is the function. And so even 
the word ‘actuality’ is derived from ‘action’, and points to the  complete reality” (Met.IX. 8.1050a21-
24).189  
Leaving aside Aristotle’s etymological statement, both érgon and enérgeia have to be both 
considered in the teleological account. Hence, if in attaining the télos actuality is implied, we 
have to be aware of the ontological ground of the term “perfection”, which we are discussing. 
Attaining the télos has to be understood as an expression of actuality. Then also we could say, 
quoting Aristotle from his texts on that subject, that the télos is “more valuable” (timióteron) 
than and  “prior” (próteron) to matter and potency.190  
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mental maturity comes around 50 years (Pol.VII. 16.1335b33).  
189 I have changed Ross’ translation in one point: instead of “action” I have written “function”, because it is the 
word I am using for the term érgon.  





Following Mirus191 and Natali,192 I wanted to give a metaphysical account of the word 
perfection, beyond the biological one. At the same time, having noted that, I will emphasize 
the value of the télos in the biological ground. Not only because living beings are the clearest 
paradigm for Aristotle, but also because it is the ontological ground on which I start for the 
sake of a fluent comparison between him and Bergson.  
Further below, in the discussion of domains of application of Aristotelian teleology, I will 
come back to the notion of perfection in order to  stress one aspect that I will mention here: 
plurality. The plurality of functions, forms, nobility or beauty in this sense, entails a 
polysemy of the term télos. In Aristotle’s nature there are different kinds of natural 
substances. Each kind has its corresponding model of completeness and perfection. As I said, 
one of the main values of this kind of philosophical approach is its flexibility, its capacity to 
fit with any kind of natural being, without subsuming it under vast overarching principles.  
In 2.2 I pose different empirical expressions of the term in the biological, human and 
heavenly realm. Although I will tackle the prior, inorganic stages of perfection in Aristotle’s 
teleology, in this account of teleology I interpret the term perfection with regard to the world 
of living beings. Here the télos is related to an individual development and specific potencies. 
Afterwards I show that there is another view of what is perfection in the global teleology 
passages. The télos as seen there is a contribution to something much larger than individual 
development, but it is compatible with the plurivocity of the term goal.   
2.1.b. Analogy and anthropomorphism 
Usually, Aristotle establishes analogies between humans and nature. 193  Methodically 
speaking, analogy is the basis of teleology.194 On one side, we find conscious activities and 
human crafts: they are both rationally directed towards something. On the other side, we find 
natural tendencies of nature, such as the growth of the teeth in a dog for the sake of chewing, 
and ultimately eating. Also, there is the unconscious work of a spider on its web, and the 
coordinated development of the different growing parts of a vegetable seed. The structural 
argument is that each phenomenon is analogous to the extent it may be understood for the 
sake of some ultimate perfection, at the end of the process.195 
However, I want to note that Aristotle did not accept every analogy. In fact, Aristotle 
restricted the use of analogies in philosophy, as Lloyd shows in a classic work.196 In the 
corpus, he attacked openly different kinds of anthropomorphism, based on wrong analogies. 
As we will see in detail, Aristotle believes that spiders work for the sake of something 
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perfect, but not like humans do: spiders do not deliberate. The moon is related, Aristotle says, 
with menstruation, but this does not entail that the moon is feminine (HA.VII. 582a35-
582b2).  
One of the clearest cases in which Aristotle seems to despise anthropomorphism is in the 
theological context, where “human beings model the shapes of the gods on their own” (Pol.I. 
2.1252b25).197 It would be absurd to say (with the poets) that the gods are envious (Met.I. 
2.983a-5). It would be wrong to say that among gods there is a monarchy (Pol.I. 2.1252.23-
25). It would be inaccurate to say that they sleep, like Endimion: but it does not mean that 
every analogy is absurd; gods are capable of contemplation or theorein, like the human 
philosophers (NE.X. 8.1178b.10-20). Also in Met.XII. 7 and Met.XII. 9 Aristotle lists several 
analogies between divine life and human psychology. So certain analogies are rigorous, but 
not every analogy: humans and gods are not similar because of their common human form, 
but because of thought (Met.XII. 1074b-15).198  
Nevertheless, Aristotle does not seem to have a problem extrapolating human actions to 
animal behavior or embryology, for instance. In Phys.II, a treatise on natural science written 
for the “student of nature”, Aristotle starts talking about the final cause by using exclusively 
human psychological examples: 
“And again, a thing may be a cause as the end. That is what something is for, as health might be what 
a walk is for. On account of what does he walk? We answer 'To keep fit' and think that, in saying that, 
we have given the cause. And anything which, the change being effected by something else, comes to 
be on the way to the end, as slimness, purging, drugs, and surgical instruments come to be as means to 
health: all these are for the end, but differ  in that the former are works and the latter tools” (Phys.II. 
3.194b30-195a2).  
After the example of the walker (used also for the same goal in Met.V. 1013a32) and the 
surgical instruments, we find in Phys.II.3 the example of the statue and the statue maker. The 
doctor, the walker, the artist and their actions are considered models for natural explanation. 
Afterwards, in Phys.II.7 Aristotle tries to summarize the doctrine of the tetralogical causality 
of Phys.II.3. Then he uses an anthropomorphic example again: the battle. He asks about the 
final cause of a war. “Or it is what the thing is for: they fought for dominion” (Phys. II. 7. 
198a15-20). Dominion is then the Aristotelian example of final cause. First the action of the 
walker, the doctor, and the sculptor and, second, the action of the fighters are Aristotle’s 
models for natural causality. Maybe this can be striking for a scientist nowadays. 
Implicit in this approach is a philosophy of nature and the human being. It will take this 
section and the next one to clarify it. It is clear that human practices and natural phenomena 
are analogical items for Aristotle. In two places in Phys.II Aristotle states that human art is an 
“imitation” of nature. 199  In this context, nature is, according to Aristotle, better than 
techniques. As we saw Aristotle says in his biological treatise PA: “Yet the final cause (tò 
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hou héneka) and the good (tò kalòn) is more fully present in the works of nature than in the 
works of art” (PA.I. 1.639b19-21).200 
On my reading, the argument runs as follows: teleology implies perfection. Thus, human 
rational actions are teleological. But nature is more perfect than human actions. From this 
perspective, human actions imitate nature in the sense that they resemble nature.  
The following passage is surely one of the clearest statements of the analogy between human 
works and works of nature: 
“Things are done for something. Therefore they are by nature such as to be for something. Thus if a 
house were one of the things which come to be due to nature, it would come to be just as it now does 
by the agency of art; and if things which are due to nature came to be not only due to nature but also 
due to art, they would come to be just as they are by nature. The one, then, is for the other. In general, 
art either imitates the works of nature or completes that which nature is unable to bring to completion. 
If, then, that which is in accordance with art is for something, clearly so is that which is in 
accordance with nature. The relation of that which comes after to that which goes before is the same 
in both” (Phys.II. 8.199a11-20, italics are mine). 
In his teleological works, Aristotle not only talks about human activity like walking. He adds 
artifacts, and, in my view, precisely for the very same purpose. Crafts are the expression of 
human consciousness or human work.201 Their role in Aristotle is to symbolize human 
actions. Human artifacts, humans and animals are potentially analogical, in this sense. A bed, 
an animal, a human being are analogues in PA.I. 640b19. At the very beginning of Phys.II. 1, 
Aristotle starts by differentiating rigidly natural beings (he mentions animals, plants and the 
four simple elements) and artificial beings (Phys.II. 1.192b10-11). The reason for this 
dichotomy is that the latter group, composed of artifacts, comprises beings that have no 
internal principle of movement. Aristotle focuses on the fact that this lack entails that crafts 
(in that case, beds) cannot reproduce themselves. But subsequently he establishes a solid link 
between one realm and the other, because of the form. Artificial beings and human activities, 
on one hand, and natural process, on the other, constitute the basis of this analogy, where the 
form is involved. Crafts, on the one hand, and natural beings, on the other, have to be 
understood according to their peculiar form. Aristotle begins to make this conceptual 
connection when he compares the form of an organic being and the form of the bed, avoiding 
the aforementioned difference. Among the organic beings, he says, the form is internal as a 
principle of movement and change; in artifacts, the form is external.  
The form and function are the point of the analogy between the natural being (physikón) and 
the artificial one (technikón): 
“A hatchet, in order to split wood, must, of necessity, be hard ; if so, then it must, of necessity, be 
made of bronze or of iron. Now the body, like the hatchet, is an instrument; as well the whole body as 
each of its parts has a purpose, for the sake of which it is; the body must therefore, of necessity, be 
such and such, and made of such and such materials, if that purpose is to be realized” (PA.I. 1.642a10-
13).  
In his embryological account, in GA.II, both the difference and the affinity between both 
sides is addressed in the same passage: 
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“…heat and cold may make the iron soft and hard, but what makes a sword is the movement of the 
tools employed, this movement containing the principle of the art. For the art is the starting-point and 
form of the product; only it exists in something else, whereas the movement of nature exists in the 
product itself, issuing from another nature which has the form in actuality” (GA.II. 1.734b19-
735a4).202 
Although there is a definite reason for sharply distinguishing crafts such as hatchets and 
swords, on the one hand, and natural beings, on the other,203 in the end Aristotle’s general 
discourse on natural causality gives more relevance to the common element. The form and 
the function are the common element. There is also a comparison between the matter of the 
bed (wood) and the matter of the organic being (flesh and bone): they are both relative to the 
form.204 Human actions, human artifacts and natural entities are thus analogues of each other. 
At least in one case, Aristotle also takes this very same analogy the other way around: the 
plot (ho mythos) of the tragedy is the télos of the tragedy (Poet.6. 1450a23), which ultimately 
may lead to its cathartic function. In order to explain this main feature of tragedies, which in 
the end is something that we construct (synístasthai, Poet.1. 1447a-2), he says that it is “like 
the soul” (oion psychè) of the artifact (Poet.6. 1450a39). Shortly afterwards, talking about the 
ordered structure of elements and magnitude, he comes back to the organic analogy 
(1450b35-1451a5). By no means does it entail mixing both realms. The world of artifacts is 
the world of extrinsic teleology, whereas the world of natural beings deals with immanent 
teleology. The case of the tragedies is an exception that shows the inverse use of the analogy. 
By mythos Aristotle means an especially sophisticated kind of teleological union between 
parts and wholes, and he recalls the case of the soul. To this extent, we can see well how art 
imitates nature.  
It is important to notice that crafts are not part of immanent teleology, since their directedness 
is extrinsic. Crafts are excluded from immanent teleology from the beginning of the Physics. 
However, they are very useful for understanding natural teleology insofar they are an 
expression of human directedness. Their goal is human nature and because of their evident 
directedness, they offer a clear example for grasping the meaning of natural teleology.  
We know now how the analogy between the realm of intentional activity and the natural 
unconscious realm works. It is time to explain why Aristotle proposed this in a treatise on 
natural causality.  
As far as I am concerned, the only rejection of the possible objections of this analogy can be 
found in Phys.II.8, which is a defense of anthropomorphism or, moreover, biomorphism. In 
the following passage Aristotle affirms that our goal-directed actions cannot really be 
identified with inquiry and deliberation, since these are merely species of goal-directed 
actions.205  
“The point is most obvious if you look at those animals other than men, which make things not by art, 
and without carrying out inquiries or deliberation. Spiders, ants, and the like have led people to 
wonder how they accomplish what they do, if not by mind. Descend a little further, and you will find 
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things coming to be which conduce to an end even in plants, for instance leaves for the protection of 
fruit. If, then, the swallow's act in making its nest is both due to nature, and the spider's in making its 
web, and the plant's in producing leaves for its fruit, and roots not up but down for nourishment, 
plainly this sort of cause is present in things which are and come to be due to nature. And since nature 
is twofold, nature as matter and nature as form, and the latter  is an end, and everything else is for the 
end, the cause as that for which must be the latter” (Phys.II. 8.199A20-34, my emphasis). 
 
Here Aristotle affirms that goals are in nature, sometimes far from human consciousness. It is 
found in entomology and also in plant growth, and it does not mean anthropomorphism. 
Spiders do not deliberate like humans, but they still have things in common with us. The 
same happened with gods: they do not dream, they are alien to envy, but they think. In this 
case, transferring immanent teleology to spiders and plants is right, and is not part of 
anthropomorphism. Aristotle himself would reject the analogy in terms of deliberation 
because of its anthropomorphic illegitimacy. A correct analogy may imply distinguishing 
similarities and differences with equal clarity.  
The analogy between humans and nature is strengthened in a second way in Phys.II. 8: 
namely, with regard to failure. Natural beings tend toward their own form and function 
regularly. The problem is that sometimes there is no accomplishment in nature. Human 
failures and broken artifacts do not attain always their ends. The fulfillment of the proper goal 
happens always (aeì) or most of the time (hos epì tò poly): this can be applied to human 
affairs and, again, also to nature. The animal born deformed is the example of “natural 
failure”.206 It helps Aristotle to elaborate the analogy between the human conscious world and 
the natural world. Given that art imitates nature because nature is more perfect, and given that 
failures happen exceptionally in nature, it is legitimate to establish another analogy. I agree 
with Witt on calling this “argument from mistakes”.207 In the end this analogy is derived from 
the regularity of the good order of nature and reason. Failure is seen as exceptional in this 
context.  
Ultimately, I think that the constant teleological analogy between the human realm 
(intelligent activities and crafts) and natural phenomena is held for two reasons. The first one 
is only methodological. We know the human world better, since it is our perspective. And 
then we can move beyond through analogy. Aristotle openly defends this method at the 
beginning of Phys.I.1, when writes: 
“The natural course is to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to us, to what is more 
knowable and clear by nature; for the two are not the same. Hence we must start thus with things 
which are less clear by nature, but clearer to us, and move on to things which are by nature clearer and 
more knowable” (Phys.I. 184a17-22). 
There is a more important reason for using analogies throughout these works. It is grounded 
in how Aristotle conceives human beings and their legitimacy for making rigorous analogies. 
A philosophy of man is here implied. If we resemble nature, as Aristotle says, it is because 
we are part of nature. Intellect is part of nature: “For just as the intellect (ho nous) acts for the 
sake of something, nature (he physis) acts in the same way; and this something is its end 
(télos)” (DA.II. 4.415b15-18). 
In the argument of immanent teleology, analogy is grounded upon a regular perfection that 
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different phenomena have in common. There is, as I said, a genuine plurivocity regarding the 
Aristotelian télos, but at the same time, one common meaning. There can be great differences 
between the specifics of that perfection, but its immanent tendency towards completeness 
establishes the similarity. The efficacy of a hatchet, the wise practice of a surgeon, the 
unconscious work of a spider, the correct development of an embryo or a seed are analogue 
to a certain extent: they exist all for the sake of something good. Nature is more perfect than 
art, but resembles it. Thus, Aristotle insists on human actions for two reasons: intelligent 
actions are easier to understand for the students, and human beings are part of nature too, 
since they tend immanently towards one télos.  
We start with human nature, like the walker. The next step is to transfer analogically this 
teleological idea of tendency to non-human natural beings, like plants and spiders. They also 
have their own horizon of specific perfection. Perfection and analogy are thus intimately 
linked in the teleological argument.  
One last issue of analogy needs to be addressed. Until now I have referred to Phys.II. The 
perspective of this treatise is individual teleology, the paradigm of teleology in Aristotle. In 
the examples of global teleology that we will see in 2.2, the analogy between human 
techniques or crafts and natural phenomena is partially absent. Although the presence of the 
analogy is poor there, in comparison with the individual teleology excerpts from Phys.II, I 
believe that there are still analogic elements in all these passages except one. Global 
teleology is philosophically less developed than the other. This means, for instance, that the 
analogical method is less clear, although the perfective element is rapidly noticeable.  
We will see these texts in detail in 2.2, but for the moment we can say something regarding 
the analogies. I will tackle here only two cases of the use of analogy. One of the most 
important texts that support the existence of immanent global teleology in Aristotle is 
Met.XII.10. It is the only text in which Aristotle covers the whole universe within one 
panoramic glance. The perfective element is the good arrangement of the parts (he mentions 
different kinds of animals). Aristotle compares the whole universe with a household and an 
army, not with a human body or a human action. This microcosmos and macrocosmos 
analogy does not refer the universe to one organism, but to a compound of them.  
 
I observe some precaution with respect to this organic analogy in the field of cosmology. 
Aristotle compares the world, an ordered and hierarchical sum of entities, with two human 
constructs without soul like the household and the army. Aristotelian global teleology does 
not imply a soul of the world. He did not accept that doctrine from the Timaeus. To my 
knowledge the idea of the universe understood as an organism is referred to once in the 
corpus (in Phys.VIII. 2.252b) and he does not reject openly the Platonic notion of anima 
mundi in this chapter concerning the origin of movement. 208 In fact, Aristotle seems to accept 
a comparison between the world and an animal in this passage. The idea of the rejection of 
the soul of the world is mostly an argument from silence. He does not affirm such a notion 
anywhere. What interests us now is that Aristotle arranged an artificial compound of entities 
(an army) and a natural compound of entities (a household) for proposing the analogy. These 
two, army and household, are compounds of entities that appear to us as something “clearer”. 
The ground for the analogy is its paradigm of perfection: the arrangement of the parts. I think 
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that the lack of soul of these two examples is relevant, since it does not lead to Platonic 
assumptions. Aristotle’s global teleology is still a particular conception of the world.  
 
Other global passages deal with the term “imitation”. Again, we will deal with them in 2.2, so 
the only thing I would like to briefly discuss here is the analogical element. Here the use of 
analogy is minimal, but there is still analogy in this “language of desire”.209 In Met.IX. 8 and 
GC.II.10 Aristotle talks about imitation among inorganic beings. In the second case, the 
philosopher calls imitation the general cycle of elements. In DA.II. 4 and GA.II. 1 he talks 
about imitation regarding plants and animals through cycles of reproduction. In these cases, 
the only analogic element that I have found is in fact the verb. Imitation here means 
something different from the “imitation of nature” by art and far from aesthetics. In this case, 
Aristotle uses repeatedly the term imitation. It is a choice that is, now more than ever, full of 
Platonic echoes. In these specific cases, perishable beings reproduce themselves for the sake 
of something good: taking part of eternity. Perfection means here to contribute with 
individual powers to something beyond individuality. But we will deal with that later.  
 
The original and “clearer” sense of the verb, to imitate (mimeisthai), is the conscious and 
human one. According to Aristotle, imitation is something connatural (symphyton) to us. We 
learn by imitating (Poet.4. 1448b5-10), and that is the context of the term in aesthetics for 
instance.210  There is a second well-known use of the mimetic language, to be found in 
Aristotle’s natural works.  As we have seen above, he repeats many times that “arts imitate 
nature”. The ultimate meaning of this Aristotelian mantra is resemblance. Aristotle is still 
talking about the human realm, he is talking about arts, technical skills, although he is 
comparing it with nature.  
 
There is a third context of imitation. In the four texts on global teleology, the meaning of the 
verb takes some steps further. As we will see, Aristotle attributes imitative qualities to 
elements and vegetables. In this case, imitation means, as we know, an ontological 
contribution and participation. This teleological activity is absolutely unconscious. It has 
nothing to do with imitation in terms of intentionality, as we have them in the Poetics, and it 
is not the imitation of nature, attributed to human arts in Physics.  
 
The five global passages that I already have introduced have analogical features, but only in 
the first one, Met.XII. 10, were they explicit. However, even in that case, the analogy was not 
like the analogies in Phys.II and other places. The entire universe is not compared with one 
organism, but with one household and one army. They are items without a soul. In an old 
publication on organic analogies, G. Conger holds that Aristotle is not a microcosmic 
author.211 He did not use the analogy between cosmos and organism. The most he does is to 
not reject it in Phys.VIII. 2.252b. The imitation passages also contain enough analogical 
elements, borrowed from rational imitation, but this is the same likeness that permit us to 
understand distant phenomena in a clearer way.212  
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2.1.c. Hierarchy and anthropocentrism  
The inclusion of this section has been motivated by M. R. Johnson’s monograph Aristotle on 
teleology, especially its conclusion. He writes: 
“Because non-human organisms do not have conscious goals or purposes, we assume that it is 
anthropomorphic to attribute ends to non-human things such as animals and plants. A consequence of 
this avoidance of anthropomorphism is the acceptance of anthropocentrism: if only humans can be the 
subjects of purposes and values, then only humans can be objects of purpose or value, and thus have 
ends”.213 
 
Here I introduce a new term: anthropocentrism, different and even opposed to 
anthropomorphism. There are different kinds and degrees of anthropocentrism in the history 
of philosophy, as we will see soon, but what I call absolute anthropocentrism concedes goals 
and perfectiveness only to gods and human beings, by identifying the mind with 
perfectiveness. In absolute anthropocentrism human beings are not only the most perfect 
beings within nature, but also the only ones that have proper goals. Absolute 
anthropocentrism conceives nature always in relation to human goals, and hence the goal of 
individual natural entities is necessarily subordinated to human goals. An absolute 
anthropocentric position can include providence and creation, providence without creation, 
and can also disregard both. Perhaps the most famous anthropocentric account of nature can 
be found in one passage of the first book of the Bible, which includes providence and 
creation.214   
 
Until now I have addressed the notions of perfection and analogy in a pluralistic way. This 
means basically what Johnson says: the correct anthropomorphism, the rigorous biomorphic 
analogy, entails a “challenge to teleological versions of anthropocentrism”.215 I also believe 
that immanent teleology has some sort of ecological meaning or “biophilia”: this approach to 
natural philosophy entails a “recognition that other things besides humans have intrinsic 
value”.216  
 
According to anthropocentrism we cannot think about natural beings beyond their relation 
with human beings; according to biomorphism or a correct anthropomorphism, we should be 
able to. There are different kinds of perfection in nature. There is a common perfection 
between every living being, and life (and not mind) is the paradigm. The model of immanent 
teleology implies both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of human beings. As I said, 
the Aristotelian conception of man is a naturalistic one. This is an implicit philosophy of 
anthropology that cannot be found in Phys.II, but I still consider it a structural element of 
immanent teleology. It is necessary to complete this account of Aristotelian nature and 
humans by nuancing the pluralism, mentioned in sections a) and b), and also defended by 
Johnson.  
 
I give three examples: Plato, the Stoics and Descartes. They are influential thinkers of 
absolute anthropocentrism in ancient and modern philosophy.  
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As I said above, Plato defends a transcendental teleology, which includes providence and also 
divine creation. In this framework, heavenly beings and human males are intelligent beings 
and thus they have their own goals. In the end, Plato’s idea of a genuine goal is restricted to 
these two types, while the rest of the species in nature is conceived as degraded forms. 
According to Timaeus. 90e-92c the rest of animals were sinful humans in the past. Following 
this passage literally we can say that for Plato human females, birds, quadrupeds, snakes and 
fish were human males in the past and afterwards became what they are through 
reincarnation.217 
 
In Cicero we have a clear account of the Ancient Stoic anthropocentrism.218 The passages 
from On the nature of the gods add to the question of providence a clearer conception of what 
anthropocentric teleology might be. The representative of Stoic thought says in this dialogue:  
 
“For whose sake, then, would one say that the universe was formed? For the sake, undoubtedly, of 
those animate beings that exercise reason. These are gods and men, whom nothing assuredly 
transcends in excellence, since reason is the highest of all things. It is thus credibly established that 
the universe and everything that is in it were made for the sake of gods and men” (De natura deorum. 
II. Chap. 53. 133).219 
 
The last remark states clearly that the goals of natural beings are necessarily related to human 
and divine goals. Their value and completeness are to refer to intellectual beings. Hence 
everything is relative to gods’ and mankind’s value. The next text shows us how it can be so: 
 
“But it will be asked for whose sake so vast a work was carried out. Was it for the sake of trees and 
herbs, which though without sensation are nevertheless sustained by Nature? No, that at any rate is 
absurd. Was it for the sake of animals? It is equally improbable that the gods went to such pains for 
beings that are dumb and without understanding. It must, then, be admitted that this wealth of things 
was provided for man, unless, perhaps, it is the great abundance and variety of fruits, and the 
pleasantness not only of their taste, but also of their smell and appearance, that throws a doubt upon 
their having been bestowed by nature upon man alone! So far are they from having been also provided 
for the sake of animals, that we perceive the latter to have been themselves created with a view to 
man. What other end do sheep serve except that of clothing men with their wool, when it has been 
prepared and woven?” (Cicero. De natura deorum. II. Chap. 63. 158).220  
 
The last passage is relevant for us, since it clearly shows how to understand the Stoic inter-
species anthropocentric teleology. It shows the role played by non-human species in the 
framework. Like in one Aristotelian interspecies passage,221 we have here a natural scale 
interpreted in global teleological terms: the inferior’s goal is to serve the superior. This means 
that plants (and their fruits) are for the sake of animals and humans, since the latter are more 
perfect. Animals are for the sake of humans, because the latter are better. As we can see here, 
the Stoic interprets the natural scale or ontological hierarchy in teleological terms. This 
allows him to conceive the whole of nature as a hierarchical web of subordinated goals. Each 
one is relative to the next step further in the scale, and especially “with a view to man”.  
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Descartes distrusted final causality. For him transcendental teleology is useless. 222 The 
founder of modern philosophy is a founder of non-providential anthropocentrism. In the 
biological individual realm everything is mechanics and thus animals do not have such a 
thing as a specific form or soul.223 In Descartes we can only talk about human goals, based on 
our spirit. But there is no point in saying that plants or animals have goals, not even in saying 
that those goals are “with a view to man”. Descartes dispenses with any kind of teleology in 
nature, he rejects extrinsic and immanent teleology.  
 
For absolute anthropocentrism, it is impossible to understand living beings without reference 
to humans and in some cases above ultimately to gods. In comparison with Aristotle, these 
previous visions share a restricted understanding of what a natural goal is. In the case of 
Descartes, there is pure anthropocentrism, since only man has goals. In the case of Plato, the 
vast plurality of goals in nature is referred to human males, who are the paradigm of 
perfection (while the rest is conceived as decadent). The world of living entities, such as 
plants and animals created by the demiurge, has its absolute center in the human being.  The 
two Stoic passages show how the rest of nature can have its own goals, although its value is 
ultimately relative to intelligent beings, like gods and humans.  
 
Aristotle’s understanding of nature challenges the Platonic, Stoic and Cartesian conceptions 
of nature and human beings. Johnson is right in saying that correct anthropomorphism 
automatically implies the rejection of absolute anthropocentrism. In Aristotle humans are not 
isolated in nature. Aristotle conceives non-intelligent goals in nature.  
As a consequence I believe that Aristotelian pluralism must be nuanced. In Aristotle there is 
neither “radical egalitarianism” nor “arbitrary relativism”.224 While he recognizes non-human 
life, he defends a hierarchy in which intrinsic perfection counts.225 In the very last two pages 
of his work Johnson addresses the question of the hierarchy and the position of human 
dominance, something that is a key part of Aristotelian universe. The scholar himself asks: 
“But does this kind of hierarchy send us right back to the position of human dominance, and 
so effectively amount to the anthropocentrism that we were trying to avoid?” And he 
continues: “One answer is that, even if it did, at least we would have a naturalized, objective 
basis for that apparently inevitable axiology”.226 Secondly, Johnson says that actually there is 
no anthropocentrism in Aristotle and gives a rough outline of what an Aristotelian 
environmental ethic can be: it may regard “explotation of nature with reference to the ends of 
other natural entities”.227 Then the interpreter seems to link the idea of recognition with that 
of the notion of limit of acquisition in Pol.I.10. Given the recognition of value in life of any 
kind, exploitation would never be legitimate beyond the natural limit of acquisition, 
proportional to our limited necessities.  
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I defend a middle ground position for Aristotle, one which is not so opposed to Plato. The 
Aristotelian human is to be found on a natural and, ultimately, ontological scale. The human 
being is inferior to supralunary beings (NE.VI.7.1141b-5), although it is prior in nature in 
comparison to any other being within the infralunary realm. Human beings are a 
recapitulation of the physical world, since all the different grounds of life are contained in his 
or her own nature. Second, mankind has unique characteristics. Mankind summarizes the 
previous stages and adds the most perfect ones, but as Rémi Brague says, this “does not mean 
an absolute anthropocentrism”.228 Also, I think that this rooting of human faculties in the 
natural world is what Johnson means by “naturalized”. If Aristotle was an anthropocentrist, it 
would be a naturalized anthropocentrism, Johnson says. But finally, he rejects that label. 
Johnson prefers the term “naturalized axiology”.229 The ultimate meaning of this term in 
Johnson is basically practical or ethical: axiology has to justify exploitation of nature. 
Nevertheless, apart from this possibly legitimate conclusion, there is still an ontological 
superiority of human beings in Aristotle.  
Aristotle’s naturalized anthropocentrism mitigates the previous conceptions of human beings, 
and challenges, après or avant la lettre, those frameworks in which man is the goal of inferior 
natural beings or even the only goal of nature. However, while the term “anthropocentrism” 
means that human goals are more important than animal goals, I think it must be applied to 
Aristotle. Humans in Aristotle summarize or represent the rest of the faculties in nature, and 
also add some unique ones. Unique faculties like the intellectual ones are grounded, in 
Aristotle, in the biological faculties.  
If the “centrism” means importance or uniqueness, this might imply a certain 
anthropocentrism. But notice that I add the term “mitigated”, for it is necessary to distinguish 
sharply this point of view from Plato’s. Again, with Johnson I think that absolute 
anthropocentrism is incompatible with immanent teleology, but I do not think that the same 
conclusion follows from the mitigated version. That is, mitigated anthropocentrism is a 
structural part of immanent teleology and it is perfectly compatible with pluralism and 
anthropomorphism. 
Before discussing specific features of human beings in Aristotle, I want to draw attention to 
the notion of hierarchy implied and almost never explicit in his writings. We have to see that 
man is in a specific position on the natural scale. Moreover, we will see that this scale is the 
structure of his own knowledge: in general terms, the scale represents man’s own lower 
faculties. After noticing this we will be able to understand the naturalized anthropocentrism 
of Aristotle, where ethics and intellect are grounded on nature. Only afterwards will we be 
able to highlight human uniqueness, named by me as summary and uniqueness. 
The scale of being is implied in multiple texts of Aristotle but he only explicitly addressed it 
in a few. To be sure, the Aristotelian scale is not a mere scale of living sublunary beings. It 
includes a wider range of entities. Among the sublunary realm it also covers the four 
sublunary primary bodies (fire, air, water, earth). Besides, the scale rises upwards to the 
heavens and up to god, the prime mover. Supralunary eternal entities like the sun, the moon, 
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the stars and the first heaven also have their particular position in the scale. The scale 
includes elements, living beings, human being and heavenly bodies, as DC.II. 12 suggests.230 
 
However, I focus on living beings. Although the idea is not developed, Aristotle has in mind 
an rising continuum in DA. There is, at least, one passage that shows clearly so: “There is 
also this parallel between the cases of soul and of the figures: what is prior in the sequence is 
always implicitly present in the other figures or ensouled things (the triangle in the rectangle, 
the nutritive in the perceptive)” (DA.II. 3.414b29-32). The perspective there is that of a 
variety of faculties and the types of souls, simultaneously. This means both that the beings 
capable of perceive also have the nutritive faculty. There is a hierarchy.   
The so-called rising continuum in the living realm is described only in two places in the 
corpus. In fact, they are the only texts in Aristotle in which he addresses the topic of nature in 
a panoramic way. This panorama has the form of a natural scale.  
 
In the first case, on Ascidians, between plants and animals: 
 
“For nature passes from lifeless objects to animals in such unbroken sequence (synechos), interposing 
between them beings which live and yet are not animals, that scarcely any difference seems to exist 
between two neighbouring groups owing to their close proximity” (PA.IV. 5.681a10-14). 
 
Here there is the second passage on the natural scale of biology:  
 
“Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to 
determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form should lie. 
Thus, next after lifeless things in the upward scale comes the plant, and of plants one will differ from 
another as to its amount of apparent vitality; and, in a word, the whole genus of plants, whilst it is 
devoid of life as compared with an animal, is endowed with life as compared with other corporeal 
entities. Indeed, as we just remarked, there is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent towards 
the animal” (HA.VIII. 1, 588b3-7). 
These texts highlight what Lovejoy calls the “principle of continuity”. Although there is not a 
general exhaustive classification of biological species in Aristotle, there is in this view a 
classification of faculties.231Although he admits that there are transitional forms in Life, such 
as the ascidians, there are sharp distinctions between realms in his conception of biology. In 
DA.II. 4 we see that nutrition, growth and reproduction are part of all the living beings. With 
regard to the analogy between biological forms and geometry, nutrition is the triangle. It is 
the most basic ground of life. That is, the vegetable life. When in NE.I.7 Aristotle asks about 
the goal or function of plants, he mentions nourishment and the faculty of growth (NE.I. 
7.1098a1).  
 
After plants and Ascidians we reach animals. It is true that among animals the hierarchy is 
unclear. Aristotle affirms that “animals must necessarily have perception” (DA.III. 12.22-33), 
namely the sense of touch (DA.III. 12.434b14). In DA.III. 10 it seems that desire is also a 
necessary faculty of animals. In DA.III. 11 he mentions “imperfect animals” that have only 
the sense of touch (from which they can experience, incidentally, pain and pleasure) (DA.III. 
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11.434a4). A bit further he says that while touch (and taste) are for living, “the rest of the 
senses are for living well” (DA.III. 12.25-27).232 
 
It seems then that there is a hierarchy between animals, regarding their capacities. There are 
those that only perceive through touch, and the rest are superior. Aristotle makes this 
distinction in different regards. Aristotle says, “it is evident, then that perceiving and 
understanding are not the same thing; for all animals have a share of the former, but few of 
the latter” (DA.III. 3.427b7-9). Also, regarding imagination, he says: “while imagination is 
present in many beasts, lógos is not” (DA.III. 3.428a28). Memory, and hence prudence, is 
also present in some animals, and in some there’s not (Met.I. 1.980a25-980b27). Some 
animals (not many), apart from human beings, have the power of understanding and 
remembering; and many (not all) have imagination. In any case, to my knowledge, there is no 
classification of those superior animals that can perceive through vision or hearing and that 
also can imagine or move themselves. Hence, there are superior animals and inferior animals 
for Aristotle, although he does not provide any classification with examples.233 
 
Just as the plants are to be understood according to the faculty of nutrition and reproduction, 
and human beings according to their intellectual capacities, the possibility of deliberation and 
being happy, the animal kingdom is, generally speaking, sensitive to pain and pleasure, as 
well as desires, which are the cause of locomotion. Again, in the function-argument or ergon-
argument chapter of the first book of NE, Aristotle points out the specific function of animals 
and mentions sentient life (NE.I. 7.1098a1-2).  
 
Finally, we reach mankind. It is at the top of the infralunary scale of beings. There are 
multiple texts in which Aristotle talks about man’s superiority and unique faculties,234 but the 
first feature I want to mention concerning Aristotle’s man is something that I have already 
suggested: human beings summarize the rest of the natural world. Apart from the elementary 
compound, it is one unique feature of humans that they participate in the rest of the biological 
faculties. Humans have all the faculties mentioned in the treatise On the soul. In my view 
NE.I. 13 is one of the best examples for highlighting the idea of recapitulation in mankind. 
This means that humans summarize the whole scale of living beings in the infralunary realm. 
Moreover, as Brague suggests,235 NE.I. 13 echoes a certain ontogeny. That means that the 
development of the human being, from the first embryological stage to maturity, goes 
through vegetable life, animal life, and, finally, human life.  
While in the function-argument of NE.I. 7.1097b35-1098a16 Aristotle recalls the natural 
scale and distinguishes three basic parts of it, in NE.I.13 the philosopher links nutrition and 
growth, the goal of vegetable life or phytikón (NE.I. 7.1098a), to the first stage of human 
development, the life of the embryo. There he focuses on nutrition and dreams (NE.I. 
13.1102b-5). In the function-argument of NE.I. 7 the function of senses or actualization of the 
sensitive capacity or power (aisthetiké) is the télos of the animals (NE.I. 7.1098a1). Apart 
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233 Wolff shows that classification in Aristotle is variable and not stable: regarding habitat, the way of life, or 
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from that, the faculty of desire is also implied in the animal type. It can easily be linked to the 
irrational principle of the human soul (NE.I. 13.1102b15-1103a), the orektikòn and 
epithymetikòn. Aristotle clarifies that the first level, the vegetable one, does not participate in 
reason, while the second, the animal one, does it through obedience. Already in NE.I. 7 the 
philosopher had noted that human beings both obey reason and have reason and think 
(dianoúmenon) (NE.I. 7.1098a2-5).  
It is easy to find other passages in the corpus where Aristotle makes the analogies between 
children and animals clearer. Regarding the development of the body, Aristotle distinguishes 
mature humans from animals because of the straight posture. While they move themselves 
horizontally, using hands and legs, children are closer to animals (PA.IV. 10.686b-25).236 
Aristotle is clear in saying that “children and animals” are not capable of rational 
deliberation,237 and in the context of chance and fortune, Aristotle states eloquently that 
“nothing done by an inanimate object, beast, or child, is the outcome of luck, since such 
things are not capable of choosing” (Phys.II. 6.197b7-9). Children have senses, desire and 
capacity of locomotion, but do not have reason. The embryo stage and childhood are linked 
with the natural world because human beings summarize the rest of the faculties. The 
progress of the human’s development shows it clearly. As I said, the vegetable faculties and 
the animal faculties considered in DA can be found in the human life.  
But humans also count with privileges in Aristotle. They have unique features and faculties. 
We can start with physiology. Among the varied physiological peculiarities of the human 
beings in Aristotle’s biological approaches,238 I would say that human hands and the human’s 
upright position are the most meaningful.239 I think that is so because, although Aristotle 
himself states that nature makes each thing for one purpose (hen pros hén), unlike the 
Delphic multipurpose knife (Pol.I. 2.1252b-5), in the example of the hand we find an 
extremely multipurposeful organ.240 It is, thus, something quite special and unique. But maybe 
the clearer physiological uniqueness of mankind for Aristotle is the upright posture, in PA.II. 
10.656a7-10. There Aristotle states only that humans participate in the divine (monon 
metéchei tou theiou), and that it is manifested in their upright posture. In man alone do the 
natural parts appear in their natural situation (PA.II. 10.656a12). 
 
Once we reach the intellectual capacities of the human soul there is only uniqueness. 
Although some superior animals can participate in practical reason,241 in general terms 
                                                
236Also EN. 1105a1 and HA. 588a30-588b. 
237 See NE.III. 2.  
238 On the variety of human eye colors: H.A.I. 10. 5-6. Humans are the only living beings that cannot move the 
ears: H.A.I. 11.21-22. They have the smallest nails and thinnest skin: GA.II.6.745b15-20. They have the longest 
life, along with the elephant: GA.IV. 10.777b-5-. Human beings have a relatively perfect sense of touch: HA.I. 
15.494b15-20 and PA.II. 16.660a11-13. They have the thinnest skin. HA.III.517b25-30. Other specificity is the 
possibility of being ambidextrous: HA.II.1.498b.31, PA.IV. 8.684A27 and NE.V.10. 1134b33. Another 
peculiarity is having mammals in the front: HA.I. 498a. Man is the animal that dreams more: HA.IV. 10.537b14-
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regarding the variable time of gestation and the number of fetus: HA.VII. 4.584a35-37 and HA. 585b25-30, 
respectively. 
239For the hand PA.IV. 10.687a10-688a25. For the posture HA.I. 15.494a27-494b, PA.II. 10. 656a11-13, PA.IV. 
10. 687a5-6.  
240 I stress “extreme” because there are in nature other things which are used for two purposes or more, like the 
teeth. 
241 On animals that think in Aristotle: Met.I. 1.980a27-b30 and DA.II. 3.415a7. Since friendship implies virtue or 
is virtue, and virtue implies any sort of reason, animal friendship, mentioned in NE.VIII. 1.1155a15-20, might 





animals are “idiots (aphronéstera) in comparison with man” (PA.IV. 10.686b24). The 
reflective capacity is exclusive to humans (HA.I. 488b25-27). At the top of the complex view 
of intellectual capacities in Aristotle can be found contemplation or theoretiké (NE.X. 
7.117a18). I only need to focus on this concrete capacity. Contemplation is the most divine 
capacity in us (en hemin theiótaton, NE.X. 7.117a16) and entails a perfect happiness (teleía 
eudaimonía, NE.X. 7.117a17 and eudaimonéstatos, NE.X. 7.1178a8) and autarchy 
(autárkeia, NE.X. 7.1177a28). Aristotle compares it with the happiness of the divine entities 
(NE.X. 7.1177b28-1178a1, NE.X. 8.1178b910, NE.X. 8.1178b26-27). To contemplate is, for 
Aristotle, inaccessible for any other creature and, at the same time, the most perfect activity 
in the world, it is something that “in its power and value far exceeds everything” (EN.X. 
1178a).  
 
We have seen physiology and intellect. Another anthropological characteristic needs to be 
addressed. It is well known that for Aristotle humans are political animals. Sociality is a 
necessary characteristic of human life (Pol.I. 1253a-5), and the human is even more political 
than other political animals, more political than bees, for instance (Pol.I. 2.1253a7-8). In 
Pol.I.2 we see that the télos of man, that is, “living well” or eu zen, only can be achieved in 
the polis (not in previous, imperfect or incomplete stages of communities, such as the village 
or the familiar tribe, Pol.I. 21252b29). This entails, among other things, that humans can 
contemplate only in the context of the city, which is the only community with autarchy or 
self-sufficency. In his view, the capacity to use an articulated language shows its deeply 
political nature, since language can express moral or political values. This is all unique to 
human beings.  
 
There is one aspect of Aristotelian anthropology in Pol.I 2 that might reduce its superiority: 
another central characteristic of human beings is their ambivalence. A rational, well-educated 
individual living in the context of the city is the best but a vicious human being, living 
outside the law, virtues and cultural values is worse than any other living being. Human 
beings are for Aristotle ambivalent, since they can be the best (béltiston) and the worst 
(cheíriston) of nature (Pol.I. 2.1253a31). This so-called capacity of degradation is also 
another expression of human uniqueness, since vice does not have this power over any other 
animal.242 But in any case, is important to have in mind that when I say that the human is 
superior to any other infralunary being in Aristotle, I do not refer to vicious specimens, since 
they could not qualify as such.  
 
Now we can turn back to the main question of the section. Human beings are not one species 
among others, but rather a unique, supreme and exclusive case in nature. 
 
A so-called mitigated anthropocentrism means also that human beings are superior to 
animals, but likewise inferior to other entities, such as the supralunary ones. Mitigated 
anthropocentrism means, thus, that pluralism is compatible with a rigid hierarchy. To some 
extent, there is a sharp gap between infralunary beings and human beings, and there is 
another one between humans and heavenly bodies. This position does not imply that animals 
are necessarily for the sake of humans.243 It states however that humans are by far more 
perfect than the rest of the worldly entities because of their unique capacities. At the same 
time, this perfection is rooted in nature. Human beings are also the hierarchical compendium 
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of the biological faculties. Let me use a political metaphor. Aristotle considers nature as a 
plurality of different entities with different goals according to their own nature. They are for 
their own sake, which he recognizes. It may be seen as a democratic conception of nature. At 
the same time, nature is not a matter of metaphysical equality where every living body is 
worth the same.  
 
This account does not directly address the teleological argument, but it nonetheless helps us 
to understand Aristotle’s pluralism better. It also explains in which sense human beings are 
part of nature. Thanks to their non-rational faculties there are even closer analogies in lower 
levels. This means that the growth of the plant is analogous to human rationality, and 
furthermore it is even closer to human embryonic growth. The intellect enters only after the 
embryo stage and the irrational childhood stage. The intellect is the end of a perfective 
process that starts in nature. Humans are analogous to plants, but they were more analogous 
at the beginning of their individual progress to maturity. This means that reason and humans 
are to be understood within nature. It explains what Johnson says about naturalizing the 
axiological scale. Man’s excellence is, in the end, rooted in prior faculties that pertain to the 
world of life.  
 
There is one more important thing to say. Almost all human faculties are natural, but some 
are divine. They have what I called unique faculties. The case of human upright posture can 
be less clear for us, since it doesn’t involve any particular faculty, but the intellect is more 
evident. The intellect, or contemplation, is divine. This explains, for instance, why Aristotle 
applies his immanent teleology to the heavens, as we will see in 2.2. For the moment we have 
seen the basis for this analogy. Thinking means the fulfillment of human nature. It is the 
function of man. This télos can be transferred to the heavens according to Aristotle. 
 
If uniqueness derives from anthropocentrism, the human’s sum of natural faculties and 
unique characteristics in the infralunary realm (including his or her capacity of being the 
worst of all beings) point to it. Physiologically and intellectually, humans are the most 
perfect. They are closer than any other being to the intellectual heavenly bodies and, 
ultimately, to god. Aristotle’s anthropology can be defined thus as a mitigated 
anthropocentrism, because as we saw animals and plants have their own irreducible goals too. 
There is more of this to be said in 2.2. In sum, humans are not alone, but they are the best. 
 
2.1.d. Regularity versus luck 
- Primary teleology 
While perfection is the main ontological claim in the teleological argument, analogy is the 
basis of the teleological method. In my view, regularity is a secondary methodical element, 
but still crucial. It is to be found in Phys.II.8. Aristotle defines final causes as outcomes of a 
regular non-arbitrary world, opposite to luck. At that moment, lucky events have been already 
tackled in that treatise, in chapter 4, 5 and 6. It is natural that chapter 8 refers to them.  
Basically, Aristotle says, nature tends regularly towards the best, the good, to excellence and 
completion.  
“…because in fact we do not find any chance creature being formed from a particular seed 
(spérmatos), but A comes from a, and from b ; nor does any chance seed come from any chance 





Regularly, new human beings are born from already existing human beings. Regularly, the 
sun is in a certain position, generating winter rain, for instance. Regularly, horses live horse 
lives, and not plant lives, for instance. Regularly, in nature, things work for the good or the 
best regarding specific forms. Once again, the good or the best which is attained can be 
understood in a wide range of phenomena: the reproduction of the species, the place of a 
heavenly body in the cycle or horses’ habits, for instance. The point now in Phys.II.8 is that 
in all these cases perfection happens regularly. There is a regular tendency toward the best 
among all the beings in the infralunary and even more clearly in the supralunary realm.244  
Aristotle says:  
“(…) but when a certain thing comes to be always (aeì) or for the most part (hos epì tò poly), it is not 
a concurrent happening, nor the outcome of luck” (Phys. II. 8. 199b23-25).  
Aristotle is pointing out the regular tendencies towards the attainment of the specific form, 
the actualization of the substance. “Things according to nature are as fine as can be” (tà kata 
physin, hos oión te kállista echein, EN. I.10.1099b21-2). Every natural being, for the most 
part then (if not always), is as fine as can be. 
As I said, the argument of regularity is a methodological one, because it shows through 
experience that everything in nature works toward the good. But it is grounded in an 
ontological claim: things happen regularly for the good and not for the bad. Only afterwards 
do we find the “argument from mistakes”, that we saw in section 2.1.b. 
- Secondary teleology: what happens only once 
We have already covered the main Aristotelian texts on teleology. Now I want to add 
something else that will be put to good use further on in this study: Aristotle's account of 
chance and lucky events.  This leads us to the concept of “secondary teleology”, different 
from the “primary” one, already known. Secondary teleology means teleology beyond the 
boundaries of regularity. This idea of secondary teleology is central in Chapter 3 and 4.  
Augustin Mansion thinks of chance and luck as an obstacle to teleology.245 Against his view, 
Wieland was the first who avoided the opposition between tyche and teleology. According to 
Wieland, the chapters on chance and luck in Phys.II show what Aristotle thought about 
teleology in general. The result in his case was enormously exaggerated: in Wieland’s view 
teleology suffers a severe ontological reduction. As we know the latter openly links 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the final cause to Kant’s Third Critique by saying that in Phys.II and in 
the whole corpus there is an as if teleology. For Wieland’s Aristotle final causality is always 
retrospective, reflective and heuristic. The regular fulfillment of functions in the world is not 
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a claim grounded in nature, but just part of the way in which we humans interpret the 
surrounding world.246  
 
In denying the Mansonian assumption of obstacle to teleology in fortune, Boeri follows 
Wieland. Furthermore, Boeri avoids Wieland’s excesses and distinguishes two teleologies. 
There is a primary teleology based on regular constitutive tendencies towards completeness. 
It is grounded in ontology and nature. It is what I have described all along these pages. It is 
what Mansion talks about. Boeri’s account has to be understood within a line of interpretation 
that regards Aristotelian teleology as complex field, with alternative branches and 
perspectives. Also, this scholar proposes a “secondary teleology”. This one is heuristic and 
describes the way in which we interpret accidental processes. 
 
Take the famous example of one creditor who accidentally finds the debtor in the market.247 
The creditor did not go to the market for the sake of finding his debtor. The converse can be 
said of the debtor, for sure. But after that incident, one can imagine what the creditor can 
think about the whole event. He will interpret and reconstruct all the process as if he was 
going to the market for the sake of recovering his money. Secondary teleology permits us to 
make sense of contingent things.  
 
We can study Aristotle’s idea of tyche or luck in his own words in Phys.II.248 In Phys.II.6 
Aristotle states that while luck happens regarding the human rational ground (the ground for 
bad luck –distychía- or good luck –eutychía-), there is another notion of an accidental 
undefined cause of singular events called autómaton which is not to be applied to human 
rational beings but to natural entities, animals and children (a horse or a human baby can 
have neither good nor bad luck, according to the Stagirite).  While I translated tyche as luck, I 
translate autómaton as chance. Chance does not work in the non-rational realm, while luck 
does. Luck is conceived twofold: there is good luck (eutychía) and bad luck (distychía). If the 
creditor finally obtains his money, we have a case of good luck.  
 
What is more important for us is that lucky or apò tyches events are accidental and undefined 
(tò dè katà symbebekòs aóriston, Phys.II.196b.28. 197a8). It is crucial to see that among these 
phenomena there is no “for the sake of” or goal (Phys.II.197a32-35). There is no progress 
towards a specific form or function neither in luck nor chance. The encounter between the 
debtor and the creditor could never be compared with the cases of growth or function that we 
have already seen. Chance and luck are not regular, like the cases of growth and function: the 
former cases are unstable, uncertain (abébaios, Phys. II.197a.30-31). The accidental causality 
of chapters 4, 5 and 6 is “obscure” (ádelos, Phys.II. 5.197a10), while the primary causality is 
clear in Aristotle. He considers these phenomena, causally speaking, to be secondary 
(Phys.II. 198a8). Chance and fortune are based on exceptional or singular events, so they is 
unpredictable or inexplicable (parálogos, Phys.II. 5.197a18 and EE.VII. 14.1247a33). 
Coherently, the philosopher considers that there is no possible science of chance and luck.  
 
Following Dudley, I defend an “indeterminist” Aristotle. This means that I do not believe that 
he thought of chance/luck events as being something unpredictable for us. I believe they are 
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part of nature as such, although human nature has to rely on them in a special way: tyche is to 
be found exclusively in the human practical realm. 
 
We can distinguish a primary teleology, grounded in regularity, forms and functions, from a 
secondary one, which in my own terms, makes sense of singular events that cannot be 
repeated. Primary teleology, on which I have focused, has the status of science in Aristotle. 
That is not the case with the second one. I call the latter narratology, for it is a coherent 
account of unpredictable and singular events. It is a retrospective teleology. This alternative 
retrospective teleology is not relevant for Aristotle’s teleology, in my view, but it will be very 
important when we come to Bergson’s teleology, where it will be applied not to the human 
practical realm, but to nature as such.  
 
 
2.2. Two domains of immanent teleology in Aristotle 
As I already mentioned in the Introduction, I distinguish two domains of final causality in 
Aristotle.  Since my approach to Aristotle is comprehensive, I defend that both are 
compatible. They diverge in the notion of perfection or télos that is implied. In general terms, 
in 2.2 I will highlight different approaches to the notion of perfection from different fields. 
First, there is a paradigmatic individual teleology, to be found in Phys.II, in P.A.I and also in 
Aristotle’s works on ethics, biology or even astronomy. Then, we will look at different 
passages on global teleology. All these together complete the picture of immanent teleology 
in Aristotle.  
On five occasions in the corpus, Aristotle defends a twofold understanding of the final 
cause.249 There the final cause or that for the sake of which (hou héneka) is seen as hou 
héneka tinos that is, “ for the sake of ” declined in the genitive, which is regularly considered 
by translators and interpreters a goal in the sense of an “ aim ”. And there is the final cause, 
hou héneka tini, where the teleological expression is declined in the dative. This is usually 
seen as a goal understood as a “ beneficiary”. Without exception, these remarks are obscure 
and brief, and they do not shed much light on the topic. In any case, Aristotle insists five 
times on the twofold description of the term, so it must be considered a stable typology. 
Every interpreter of Aristotle has to address this problematic and uncertain question. I believe 
that Gelber is right in pointing out some difficulties in the common reading of the 
aim/genitive and the beneficiary/dative regarding some of those texts. However, to some 
extent I follow the line that “commentators almost universally” follow.250  In addition, 
following an important series of scholarly interpretations, that the distinction aim/beneficiary 
leads to a comprehensive understanding of immanent teleology, in which individual teleology 
and global teleology can coexist in the corpus. The goal in the sense of an aim matches with a 
global understanding of télos. And the same happens with for the sake of in terms of 
beneficiary. 251 
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I am not as sure as Kullmann of whether the entire set of texts can be equalized in terms of 
meaning.252 In DA.II. 4.415b15-21 Aristotle talks about the relation between the body and the 
soul, and in Phys.II. 2.194a33-6 about tools and their user. This is where Gelber’s argument 
can work better. In my view DA II. 4.415b15-21 and Met.XII. 7.1072b1-2 can still be read in 
terms of aim and beneficiary. Both introduce the relation between one item in movement and 
another one stable, eternal, perfect. That happens also in EE.VIII.8, 1249b9-21, although the 
text is less clear. I will thus focus on the two mentioned passages.  
First, we will read a famous passage from DA.2.4 on reproduction to which we will come 
back in the section on global teleology. On this occasion my focus is on the mentioned 
remark: 
“It follows that first of all we must treat of nutrition and reproduction, for the nutritive soul is found 
along with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distributed power of soul, being indeed 
that one in virtue of which all are said to have life. The acts in which it manifests itself are 
reproduction and the use of food – reproduction, I say, because for any living thing that has reached 
its normal development and which is unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not spontaneous, 
the most natural act is the production of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a 
plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine. That is the goal 
towards which all things strive, that for the sake of which they do whatsoever their nature renders 
possible. The phrase ‘for the sake of which’ is ambiguous; it may mean either the end to achieve 
which (to men hou), or the being in whose interest, the act is done (to de hoi)” (DA.II. 4.415b15-21). 
In this case, the translator (J. A. Smith) writes about the end “to achieve”, which is in the 
genitive and might be understood as the aim. Then we have the dative, which means the 
beneficiary “in whose interest” we should understand the “striving”. As Gelbers says: 
“Scholars are in agreement that Aristotle is claiming that reproduction and whatever else 
living things do, such as perceive and move around, is a way of aiming or striving at sharing 
in what is eternal and divine”.253 I think that the basic reason for this agreement is in the 
clarity of the text: it does not require any speculations. In this text we see what participation 
can mean, in Aristotelian terms: contributing to the eternal stability of the species and taking 
in turn a benefit from this participation in eternity, whatever it could mean for Aristotle.254 
This is global teleology, because the individual and perishable entity is partaking in 
something that goes far beyond it, something that is part of the cosmos as a whole, and 
namely, a central feature of the best within cosmos: eternity. It shows, in sum, the 
arrangement between two different levels of the Aristotelian cosmos understood as a whole, 
as we can find in Met.IX. 8 or elsewhere.  
                                                                                                                                                  
problem of value, W. J. Oates, 1963, Princeton. Also Scharle: Margaret. “Elemental teleology in Aristotle’s 
Physics 2.8”. Oxford Studies in Ancient PhilosophyXXXIV (May 2008): 147-183. “The role of material and 
efficient causes in Aristotle’s natural teleology” Apeiron 41.3 (September 2008), pp. 27-46. Chapter 5: “Man 
from man, but not bed from bed: Nature, art and chance in Physics II”, in Aristotle’s ‘Physics’. A critical guide. 
Op. cit. 
252 Frans De Haas has brought to my attention the difference of ultimate meaning between these texts.  
253 Gelber, Jessica. “Two ways of being for an end”. Phronesis 63, 2018, p. 76. 
254 See also e.g. Johnson, who says that living beings aim at “participating in the divine and eternal, which is in 
turn for the benefit of (hou heneka tini) the living animal”. Johnson, Monte Ransome. Aristotle on teleology. 







In the most important book on theology, Aristotle recalls the twofold conception of final 
cause. This is the second passage I quote on this matter: 
 
“For the final cause is some being for whose good an action is done (hou héneka tini), and something 
at which the action aims (hou héneka tinos); and of these the latter exists among unchangeable entities 
though the former does not” (Met.XII. 7.1072b1-2). 
 
In the latter passage it is clearer that hou héneka tini (dative) or “for whose good an action is 
done” means the benefit; hou héneka tinos (genitive) means the aim. In this context, Aristotle 
gives new information: the latter, he says, is a goal that may be seen in regard with 
unchangeable entities (en tois akinétois).  
As I see them, these excerpts refer to the two complementary dimensions of perfection and, 
thus, to Aristotelian immanent teleology as a whole. However, as I said, Aristotle’s remarks 
do not clarify much of how it may work. The basis of the two different domains in 
Aristotelian teleology can be better defended with regard to the texts and the argument 
within.  
2.2.a. Individual immanent teleology: form and function 
Individual teleology fits with the cause for the sake of which in the sense of “for what is 
benefitted”, it implies an ordered development in time of a certain function until its 
flourishing. This is the first domain of teleology. We are already familiar with it. The process 
of growth of an organic entity, an embryo or a seed is the paradigm of this directed progress: 
“But the process of growth does not stand in this relation to nature: that which is growing, as such, is 
proceeding from something to something. What, then, is it which is growing? Not the thing it is 
growing out of, but the thing it is growing into. So the form is nature” (Phys.II. 1.193b15-19). 
Phys.II shows different kinds of natural phenomena according to this model, a model 
restricted to singular progresses. As we have already read: “because better (béltion) thus—
better not simply, but in relation to the reality of the thing concerned (pròs tèn hekástou 
ousían)” (Phys. II. 7.198b8-9). 255 Following Lennox, Judson considers that it is the “axiom” 
of teleology.256 
Perfection, that is, completeness, goodness and priority can be understood in this individual 
sense. The main divergence among the defenders of the exclusive individual teleology is that 
made by the biological reading. As we will see in the next pages, some scholars consider that 
only biological entities have to be teleologically understood. Some other who accept the 
biological reading, also think that Aristotle’s teleology covers items such as rocks or flames 
and, in more abstract terms, substances. 
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- Ontology and elements 
Interpreters like, recently, Mirus, claim that teleology is a metaphysical conception and 
involves every individual being, alive or not. 257 By stressing the metaphysical concept of 
“actuality” held by Aristotle in Met. IX. 6-8, among other places, this scholar defends a non-
biological interpretation of teleology. From the field of physics (DC.III and IV, on the 
concept of natural place, and Phys.IV, on the concept of own place) Lang also defends the 
non-biological roots of actuality.258 Also, Berti,259 and Johnson defend, in much shorter length, 
this position.260  
In some occasions when Aristotle talks about “things in general”, he talks about goals and 
functions: 
“… a thing is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when it can perform its 
function; an eye, for instance, when it can see. When a thing cannot do so it is that thing only in name, 
like a dead eye or one made of stone, just as a wooden saw is no more a saw than one in a picture”. 
(Meteor. IV.12.3909.10-21) 
As I said earlier this kind of teleology can be defended, in my opinion, with enough textual 
basis. But in any case, it will not be conceptually fruitful in this comparative work, since I 
have not found anything similar in Bergson’s framework, which is so focused on the 
ontology of life. Whereas the point of my account of Aristotle’s immanent teleology is to 
highlight its contrast with Bergson’s, I shall not tackle the ontological and elemental domain. 
In short, these interpertations can be found in the discussion of the notion of télos, perfection 
or good. For the moment the metaphysical reading, the elementary reading and the biological 
one have in common one thing: perfection is to be understood regarding one substance.  
- The goal of living beings: survival, reproduction and well-being 
To some extent, the biological interpretation of teleology in Aristotle is uncontroversial. 
Again, even in this context, its origin seems to be Platonic (Timaeus, 44d-45b). All the 
Aristotelian scholars consider that the individual biological process is teleological. Survival, 
reproduction and well-being are included here as main cases of érgon and eidos, function and 
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As we know, the analogy is illustrated by cases in which a craft or human action is referred to 
organic or ethological phenomena. There is a general agreement according to which 
individual living sublunary entities (from plants to humans) are the paradigm of Aristotelian 
teleology. Organisms and their functions are the clearest example of teleology in Aristotle. 
Surely, Aristotle himself was aware of this, and that is why he tended to use biological 
examples. For instance, we have the example above, from Meteor.IV.12, where he says that 
the dead eye has lost its function, and then it is not an eye anymore. As Allan Gotthelf says: 
in “almost every passage in which Aristotle introduces, discusses, or argues for the existence 
of final causality, his attention is focused on the generation and development of a living 
organism”.261  
 
Despite their different approaches and theses, Allan Gotthelf, James Lennox, David Balme, 
Lindsay Judson, Martha Nussbaum, Pierre Pellegrin and David Charles lead the 
contemporary reading of Aristotle’s treatises according to which exclusively individual living 
beings are interpreted teleologically.262 That is: individual non-living beings are not accepted 
in this restricted individual teleological framework.  
I think Balme represents this shared position well when he says: “sublunary elements, air, 
earth, fire, and water, act teleologically only when they are part of a living body; outside of 
that (for instance the occurrence of rainstorms) there is no final cause acting on them”.263 In 
this sense, the only possible interpretation of the term télos or perfection is survival, 
reproduction and well-being.264 It is now time to tackle these concepts. 
For certain commentators, Aristotle’s teleological framework can be put in relation with the 
biological concept of adaptation. Since the télos means a natural function or activity, and that 
activity is to be conceived within a context or environment, immanent purposiveness implies 
adaptation. Lindsay Judson mentions that in his paper “Aristotelian teleology”.265 He notices 
that in PA.III. 14, 674a22–b5 the camel has a hard palate and several stomachs because its 
food is woody. In PA.IV. 12, 694b12–17 points out that “some birds have long legs and long 
toes because they live in marshes and have to walk across boggy ground, and ‘nature makes 
the organs to fit the function, not the function to fit the organs’”.  
 
The link between Darwinian adaptation and classic teleology has been studied by Lennox and 
Gotthelf: these authors consider, in general, adaptation as a teleological concept. To this 
extent, while modern biology is talking about adaptation, the ancestry of Aristotle can be 
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defended. Also the philosopher Robert Spaemann has defended teleology within the adaptive 
framework.266 Important historians of biology such as Ayala, Mayr and, afterwards, Ruse 
admit, in different ways, Aristotelian teleological features behind the biological concept of 
adaptation.267  
 
The goal can be easily understood as a biological flourishing. As we saw in the section 2.1.a 
in Phys.II.2, Aristotle distinguishes the goal from the limit. In that context, death is not a 
goal. As David Charles says: where is the good, the best and the perfection of a stone in 
movement? Where is the beneficial outcome of its movements? It is more difficult to see. 
Thus, the “for what is it beneficial” final cause can’t be considered regarding living 
organisms here.268 Living beings, in Aristotle, are entities with soul.  
I can recall this passage, in which Aristotle uses the intellectual analogy pointing out his 
teleological understanding of live: 
“It is also evident that the soul is the cause as that for the sake of which. For just as the intellect acts 
for the sake of something, nature acts in the same way; and this something is its end” (DA.II. 
4.415b17-19).  
The soul is the goal of the living. This is, again the paradigm of immanent teleology. 
Aristotle explains certain aspects of biology in mechanical and non-teleological ways.269 In 
this case it is clear that final causes are for the sake of the animal’s function, but the eye color 
is due to another sort of causality: efficient causes and necessity. Regarding the cause of heat 
and cold, for instance, Aristotle himself makes the distinction: “they make flesh soft partly by 
necessity and partly not by necessity but for some end” (GA.II. 734b31, 743a36b16). He also 
says: “True, nature sometimes uses even excess products to advantage, but this does not 
justify our seeking a final cause in all – but while some things exist for the sake of an end, 
many other things necessarily come about too because of them” (PA.IV. 677a17). 
Not everything in every organism is for the sake of its main goal then. But the most important 
things (organs, senses and parts of every organism) are for the sake of their goal, the soul. 
Every living being has a soul; and that covers plants, animals, humans and heavenly bodies. 
In general, the parts and organs of one living being and its soul have a part/whole relation. 
This mereological relation appears much earlier than that of maturity. In fact, attaining 
maturity means attaining the goal. Aristotle applied teleology to embryology. He uses the 
example of the seed and its directedness towards maturity, when the being is complete and 
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when it can function according to its specific nature. Aristotle also tackled this phenomenon 
as such. The second book of GA is focused on embryology. For example: 
“But how is each part formed? We must answer this by starting in the first instance from the principle 
that, in all products of Nature or art, a thing is made by something actually existing out of that which 
is potentially such as the finished product. Now the semen is of such a nature, and has in it such a 
principle of motion, that when the motion is ceasing each of the parts comes into being, and that as a 
part having life or soul. For there is no such thing as face or flesh without life or soul in it; it is only 
equivocally that they will be called face or flesh if the life has gone out of them, just as if they had 
been made of stone or wood. And the homogeneous parts and the organic come into being together”. 
(GA.II. 1.734b20-28). 
In the products of art, fulfillment is to be found at the end of the activity, so in the products of 
organic development the structure is repeated. First we have the semen, then the parts of the 
organism, after that, the “finished product”. Although the télos comes later in chronological 
terms, it is ontologically prior (GA.II. 3.736b3-5 and GA.II. 6.742a20-25). I have used the 
metaphor of “flourishment” in relation to teleology. In the case of embryology it is not a 
metaphor, but a literal depiction of the phenomenon.  
Aristotle used the example of the seed and the embryo many times when discussing the 
specific realm of life. Surely, he thought that this was a quite illustrative phenomenon of 
teleology. In Met.IX. 8—which is on the different senses of ontological priority, and 
specifically regarding the third sense, substantial priority—Aristotle himself uses this 
example: 
 “...because the things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in substantiality (e.g. man 
is prior to boy and human being to seed; for the one already has its form, and the other has not), and 
because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for that for the sake of 
which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the 
end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired” (Met. IX. 8.1050a5-10, my emphasis).  
Thus, from the very beginning every part of the organism takes part in the activity of 
fulfillment of the soul. Nutrition, growth and reproduction, says Aristotle in DA.II. 4, are the 
most basic ends of the substances with soul. They can be understood as tendencies for 
existence, since, in the end, existing is better than not being. Then, their inner impulse to life 
can be interpreted as seeking perfection. Perfection is, here, being. The following statement 
shows deeply how teleology can be understood in a biological way: 
“That they [sexes] exist because it is better and on account of the final cause, takes us back to a 
principle still further remote (hos dè dià tò béltion kaì tèn aitían tèn héneka tinos ánothen échei tèn 
archèn). Now some existing things are eternal and divine whilst others admit of both existence and 
non-existence. But that which is noble and divine is always, in virtue of its own nature, the cause of 
the better in such things as admit of being better or worse, and what is not eternal does admit of 
existence and non- existence, and can partake in the better and the worse. And soul is better than 
body, and living, having soul, is thereby better than the lifeless which has none, and being is better 
than not being, living than not living” (GA.II. 1.731b20-2a1, my emphasis).270 
In this sense, the tendency towards the best can be interpreted as a tendency towards being. 
Survival for the individual involves nutrition; survival for the species involves reproduction. 
There are different degrees of being, and, as we saw, every substance tends toward the best 
specific way of being, and that involves growth. As we also have seen, this relates to the 
                                                





concept of adaptation.  
Superior animals tend also to well-being. The animal can attain its goal through the senses. 
Animal life is necessarily linked to sensation or aísthesis. Sensitive life is animal life, and its 
flourishing means the function of animals (NE.I. 7.1098a1-2). In DA.III. 11 Aristotle 
mentions “imperfect animals” that have only the sense of touch from which they can obtain 
pain and pleasure (DA.III. 11.434a4). A bit further he says that while touch (and taste) are for 
living, “the rest of the senses are for living well” (DA.III. 12.25-27). One chapter later 
Aristotle states: “The [superior] animal has the other senses, as was said, not for the sake of 
being, but for the sake of well-being (ou tou einai héneka allà tou eu)” (DA.III. 13.435b24-
25). 271  
 
At least for superior animals, nutrition may imply pleasure: he even adds that desire is desire 
of what generates pleasure (he gàr epithymía tou hedéos estín, PA.II. 17.661a7-9). One sense, 
like vision, implies one sort of good that we can relate with well-being. In any case, a 
superior sensitive faculty entails knowledge. Apart from its utility, for instance, we humans 
love them: we enjoy feeling. Above all, we love the sensations of vision (Met.I. 1.980a20-
980b).  
 
-The goal of human beings: happiness  
 
As we know, the founder of immanent teleology holds a naturalistic vision of human beings. 
It is not surprising that I include human beings as goal-directed entities. In NE.I. 7 Aristotle 
extends the “function argument” to the human realm. It means that Aristotle seeks to find a 
specific goal or function, in the context of human nature. Every complex living being has 
among its goals survival, reproduction and well-being. Well-being for humans may mean 
something else, different from the well-being previously noted.  
Well-being among humans has a more concrete term: it is called “happiness” or 
eudaimonia.272 We can read the passage from EN.I. 7 in which he uses again the analogy 
between arts and nature. In this case, the nature of human beings: 
“Happiness, then, is obviously something complete and self-suficient, in that it is the end of what is 
done (prakton). But perhaps saying that happiness is the chief good sounds rather platitudinous, and 
one might want its nature to be specified still more clearly. It is possible that we might achieve that if 
we grasp the characteristic activity of a human being (tò érgon tou anthrópou). For just as the good 
the doing well of a flute-player, a sculptor or any practitioner of a skill, or generally whatever has 
some characteristic activity or action, is thought to lie in its characteristic activity, so the same would 
seem to be true of a human being, if indeed he has a characteristic activity” (NE.I. 7.1097b20-28).  
This characteristic activity, goal, or function that gives happiness should involve reason or 
lógos (NE.I. 7.1097b30-109b7-8). That is happiness, in human terms. As Nussbaum rightly 
and reasonably reminds us, “we want to live a life that uses all our capacities”.273  
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In NE.I. 13 Aristotle emphasizes the hierarchy of faculties of the human being, according to 
the natural scale. As we know, the human indeed has vegetative faculties and animal 
faculties, but the rational one is unique to him or her, and also the best of all.  
In Aristotle, the aforementioned theoretical happiness and other lower kinds of happiness in 
his complex account of the human being, ethics, and dianoethics can be only fulfilled in the 
context of the city, and not in the village nor in the tribe. Among humans the eu zen of human 
beings is unique to citizens (Pol.I. 2.1252b30). 
For our purposes, it is important to say now that teleology does not lead to fatalism or 
determinism. As I say regarding Physics II. 4-6,274 Aristotle leaves room for different types of 
indeterminacy. Like Alexander of Aphrodisias in On fate, Dudley defends indetermination in 
the Aristotle’s framework. His readings rely on phenomena such as fortune and chance 
(Phys.II. 4-6, EE.VIII. 2, NE.I. 9-10), accidents (Met.VI. 3) and future contingents (De 
interpretatione. 9), but also on freedom in the sense of self-determination or genuine 
responsibility (EN.III. 3-5) in Aristotle.  
According to Aristotle, the uniquely-human ultimate goal, well-being, involves rationality, 
autarchy and living in the context of a polis. At the same time, the human has the capacity to 
choose his or her destiny, to some extent. Technically speaking, the well-being of human 
beings is called happiness. 
- The goal of heavenly bodies: happiness 
The scale of living individuals does not stop at the human level. It can ascend much further. 
Now we ascend upwards in the scale, thus reaching the astral beings. 
Change, movement and the action of individual stars and heavens is for the sake of some 
immanent perfection as well. Since they are supralunary, perfect, and imperishable beings, 
their way of attaining their end is better than that of the infralunary human beings. They tend 
toward movement because movement is more perfect than the other types of change 
(Phys.VIII. 7). Their movement is circular, because, among movements, the most perfect 
movement is circular rotation (Phys.VIII. 8).  Among the heavenly hierarchy, the best 
heavens have simpler movements than the lower heavens. According to Aristotle, heavenly 
bodies and heavens have psychology and their télos is happiness as well. The long passage 
below illustrates relatively clearly all these considerations: 
“…since the primary body shows one motion only, that the body which is nearest to it should move 
with the fewest movements, say two, and the one next after that with three, or some similar 
arrangement. But the opposite is the case. The movements of the sun and moon are fewer than those 
of some of the planets. Yet these planets are farther from the centre and thus nearer to the primary 
body than they, as observation has itself revealed. For we have seen the moon, half-full, pass beneath 
the planet Mars, which vanished on its shadow side and came forth by the bright and shining part (…) 
we have been thinking of the stars as mere bodies, and as units with a serial order indeed but entirely 
inanimate; but we should rather conceive them as enjoying life and action. On this view the facts 
cease to appear surprising. For it is natural that the best-conditioned of all things should have its good 
without action, that which is nearest to it should achieve it by little and simple action, and that which 
is farther removed by a complexity of actions, just as with men’s bodies one is in good condition 
without exercise at all, another after a short walk, while another requires running and wrestling and 
hard training, and there are yet others who however hard they worked themselves could never secure 
                                                





this good, but only some substitute for it “ (DC.II. 12.292a14-292b25). 
The natural scale starts with elements, continues with living beings, goes on with humans and 
reaches heavenly bodies. From the sun to the first heaven different degrees of perfection can 
be found. But they are all circular or rotatory movements, and they imply a peculiarity: “Its 
unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to move when it 
comes to its proper place, but the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place 
for starting-point and goal” (DC.I.9). The télos is then attained simply.  
In Met. XII. 7 Aristotle explains the origin of movement through his theory of simple circular 
movements. Since the desirable (tò orektòn) and the intelligible (tò noetón) move without 
being moved (Met.XII. 7.1072a26), the prime unmoved mover, god, moves the first heaven 
in this way. That is, god moves the first heaven as a beloved (erómenon, 1072b2) does. The 
first (rotatory) movement (próte ton metabolon) is originated by this sort of attraction 
(1072b10). This kind of movement is considered by Aristotle to be a final cause (1072b-2). In 
this case, at least when discussing the first heaven (it could involve more substances, even 
every substance), we see that the individual télos as self-movement and the télos as imitation 
coincide. Movement and imitation are the same for the first heaven.275  
For Aristotle nutrition and reproduction are the basic faculties of the living beings. These are 
two examples of télos, since these two faculties seek to attain what is the best for a being: 
merely being or surviving. There are two ways of surviving, individually (nutrition) and as 
species (reproduction). This describes the teleological status of a plant. Upwards in the scale, 
we find different ways of sensibility and locomotion. They imply surviving, but they add 
sentient life, as we saw. Sentient life means well-being and a basic knowledge. Well-being is 
a broad concept in Aristotle and embraces more perfect senses, namely happiness and 
enjoying rational life. These two concepts, beyond pleasure, can be applied to humans and 
heavenly beings, from the moon till the last heaven. In the case of the heavenly bodies, 
enjoying involves, along with intellectual activity, rotation. This covers the biological realm, 
in its widest sense, in Aristotle: now we will leave this realm and we will move to the domain 
of culture.  
- The goal of the city: autarchy 
This subsection deals with one peculiar ontological level, what we call nowadays “human 
culture”. In the recent scholarly literature, the teleology of the city, of tragedy and of the 
history of philosophy are generally disregarded. I think that a complete account of 
Aristotelian teleology can include such entities, or at least ponder its validity, as other 
relevant contemporary interpreters like Aubenque have done.  
 
Contrary to the topic of elementary teleology, I believe that this topic, teleology of culture, is 
more important in Bergson than regarding Aristotle. Something similar happens around 
secondary teleology. Since the ultimate goal of Chapter 2 is to set up the contrast with 
Bergson in Chapter 4, it is worth addressing this topic and its problems, at least roughly. In 
advance I only defend Aristotelian immanent teleology properly speaking in the case of the 
city. 
 
Among all the items mentioned above, two things are common. First, there is no soul 
involved. So, from this moment we are out of the biological realm and biomorphism. Second, 
                                                





one particular being, one city, one literary genre or one theory of logic can be understood in 
terms of individual teleology although in a singular way. It could not qualify as global 
teleology, because we are not talking about nature understood as a whole or anything 
unperishable. The teleology of the city, the tragedy and the philosophy of history may be a 
mixture between the individual and the global teleology, for a plurality of individual 
substances (namely, people) take part in one process that ultimately leads to one fulfillment. 
Like in every other case of individual teleology there is a function and a form involved: the 
three examples mean fulfillment of a function. It has to be said that there is a remarkable 
difference between these three objects. We cannot say that they are all artificial beings. At the 
very least, the city qualifies in Aristotle as a natural entity, just like the household and the 
village.  
 
Aristotle talks about the city in clearly teleological terms: 
 
“… the earlier forms of society [family, village] are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, 
and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, 
whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is 
the best, and to be self-sufficing (autárkeia) is the end and the best” (Pol.I. 2.1252b28-1253a2).  
The man, the horse (with a  soul) and the family (natural but without a soul) are the analogy 
for this teleological claim. Self-sufficiency or autarchy is the immanent goal to attain. In 
other cases, Aristotle even talks about the city as analogous to people and families, but 
composed and prior in nature (próteron dè te physei, 1253a19) to them: 
“…the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to 
the part” (Pol.I.2.1253a19-20). 
The city is then a natural entity. It is perfective, analogous to this extent to living beings. 
Aristotle points out clearly which type of perfection should be attained in his case. It is 
compounded of humans and their families and, as he tends to do regarding biology, adds a 
part/whole remark. 
 
Both Berti and Wolff are positive about the mere analytical perspective of Pol.I.2, a chapter 
in which Aristotle talks about households and families, villages and cities in three 
distinguished stages, subsequent in time. Berti states that Aristotle’s approach in this chapter 
is “clearly ideal, and doesn’t pretend historical validity”.276 This ideal history of the ideal city 
shows the growth of one population from the isolated household to the tribe, and then 
towards autarchy, like a living being.277 Given that this progress is a sort of fiction, since 
history is contingent and every polis can have a different process, what is necessary to point 
out clearly is that a human population can only attain its goal being a compound of families 
and villages. They are the material cause, like the parts in a living body. The ultimate goal of 
this natural entity, the city, is autarchy. Autarchy means a natural fulfillment, and the function 
of the final cause is affirmed clearly by Aristotle. The city is natural and its goal is clearly 
noted as autarchy. Then it may qualify as a teleological item in its own right.  
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This perfect autarkic stage is the only one where human beings can enjoy well-being (eu zen), 
and not, apparently, the previous one, the village (Pol.I.21252b29). Human individual 
teleology and individual teleology of the polis refer to each other.  
 
In the domain of history, Aristotle’s commentaries on the progress of tragedy, the literary 
genre, and on philosophy as a discipline have been read as applications of his view of the 
final cause. I will address the two cases as two examples of history of teleology as a whole, 
since both refer to the same type of problem. I shall first present the texts, first on tragedy, 
second on history of philosophy and then address the question of the teleology of history. 
 
Charles Kahn in “The place of the prime mover in Aristotle´s teleology”278 extends the 
domain of final causality to culture. Aristotle, he says, holds a “cosmic optimism”. His 
“willingness to see things arranged ‘for the best’ not only in the heavens and in biology but in 
human affairs generally. For example, he finds the biological pattern of development 
replicated in cultural history”.279 Then he quotes the passages from Pol.I that we have already 
seen, on the city, and also another one: “Attic tragedy”. 
 
Kahn quotes these lines:  
 
“Tragedy advanced by slow degrees; each new element that showed itself was in turn developed. 
Having passed through many changes, it found its natural form (tèn hautes physin), and there it 
stopped” (Poet. 4. 1449a5-15).  
 
One can wonder if, then, we should take the idea of nature in a strict sense or not. This would 
mean that the tragedy is like the city, which is, as we have seen, natural, according to 
Aristotle. Like Pol.I.2, Chapter 4 of the Poetics covers the whole development of a cultural 
form: from its origins until its télos. However, it is certainly more difficult to consider this 
narrative as one idealized history: Aristotle mentions concrete real individuals like Homer, 
Aeschylus and Sophocles.  
 
A number of readers of the Poetics have interpreted the short remark on tragedy attaining its 
ontological status in a naturalistic way. For instance, in his commentary on the treatise, Lucas 
says: “the tragic form, like an organic growth, develops until it reaches its télos, when its 
potentiality its fully realized”. 280  
 
More recently, Whalley addressed the same question but noticing the problematic aspect of it. 
Although Whalley compares the octopus, the human and the city, he does not include  
tragedy, like Kahn or Lucas do. If I have understood him correctly, tragedy would only 
qualify as long as it is considered part of human nature or what he calls “human dynamis”. It 
is rooted in human nature and it is made for the sake of human psychology.281 Thus, Whalley 
understands it as a natural being.  
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The other domain of culture that has been interpreted in teleological ways is the history of 
philosophy. The Hegelian hellenist Rodolfo Mondolfo calls Aristotle the “forerunner of the 
philosophy of history”,282 in reference to 19th century philosophy. He understood Aristotle’s 
conception of the history of philosophy as a tendency to perfection.283  This historical 
teleology of human thought may be regularly stopped by cataclysms. Following Plato, 
Aristotle seems to think that periodical catastrophes devastate human achievements.284 
 
 In Le problème de l’être chez Aristote, Aubenque nuances this view that he calls the “eternal 
recurrence of cycles”: in his view historical time has two faces for Aristotle. On the one hand, 
it means natural destruction and, on the other, it is at the same time a “benevolent assistant of 
human action”.285  
 
For Aubenque the sense of human cultural evolution has nothing to do with either regression 
or oblivion, as it had for Plato. He finds two stages in Aristotle’s non-regressive vision of 
history. First, there is an optimistic, progressive and finalistic vision of human knowledge in 
Aristotle at the beginning, in On philosophy and Met.I. Then in later treatises like Met.IV or 
VI, Aubenque finds a more pessimistic thinker of history, according to which philosophy and 
knowledge do not lead to an end. For this skeptical, second conception of history, Aubenque 
also recalls Phys.I and DA.I, texts where the previous philosophers do not take part in a sort 
of historical conquest of truth as in Met.I.3-10, a historical process from the primitive 
philosophy that only “whispers” what the late philosophy will formulate and solve clearly 
(Met.I.10.993a15). In DA.I or Met.IV the previous philosophers offer subjects and ideas for 
the sake of an untimely dialogue that “excludes any kind of genealogy”.286 Anyway, Met.I.3-
10 represents for Aubenque a sort of teleology of philosophy, in which philosophy itself leads 
to one single flourishing in Aristotle.  
 
Now I will address these teleological approaches to human culture. First, as I have noted in 
the subsection on analogies, Aristotle carefully divided natural entities and crafts. The crafts 
can be expressions of human rationality and, hence, human goals, but they do not contain 
them. There is a sharp border between the two worlds. Since among the things in the world 
some “exist by nature, some from other causes. By nature the animals and their parts exist, 
and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)—for we say that these and the 
like exist by nature.” And he adds: “All the things mentioned plainly differ from things which 
are not constituted by nature” (Phys.II.2.192b9-192b12).  
 
Unlike families and cities, tragedies and theories cannot be called by nature. When Aristotle 
refers to tragedy as reaching its own nature (tèn hautes physin), he means its definite form 
and craft function. As noted, the main feature of the tragedies, the plot (ho mythos) is 
something that we construct (synístasthai, Poet.1. 1447a-2). The organic analogy between the 
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tragedy and the animal is only one analogy.287  As we know, Aristotle knew well the 
difference between one artifact and a natural being. In general, Aristotle uses the analogy the 
other way around: he can talk about the making of a sword for making clear the development 
of an embryo. In this case, Aristotle refers to an organic being with an authentic soul in order 
to explain the structure of tragedy. The organic model is important in Aristotle, but it does not 
mean a confusion. The tragedies are so sophisticated that he appeals to the biological 
constitution of a natural being. But the tragedies are artificial beings, made by human 
intellect. Nor can philosophical doctrines be considered natural entities, whatever their 
ontological status is in Aristotle.  
 
Thus, they both cannot be considered to be within any domain of primary immanent 
teleology. They can attain, to be sure, more perfect forms, forms that better fulfill the original 
need of human beings. The tragedies of Sophocles can be better than Aeschylus and 
ultimately generate better catharsis, etc. Aristotle can regard himself as the apex of ancient 
philosophy, the culmination of human wisdom, etc. This would not involve the use of final 
causality in its primary sense, but extrinsic teleology, like any other craft. But we would need 
much more textual evidence to be certain.  
 
Besides, these are examples of the teleology of history. But there is no historical teleological 
principle ever formulated by Aristotle. Not even in Met.I, where Aubenque sees a teleological 
approach of the history of philosophy (namely, the discovery of the four causes). Surely 
Aristotle praised history more than any philosopher before him, but his conception of history 
is neither progressive or regressive, but empirical. Apart from the example in Pol.I. 2 that 
scholars consider ideal process, the other cases of past events and past doctrines in Aristotle 
do not construct a whole with a principle of development and different stages. Again, in this 
framework history is contingent. In this sense, there is plenty of empirical material in the 
corpus. There is no teleology at stake in the historical account in Pol.III. 10-VI, nor is there 
history of philosophy in the texts mentioned above concerning Aubenque, like On philosophy 
and Met.I. Aristotle collected large sums of data, but this does not entail a teleological 
structure of parts/whole.  
 
In fact, Aristotle addressed in one place the work of the historian, and precisely what he says 
is that there are no historical principles. When Aristotle addresses the task of the historian 
(historikòs) he states that he is talking about particulars (kath’ hékaston, Poet.9.1451b7), and 
nothing like general concepts, something that the philosophy of history would entail. For 
Aristotle the historical accounts (historiais) are nothing like unitarian story lines guided by 
principles. On the contrary, historical writings are considered summaries of events that 
merely happened in determinate periods, with no other relation to each other than luck (hon 
hékaston hos étychen échei pro állela, Poet.23.1459a21-25). This explicit denial reinforces 
then the lack of philosophical and teleological principles in Aristotle’s view of history. As 
Powell says, although in Aristotle there is a rich “practice of history”, there is no “systematic 
history”.288 
 
Aristotle’s understanding of crafts, the lack of historical principles in his work and the vision 
of history in the Poetics make me dismiss the two latter examples of the individual teleology 
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of non-living compound entities. In any case, interpreting history teleologically can be part of 
secondary teleology, the narratology of chance events as if they were teleological for the sake 
of the concluding fortunate stage (see 2.1.d).  
 
2.2.b. Global immanent teleology: contribution and imitation 
The second domain understands the term perfection within a much broader framework. Like 
cultural teleology, it extends the use of the final cause beyond the boundaries of the 
individual soul, although unlike tragedies and history we remain in the realm of nature. 
Furthermore, we are not in the domain of development any more. Global teleology deals with 
the static cosmic order. That is the opposite, then, of any sort of history.  
This second domain of teleology fits with two of the passages of “for what is aimed at” 
teleology, as Kullmann noted. Scholars have called this domain of teleology secondary 
teleology, extrinsic teleology, intra-species teleology or second-degree teleology. In short, it 
considers that the télos is not just a fulfillment of its own form and specific function, but a 
participating in the whole of nature or general order (τάξις). The eidos and the érgon leave 
the stage for the táxis. In the end, this requires examining the very same items but from a 
broader perspective. One of the structural functions of living beings like reproduction can be 
conceived as imitation, meaning imitation for the sake of participation in something better.  
Equally, every natural individual fulfillment (survival or well-being) can be understood as 
contributing to the good order of everything. From this larger schema, the individual télos is 
put in relation with a general order, which is good and eternal.  
 
Interpreters such as Kahn, Owens, Cooper, Sedley and, more recently, Scharle hold different 
visions of global Aristotelian teleology, but they are always compatible with the individual 
teleology reading. As Sedley says: “Aristotle’s teleology can be best understood by adopting 
a dual perspective, combining the local and the global levels of explanation”.289 I follow this 
basic assumption.  
 
As I have said, the texts we are going to comment on are highly controversial among 
scholars. We already know which of them deny the existence of this kind of approach to final 
causality in Aristotle. One interpreter has even seen this global reading as “thoroughly un-
Aristotelian”.290 Others like Kullmann accept its existence within the corpus, although “this 
finality compared with that in the organic area is deficient”.291 
 
I agree with Kahn when he says that the Aristotelian god, the unmoved mover, is ultimately 
the basis of global teleology. But as I said in the Introduction, immanent teleology has 
nothing to do with providentialism. Aristotle’s god is contemplative, not active. This means 
that he neither produces nor arranges the world. The immanent teleology model implies an 
active vision of nature. It is nature itself that seeks perfection. Nature has not been created by 
any god, in Aristotle. The Aristotelian god is the basis of global immanent teleology since it 
inspires in nature, in its different levels, the tendency to perfection. To this extent, the final 
cause is also the origin of movement in the world.  
There are different ways of seeing the influence of god upon the moveable world in Aristotle. 
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Kahn finds among scholars a “narrow view”, which attributes this influence to the first 
heaven, based on Met. XII.7,9. There is a wider sense that extends this teleological aspiration 
to heavenly bodies. There is a third one, a “broader view”, led by Kahn himself, that defends 
the teleological influence of the prime mover upon the world. Elements, plants, animals, 
humans, and heavenly bodies are influenced by god, as separate entities and as one arranged 
whole as well.  
According to Kahn “on this view, everything in nature aspires to the condition of deity; but 
each kind of thing can attain this goal only in a limited specific way”.292 And: “ In following 
their own nature, then, the elements imitate their ontological superiors, just as living things 
do in reproducing their own kind ”.293  
There is then a general mimetic aspiration, for this interpretative line. The infralunary cycles 
(transformation of elements, reproduction of plants and animals) imitate, we will see, 
supralunary rotatory cycles. The perishable imitates the unperishable, in Aristotle. We have 
seen in GA. II. 1 that, according to Aristotle, “being is better than not being, living than not 
living”. This can shed light on this idea of mimetic aspiration. Transformation of the elements 
and reproduction of the living perishable beings may be considered an aspiration for being 
beyond individual capacities.  
Although I follow Kahn’s “broader view”, I do not extend the term imitation to any type of 
global teleology. Sometimes Aristotle uses other terms, also deeply rooted in Platonic 
philosophy, such as participation. In fact, to some extent imitation can be understood as one 
type of participation. I use the term contribution, which may contain the two meanings in 
their different contexts. This meaning reduces every case of global teleology to partial 
contributions for the sake of the everlasting stability of something within the whole or for the 
sake of the good order of the whole. In the first case, the model of the teleological imitation 
of the eternal by the perishable is the most illustrative. In the second case, it is not so.  
Apart from his enlightening interpretation, in the same place Kahn gives an interesting 
historical account of the problem of global teleology among scholars. It can be useful to 
quote him again: “We find this second, broader view [of teleological influence of god upon 
nature] in earlier interpreters, such as Zeller and Joaquim. Recent authors tend to be more 
cautious, and to restrict their account of the prime mover to a narrower, more explicitly 
documented interpretation (…). Perhaps some will regard [the narrow view] as the more 
‘scientific’ view of the prime mover, since it makes a minimal use of the metaphysical 
explanation of motion in terms of desire for the supreme good, limiting this principle to the 
eternal motion of the heavens where Aristotle has supported his doctrine by careful argument 
and closely tied to requirements of his astronomical theory”.294  
 
I think that Kahn is right in pointing out some of the reasons for this controversial status of 
the global texts. First and foremost, it is clear that individual teleology is “more explicitly 
documented”. In comparison, it is completely true that global texts are not abundant. Second, 
individual teleology is more “scientific” according to Aristotle’s and also to our paradigm. 
Global teleology is, philosophically speaking, scarcely developed and scattered. It is maybe 
not very representative of the philosophy of Aristotle, but I think we cannot deny its 
existence. Regarding the rejection of global teleology, Cooper even detects “complex 
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feelings” among critical commentators.295 For whatever reason it has been rejected, the 
textual basis for global teleology is sufficient.  
I start from the broadest teleological passages, which are on cosmology and theology. God’s 
non-providential influence on the rest of the universe (meaning both supralunary and 
infralunary realms) can be understood in terms of order. Thus, participating actively in the 
order is the good and the télos. We will read one text on participation in a general order and 
another one on the dependence of the infralunary world on the supralunary one. Both are to 
be found in the last chapters of Met.XII. Afterwards I quote a text from Met.IX on imitation. 
At this level, the use of imitation does not refer to cycles, but is framed in purely abstract 
ontological terms: the sublunary realm, we will know from Met.XII, depends on the eternal 
supralunary world for its being. We will see that imitation is the term that expresses this 
dependence. Then I descend to physics: I quote the two passages in the corpus on elemental 
transformation. They show the influence of the eternal realm of cosmos upon the non-living 
beings of the infralunary realm. It may illustrate how the infralunary realm depends on the 
supralunary one. The cycle of elements fire-water-air-earth seems to be the imitation of the 
perfect circular motions in the supralunary realm. Then, I shall recall the two famous 
passages on biological reproduction. They highlight the influence of the eternal realm of 
cosmos on the living beings of the infralunary realm. Reproduction is the only way perishable 
living beings can be imperishable, just like the heavenly beings above. Aristotle holds that 
animals and plants participate in eternal imperishable life through their species. He uses the 
term imitation. Finally, I quote the only two passages on global teleology where the eternal 
does not appear. There is no trace of imitation. These last two texts, especially controversial 
among interpreters, show how global teleology can be applied only to biology. These are the 
only two examples of teleological ecology that can be found in Aristotle, to my knowledge. 
Despite the fact that ecology is a modern notion, I think it identifies correctly the subject of 
the two passages, that is, stability and inter-specific teleology. The teleological model of 
these two passages is participation and not imitation, and to this extent they are related with 
the first cosmological text that we will read, Met.XII. 10. 
- The order of cosmos: the good of the whole 
“We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good (agathòn), 
and the highest good (áriston), whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts 
(tèn táxin). Probably in both ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and in its 
leader (kaì gàr en te táxei tò eu kaì ho strategós), and more in the latter; for he does not depend on 
the order but it depends on him. And all things are ordered together somehow (pánta dè syntétaktaí 
pos), but not all alike, -both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has 
nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end (pros mèn 
gàr hén hápanta syntétaktai), but it is as in a house, where the freemen are least at liberty to act at 
random, but all things or most things are already ordained for  them, while the slaves and the animals 
do little for the common  good (tò eis tò koinón), and for the most part live at random; for this is the 
sort of principle that constitutes the nature of each. I mean, for instance, that all must at least come to 
be dissolved into their elements, and there are other functions similarly in which all share for the 
good of the whole (éstin hon koinonei ápanta eis tò hólon)” (Met. XII.10.1075a10-25, italics are 
mine). 
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This is the most important text on global teleology in the broadest sense in Aristotle. Despite 
the ontological pluralism, everything is ordered towards something good.296 Being ordered by 
this influence everything shares in the good, harmony and being. The idea of the army 
appears also in the quotation of Homer (Iliad.II. 204) at the end of Lambda, shortly after this 
passage. It is a variation of what we have in On philosophy (ed. Ross). frag. 12b. Aristotle 
writes:  
“… they [other philosophers] give us many governing principles (archàs pollás); but the world (tà dè 
ónta) refuses to be governed badly. ‘The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be’ (ouk agathòn 
polykoiraníe: eis koíranos hésto)”. 
The good or télos (here called “to eu”) is here identified with order or táxis, as I said. Things, 
plants, animals and (although not mentioned) humans are not just ordered in themselves. That 
is, the order in Aristotle does not consist exclusively in parts/wholes, with regard to specific 
functions for the sake of the being and well-being of their souls.  There is a general order 
between substances, an arrangement of one to each other. Aristotle talks about inter-species 
teleology. If Met.XII. 6-7 shows that the prime mover or god is the source of movement, then 
in Met.XII.10 Aristotle shows that the prime mover is also the source of general order. Its 
direct influence is not restricted here to one heaven, but to every being, regarding order. The 
télos can be understood here as the contribution to general order made by fishes, plants or 
humans. That is how the analogy with the household could be better understood.  
Anyway, in Met.XII.7 there is also a quite clear passage in which Aristotle holds that every 
living and non-living being is suspended (he uses the term értetai) from the prime unmoved 
mover. It certainly adds textual basis to the relation between individual teleology and global 
teleology, since it links the individual “scientific approach” to the “cosmic approach”, with 
god, the heavens and nature involved:  
“On such a principle [first unmoved mover, which is good and generates movement], then, depend 
(értetai) the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and 
enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also 
pleasure” (Met.XII. 7.1072b14-17).297 
In the next text, mimesis or imitation is mentioned. The imitated/imitator relation is extended 
beyond the prime mover/first heaven domain to the supralunary/infralunary domain. That is, 
the sublunary beings imitate supralunary beings, since the latter are more perfect. This also 
gives a new hint as to how global teleology is linked to the individual one.  
“And so the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that they may 
sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may. Nor do they tire in this activity; for 
movement is not for them, as it is for perishable things, connected with the potentiality for opposites, 
so that the continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is 
matter and potency, not actuality, that causes this. Imperishable things are imitated by those that are 
involved in change, e.g. earth and fire (mimeitai dè tà háphtharta kaì tà en metabole ónta, oion ge kaì 
pyr). For these also are ever active; for they have their movement of themselves and in themselves. 
But the other potencies, according to our previous discussion, are all potencies for opposites;” (Met. 
IX. 8. 1050b21-30). 
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In my opinion, the following text consolidates the previous vision: 
“… they [supralunary beings] continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified, 
living the best and most self sufficient of lives. As a matter of fact, this word ‘duration’ (aiòn) 
possessed a divine significance for the ancients, for the fulfillment which includes the period of life of 
any creature (hekastou zoes chrónon), outside of which no natural development can fall, has been 
called its duration (aión). On the same principle the fulfillment of the whole heaven (pantòs ouranou 
télos), the fulfillment which includes all time and infinity, is ‘duration’ (aión) – a name based upon 
the fact that it is always – duration immortal and divine. From it derive the being and life which other 
things, some more or less articulately but others feebly, enjoy (Hóthen kaì tois állois exértetai. Tois 
meèn akribésteron tois d’ amauros, tò einaí te kaì zen). So, too, in its discussions concerning the 
divine, popular philosophy often propounds the view that whatever is divine, whatever is primary and 
supreme, is necessarily unchangeable”. (DC.I. 9.279a18-33, italics are mine). 
The last text shows again that the infralunary realm is dependent on the upper supralunary 
realm. In the infralunary ground, being, order and life are dependent on supralunary beings 
and, in the end all are dependent on the prime mover. In Met.XII. 7 Aristotle uses the verb 
“artáo” and in the latter, DC.I.9, “exartáo”, which literally means ‘hanging’ or ‘physical 
dependence’.  
As I said, Aristotle modifies the Platonic providentialist schema of the Timaeus: the tendency 
towards perfection is motivated by the eternal, but comes from nature, ontologically 
dependent.298 Thus even within this global and cosmic context, we are still in the exclusively 
immanent domain.  
The fundamental scope of these texts is to explain order and stability in the infralunary realm 
as the influence of the eternal realm, which in this context is “the best”. In Aristotelian 
cosmology and theology, the infralunary realm aims and aspires to be ordered and to be 
eternal, and in this sense it takes part in the supralunary and divine world. Again, Aristotle’s 
global perspective includes an overarching god, but the relationship between god and the 
world is not providential since, as he affirms, god is totally occupied in self-understanding. 
From Ravaisson to Zeller in the 19th century, and from Zeller to Kahn, Sedley, and Scharle 
nowadays, the global interpretation of Aristotelian teleology does not pretend to return to 
Platonic theology. In fact, this vision is thus genuinely and thoroughly Aristotelian.  
It is difficult to state anything clearly about the ontological status of nature understood as a 
whole. It is something natural, not artificial. It is a compound of substances. It has no soul. 
Sedley has compared Aristotle’s conception of the city-state and also the household with the 
universe: none of them has a soul but all are considered natural entities with parts which refer 
to the whole. This whole is prior to its parts.299  
Leunissen expresses it in this way: “…the goodness, order and joint arrangement of the 
cosmos as a whole emerge from the goal directed actions of the individual parts of the 
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cosmos towards the same end, the Unmoved Mover”.300 
- Elementary imitation: stability of non-living perishable beings. 
“Coming-to-be and passing-away will, as we have said, always be continuous, and will never fail 
owing to the cause we stated. And this continuity has a sufficient reason on our theory. For in all 
things, as we affirm, nature always strives after ‘the better’. Now ‘being’ (we have explained 
elsewhere the exact variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better than ‘not-being’: but not 
all things can possess ‘being’, since they are too far removed from the ‘originative source. ‘God 
therefore adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making 
coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, 
because that ‘coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually’ is the closest approximation to 
eternal being. - The cause of this perpetuity of coming-to-be, as we have often said, is circular motion: 
for that is the only motion which is continuous. That, too, is why all the other things – the things, I 
mean, which are reciprocally transformed in virtue of their ‘passions’ and their ‘powers of action’ e.g. 
the ‘simple’ bodies imitate circular motion. For when water is transformed into air, air into fire, and 
the fire back into water, we say the coming-to-be ‘has completed the circle’, because it reverts again 
to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating circular motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous” 
(GC.II.10. 337a ss, italics are mine). 
The following text, strengthens this vision: 
“The whole world surrounding the earth, then, the affections of which are our subject, is made up of 
these bodies. This world necessarily has a certain continuity with the upper motions: consequently all 
its power and order is derived from (kybernasthai, also “controlled by”) them. (For the originating 
principle of all motion is the first cause. Besides, that element is eternal and its motion has no limit in 
space, but is always complete; whereas all these other bodies have separate regions which limit one 
another.) So we must treat fire and earth and the elements like them as the material causes of the 
events in this world (meaning by material what is subject and is affected), but must assign causality in 
the sense of the originating principle of motion to the influence of the eternally moving bodies” 
(Meteor.I.2.339a19-32). 
The main scholar nowadays that has been working on these texts with brilliant outcomes is 
Scharle.301 Following also Kullmann, Scharle distinguishes two types of teleology. In her 
vision, elemental teleology works with regard not only to the tendency towards natural 
places, but also with regard to the rotatory nature of the cycles. In this sense, Scharle’s 
exclusively imitative teleology develops Kahn’s regarding elemental substances. “In taking 
the best thing as their aim, individuals do not seek to improve or benefit the end, but they 
seek to improve their own condition: the more closely they approximate the activity of the 
best thing, the better they are”.302 And: “In moving rectilinearly the sublunary elements 
cannot become the best, … but nonetheless they can approximate the circular movement”.303 
As we saw in GA.II.1.731b20-2a1 “being is better than not being, living than not living”. 
Although in this text Aristotle is talking about living beings, the argument could perhaps be 
extrapolated to non-living beings thanks to GC.II.10. 337a, where we read that “‘being’ (we 
have explained elsewhere the exact variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better 
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than ‘not-being’: but not all things can possess ‘being’, since they are too far removed from 
the ‘originative source”.  
Elementary teleology is, however, not part of this account of teleology. As I said above, 
regarding individual elementary teleology, it would not have been possible to make a 
comparison with Bergson. But the latter passages have to be included in a complete account 
of global teleology, for the sake of imitation. For this reason, I have included elementary 
teleology only with regard to the cycles of transformation, which I read in a teleological way. 
The two texts show a general tendency to the best. The best here is being, beyond the 
perishable substance of the living and non-living being. 
- Biological imitation: stability of perishable living beings 
“For one of the most natural of works for living things (as many as are complete and not damaged, or 
not spontaneously generating) is to make another like itself—an animal an animal, a plant a plant—so 
as to partake so far as it is able in the eternal  and divine. All things reach for this, and for the sake of 
this do whatever they do according to nature (‘for the sake of’ being twofold: for what is aimed at and 
for what is benefitted). Since, then, it is unable to share in the eternal and divine by way of continuity, 
because perishable things do not admit of persisting as the same thing and one in number, each thing 
shares in the way in which it is able to partake (one more, another less). So it persists not as the same 
thing but as one like itself, not one in number but one in form” (DA.II. 4.415a27-415b9). 
And: 
“Now some existing things are eternal and divine whilst others admit of both existence and non-
existence. But that which is noble and divine is always, in virtue of its own nature, the cause of the 
better in such things as admit of being better or worse, and what is not eternal does admit of existence 
and non-existence, and can partake in the better and the worse. And soul is better than body, and 
living, having soul, is thereby better than the lifeless which has none, and being is better than not 
being, living than not living. These, then, are the reasons of the generation of animals. For since it is 
impossible that such a class of things as animals should be of an eternal nature, therefore that which 
comes into being is eternal in the only way possible. Now it is impossible for it to be eternal as an 
individual (though of course the real essence of things is in the individual) – were it such it would be 
eternal – but it is possible for it as a species. This is why there is always a class of men and animals 
and plants” (GA. II. 1, 731b20-2a1). 
As Ross says: “The perpetuation of the type is the best proof of finality in nature”.304 These 
passages are certainly quite clear and have been quoted innumerable times. It is easy to note a 
resemblance of them with the Platonic Symposium (207d-209e). These biological passages, 
convergent in their meaning, state that Aristotelian biological infralunary species are eternal, 
and also that infralunary individuals are not. This is, again, due to the fact that being is better 
than non-living,305 and nature does the best among the possibilities. Survival is the individual 
télos, and reproduction is the specific télos. Since, for Aristotle, the species is eternal and 
survival is not, Ross’ statement is understandable.  
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As stated in the previous section on elementary transformation, there is an imitative striving 
to be in a stable condition, beyond the unstable existence on earth. In this sense, reproduction 
is an imitation of the imperishable realm, and also is expressed by circular motion: the cycle.  
Biological reproduction is easily conceived within a global framework of the“for what is it 
aimed at” teleology, whereas there is a “for what is it beneficial” teleology at stake too. As I 
see it, there is a doubly comprehensive understanding of the same function: reproduction. 
There are two complementary levels of the term télos in these two places in the corpus. As 
always, the individual télos, the benefit, and the teleology of development are clearer. 
Reproduction is a potency of living beings. The fulfillment of that potency means, as we 
know well, the goal and the function. Reproduction is, like other faculties within the 
biological realm, a flourishing. Besides, this fulfillment expresses a general aim, called 
imitation by Aristotle. Obviously, it is not a conscious imitation. Imitation, here, is an 
analogical term: it means an ontological dependence, as we have seen. Reproduction means 
contributing to something beyond the individual. This something is the stability of the 
biological species in the cosmos. Since the Aristotelian cosmos is eternal, the biological 
species within it are so too. By reproducing, individual living beings contribute to eternity, 
that is, stability in the time of part of that cosmos: namely, their species.  
While in the text from Met.XII.10 natural things function for the sake of the general order, in 
these last cases of imitation natural beings contribute to the stability of that general order. 
Each global passage emphasizes one aspect of that cosmic understanding of perfection.  
- Ecology: interspecies order 
There are still two global texts to read. They do not include eternal supralunary items any 
more, hence there is no imitation at stake. They fit better with the Met.XII.10 global 
perspective.  
According to Judson, the first of the following two texts is “conformist” with the basic 
teleological “axiom”, that is: the goal is “better with reference to the essence of each 
thing”.306 The global teleology described in PA.IV. 13 is conformist since the general good 
fits with relatively individual goods: they are compatible. The second text from Pol. I. 8 goes 
against Judson’s axiom: it could never be conformist. This example means a certain 
asymmetric understanding of teleological relations.  
Following Judson’s useful commentary, I have distinguished the two passages with two titles:  
Good for everybody:  
“For in some [fishes] this is placed in front, at the very extremity of the body, while in others, as the 
dolphin and the Selachia, it is placed on the under surface; so that these fishes turn on the back in 
order to take their food. The purpose of nature in this was apparently not merely to provide a means of 
salvation for other animals, by allowing them opportunity of escape during the time lost in the act of 
turning – for all the fishes with this kind of mouth prey on living animals – but also to prevent these 
fishes from giving way too much to their gluttonous ravening after food. For had they been able to 
seize their prey more easily than they do, they would soon have perished from over-repletion. An 
additional reason is that the projecting extremity of the head in these fishes is round and small, and 
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therefore cannot admit of a wide opening”. PA.IV. 13. 696b25-34.). 
Good for some, bad for others: 
“For some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much food as will last until they are 
able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the 
viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves, which is 
called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake (tá 
te phytà ton zóon héneken einai) and that the other animals exist for the sake of man (kaì álla zóa ton 
anthrópon chárin), the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for 
food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing 
incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of 
man (ton anthrópon héneken autà pánta pepoiekénai tèn physin). And so, in one point of view, the art 
of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought 
to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will 
not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just”. (Pol. I. 8. 1256b7-1256b26). 
A number of influential scholars do not accept these texts as examples of Aristotelian 
teleology. First, they are only two in a huge corpus.307 Secondly, they are not interpreted 
straightforwardly or literally. Balme considers the first passage, on the dolphin in GA.IV.13, 
as “sarcastic”.308 Regarding Pol.I.8 he states that “it is impossible that he could have meant 
this literally. It comes in a rhetorical and popularizing account of the varieties in natural 
lifestyle”. In a similar way, Wieland calls global teleology accounts in general “concessions 
to popular notions”, and, especially in Pol.I.8, a “practical question”. In Aristotle the animals 
do “not [have] an innate tendency to serve man”, says Wieland.309 These two passages, but 
overall the second, are regularly read from popular perspective, as a opposed to a biological 
or scientific one. 
 
There is an idea of a “web of interests” all over nature. It entails, in my reading, the 
compatibility of the global teleology of “for what is aimed at” and the individual teleology 
“for what is it beneficial”.  
Aristotle states that: “For in some [fishes] this is placed in front, at the very extremity of the 
body, while in others, as the dolphin and the Selachia, it is placed on the under surface; so 
that these fishes turn on the back in order to take their food”. The purpose of nature is 
twofold: 1) “to provide a means of salvation for other animals, by allowing them opportunity 
of escape during the time lost in the act of turning – for all the fishes with this kind of mouth 
prey on living animals”. This can be named as the “good of other animals”. 2) “to prevent 
these fishes from giving way too much to their gluttonous ravening after food”. Which can be 
named as the “good of the dolphin and the Selachia”. 1) and 2) are the good of “for what is 
benefitted” (érgon, eidos) but the articulation is “for what is aimed at” (táxis).  
We can take this other passage: “From it [duration immortal and divine] derive the being and 
life which other things, some more or less articulately but others feebly, enjoy” (DC.I.9). Or: 
“On such a principle [first unmoved mover, which is good], then, depend (értetai) the 
heavens and the world of  nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy 
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for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also 
pleasure” (Met. XII. 7.1075a onwards). Furthermore, as we saw, in Met.XII.10 this 
“derivation” and “dependence” is considered “order” and “stability”, or, maybe better, “stable 
order”. It is the general accordance to one principle. Aristotle himself states that the idea of 
something “besides sensible things” is linked to the “first principle”, “order”, “becoming” 
and “heavenly bodies”. These major elements all presuppose each other, it seems. The one 
interesting thing for us, at this point, is “order”. Order, we saw, is good, it is télos. Against 
those who “give us many governing principles” Aristotle famously says the “world (ónta) 
refuses to be governed badly” (Met. XII.10.1076a-3).  
In my view, the Met.XII.10 passage sheds light on PA.IV. 13, yet it strengthens the global 
teleology position (this is, precisely, Sedley’s main strategy in his controversial analysis of 
Pol.I.8 in the light of Met.XII.10).  
The first text, PA.IV.13 is good in two perspectives: it provides salvation for little fish and 
prevents gluttony among dolphins. I do not think it “reverses” Pol.I.8’s chain, since in this 
conformist case, so to speak, they all win.310  
 
John Cooper quotes the PA.IV.13 passage as a “scientifically” valid example of Aristotelian 
ecology.311 I agree since it talks about interactions among species and about global stability as 
something good, attainable and something in which everything takes part. As Cooper says, 
“there is inherent in the world a fundamental tendency to preserve permanently the species of 
living things it contains”.312 
 
So I have titled the PA.IV. 13 passage as “good for everybody” and the Pol. I. 8 passage as 
“good for some, bad for others”. This emphasizes the polemic non-conformist aspect of our 
last text on Aristotelian global and immanent teleology. It deals with the problem of 
anthropocentrism, defended by Sedley in two insightful texts and by Owens in a single one. 
In PA.IV.13 we were talking about an order in which the two teleologies, that of the good of 
“for what is it beneficial” (érgon, eidos) and the other “for what is it aimed at” (táxis), are 
compatible, and thus conformist.  
On the contrary, in Pol. I. 8 the first individual’s télos is, so to speak, “sacrificed” for the sake 
of the second’s, and the second’s for the sake of a third’s. The order of the substance and its 
télos is referred to its degree of perfection. Thus, plants exist for the sake of animals, and 
animals exist for the sake of humans. Pol. I.8 has to be understood in the context of the “art 
of acquisition”, which is the last topic in a sequence that starts with the nature of the polis 
and, subsequently, the legitimacy of natural slaves. The passage pertains then to the section 
on art of acquisition, and echoes the previous two. In this context, also the idea of using 
natural slaves is justified in the same way as hunting, etc. That is, Aristotle considers animals 
and slaves instruments for survival and well-being of the best (non-slave humans). 313 
According to some scholars, this theory contradicts Aristotle’s biology, just as the theory of 
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slavery contradicts his anthropology.314 
In this case, this ecological or global teleology is different from PA.IV.13 since the good or 
télos is, on occasions, death. This raises important problems, since, we know, télos and péras 
are different, and death is péras, and never the goal.  
Sedley and Owens defend both “a hierarchical teleology in nature”, in their opinion firmly 
rooted in Aristotle’s thought. 315  First, Sedley is right in claiming that, despite the 
aforementioned context, Pol.I.8’s passage is not only about human beings and nature, but also 
about the “art of acquisition”. At this point, rigorously basing his interpretation on Aristotle’s 
words, Sedley want to debilitate popular and pragmatic readings. He is right in saying that an 
important part of this text talks about biology. To my knowledge, interpreters have never 
responded to that satisfactorily.  
Notice that Aristotle says that “the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the 
viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves, 
which is called milk”. Aristotle adds that “In like manner”, that is, analogically, “we may 
infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake (tá te phytà ton zóon héneken 
einai)”. Milk and plants have their télos in another being. Analogically he states “that other 
animals exist for the sake of man (kaì álla zóa ton anthrópon chárin), the tame for use and 
food”. Little further he reinforces this idea: “Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and 
nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man (ton 
anthrópon héneken autà pánta pepoiekénai tèn physin)”. As I said, the context of natural 
slavery is still present in the background, which is clear when Aristotle adds that the art of 
acquisition and hunting is “an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against 
men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind 
is naturally just” (Pol. I. 8. 1256b7-1256b26). 
Sedley and Owens think that Aristotle is, within the sublunary realm, anthropocentric. 
Everything in nature, simple elements, plants, animals and natural slaves are for the sake of 
Greek human beings. To be eaten can be understood as the goal of animals and plants, 
according to Sedley’s reading. The two scholars think that beneficiary biology and global 
teleology are so. Regularly, the goal of the wild animal is maturity, but eventually, its goal 
(and not only limit) can be death, if this is necessary for humans. This is the most 
controversial point of this non-conformist reading, but I do not support it while it is 
contradictory to the doctrine I have developed so far, according to which the télos is the 
completion and good.  
As Sedley points out, the perspective of Pol.I. 8 seems to include the relation between plants 
and animals. Second: if we consider this a popular concession, then we have to address the 
doctrine of the natural slave (physei doulos), three chapters earlier. Owens also recalls that 
every human being is not equally considered, and that all are to be understood regarding the 
contemplative philosopher, the goal of the city. 
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Aristotle recalls that in physiological terms slaves are different from their owners: they are 
stronger and less intelligent (Pol. I. 5.1254a29-1254b31). According to Aristotle this is not a 
conventional claim: the slave is an instrument for the owner, and that seems to be grounded 
in nature (Pol.I.5.1254b20-30). At the same time, technically speaking, as Berti points out, 
the slave is not one species.  
In that chapter, nature is seen as a web of goals, where the inferior being in the scale is 
subordinated to the superior one. One could however still defend the conformist perspective 
here: although it is difficult for us to understand it, Aristotle’s conception of the slave 
includes flourishing and the télos. By contributing to the rationality of the télos, the slave 
participates in something good, which is better for him or her. This could be a way of 
understanding part of the section in Pol.I.8. But some of those uses between species in nature 
imply death, i.e. the plants nourishing the cows. One of the most important ideas regarding 
the notion of télos, as we saw, is that it is not like péras or escháton. The goal is not the limit 
of a substance’s progress of any kind, but its peak. Death could never qualify as télos, in my 
reading. The death of one living entity can be a télos only accidentally since its meat means 
growth for another animal.  
I think that the most cautious thing to say here is to affirm that wild living beings have their 
own goal and that they contribute in different degrees to the general good. This contribution 
is certainly unclear in Met.XII.10, but it may involve the specific function and not the death 
of living entities. I think Aristotle’s global teleology in Pol.I.8 could partially respond to this 
question (as Sedley says) only in cases of use, when the immanent télos and the general inter-
species order are compatible (slavery). When they are not (the trophic interpretation of the 
natural scale), it cannot fit with the doctrine developed above. Death can never be a goal, 
since it is the opposite of the survival and flourishing of a species. Pol.I.8 is a non-conformist 
passage, like the other cases of global teleology. The controversial status of the text is 
justified. Pol.I.8 is not a popular concession, as has been suggested, since it fits clearly in 
Pol.I as a whole. At the same time, I believe a global teleology scheme belongs beyond the 
boundaries of the immanent teleology, linked to natural forms, addressed throughout these 

























Conclusion of Chapter 2 
 
[A] According to Aristotle, teleological events are interpreted by analogy. In individual 
teleology, arts and crafts are the analogies used. In global teleology analogy plays a lesser 
role, although it is still present: the language of mimesis, the household and the army.  
[B] In Aristotle, teleological phenomena are understood as perfective, as a causal tendency 
toward excellence, the good and completeness. This is connected to the natural form and 
function.  
[C] The human being is the summary of the natural scale below in the sublunary world and 
also has unique goals. The unique goals, implied in their rational faculties, are part of a 
further analogy between humans and divine beings.   
[D] Immanent teleology is to be found in regular events, since they happen always or for the 
most part.  
[E] Chance and luck events are not part of primary teleology, because they do not tend 
toward immanent forms or functions. But for Aristotle they can be interpreted in a 
retrospective way as if they were goal directed in the realm of human praxis. This can be 
called secondary teleology.  
[F] The model of immanent teleology has two domains. They are referred to in two of the 
passages that distinguish two senses of final cause, namely, the beneficiary (hou héneka + 
dative) and the aim (hou héneka + genitive). There is an individual teleology, philosophically 
developed by Aristotle in Phys.II, PA.I, in his many works on biology and also in his ethics. 
It is normally linked to the idea of the beneficiary. There is also a global teleology, found in a 
small number of texts scattered throughout the corpus. This second dimension is related to 
the notion of the aim of the final cause. 
[G] In the domain of individual teleology, I focus on different kinds of biology. Apart from 
biology, I include the development of city-states as one kind of natural teleology. This does 
not apply to history, however.  
[H] In the domain of global immanent teleology, the aims are phrased in terms of perfection, 
contribution, participation and imitation. Leaving aside one case (Pol.I.8), this domain is 











3. Structural elements in Bergson’s teleology 
 
 
In this chapter I will address the main structural elements and issues in Bergson’s conception 
of teleology. In 3.1 I tackle one central aspect of teleology: the analogy between the 
intentional world (the world of the human mind) and the natural world (the non-human 
world). I find that analogy and perfection, or goal, are interconnected notions, so I address 
both in the same section. Besides, it is true that Bergson has nothing like a consideration of 
the télos, péras, or the good as such, like we had in 2.1.a (although he applies the concept in 
concrete empirical examples throughout, as we will see). In order to pose this dual concept of 
analogy/perfection I gather the main examples of analogy in Bergson’s work, regarding 
conservative or transgressive teleology.  Consciousness, the embryo, and history are some of 
these examples that involve one proposal of analogy and one notion of what perfection is in 
each case. According to the previous account, 3.1 deals with pluralism (different types of 
perfection) and anthropomorphism (different kinds of right analogy).  
 
3.2 deals with the problem of anthropocentrism. I tackle the place of human beings in the 
cosmos, derived from the philosophical model of immanent teleology. I find here, as I found 
in Aristotle, a mitigated anthropocentrism. I defend it is against absolute anthropocentrism, 
but it also states that human beings are, essentially, the most perfect animals (in the sublunary 
realm, in the case of Aristotle). In Aristotle, to a certain extent, humans sum up nature. They 
use vegetative faculties and animal faculties, and, besides, they have unique faculties, such as 
ethical and dianoethical virtues that, in one case—namely, contemplation or theorein—
pertain to astral supralunary beings. They sum up nature and they also add something unique 
and divine to it. In my reading of Bergson, there is biomorphism, since there is a great variety 
of beings, goals and analogies: there is a common element between humans and the rest of 
beings. But human beings, on the one hand, also sum up nature and, on the other hand, have 
unique faculties. In Bergson there is a hierarchical use of the ontological scale for the sake of 
teleology, but in an evolutionary way. It is, thus, a mitigated anthropocentrism: humans are 
not the only goal-directed being in the world, but among the variety of goals, human goals are 
the best ones.  
 
The third aspect I study in chapter 3 is the question of regularity. It is important for immanent 
classical teleology, as we saw in 2.1.d. To this extent, Bergson’s conservative teleology is 
supposed to work always or for the most of the time. Bergson’s account of attention to life or 
closed society tendencies, as we will see in 3.3.a, fits well with Aristotle’s regular account of 
individual teleology.  
 
In 3.3.b I tackle singular, unpredictable, indeterminate processes, which retrospectively can 
be interpreted as beneficial or not. Here is where I link Aristotle’s secondary teleology with 
Bergson’s view of evolution and history. Here also I develop one brief but enlightening 
remark made by the Bergsonian scholar Camille Riquier. 
 
 
3.1. Perfectivism and analogy 
 
In the “Introduction” to EC, Bergson proposes one circular philosophy. Bergson says that: 







“[a] A theory of life that is not accompanied by a criticism of knowledge is obliged to accept, as they 
stand, the concepts which the understanding puts at its disposal: it can but enclose the facts, willing or 
not, in pre-existing frames which it regards as ultimate. It thus obtains a symbolism which is 
convenient, perhaps even necessary to positive science, but not a direct vision of its object. [b] On the 
other hand, a theory of knowledge which does not replace the intellect in the general evolution of life 
will teach us neither how the frames of knowledge have been constructed nor how we can enlarge or 
go beyond them. It is necessary that these two inquiries, theory of knowledge and theory of life, 
should join each other, and, by a circular process, push each other on unceasingly. 
[c] Together, they may solve by a method more sure, brought nearer to experience, the great problems 
that philosophy poses. For, if they should succeed in their common enterprise, they would show us the 
formation of the intellect, and thereby the genesis of that matter of which our intellect traces the 
general configuration. They would dig to the very root of nature and of mind. [d] They would 
substitute for the false evolutionism of Spencer—which consists in cutting up present reality, already 
evolved, into little bits no less evolved, and then recomposing it with these fragments, thus positing in 
advance everything that is to be explained—a true evolutionism, in which reality would be followed in 
its generation and its growth”.316  
I claim that the “true evolutionism” defended here is to be found in the reformed finalism, 
according to Bergson. As we saw, Bergson considers that the basis of teleology or finalism is 
psychological. Spencer’s progressivism does not rely on that so fully, according to Bergson. 
The psychological basis should refer to the theory of knowledge. This theory of knowledge 
should reinforce a solid theory of life. For Bergson, we should start our analysis from our 
daily experience of the world. Only afterwards can we build a bigger vision on that. Only 
from consciousness we could experience what Life is. At the same time, the theory of life 
gives us the broader picture. It expands psychology. It traces within nature the large roots of 
our inner experience.  
 
“Theory of knowledge” implies that there is a sort of perfectionism in consciousness (we all 
are progress). In Bergson’s view, continuity, action and self-creativity are perfective features. 
Continuity and self-creativity were part of his doctrine of duration in D.I, and he added 
external action in MM. In the latter book he established the capacity of extrapolating these 
mind features to natural beings, such as amoebas. In MM he had already added to the “theory 
of knowledge” a “theory of life”, but he didn’t develop the idea. The “theory of life” 
examines the roots of knowledge and how knowledge could be understood within a bigger 
framework (bigger than the label “human theory of knowledge”). At this point I think that 
Bergson is developing his well-known claim according to which doing philosophy implies 
going beyond human nature. 317  Based on the theory of life we can grasp a deeper 
understanding of the theory of knowledge. Since life is present in all the living beings, we can 
understand our knowledge in comparison with them. Since Life, as such, has its own features, 
we can understand ourselves better in comparison to it. Life and knowledge compound a 
common ground for EC. The analogy illustrates that.  
 
In sum, the theory of life entails the use of analogy, so it requires extrapolation. Bergson’s 
analogy can be established between human consciousness and living beings, and its aim is to 
show what life is as such. In MM the human organism and some parts of its consciousness 
are thus like other organisms to some extent. In LR human consciousness is a part of one 
society, and societies are organisms. In EC this analogy becomes much bigger. In addition to 
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the theory of life, which concedes the possibility of establishing analogies between individual 
living beings and human consciousness, there is a complementary theory of life that defends 
the analogy between human beings and Life, understood as evolution. Hence, in EC there are 
analogies between human consciousness and one insect, between consciousness and one 
embryo and between consciousness and one plant. There are also ambitious analogies 
between human consciousness and Life, regarding creation. 
 
I believe that in the introduction to EC Bergson is referring to teleological concepts, since 
perfection and analogy are both implied in the theory of knowledge and in the theory of life. I 
also consider in fact that, in the model of immanent teleology, analogy and perfection 
compose a circle. The theory of knowledge refers to our experience of what perfection is and 
the theory of life is the philosophical basis upon which the analogy can be established 
legitimately. Without perfection there is no directionality in nature. Without analogy there is 
no perfective model, since it is to be found in consciousness.    
 
In general terms, the idea of analogy implies that human consciousness and human affairs are 
different parts of nature. There is analogy but also plurivocity of the same term. Hence, 
regarding its natural being, some common trace has to be noted between the human realm and 
the natural non-human one. This idea fits well with Bergson’s claim that: “philosophy should 
be an effort to go beyond the human state”.318 It goes beyond anthropocentrism. In Bergson’s 
world, Cartesian anthropocentrism is much closer than that of Plato and the Stoics.319 Bergson 
conception of nature challenges Descartes’ and that of his heirs.  
We saw that within Aristotle perfection or télos has several meanings, although it always 
refers to a certain kind of natural completeness. Regarding each case of analogy one concrete 
notion of what is perfection is has to be at work. In the human realm, completeness would 
mean the consummation of a productive action (the sculpture, the carpenter’s work, the 
house, the health of a patient), the consummation of a faculty (sight for an eye, movement for 
the legs) or the fulfillment of a general goal (life according to virtue and reason, or 
happiness). This can be extended to nature, as we know well. According to Bergson’s 
philosophy there are also a number of interpretations of what perfection is. All these types of 
perfection, according to the model of immanent teleology, can be extrapolated from human 
life to nature. According to that model, nature is again more perfect than human life.  
 
In Bergson, the capacity of spontaneous efficiency upon the environment, temporal 
continuity, and free creativity are some of the mental features extrapolated to different 
phenomena by Bergson. In the next pages I deal with this case by case. My aim in 3.1 is not 
to discuss in full detail the perfective aspect, the télos involved. Now I will deal with the 
analogies in particular, and I will also give an account of the type of perfection. But I will 
come back to that in 4. 
 
My aim here is just to highlight the main cases of analogy in Bergson, which can be 
understood in two types: a “horizontal analogy”, between the individual (the organism, 
embryo, society) and the (human) individual, that is, analogies 3.1.a, 3.1.d and 3.1.c; and a 
“vertical analogy”, between the human soul and the élan.320  
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The two most important studies on Bergson’s notion of analogy are Pierre Montebello’s 
L’autre métaphysique and David Lapoujade’s Puissances du temps. Versions de Bergson. To 
be sure, both disregard the use of analogy for the sake of a teleological argument. Moreover, 
Lapoujade denies any sort of finalism in Bergson.321 In fact, Lapoujade states that finalism’s 
“raisonnement par analogie est mal fondé: ils rabattent les touts ouverts de la nature sur les 
systèmes fermés de l’intelligence”.322 According to this Lapoujade’s account of finalism 
could not succeed in grasping what Life and freedom is in Bergson.  
 
Although far from my view, I think that Lapoujade develops an interesting and useful theory 
of analogy in Bergson.323 It is not a matter of an analogy between fixed things, he says, but 
between tendencies. This echoes one of Bergson’s mantras. Analogy is understood within a 
method here. Firstly, there is intuition of the self by the self.324 That is, we grasp ourselves 
spiritually, vitally and materially, he says. Secondly, there is extrapolation. This second step 
is what he calls sympathy, which is an “analogical reasoning”.325  
 
Lapoujade gives a systematic vision of these two Bergsonian terms: intuition and sympathy. I 
think Lapoujade is not far from my position, although I do not use the terms intuition or 
sympathy in my work and, besides, he rejects finalism in Bergson. Lapoujade describes a 
circle or a circuit of these two operations of the mind, which “presuppose themselves one 
another”.326 According to this vision, intuition and sympathy could play a role similar to what 
I understand as analogy and perfection. In any case, analogy and perfection can be conceived 
as what Lapoujade holds thinking to be for Bergson: to jump beyond the limits of the circle in 
which human experience is enclosed.327 I also hold that the analogy is between tendencies, 
and not between fixed terms, as he claims for sympathy. In fact, Aristotle himself thinks that 
perfectivism is a feature of tendencies, and not things.  
 
In L’autre métaphysique Montebello gives a deep account of the value of analogy in different 
important contemporary philosophers. Bergson is placed among Ravaisson, Schopenhauer, 
Gabriel Tarde and Nietzsche. Montebello shows the basis of the “most human of the 
metaphysics of cosmos, the most cosmic of the metaphysics of human beings”328, that is “the 
other metaphysics”, is opposed to the modern philosophy represented by Descartes, Kant and 
phenomenology. “The other metaphysics”, in short, places human beings within nature, and 
not isolated from it. In a way he claims that Descartes, Kant and phenomenology are 
anthropocentric. Montebello gives an extraordinary importance to the analogy as a method 
for the “other metaphysics”. Analogy for him means that a human being is part of nature, and 
that, according to proportions there is a link between him and natural beings. There is also a 
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link between him and the cosmos. Along with this, this “other metaphysics” conceives beings 
as something spontaneous, non-passive; and also, it constitutes an “evident hierarchy”.329 
 
The “other metaphysics” implies a vision of human beings divided in different stratums of 
being, where analogies can be erected. It also defends the analogy between the human being 
and the cosmos. Here, philosophy of nature and anthropological philosophy are reciprocally 
elaborated between each other.330 This depiction of the other metaphysics is right, at least 
regarding Bergson. The mind is a natural issue. All natural beings, on the other hand, fall on a 
natural scale. There is an analogy between the cosmos and the human being, since humans 
are at the top of this scale. There is an inner comprehension of what nature is. In my view, 
this, so to speak, natural assumption of human consciousness is a central claim of 
teleological thought. Eventually, throughout his discourse, Montebello does acknowledge this 
intimate affinity. It is evident, however, in the case of Ravaisson, an openly finalistic thinker, 
and not in the case of Schopenhauer, an openly non-finalistic thinker. In any case, 
Montebello does not explore the essential affinity between analogy and teleology. That is my 
task now.   
 
The main difference between, on the one hand, Montebello’s and Lapoujade’s accounts, and, 
on the other, mine consists in the fact that I consider both the cosmological assumption and 
the circular argument (intuition and sympathy) to pertain to the teleological tradition. 
Lapoujade denies any sort of finalism and Montebello remains neutral, to some extent, but 
both employ teleological concepts. Therefore, I follow some of their indications in this 
section on analogies. I also analyze the two natures of the two main analogies distinguished, a 
vertical one (man/macrosmos) and the horizontal one (man/organism).  
 
3.1.a. Analogy of adaptation: attention to life 
 
MM is focused on the human body, the human soul and, above all, their intersection. 
Regarding the human body, in the first chapter is to be found an analogy between it and the 
rest of the living bodies. Life, and its philosophical meaning, is one of the main notions of 
MM. The microscopic Monera 331 , “as we rise in the organic series”, 332  the “higher 
vertebrates”333 and, at the top, the human beings all take part in life. This is the first natural 
scale that appears in Bergson (only MM contains three). Here he finds that “the more it 
develops, the more numerous and the more distant the points of space are, which brings it 
into relation with ever more complex motor mechanisms. In this way the scope that allows to 
our action enlarges: its growing perfection consists in nothing else”.334  
 
The term “perfection” is here linked to efficiency. Note that it is not an intellectual item. 
Unlike Aristotle, Bergson doesn’t use the artisan’s action as model. Bergson emphasizes the 
perfective efficiency of the inner drive of life. Among efficiencies, the most varied and 
articulated efficiencies should be called the most perfect ones. During the first statement of 
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his own position regarding knowledge in MM,335 Bergson recalls the organic base of our 
being. In other words, knowledge, and especially in this case, perception, should be 
understood within the general framework of living beings. And living beings are centers of 
action,336 and namely useful action.337 These actions are to be considered spontaneous and 
unforeseen movements.338 This label is, again, not restricted to human bodies, but also to the 
“humblest body” of the humblest living being.339 Between a body with a brain and one 
without it there is a “difference of complication, and not a difference in kind”.340 The living 
bodies consist in useful (for the sake of conservation), spontaneous (with certain minimal 
independence) action. As Bergson says: “my own body and, by analogy with it, all other 
living bodies are those which I have the most right to distinguish in the continuity of the 
universe”.341  
 
Our experience of the world is absorbed in avoiding certain things while seeking other things, 
since we are living beings and we are focused on action. This experience of the world can be 
extrapolated to other beings, such as the monera or the vertebrates. In MM.III Bergson recalls 
the ex gradibus vitae argument. The “purely utilitarian origin of our perception of things”,342 
can be grasped by comparing our nervous central system with the “herbivorous animal”. 
Shortly after this, Bergson also calls the amoeba a “rudimentary consciousness”,343 and gives 
the general idea: 
 
“…We can follow from the mineral to the plant, from the plant to the simplest conscious beings, from the 
animal to man, the progress of the operation by which things and beings seize from their surroundings that 
which attracts them, that which interests them practically, without needing any effort of abstraction, simply 
because the rest of their surroundings takes no hold upon them: this similarity of reaction following actions 
superficially different is the germ which the human consciousness develops into general ideas”.344  
 
As we know, this similarity, despite the difference, is the basis of analogy. Finally, later in 
MM.IV, a chapter divided into short sub-sections, the discourse talks about inner movement 
in consciousness (sub-section II), and only subsequently is consciousness extrapolated to life 
in the “humblest being”.345 In the conclusion of MM (sub-section IX) Bergson refers to the 
scale as the “progress of living matter” which “consists in a differentiation of function which 
leads first to the production and then to the increasing complication of a nervous system”.346  
The “birth of consciousness” and its progress means conservation and reproduction.  
 
As Worms says, inner human life is part of an “analogy to the comprehension of life”.347 The 
second must be understood beyond the human psychological boundaries. The “biological 
foundation” of philosophy implies the use of valid analogies.348 But not just analogy, it 
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implies analogy and perfection or function. The télos is not a mere similarity, but grounds the 
analogical psychological item in non-psychological nature. What there is at stake in MM is a 
bunch of analogies of functions and tendencies. There are analogies for the sake of 
conservation, for the sake of growth, etc.  
 
The teleological ground of MM is basically the human body. Action and reaction are the very 
functions of the human body and every living body. Since it is not opportune now, I woill not 
address the great importance of the past and memory in this section. The basis for the analogy 
among the different species, genera and kingdoms of biology is that, regarding their relation 
with the present (including here the environment, the surrounding world), they all take part in 
life: different types of action and reaction mean different types of fulfillment of the biological 
functions in certain environments.  
 
We have also seen that Bergson’s species, genera and kingdoms are conceived not just like a 
mere plurality but like a hierarchical scale or progress. The human body is at the top of that 
scale.  
 
The human body/organism is the first of the innumerable series of analogies in Bergson. It 
implies perfection in the sense of individual teleology: human bodies, herbivorous animals, 
amoebas and vegetatives act for the sake of existing individually, specifically, and well. In 
my view, regarding human physiology, MM should be considered within a teleological 
framework, although Bergson does not talk about forms, éidos or morphé. In this regard, the 
emphasis must be put on the érgon or function. The philosophical schema fits with the 
individual teleology, established between mature living beings. Bergson coins this common 
orientation towards a function or télos as “attention to life”.349 
 
Also in EC.II the analogy regarding functions is suggested. There is analogy between mature 
insects and human beings. The homo sapiens—here called homo faber—and insects—such as 
the yellow-winged Sphex known by Bergson thanks to the Souvenirs entomologiques by 
Fabre—are an example I can recall.350 The main idea behind this is that both lineages, the one 
that leads to humans and the one which leads to insects, are the most perfect trends of nature.  
First, he writes: “… instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing organized 
instruments; intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganized 
instruments”.351 So, these “two modes of psychical activity”,352 and “represent two divergent 
solutions, equally fitting, of one and the same problem”.353  
 
In this level, the task to be performed is the function, which implies adaptation. Adaptation 
means survival, reproduction and well-being. Animal instinct attains that function, and so 
does intelligence among humans. Despite the naturalistic approach, it is crucial to note that 
Bergson does not say either in MM or in EC.II that animals and humans are equal. These 
passages just stress the similarity in terms of functionalism. His philosophy of action 
understands life as efficiency. It is the best example of conservative teleology, since it refers 
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a regular efficiency for the sake of the conservation of the already living being within an 
already given environment. This analogy is a horizontal analogy, based on two different 
substances.  
 
3.1.b. Analogy of maturity 
 
Bergson also holds that there is an analogy, and so also an extrapolation, of perfective 
features between human consciousness and embryos. It is thus another case of conservative 
teleology based on horizontal analogies. The function or action for the sake of conservation 
in one environment is less clear here. The analogy is based on the continuum of the flux of 
consciousness and the development of the embryo. This analogy establishes duration 
(originally one of the central concepts of the young Bergson) and a process of biological 
growth. The specific action or function here is mere survival, development and being. First, 
we can see the meaning of duration in DI, before Bergson’s philosophy of nature (and, hence, 
before his reformist teleological project).  
 
The continuum of heterogeneous qualities was, along with irreversibility and creative 
freedom one of the main features of human psychological duration in DI.II. Duration as one 
continuum composed of heterogeneous unmeasurable qualities seems to be some sort of pure 
becoming. But this would not offer a complete depiction of Bergson’s essay. The perfective 
features in this early work are for me undeniable, and at the same time less explicit. 
Teleology is not rejected at all in that early framework. In short, quality, simplicity, 
continuity, irreversibility and free will (later on called “creativity” by Bergson) compose a 
general description of what maturity is. The teleological horizon of this work is a self-
determined choice and decision made by the “whole soul”.354 This is that ontological peak 
called maturity. He even says that many men are not even capable of fulfilling that goal and 
also adds that we are “rarely free”.355 In this framework, freedom is, in sum, the specific 
function of the human being. Here freedom is to be considered as one specific moment of a 
process: it is a moment of certain flourishing.  
 
In my reading of DI irreversibility means directionality and free will is young Bergson’s 
model of perfection. But in DI the approach to the notion of duration is not natural immanent 
teleology since there is no analogy beyond human experience, apart from one example on the 
experience of space.356 In DI the author remains psychological. To be sure, in Bergson’s 
account of duration there were suggested analogies with the natural realm, whereas he rejects 
any sort of analogy with mathematics. For him, we cannot measure deep feelings, while the 
major “ideas” that guide our life play the role that cells play in an organism.357 His view of 
consciousness as an interpenetrated amount of qualities has an organic model. Psychology is 
the world of life and “free action drops from it like an over-ripe fruit”.358  
 
Apart from these suggestions, in general terms, the external world is considered there as pure 
space. One would have to wait until MM for a proper philosophy of nature (and also a 
subsequent development of his idea of consciousness). The model of immanent teleology 
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finds human consciousness and its perfectivity as analogous to other beings. It is a natural 
philosophy. In DI there are only hints of that. 
 
In EC Bergson constantly projects psychological features onto different phenomena of 
biology, since he considers that human psychology is a central part of Life. At the beginning 
of EC.I Bergson recalls his old notion of duration. In comparison with DI, something 
important has changed: there is an analogy at stake with natural implications. In the first 
pages of EC he makes an analogy between one embryo and human consciousness by 
stressing the feature of continuity in time.  This is the first analogy in EC. Again, this case 
does not reproduce what the author said in DI, because in EC he wants to elaborate a 
philosophy of nature, something more ambitious than the DI scope. It is maybe not very 
representative of EC in itself, since it is not based on a transgressive or creative télos, but on 
the most conservative example of all his conservative teleology.  
 
The embryo growth is a process for the sake of completeness, perfection and fulfillment of 
specific faculties. The embryo’s progress in not an a-teleological progress. Consciousness 
and the embryo’s development is not pure becoming, but a tendency towards maturity. We 
can read the passage now: 
 
“If I consider my body in particular, I find that, like my consciousness, it matures little by little from 
infancy to old age; like myself, it grows old. Indeed, maturity and old age are, properly speaking, 
attributes only of my body; it is only metaphorically that I apply the same names to the corresponding 
changes of my conscious self. Now, if I pass from the top to the bottom of the scale of living beings, 
from one of the most to one of the least differentiated, from the multicellular organism of man to the 
unicellular organism of the Infusorian, I find, even in this simple cell, the same process of growing 
old”.359 
 
The DI concept of irreversibility seems at stake, but as applied to every living being. The 
body, and consciousness mature. Later on, Bergson introduces the scale of living beings (just 
like he did before in MM). It is true that Bergson emphasizes now the features of progress 
and growth in terms of a pure becoming: 
 
“The cause of growing old must lie deeper. We hold that there is unbroken continuity between the 
evolution of the embryo and that of the complete organism. The impetus which causes a living being 
to grow larger, to develop and to age, is the same that has caused it to pass through the phases of the 
embryonic life. The development of the embryo is a perpetual change of form. Any one who attempts 
to note all its successive aspects becomes lost in an infinity, as is inevitable in dealing with a 
continuum. Life does but prolong this prenatal evolution. The proof of this is that it is often 
impossible for us to say whether we are dealing with an organism growing old or with an embryo 
continuing to evolve; such is the case, for example, with the larvae of insects and crustacea. On the 
other hand, in an organism such as our own, crises like puberty or the menopause, in which the 
individual is completely transformed, are quite comparable to changes in the course of larval or 
embryonic life—yet they are part and parcel of the process of our ageing. Although they occur at a 
definite age and within a time that may be quite short, no one would maintain that they appear then ex 
abrupto, from without, simply because a certain age is reached, just as a legal right is granted to us on 
our one-and-twentieth birthday”.360 
 
It is clear that Bergson is stressing here the aspect of change. The “perpetual change of form” 
is related to duration from DI. At the end, Bergson uses the case of menopause and puberty as 
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examples of biological transformation. They don’t imply perfection, but crisis. Maturity is 
between these two crises. But he refers to irreversibility also in material items, like bodies. 
There is continuity and change. Only the implicit aspect of irreversibility contains the 
teleological substratum.  
 
We know how Aristotle shows the process of an embryo: first appears the figure and, always 
afterwards, the color and hardness or softness of the material: nature works just like a 
painter361. Like in the case of “attention to life”, the intelligent artisan analogy is absent. 
Furthermore, to age for a mature being is not the same as the perpetual change of form. 
According to Aristotle’s major teleological claim, the later steps in the embryo’s 
development are better than the previous ones: while, ontologically speaking, the perfection 
is prior, chronologically speaking, it comes the last (GA.II. 736b4-5).362 
 
We have seen that he is using the scale exactly as he used it in MM and the analogical 
perspective. The issue here is the meaning of perfection. In these passages Bergson is using 
the concept of continuum used in DI, in MM.III and IM. In the case of EC.I, there is space to 
interpret the text.  
 
As I said, DI seems to be alien to the topic of teleology. The concepts involved there, 
especially in its chapter II, were that of continuum, heterogeneity, quality, irreversibility and, 
finally, self-creativity or freewill, dealt with in chapter III.  I will leave aside heterogeneity 
and quality for now. In my opinion, irreversibility and continuum compose a framework in 
which maturity is possible. Moreover, maturity is the basis for self-creativity or freewill. 
 
In the example from EC.I, Bergson is removing this human feature, the continuum of 
consciousness, from living organisms. Bergson says that “it is often impossible for us to say 
whether we are dealing with an organism growing old or with an embryo continuing to 
evolve” and that “there is unbroken continuity between the evolution of the embryo and that 
of the complete organism”. My argument doesn’t change with regard to DI. Irreversibility 
and maturation are implicit concepts of Bergson’s idea of duration. The concept as such is 
unchanged in EC, but now one analogy is involved.   
 
The analogy as such, the feature that we are currently looking for, only appears in EC. It is, 
by the way, far from Aristotle’s embryology. It establishes explicitly what can be traced back 
to DI. Although Bergson emphasizes the continuum-becoming element, irreversibility 
(associated with duration from the beginning) points in the direction of maturity, and, thus, to 
the goal or perfection. We will deal with embryology again in 4.1, in the section where I 
tackle the different kinds of perfection. It is part of what I call conservative teleology. In this 
case, it tends implicitly towards maturity.  
 
3.1.c. Analogy of adaptation: the community 
 
The special feature of this type of analogy relies on the class of individual involved here: the 
community. It is a special individual analogy since for us one society is not an individual 
living substance, but a compound of other individuals (namely citizens). Bergson considers 
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human communities natural entities. Influenced by the biological perspective of his epoch, 
Bergson goes beyond Aristotle and considers the community not just a natural being, but also 
a living being. I think that Bergson is never completely clear about this question, since 
although he states that, as we will see, he does not nuance or clarify this idea.  
 
In Bergson each individual is a part for the sake of the whole. Some part of our psychological 
life and also our moral life is deeply rooted in this whole. Bergson’s essay on laughter and his 
later approach to what he called “closed society”, DS.II, analyses the relationship between the 
individual and that whole. In both essays he tackles the functions of concrete individual 
societies for the sake of their conservation or survival.  
 
In the case of laughter, the philosopher clearly talks about the relation between the individual 
members. Society’s impulse through the comic is to be understood as a tendency to social 
politeness. In Bergson’s view, laughter’s essence is to intimidate by humiliating. It is a 
reaction against different disintegrative habits, of very different levels.363 As I will show in 
4.1.”Destination of the community”, a conservative teleology is there at stake. But the main 
point here is that he establishes the analogy between an organism and a society.  
 
In DS he poses a clearer analogy between society and the living being: 
 
“The members of a civic community hold together like the cells of an organism and habit, served by 
intelligence and imagination, introduces among them a discipline resembling, in the interdependence 
it establishes between separate individuals, the unity of an organism of anastomotic cells”.364 
 
Furthermore, Bergson used this analogy within a more concrete political context. Between 
LR and DS, he gave one of his “war lectures” in 1916, called “On personality” (“La 
personnalité”).365 There he tackled this topic, but focused on national societies. “As long as 
one society has grown and matured, as long as it has reached to become aware of itself, it is 
one person. As long as one society has its traditions, its laws, its institutions, which 
synthetically are past, they play the same role as memory does in every individual. One 
society that has its own form, its peculiar character, which imposes this form and this 
character to the actions that it realizes, is one person”.366  
 
But the relevant element of this text is the analogy between the human mind (person) and 
human groups, such as societies and nations. To some extent, societies are like persons. In 
line with the Romantic conceptions of nation and politics, Bergson believes that behind the 
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State there are organic peoples.367 “Societies with traditions”,368 are like humans. The three 
dimensions of spiritual time, past, present and future, are present regarding national societies. 
This analogy focuses on the conservation of the being through time, among other things. It is 
also easy to interpret the already quoted words, from “On personality”, in a teleological way: 
matureness, fulfillment and growth. Past, present and “destiny” or “mission” are both parts of 
one person and one country.369  
 
Throughout DS there is a constant analogy between individual souls and human community. 
This late essay also represents a systematic nuancing of the two teleological strivings. For the 
first time, Bergson articulates conservative teleology and transgressive teleology (which I 
will address in Chapter 4). Both tendencies are grounded in human consciousness and 
expanded to communities and universal history through analogy. First, he defines the two 
tendencies in our consciousness. One of them is obligation, pressure, impulsion or 
compulsion, which is basis for conservative teleology. Here Bergson revises his concept of 
society in LR. The other tendency is emotion, aspiration or attraction, which is a basis for 
transgressive teleology. The two articulate our behavior and ethics: “Pressure and attraction, 
specifying their objectives, would lead to anyone of these systems of maxims, since each of 
them aims at the attainment of an end both individual and social”.370 These two perfective 
tendencies are “two forces to which society owes its stability and its mobility”.371  
 
The analogy that we have to see now is impulsion. As Bergson says, its outcome is stability 
in society, but also survival. It is expressed very clearly in myths from the beginning of 
history. Bergson addresses this topic in DS.II. But what is interesting for us now is said in 
DS.I: in human consciousness there is a correspondence in obligation or impulsion. Society 
has a compulsory power on human consciousness. Human beings only have to accept the 
commandment of their society, in different degrees, from the family to the country. Society 
here has to be understood not only in static terms, but also as something individual.  
 
Given this conception of society, it is clear that he endorsed this analogy. In terms of entity, 
there is a new example, because we have not seen the function of societies until now in 
Bergson. But in terms of perfection, here we are talking about the survival and well-being of 
the society. That is, in this case we remain in conservative teleology.  
 
3.1.d. Analogy of creation 
 
After the analogy of self/embryo there is, in EC, a second one, much more ambitious. It 
establishes an analogy between our soul and the cosmos.372 It is difficult to determine the 
concrete scope of this statement. In any case, EC deals with the analogy between something 
more concrete, although extraordinarily ambitious: self and Life, Life in general, also called 
Consciousness or Supra-consciousness.373 More famously, this is the élan vital and it is only 
expressed by biology, in the universe. It is what I call a vertical analogy, since it is 
established between the part and the whole. This is an analogy of 
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macrocosmos/microcosmos, which is foreign to Aristotle. It is also part of the transgressive 
domain of Bergsonian teleology, since the ultimate scope of it is neither stability nor survival. 
The goal at stake is change, progress, transgression, with no particular beneficiary.  
 
 We can read again the following claim: “In reality, life is of the psychological order, and it is of 
the essence of the psychical to enfold a confused plurality of interpenetrating terms”.374  
 
The psyche is a plurality of interpenetrating qualities in DI, and now that is translated into 
something else. He gives more detail in the same analogical direction: “The elements of a [n 
evolutionary] tendency are not like objects set beside each other in space and mutually 
exclusive, but rather like psychic states”.375 
 
The history of evolution is the history of Life, and with “elements of a tendency” he means 
the general features of one development. For instance, the central tendency in his view is the 
development of the central nervous system. As I said very briefly in the Introduction, Life has 
one origin and is spread out in different species and lineages through millions of years. Our 
own personal and individual history is not a replica but has important traits in common with 
the history of life and the history of humans376 
 
This analogy is not based on a certain community between one individual and another, for 
instance, the human mind and an embryo. In this case, Bergson is referring to the analogy 
between one living individual (or part) and Life itself (or the whole). The human being and, 
specifically, its consciousness represent the whole of living beings to some extent. This link 
between the best part (human life) and the whole (Life) is not a horizontal analogy, but a 
vertical one (Worms). 
 
“Consciousness, or supra-consciousness, is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall 
back as matter; consciousness, again, is the name for that which subsists of the rocket itself, passing 
through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms. But this consciousness, which is a need of 
creation, is made manifest to itself only where creation is possible. It lies dormant when life is 
condemned to automatism; it wakens as soon as the possibility of a choice is restored”.377 
 
I think this passage is useful to us for two reasons. It shows, firstly, which is the main 
teleological element of Life: it is for the sake of creation. There is also another thing: it “lies 
dormant” and it is “condemned to automatism”. Which means that when Life does not fulfill 
its scope it is condemned to automatism. What is automatism here? In my interpretation the 
opposite of transgression or evolution from one species to another is non-variation and 
adaptation, with no tendency to change to higher degrees of life (the development of the 
central nervous system, for instance).  
 
In human life, creation—that is, in this context, freewill—is the perfective element to link 
through analogy with Life, since both humans and Life have the same need and, more 
importantly, have it as a natural tendency. As Bergson says: “…the root of life there is an 
effort to engraft on to the necessity of physical forces the largest possible amount of 
indetermination”.378 Here the notion of indetermination plays the role of the télos. In nature, 
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indetermination means overcoming certain unforeseeable limits. That is precisely what 
Bergson sees as perfect. For Bergson that is the highest capacity. It is much higher or more 
perfect than the other kinds of perfection, such as efficiency or adaptation. It is certainly 
higher than the conservative continuum. 
 
As I noted, Bergson finds this unique capacity of transgression both in nature or Life and in 
human individual life. Human beings are for the sake of indetermination, because our 
maturity is or should be an unforeseen self-creation.  
 
In Bergson, as we saw in DI, few of us are really free. So also among human beings there is 
an inequality regarding this faculty. Bergson then has to choose one type of human being for 
the sake of a correct understanding of the microsmos/macrocosmos analogy of human/Life. 
Bergson’s choice is clear: the artist is the best example in Bergson for addressing this 
analogy. The genius of the artist is surely the central example of EC and one of the most 
important in Bergson’s philosophy: 
 
“If life is a creation, we must represent it by analogy with the creations it is given us to observe, that is 
to say, with those we ourselves achieve. Now, in artistic creation, for example, it seems that the 
materials we have to work with, words and images for the poet, forms and colors for the painter, 
rhythms and harmonies for the musician, range themselves spontaneously under the idea they are to 
express, drawn, as it were, by the charm of a superior ideality. Is it not a similar movement, is it not 
also a state of fascination we should attribute to material elements when they are organized into living 
beings?”379 
 
For Bergson, Life is like an artist, since both tend to perfection. In this context of 
transgressive teleology, it means newness, unpredictability, and simplicity. 
 
He opens the book stressing the artist’s unpredictability:380 
 
 “The finished portrait is explained by the features of the model, by the nature of the artist, by the 
colors spread out on the palette; but, even with the knowledge of what explains it, no one, not even 
the artist, could have foreseen exactly what the portrait would be, for to predict it would have been to 
produce it before it was produced—an absurd hypothesis which is its own refutation. Even so with 
regard to the moments of our life, of which we are the artisans. Each of them is a kind of creation. 
And just as the talent of the painter is formed or deformed—in any case, is modified—under the very 
influence of the works he produces, so each of our states, at the moment of its issue, modifies our 
personality, being indeed the new form that we are just assuming. It is then right to say that what we 
do depend on what we are; but it is necessary to add also that we are, to a certain extent, what we do, 
and that we are creating ourselves continually”381 
 
But maybe the clearest statement regarding the analogy between nature and the artist is to be 
found in PR, in the context of seeing life as the “continuous creation of unforeseeable 
novelty”: 
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“Take the concrete and complete world, with the life and consciousness it encloses; consider nature in 
its entirety, nature the generator of new species as novel and original in form as the design of any 
artist: in these species concentrate upon individuals, plants or animals, each of which has its own 
character - I was going to say its personality (for one blade of grass does not resemble another blade 
of grass any more than a Raphael resembles a Rembrandt)”.382 
There is another similar feature between the activity of the artist and the tendency of Life. 
That is simplicity, which appears first in IM and in VOFR:383 
 
“[a]An artist of genius has painted a figure on his canvas. We can imitate his picture with many-
colored squares of mosaic. And we shall reproduce the curves and shades of the model so much the 
better as our squares are smaller, more numerous and more varied in tone. But an infinity of elements 
infinitely small, presenting an infinity of shades, would be necessary to obtain the exact equivalent of 
the figure that the artist has conceived as a simple thing, which he has wished to transport as a whole 
to the canvas, and which is the more complete the more it strikes us as the projection of an indivisible 
intuition. Now, suppose our eyes so made that they cannot help seeing in the work of the master a 
mosaic effect. Or suppose our intellect so made that it cannot explain the appearance of the figure on 
the canvas except as a work of mosaic. We should then be able to speak simply of a collection of little 
squares, and we should be under the mechanistic hypothesis. We might add that, beside the 
materiality of the collection, there must be a plan on which the artist worked; and then we should be 
expressing ourselves as finalists. But in neither case should we have got at the real process, for there 
are no squares brought together. It is the picture, i.e. the simple act, projected on the canvas, which, by 
the mere fact of entering into our perception, is decomposed before our eyes into thousands and 
thousands of little squares which present, as recomposed, a wonderful arrangement. [b] So the eye, 
with its marvelous complexity of structure, may be only the simple act of vision, divided for us into a 
mosaic of cells, whose order seems marvelous to us because we have conceived the whole as an 
assemblage”.384 
 
In [a] Bergson is talking about the artist, and in [b] Bergson is talking about an evolutionary 
process. In his view, both are made by a simple impulse impossible to grasp by intelligence. 
In IM, where he talks about the Iliad,385 in EC he recalls the example: the work of literary art 
and the alphabet. The atoms are the letters and the harmony and evolution of them is 
simplicity. 386 
 
Rather, Bergson places together the idea of unpredictability and the idea of simplicity in the 
same statement: 
 
“Every human work in which there is invention, every voluntary act in which there is freedom, every 
movement of an organism that manifests spontaneity, brings something new into the world. True, 
these are only creations of form. How could they be anything else? We are not the vital current itself; 
we are this current already loaded with matter, that is, with congealed parts of its own substance 
which it carries along its course. In the composition of a work of genius, as in a simple free decision, 
we do, indeed, stretch the spring of our activity to the utmost and thus create what no mere 
assemblage of materials could have given (what assemblage of curves already known can ever be 
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equivalent to the pencil-stroke of a great artist?) but there are, none the less, elements here that pre-
exist and survive their organization. But if a simple arrest of the action that generates form could 
constitute matter (are not the original lines drawn by the artist themselves already the fixation and, as 
it were, congealment of a movement?), a creation of matter would be neither incomprehensible nor 
inadmissible”.387 
 
Human beings are in the highest degree natural, because they can do certain things which are 
unique only to them. These unique faculties have to be related with spontaneity and creation. 
Humans are in the highest degree natural because they are in the highest degree free.  
 
Also in EC, we find the unforeseeable novelty of the piece of work itself: 
 
“We say of astronomical phenomena that they manifest an admirable order, meaning by this that they can be 
foreseen mathematically. And we find an order no less admirable in a symphony of Beethoven, which is genius, 
originality, and therefore unforeseeability itself”.388 
 
We have seen two types of analogy, the horizontal one and the vertical one. Regarding some 
aspects of human consciousness, Bergson links one part of nature (human consciousness) to 
another part of nature, like one animal organism or one embryo, or even one community. This 
is an analogy between individuals and their individual functions or tendencies. Insofar as one 
human is natural and has one specific télos and another being is also natural and has its own 
télos, the analogy can be established. There is another possibility in Bergson. It is the 
possibility to establish an analogy between one exclusive type of part (only human 
consciousness) and the whole of nature. This is a vertical analogy. Now we can see that this 
analogy exists. 
 
Apparently, we all have not developed the creative faculty, although it is present in all of us 
in potentia. That specific part is creativeness or freedom. The artists and poets are a sort of 
paradigm of freedom and creativeness for Bergson. To this extent we all try to imitate the 
great geniuses. Precisely because we are only partially poets and creative can we understand 
their talent.  
 
The idea of simple and non-decomposable, creative, sudden effort, and the unforeseen 
efficacy of his work, not led by any sort of “plan”, is considered here perfection. Bergson 
considers that simplicity and unpredictability are to be found regarding human freedom, also 
in moral matters. But his proposal uses those two traits for a general extrapolation to Life and 
the cosmos. It is not part of what I called conservative teleology, but of transgressive 
teleology. The human individual is neither free nor creative for the sake of surviving or even 
well-being, but for the sake of contributing to something bigger. I will come back to this idea 
especially in 4, but we can say for the moment that a creative contribution (an advance, a 
discovery, etc.) entails in this framework some sort of well-being (such as joy). This remains 
within the participation model. In this case we are talking about participating in the progress 
of the cosmos, and not in its stability, as we found in Aristotle to whom perfection was 
something different. 
 
Between Life and individual human life (and also history, as we will see in the next case of 
analogy) the analogy works, according to Bergson: 
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“… in a general way, in the evolution of life, just as in the evolution of human societies and of 
individual destinies, the greatest successes have been for those who have accepted the heaviest 
risks”.389  
 
The self and Life are linked by one image: successful creation. Bergson’s post-romantic 
universe bestows to the artistic genius the role of central analogy. There’s still one possible 
analogy that, following the very same terms (self and Life), relies not on a case of success 
(creation), but on failure.  
 
I want to note this deflationary or negative version of the vertical analogy. As in Aristotle,390 
in Bergson there exists the analogy between nature and human failure. In EC.II he addresses 
his vision of the history of evolution: the continual overcoming of one species from one into 
another, is the characteristic of the vital impulse.391 But there is also an opposite tendency. 
Bergson sees this tendency as a decline. It is the tendency toward i) adaptation or ii) toward 
vegetative torpor. I will explain this obscure vision in Chapter 4, but we can say in advance 
that every species has to adapt itself to the circumstances. Once some new species has 
adopted one form and conserves its own being by succeeding in reproducing itself, then we 
can talk about success. For Bergson in EC, in comparison with the “movement” that leads 
spontaneously (not by chance) to new species, the movement of adaptation is ontologically 
secondary. Also, and more emphatically, he considers the lineage that leads from animals to 
what he understands by vegetative torpor, decadence. For instance, the fungi group and the 
animal parasites represent in EC.II this tendency. The two most opposite tendencies are 
consciousness (which means an ascent) and unconsciousness (which means a descent).392  
 
As I said, adaptation and, above all, decline, is no creative art. Bergson does not talk about 
simplicity and unpredictability whilst talking about adaptation and decline. Yet it is a 
tendency of Life, according to Bergson. In CV he talks about Life in very illustrative terms, 
about risk and adventure, but also about another trend, which means a “tranquil, 
unenterprising existence”,393 but should be more literally translated as “tranquil, gentrified 
existence”, since Bergson writes “bourgeoise”.394 The hero and the gentry are a Romantic 
expression of what Bergson considers the two main tendencies in Life. I believe one can say 
that Bergson is a son of the 19th century Romanticism, as Lovejoy holds.395 
 
As I recalled, for Aristotle the analogy between nature and art does not only rely on 
fulfillment, but also on error. The cases of error happen in both grounds. Leaving aside the 
differences at this point, Bergson also considers that. Human beings also decay. This is part 
of our everyday experience. Thus, the vertical analogy is not focused exclusively on 
transgression, but also on stability and “retrograded”.396  Just as there is imitation and 
repetition in our everyday life and moral life, there is imitation and repetition in nature. Sleep 
is the real loss of vitality in a lineage: 
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“Just as among primitive organisms there were some that turned towards animal life by refusing to 
manufacture organic out of inorganic material and taking organic substances ready made from 
organisms that had turned toward the vegetative life, so, among the animal species themselves, many 
contrived to live at the expense of other animals. For an organism that is animal, that is to say mobile, 
can avail itself of its mobility to go in search of defenseless animals, and feed on them quite as well as 
on plants. So, the more species became mobile, the more they became voracious and dangerous to one 
another. Hence a sudden arrest of the entire animal world in its progress towards higher and higher 
mobility (…) If the plant renounced consciousness in wrapping itself in a cellulose membrane, the 
animal that shut itself up in a citadel or in armor condemned itself to a partial slumber. In this torpor 
the echinoderms and even the molluscs live today. Probably arthropods and vertebrates were 
threatened with it too. They escaped, however, and to this fortunate circumstance is due the expansion 
of the highest forms of life”.397  
 
Obviously, Bergson is talking here in analogy with human psychology. This is, again, a clear 
challenge of the critique of anthropomorphism. The plants did not renounce consciousness, 
primitive organisms did not turn towards animal life, mollusks did not shut themselves up in 
a citadel literally, but metaphorically. Let me tackle one of these examples, the last one: 
becoming a parasite. As I said, for Bergson a lineage of animal evolution becoming a parasite 
is a clear case of retrogression. It is the case of animal torpor. Bergson describes it in a 
psychological way: it is like “falling asleep”.398 The opposite direction, towards vertebrates, 
means enhancement. The tendency to mobile living preludes human psychology in his view, 
because it initiates the long path of indetermination throughout Life. The tendency toward 
movement, like “human armaments” becomes more and more mobile.399 In the case of the 
end of a lineage, Bergson says that matter has “hypnotized” Life.400  
 
In general terms, we see, Bergson writes about it in a dualistic way, where matter and Life are 
two tendencies, which are at some time opposed: “Matter bends it to its own automatism, 
falls it to sleep in its own unconsciousness”.401 Retrogression and automatism express one of 
the tendencies of Life. And, what is central for us now, they are part of ourselves as well.  
 
Automatism and unconsciousness are tendencies of our psychic life. Human beings can or 
even should escape from this and reach freedom. Through freedom they contribute to the 
general trend of “forward movement of life”. As he says: “Automatism and repetition, which 
prevail everywhere except in man, should warn us that living forms are only halts: this work 
of marking time is not the forward movement of life”.402 Human beings are not repetitions of 
a model. At least, according to Bergson, they should not be so. Freedom and creativeness are 
the main or most perfect goal of both Life and human beings.  
 
Automatism and repetition are the negative version of the genuine impulse, simple, creative 
and unforeseeable.403 
 
We saw that human consciousness and Life have something in common. It is a vertical 
analogy, between the part of the whole and the whole itself. It is the methodical basis for 
transgressive teleology. Regarding the specific notion of perfection, it seems that Bergson 
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stresses unpredictability and simplicity. Since in this section I just want to show the terms of 
the analogy, I will leave the discussion of this concrete interpretation of what is perfection for 
section 4, where I tackle the issue straightforwardly.  
 
3.1.e. Analogy of impulsion-attraction 
 
In this subsection we have to extend the vertical analogy mind/Life to mind/human history. 
We move from EC and CV to DS, Bergson’s account of history. I recall this sentence from 
EC: 
 
“… in a general way, in the evolution of life, just as in the evolution of human societies and of 
individual destinies, the greatest successes have been for those who have accepted the heaviest 
risks”.404   
 
We have seen the analogy Life/human soul (“individual destinies”, in the passage), but we 
have still to talk about the other analogy between Life and “the evolution of human 
societies”. As we saw Bergson himself did not distinguish nature from culture. On the 
contrary he seems to consider culture part of biology. We know that in his view society is an 
organism and the individuals are cells. The analogy man/society worked in the analogy c for 
the sake of adaptation. In d we have assessed the great value of the analogy for the sake of 
evolution: Life. Now we have a mixture of both. Now in e the analogy covers the evolution 
of societies, but not any individual society. The perfective value, again, has no beneficiary in 
its horizon. Hence, it is not conservative teleology, but transgressive. Its perfective progress 
may be described for the sake of freedom, one ultimate global goal with no subsequent 
purpose. This implies a new kind of analogy: it is a vertical analogy between human soul and 
universal history. It is the last of our set in 3.1. 
 
Human progress is a unique expression of nature. In one place in DS.I he affirms that there 
are not historical laws in history, but biological ones, if (he adds) we understand the word 
“biology” by its “wide meaning”.405 Among other things, this claim implies that much of 
what we said about Bergson’s conception of natural history works with cultural history. Life 
is, for him, an “instrument of freedom”.406 So is history. DS continues and develops the 
doctrine of EC when Bergson refers to “individuals who each represent, as the appearance of 
a new species would have represented, an effort of creative evolution”.407 
 
Then he moves afterwards to the vision of the élan in history, and he recalls the two 
perfective tendencies, “two forces to which society owes its stability and its mobility”.408 As I 
said in 3.1.c DS represents the systematic nuancement of the two teleological strives in nature 
and man, and also is only definite articulation: 
 
“In order to define the very essence of duty, we have in fact distinguished the two forces that act upon 
us, impulsion on the one hand, and attraction on the other (…) We should have to open a very long 
parenthesis indeed if we had to give their due share to the two forces, the one social, the other supra-
social, one of impulse, the other of attraction, which impart to each moral motive its driving force”. 
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We already have seen the social impulsion. My current aim is to focus now on supra-social 
attraction and aspiration. Social impulsion is to be found in impersonal laws or impersonal 
habits. Attraction is anchored in personality and the effect of personal models. Bergson’s 
example is the “attitude of the apprentice towards the master, or rather, to use the language of 
Aristotle, of the accident in the presence of the essence. There would remain to be defined the 
higher ego to which the average personality defers”.409 According to Bergson, the average 
personality imitates the higher ego, and thereby he or she creates. Whereas in impulsion the 
ego obeys, in attraction it emerges.  
 
Bergson uses here again analogy. He moves from subjectivity to society. I think this second 
approach to the idea of aspiration and attraction emphasizes the perfective aspects of the 
term. Impulsion means conservation, but aspiration means enhancement and a new step 
forward. Technically speaking, I have been showing throughout these pages that conservation 
implies one notion of perfection, but progress implies a genuine one: ultimately contributing 
to the cosmic good. While in the subjective ground Bergson talks about personal authority, in 
the following passage he is also talking about a society moved by the personal attraction of a 
spiritual hero or a charismatic individual. It is important to note that his personalistic way of 
understanding progress, implies necessarily this figure. There is not any sort of inertial 
progress or impersonal and gradual law of progress in Bergson. Each spiritual hero implies a 
sudden breakthrough: 
 
“[a] Now, a mystic society, embracing all humanity and moving, animated by a common will, towards 
the continually renewed creation of a more complete humanity, is no more possible of realization in 
the future than was the existence in the past of human societies functioning automatically and similar 
to animal societies. Pure aspiration is an ideal limit, just like obligation unadorned. It is none the less 
true that it is the mystic souls who draw and will continue to draw civilized societies in their wake. [b] 
The remembrance of what they have been, of what they have done, is enshrined in the memory of 
humanity. Each one of us can revive it, especially if he brings it in touch with the image, which abides 
ever living within him, of a particular person who shared in that mystic state and radiated around him 
some of its light. If we do not evoke this or that sublime figure, we know that we can do so; he thus 
exerts on us a virtual attraction. [c] Even if we ignore individuals, there remains the general formula 
of morality accepted today by civilized humanity: this formula includes two things, a system of orders 
dictated by impersonal social requirements, and a series of appeals made to the conscience of each of 
us by persons who represent the best there is in humanity. The obligation relating to the orders is, in 
its original and fundamental elements, sub-rational. The potency of the appeal lies in the strength of 
the emotion it has aroused in times gone by, which it arouses still, or can arouse: this emotion, if only 
because it can indefinitely be resolved into ideas, is more than idea; it is supra-rational. The two 
forces, working in different regions of the soul, are projected on to the intermediary plane, which is 
that of intelligence”.410 
 
[a] and [b] show the analogy from the society to every one’s life. In [c] the idea of attraction 
becomes even more complete. It is an “appeal”. The appeal is active, personal. One can say 
that the appeal inspires privately the free soul to be free or to create while it imitates the 
master. Within impulsive matters, there is no freedom involved. Attraction is the social 
movement towards a new step forward, and it is the main internal dynamic of progress in 
Bergson.  
 
There is an intermediate teleological drive here, absolutely new in Bergson. Earlier in his 
works, there was adaptation, on one hand, and freedom or creation, on the other. In DS there 
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appears this middle term: imitation. It is perfective since, unlike impulsion, it permits us to 
create freely, to participate in progress and it also produces progress. In Bergson’s view of 
history, heroes emerge like mutations and just change the world, but also, they attract regular 
people from within. Progress, made by attraction and imitation, comes just after the hero’s 
work. Attraction is not made for heroes, but exerted by the hero’s inspiration. The heroes are, 
as we saw, like Life itself: unpredictable. Average people create by imitating that.  
 
Bergson thus introduces creativity in this mimetic model.411 Human beings have to be free as 
a condition for attaining the goals and values that the hero (who is “more free” than him or 
her) creates. As Bergson said from the beginning, although free-will is our most important 
feature, we are not usually free. On the contrary, we are “rarely free”.412 His neo-Romantic 
vision of the human being entailed that artists are the most “commonly free” among us. Then 
he developed a new way which lead him towards religion and mysticism. The spiritual heroes 
and not the aesthetic ones are “the best of mankind”.413 In any case, spiritual and artistic 
reformers are on the top of his hierarchy of beings. Although Bergson rejects Nietzsche’s 
dualistic vision of human beings, Bergson himself holds that there are two different types of 
human being: the creative and active, and the passive imitator. What he denies from the 
Nietzschean account of morals is the excessive duality regarding human beings, because 
Bergson thinks that in the end everyone has the two tendencies. 414 
 
The attractor and the attracted are the two main roles in history, according to Bergson. 
Attraction is the main original concept of DS, regarding global creative teleology. There are, 
thus, two analogical factors to be mentioned in this subsection. First, we are creators, and 
history is like one creation. This is the primordial movement of progress. Second, we are 
inspired, attracted and we aspire to be like our personal models. That expresses a secondary 
or derived, but still global, transgressive and perfective trend of humanity. As we can see, 
also within Bergson’s global teleology there is mimetic teleology. There are neither heavenly 
bodies rotating for the sake of gods imitation nor living beings reproducing for the sake of 
imitating the rotations. Here in Bergson there are geniuses who imitate the élan vital, and, 
subsequently, there are regular ordinary people that imitate the great creators in a more 
modest way. In our consciousness there are analogical patterns to establish that analogy.  
 
Furthermore, I want to propose briefly an interpretative hypothesis of the origin of the terms 
impulsion/attraction in DS that reinforces that parallel. It is relevant for us since it is based on 
Bergson’s peculiar interpretation of Aristotle in EC.IV. To my knowledge I am the first 
interpreter to call attention to this particular link between DS and EC.IV. The duality 
impulsion/attraction appeared for the first time in EC.IV in the context of Aristotelian 
theology: 
 
“There is, then, immanent in the philosophy of Ideas, a particular conception of causality, which it is 
important to bring into full light, because it is that which each of us will reach when, in order to 
ascend to the origin of things, he follows to the end the natural movement of the intellect. True, the 
ancient philosophers never formulated it explicitly. They confined themselves to drawing the 
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consequences of it, and, in general, they have marked but points of view of it rather than presented it 
itself. Sometimes, indeed, they speak of an attraction, sometimes of an impulsion exercised by the 
prime mover on the whole of the world. Both views are found in Aristotle, who shows us in the 
movement of the universe an aspiration of things toward the divine perfection, and consequently an 
ascent toward God, while he describes it elsewhere as the effect of a contact of God with the first 
sphere and as descending, consequently, from God to things”.415  
 
Surely influenced by Ravaisson’s account of Aristotle, Bergson defends there a twofold 
causality exerted by god upon the cosmos. “Attraction” in Bergson’s account is a teleological 
term. It explains how the first heaven is attracted by God, just like something “beloved” 
(“erómenon”, Met. XII. 7. 1072b2) attracts the lover. Furthermore, Bergson defends a “broad 
sense” of this attraction, and means that the whole world, in different degrees, expresses the 
same tendency. It is clear that, although in Bergson there is neither a causal God, nor a prime 
mover, as we saw in 3.2.3 there is an ascending tendency. The term “impulsion” comes from 
one theological interpretation of Aristotle, further developed in Histoire de l’idée de temps. 
Course au Collège de France 1903-1904.416 It is based on the direct movement applied by the 
first mover upon the first heaven according to Phys.VIII. 
 
I find this comparison interesting in the current analogic framework. It is difficult to prove 
whether Bergson translated Aristotelian theology into psychology, but what we can see is that 
in both applications of the word “attraction” there is teleology and mimesis implied. The final 
cause of god upon the first heaven, or the whole supralunary world or, even, maybe, the 
entire cosmos is seen as imitative. As we know, in the context of DS the main idea is 
creation. But Bergson adds the idea of imitation. The paradox here would be that for being 
creative one needs to imitate first. This never appeared before in Bergson.  
 
Attraction and creation are the authentic motors of history. It is necessarily a vision of history 
in which the genius have a key role. In Bergson the genius, like mutation in the realm of Life, 
introduces newness and the transgressive impulse. The subsequent attraction implies the 
general change in history, from epoch to epoch. Bergson bases this view in freedom and the 
personal models of exemplarity in everybody’s life.  
 
There is also a negative or deflationary version of that analogy. As we saw above in the 
analogy d): Life can succeed or not. There are different trends in Life’s evolution. Some of 
them fall into unconsciousness or retrogression, as parasites do. In general, there are, 
according to Bergson, few successes in nature. In the end, automatism and repetition of the 
same form mean some sort of materiality. The greater is homo sapiens, because every human 
individual is not a repetition. Or, better, every human individual shouldn’t be a repetition.  
 
Just as in history there is progress and retrogression, we could also find in us those psychical 
features. Although in general Bergson is a progressive philosopher, the whole of chapter IV 
of DS, “Final remarks: mechanics and mysticism”, is written under the fear of an imminent 
historical retrogression and faces the possibility of human extinction.417 Hence, decay is an 
analogical value too. Immanent teleology is anchored not only to perfection but also to the 
lack of that presumed perfection, just like in the Aristotelian framework.418 Our mind is 
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analogous to history because of its progress, its stagnancy, and also its retrogression. Genuine 
and negative versions of the analogical value are at work there.  
 
 
3.2. Hierarchy and the problem of anthropocentrism  
 
This section does not analyze a methodical element but still a structural one. This means that 
the issue I address here is not openly expressed in the analogical method but implied in it. As 
in the case of Aristotle,419 it completes the teleological world-view. The issue to tackle now 
has to do with anthropological philosophy and it is part of the structure of this vision of 
nature called immanent teleology. Behind the five analogies we saw in 3.1 there is a 
philosophical anthropology at work, composed of a theory of knowledge and a theory of life.  
 
In 2.1.c I nuanced Johnson’s commentary on anthropocentrism. He states that 
anthropocentrism is not compatible with immanent teleology, although he proposes one 
axiological hierarchy, since some goals in nature (human goals) are more important than 
others. Johnson concludes that this later notion is more harmonic within the teleological 
paradigm. I proposed another term, clearer in its meaning: mitigated anthropocentrism. It is 
equally against absolute anthropocentrism and also against evolutionary relativism. 
 
3.2 may complete Bergson’s theory of life. In Bergson, the theory of evolution plays a 
definitive role in his theory of life, and, hence, in his mitigated evolutionary 
anthropocentrism. It is naturally far from Aristotle since he was alien to evolutionary thought. 
At the same time, following other scholars who have pointed out similarities between 
Aristotle’s rich philosophy and other contemporary authors, I claim that there is some 
structural basis in common between the mitigated classic anthropocentrism and the mitigated 
evolutionary anthropocentrism. In any case, I come back to this question regarding global 
teleology in Chapter 4. Namely, this issue will be tackled in 4.2. 
 
For Bergson humans are animals, but special animals. In his immanent teleological context, 
human beings play a special role. I argue that Bergson’s view can also be called mitigated 
anthropocentrism, although in his model of nature there are more elements of 
anthropocentrism than in Aristotle. It is due precisely to his evolutionary position.  
 
This is important for one reason. Some of the elements mentioned in 3.2.b are the ones that 
permit a vertical analogy. The unique features of human beings make possible the analogy 
between individuals (parts) and Life in evolution or history (whole).  
 
3.2.a. Historical sum 
 
In Bergson, the human can also be considered a sum of the rest of the biological realms. 
Human beings recapitulate the basic previous stages of life. EC.II is the main textual basis for 
this claim in Bergson. He distinguishes life in a scale of superiority. He is a hierarchical 
author, as I defended in the Introduction. There are different degrees of life, and each one 
presupposes the previous and adds a relative superiority. For Bergson plants are defined in 
terms of reserve of energy and torpor. These two vital tendencies may define the whole reign 
in general terms. Bergson talks about animals, in general, as a tendency toward locomotion 
                                                





and instinct. He defines the human (who also can be examples of torpor and instinct) with 
some unique features: intelligence, freedom and intuition.  
 
Although, in ontogeny, the Aristotelian man recapitulates the three degrees, there is not a 
historical perspective at stake. In the case of Bergson there is. This may mean that human 
beings traverse previous stages in the history of life.  All these stages are to be understood 
regarding conservative teleology: survival, reproduction and well-being.  
 
My thesis is that, in comparison with Aristotle, on the one hand, the evolutionary perspective 
of EC strengthens anthropocentrism, and on other, it mitigates it. In any case, Bergson’s 
anthropocentrism is still mitigated. Bergson’s world-view is a clear recognition of non-human 
goals in nature: that is why his works are full of animal and vegetative life.  
 
Bergson’s evolutionary perspective reinforces anthropocentrism, in comparison with 
Aristotle. He holds the evolutionary perspective and, as we will see in depth in 4.2, he does 
not get rid of the natural scale. The historical perspective implies that the scale has been 
erected progressively: from the lower to the higher level. This means that plants can be 
understood as “for the sake of animals”, and animals “for the sake of humans” in a new sense 
which, to be sure, is alien to Aristotle. The most anthropocentric reading of Aristotle reads 
Pol.I.8 literally,420 in the sense that plants or animals exist, among other things, for the sake of 
being used by humans, in terms of food, clothes or anything else. The anthropocentric 
reading of Pol.I.8 presupposes a teleological reading of the natural scale, and the outcome is 
something similar to the Stoic passages that we read in 2.1.c.  
 
Despite the fact that Aristotle’s embryology seems to endorse recapitulation and one of his 
passages refers to a trophic scale, in Bergson it is still different. Evolutionary thought entails 
a great change of mind. The teleological reading of the scale in EC reinforces 
anthropocentrism in a new way, since it is not based only on hierarchy and use. That is, 
Bergson’s scale is not a trophic or utilitarian scale, although it does not exclude it: regardless 
of their use, in Bergson plants and animals exist for the sake of the next level of the scale. 
The vegetative realm and the animal realm are for the sake of freedom and mankind not in 
terms of use (although, again, it does not exclude it), but in terms of constitution. 
Recapitulation in Aristotle traverses different realms of living beings, but it is not 
representative of a chronology: natural history, in its successive stages. I will come back to 
my reading of EC.II in 4.2.b but for our current purpose we can say that humans do not just 
sum up nature, they recapitulate the previous basic forms of life.  
 
It seems in EC that he accepts the recapitulation theory in evolution. At least, Bergson 
presents it as in the first chapter as very probable. He does not enter much into it, so it is 
uncertain what his position would be regarding the most prominent theories of recapitulation 
at that moment. François warns us to disregard this as one part of Spencerian evolutionism: it 
would lead to the idea of evolution as uni-linearity, and not a branching tree (see 4.2.b).421 
Recapitulation in Bergson may mean something peculiar to his philosophy. Every stage 
(vegetative/animal/human) may be understood as different in kind, and not in degree. I think 
this it is perfectly possible to make room for recapitulation in embryology in his framework. 
As he puts it, it is a result of science. It is nothing that he has deduced, but taken from the 
evolutionary biological investigations: 
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“It [observation] shows that up to a certain period in its development the embryo of the bird is hardly 
distinguishable from that of the reptile, and that the individual develops, throughout the embryonic 
life in general, a series of transformations comparable to those through which, according to the theory 
of evolution, one species passes into another. A single cell, the result of the combination of two cells, 
male and female, accomplishes this work by dividing. Every day, before our eyes, the highest forms 
of life are springing from a very elementary form. Experience, then, shows that the most complex has 
been able to issue from the most simple by way of evolution. Now, has it arisen so, as a matter of 
fact?”422 
 
In Bergson, the highest forms are human forms and human beings reproduce part of the 
previous history of life. They are also the most recent product of it. He says that, according to 
his teleological understanding of Life (the best, ontologically speaking, comes 
chronologically last): “Now man is probably the latest comer of the vertebrates”.423 All this 
does not imply that the previous stages exist only for the sake of humans (that would be 
falling into anthropocentrism). I repeat that for teleological models like Bergson’s every 
being has its own goal from the moment it is alive.  
 
But there are additional reasons for noticing this mitigation of anthropocentrism. I count two. 
I develop them in detail in 4.2.b, so I will merely mention them here. Divergence and 
contingency balance the possible anthropocentrism involved in the evolutionary teleological 
reading of the natural scale. Apart from the intrinsic pluralism of teleology, Bergson holds the 
branching pattern of chapter 4 of The origin of species, which emphasizes this pluralism. Life 
is developed in many different divergent tendencies. Although, as we saw, Bergson finds that 
one of these branches is the central one that can coexist with the plural tendencies of Life. 
Furthermore, there is his idea of contingency. It comes from his own philosophical 
assumptions. Bergson put contingency at the center of his conception of evolution. This 
means that although humans relatively fulfill nature’s need for indetermination, the concrete 
process of evolution (which includes the vegetative, the animal, and the human form) is 
unpredictable. It is an outcome of contingency. This mitigates Bergson’s anthropocentrism, 
since on hand Bergson understands Life apart from the global tendency that leads to 
perfection. Furthermore, the form human is central, especially and overall, because of its 
freedom. There is, then, a great deal of evolutionary contingency in human beings. With 
Aristotelian words, we could say that only one specific part of the human’s being is divine.  
 
Also, it is true that there are general tendencies. Among this tendencies Bergson defines the 
most important ones. Among these is freedom, which is the one that we should notice, since 
it is the goal of nature. The rest, like the human form, is contingent. It also can be overcome 
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Bergson also bestows upon human beings a number of unique features. In the monograph on 
Bergson’s anthropology, N. Kisukidi states that “the specificity of the human being [is to be 
found] based on its creative activities and not based on a determination of the essence”.424 I 
am not so sure whether one should make this distinction between creative activities and 
essence. In the end, for Bergson, humans are essentially creative, even when being free is so 
difficult, occasional and rare. Anyway, my aim here is to show that Bergson considers human 
beings not just a part of nature but the best part of nature. I am not sure what Kisukidi means 
with “determination of the essence”, but for Bergson, the human’s spiritual superiority is 
necessarily linked to the “human type”. It is expressed by human culture and even human 
physiology (the brain and the hand). Bergson states that, according to his own standards of 
perfection, humans are not best in degree, but in kind.425 And that is because they are 
essentially free. Bergson writes: 
 
“…among conscious beings themselves, man comes to occupy a privileged place. Between him and 
the animals the difference is no longer one of degree, but of kind”.426 
 
Although Bergson is not fond of talking about forms or essence, I would say that this remark 
is not to be underestimated. Note that the vegetative, animal, and human faculties are all 
different versions of attention to life or maturity. They are all conservative teleology. With 
regard to the concept of “addition”, we can state that human beings have supplementary 
powers that go beyond the previous boundaries. As I will show, humans are part of 
transgressive teleology.  
 
The sharp difference between mankind was implicit in MM, it becomes more explicit in EC 
and is re-affirmed later in DS, with some religious echoes. I will mention now EC and DS, 
and some short texts in between. I divide human uniqueness into a twofold view: differences 
in nature and differences in history. The first concerns human nature as such, and the second 
aspect stresses human successes in the past. The main aspect of human uniqueness is related 
to freedom, invention, intuition and, also, moral charity. These are spiritual faculties of 
human nature, and they are all linked to the first of them. Not surprisingly, their systematic 
relation is not clarified at all in Bergson’s works, but they are all related. The capacity to 
grasp our own duration, to fear death, and to have a social life are less stressed by Bergson in 
his essays.  
 
The second aspect is more relative and contingent than the first. In Bergson’s view, human 
beings are the newest species on earth among the vertebrates, and also are the best adapted to 
the world, since they are a success in terms of dominion. At some points of Bergson’s 
discourse, it seems that it is a shared uniqueness, since also the Hymenoptera have reached 
the same apex of adaptive success. Historically, human society has advanced thanks to 
special people. These special people are the last anthropocentric aspect I study. The geniuses 
are the most perfect social individuals among human beings. Thus, Bergson makes a sharp 
distinction, in terms of morals, between regular people, on the one hand, and special, gifted 
individuals, charismatic, spiritual heroes, and creators, on the other. The latter group has 
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changed human history, and they can be identified because their trace can be found in 
cultures.  
 
- Difference in kind 
 
• Creation,	  invention,	  intelligence,	  brain:	  
 
As we saw, the difference between humans is a difference of kind. 427 It is time to see why. For 
Bergson, human beings are free and animals are merely spontaneous. Human beings re-create 
the world; they add unforeseeable newness to it. As I said, I will lay out some aspects of this 
very same thing. Freedom in terms of creation, technical invention and intuition are unique to 
human beings. Bergson started in DI to focus on freedom. In MM, along with freedom again, 
there appeared for the first time the notion of intuition, which became central in IM. The idea 
of invention came in EC, above all, and is certainly important in DS. In DS.III Bergson 
emphasized the idea of contemplation but, especially, the idea of Christian charity. The 
comparison between human beings’ faculties and the rest of nature can be found in EC, when 
the author directly tackles  the idea of the place of humans in the cosmos.  
 
We can now address the central idea. In Bergson creativeness is understood as freedom. As I 
said, freedom is probably the core question in Bergson’s philosophy. Bergson devotes the 
third chapter of his first book, DI, to this question. This also appears in MM (see the 
“Conclusion”, for instance). Human features such as language, society or the great capacity 
of the brain are mere expressions of human freedom. Human freedom is different from 
animal spontaneity not in terms of degree, but in terms of kind or nature. He states this on 
different occasions in EC, and it is the central idea of his mitigated anthropocentrism. 
Bergson repeats this idea in the following passage: 
 
“Doubtless he owes this to the superiority of his brain, which enables him to build an unlimited 
number of motor mechanisms, to oppose new habits to the old ones unceasingly, and, by dividing 
automatism against itself, to rule it. He owes it to his language, which furnishes consciousness with an 
immaterial body in which to incarnate itself and thus exempts it from dwelling exclusively on material 
bodies, whose flux would soon drag it along and finally swallow it up. He owes it to social life, which 
stores and preserves efforts as language stores thought, fixes thereby a mean level to which 
individuals must raise themselves at the outset, and by this initial stimulation prevents the average 
man from slumbering and drives the superior man to mount, still higher. The superior man’s destiny is 
in the end to evolve, in the sense of progress. But our brain, our society, and our language are only 
the external and various signs of one and the same internal superiority. They tell, each after its 
manner, the unique, exceptional success which life has won at a given moment of its evolution. They 
express the difference of kind, and not only of degree, which separates man from the rest of the 
animal world”.428 
 
The “internal superiority” is related to freedom: 
 
“Radical therefore, also, is the difference between animal consciousness, even the most intelligent, 
and human consciousness. For consciousness corresponds exactly to the living being's power of 
choice; it is coextensive with the fringe of possible action that surrounds the real action: 
consciousness is synonymous with invention and with freedom. Now, in the animal, invention is 
never anything but a variation on the theme of routine. Shut up in the habits of the species, it 
succeeds, no doubt, in enlarging them by its individual initiative; but it escapes automatism only for 
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an instant, for just the time to create a new automatism. The gates of its prison close as soon as they 
are opened; by pulling at its chain it succeeds only in stretching it. With man, consciousness breaks 
the chain. In man, and in man alone, it sets itself free”.429 
Later on, in CV, he bestows human beings again with uniqueness: “Automatism and 
repetition, which prevail everywhere except in man”. 430  If “consciousness seems 
proportionate to the living being's power of choice”,431 in human beings this proportion is 
new. As we saw, “possible action” is identified with “freedom” and equally with “invention”. 
As I said, they are linked. Bergson says: 
“As to invention properly so called, which is, however, the point of departure of industry itself, our 
intellect does not succeed in grasping it in its up springing, that is to say, in its indivisibility, nor in 
its fervor, that is to say, in its creativeness. Explaining it always consists in resolving it, it the 
unforeseeable and new, into elements old or known, arranged in a different order”.432 
Freedom, invention and intuition are concepts and human features that refer to each other. 
Namely, in my view, the unpredictable capacity for free choice is the basis for understanding 
the two others. Invention emphasizes the positive or progressive power of intelligence led by 
creativity. Bergson’s account of intelligence is here absolutely positive. Intelligence and the 
brain express human’s spiritual superiority, as I will show. This can be surprising for those 
who read Bergson in terms of irrationalism and pure spiritualism. Along with freedom and 
invention there is intuition. The latter implies freedom and appears to refer to a certain kind 
of contemplation and self-disinterested introspection. It nuances the Bergsonian definition of 
man as pragmatic homo faber. It adds another dimension to our nature: contemplation.  
“To what date is it agreed to ascribe the appearance of man on the earth? To the period when 
the first weapons, the first tools, were made”.433 The human being uses intelligence for 
practical and utilitarian purposes: adaptation and dominion. Bergson proposes the name homo 
faber, rather than homo sapiens,434 because he wants to stress the practical capacity of human 
beings. Intelligence is naturally linked with invention,435 which in human beings is important, 
since it expresses human creativeness. The history of human freedom is, among other things, 
the history of invention: progress.436 
 
Thanks to the creative use of our intelligence, human beings have changed throughout the 
centuries. The craft or the artefact is the sign of the homo faber. I think that the anti-
intellectual view of Bergson is misguided. But whilst the products of intelligence change and 
progress, it means that intelligence is the very way of creativeness towards new “horizons”: 
 
“Fabricating consists in shaping matter, in making it supple and in bending it, in converting it into an 
instrument in order to become master of it. It is this mastery that profits humanity, much more even 
than the material result of the invention itself. Though we derive an immediate advantage from the 
thing made, as an intelligent animal might do, and though this advantage be all the inventor sought, it 
is a slight matter compared with the new ideas and new feelings that the invention may give rise to in 
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every direction, as if the essential part of the effect were to raise us above ourselves and enlarge our 
horizon”.437 
 
Regarding human essential perfection or superiority in kind, it is important to notice that, 
along with language and society, the human body, and specifically the brain, is an expression 
of this sharp difference. Bergson states that: “The difference [between the human brain and 
that of other animals] at first appears to be only a difference of size and complexity. But, 
judging by function, there must be something else besides”.438 It’s then not a difference of 
complexity (degree), but “something besides”, that is, “kind”: “A difference of the same kind, 
we think, would be found between the brain of an animal and the human brain”.439  
 
It is important to note the place of the human brain in Bergson’s discourse regarding freedom 
and invention, and not intuition, since the human brain is an “essential” element of the human 
body. As Kisukidi rightly says, human creativeness is the center of Bergson’s discourse. But 
it is expressed also in concrete organs, like the brain. It means that human superiority is 
expressed also in terms of the body, not only in terms of actions, etc.   
 
The human brain is different from the rest of nature: it is the organ of human agency and 
invention. It is not, again, a difference in degree, but a difference in kind. Only after reading 
MM and ES, this idea of difference regarding the brain could be expressed, since there he 
attacks the philosophical overemphasis of the value of this organ among the positivist 
physiologists of the late 19th century. Bergson thought throughout his life that consciousness 
should not be reduced to cerebral matter. In his view, this idea of material consciousness 
comes from an interpretation of modern metaphysics, and its roots are to be found in 
Descartes. In short, Bergson does not say that the human soul is in the brain or is part of the 
brain, quite the opposite. But he states clearly in MM and in EC that the brain is an 
expression of human consciousness.440  
 
In EC, Bergson compares the brain of the human and the brain of an ape. Between both there 
is a difference comparable to the notion of “limited” and the notion of “unlimited”: 
“The consciousness of a living being, as we have tried to prove elsewhere, is inseparable from its 
brain in the sense in which a sharp knife is inseparable from its edge: the brain is the sharp edge by 
which consciousness cuts into the compact tissue of events, but the brain is no more coextensive with 
consciousness than the edge is with the knife. Thus, from the fact that two brains, like that of the ape 
and that of the man, are very much alike, we cannot conclude that the corresponding consciousnesses 
are comparable or commensurable. 
But the two brains may perhaps be less alike than we suppose. How can we help being struck by the 
fact that, while man is capable of learning any sort of exercise, of constructing any sort of object, in 
short of acquiring any kind of motor habit whatsoever, the faculty of combining new movements is 
strictly limited in the best-endowed animal, even in the ape? The cerebral characteristic of man is 
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there. The human brain is made, like every brain, to set up motor mechanisms and to enable us to 
choose among them, at any instant, the one we shall put in motion by the pull of a trigger. But it 
differs from other brains in this, that the number of mechanisms it can set up, and consequently the 
choice that it gives as to which among them shall be released, is unlimited. Now, from the limited to 
the unlimited there is all the distance between the closed and the open. It is not a difference of degree, 
but of kind”.441 
As we have already seen, freedom is the main aspect of this anthropology. The uniqueness of 
human beings regarding this question is also the center of DS. While in EC Bergson 
emphasizes human creativity by discussing technical inventions and the use of metaphor by 
the artist, in DS the scope is much broader: progress which leads to the threats of technology 




Intuition appears for the first time in Bergson in MM.IV and is used in a more technical way 
in IM. It also appears in the last section of EC.II, where it is related with the animal faculty of 
sympathy. We also have it in the “Introduction” of PM. In PM there is also one essay called 
“The philosophical intuition” which contains an approach to the history of philosophy, 
focused on Berkeley and Spinoza. In LR.III the philosopher relates the knowledge of animals 
(wolves) to aesthetic understanding. I think the latter is a precedent of the comparison 
sympathy/intuition in EC.II. However, the role and importance of the famous term “intuition” 
in Bergson is controversial and my task here is not to disentangle the doctrinal uncertainties 
that it raises. My only aim for the moment is to show that Bergson considers intuition a 
higher-order faculty that is unique to human beings.  
 
In the first important account of the notion of intuition, in IM, Bergson states that it “attains 
the absolute”.443 Since perfection is, for Bergson, absolute,444 one can say that intuition is 
more perfect than intellect and analysis, as he does. We call intuition here the sympathy by 
which one is transported into the interior of “an object in order to coincide with what there is 
unique and consequently inexpressible in it”.445 In the context of IM the main object of 
intuition is the self, although Bergson cryptically suggests an expansion. He proposes an 
attempt to go beyond the human state by using intuition, which I interpreted in 3.1. In this 
context, with the faculty of the intellect (which uses analysis and symbols) this very operation 
of self-intuition and subsequent expansion is simply impossible.  
With this short background in mind we can now go further. At some point in Chapter 2 of 
EC, it seems that the intelligence of humans and the instincts of Hymenoptera are equally far 
from intuition. Instinct grasps things, intelligence grasps relations.446 Bergson claims that it is 
thanks to intuition that instinct can become “disinterested, self-conscious, capable of 
reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely”.447 Instinct is sympathy,448 which is 
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also linked to animals. When Bergson talks about intuition, he says: “… it is to the very 
inwardness of life that intuition leads us—by intuition I mean instinct that has become 
disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it 
indefinitely: 
“That an effort of this kind is not impossible, is proved by the existence in man of an aesthetic faculty 
along with normal perception. Our eye perceives the features of the living being, merely as 
assembled, not as mutually organized. The intention of life, the simple movement that runs through 
the lines, that binds them together and gives them significance, escapes it. This intention is just what 
the artist tries to regain, in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking 
down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts up between him and his model. It is true that 
this aesthetic intuition, like external perception, only attains the individual. But we can conceive an 
inquiry turned in the same direction as art, which would take life in general for its object, just as 
physical science, in following to the end the direction pointed out by external perception, prolongs the 
individual facts into general laws”.449 
As we can see, Bergsonian intuition is a non-utilitarian and disinterested faculty. I understand 
Bergson’s intuition as a “free science” or wisdom. It implies the use of a contemplative 
faculty. There is nothing of irrationality here. This feature is emphasized in EC.II, at the end 
of the chapter, when the author talks about the Newcomen engines.450 These machines 
represent the capacity of human beings to emancipate themselves from the practical 
necessities and start to contemplate. But for Bergson, intuition or contemplation is linked to 
self-consciousness and, moreover, to aesthetics. Both creativity and intuition, practical 
activity and contemplation, are the two different but related perfect faculties of mankind in 
EC.  
My sole aim here is to show that intelligence and instinct are not situated equally for 
Bergson, since only intellectual beings can experience intuition. Bergson considers that 
intuition implies a wide range of spiritual operations, like grasping the self, aesthetics, 
philosophical systems and life in general: it seems also that the first self-understanding is the 
key and basis for the rest.451  
 
The basis of intuition is self-apprehension: “In short, pure change, real duration, is a thing 
spiritual or impregnated with spirituality. Intuition is what attains the spirit, duration, pure 
change”.452 
 
In his talk “On personality”, the contemplation of the self, or duration as a flux or continuum, 
is unique to human beings. Although the superior animals (he mentions the ape, the elephant 
and the dog) can have consciousness of themselves, in the end they just cannot experience the 
continuum of the inner life.453 To this extent, if I am not wrong, intuition is not possible for 
animals or instinctive beings. Moreover, we have seen in the text the capacity for 
contemplative and disinterested activities as well as aesthetic faculties. Bergson has never 
affirmed that aesthetics can be found among the animal interests. Animals are only interested 
in life.  
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The irrationalist conception of intuition, found for instance in his early 20th century readers 
like Bertrand Russell, is not based on the texts. Bergson considers his doctrine “a philosophy 
that attempts to reabsorb intellect in intuition” and not viceversa.454 Hence, intuition, like 
freedom and invention, is unique to human beings. These are positive features and entail 
superiority, human superiority in kind. Like in Aristotle,455 there is ambivalence in humans in 
Bergson: naturally, they are the best in nature, but they can also be the worst. I want to focus 
on one case of ambivalence and human fragility in Bergson: the human’s unique tendency 
toward depression when facing the idea of death. This is balanced by society: it has the power 
of calming down the depressive force of that idea. For Bergson, as for Aristotle, humans are 
social animals. 456 
 
- Difference in history 
 
• Domination	  of	  the	  world	  
 
As we have seen in section 3.2.a. “Sum”, human beings recapitulate the world of nature in 
historical terms. Bergson’s progressive and teleological vision of evolution leads to the idea 
that the most complete beings on earth should be the latest. “… man is probably the latest 
comer of the vertebrates; and in the insect series no species is later than the Hymenoptera, 
unless it be the lepidoptera, which are probably degenerates, living parasitically on flowering 
plants”.457 His teleological assumption implies that the ontologically prior is probably the 
chronologically posterior.  There is another progressive criterion, apart from the order in 
time: evolutionary success in terms of dominion and adaptation.  
 
While the previous historical hypothesis would be rejected nowadays, the dominion criterion 
is still valid for evolutionary thought. It is caused by the social essence of human nature. Only 
the social animals have dominated the world: the hymenopterans and human beings. In the 
case of human beings, it is difficult to pin down whether we are at the level of conservative 
teleology or transgressive teleology. On the one hand, it involves the conservation of the 
human being regarding one already given environment. On the other hand, human success 
involves invention, which is caused by the use of intelligence led by creativeness, the spirit of 
transgression. It is surely a mixture of both tendencies, but the adaptive, conservative, 
perfective tendency prevails. In the end, dominion is always for the sake of adaptation within 
one fixed already given environment.  
 
As Bergson says:  
 
“It is unquestionable, for example, that success is the most general criterion of superiority, the two 
terms being, up to a certain point, synonymous. By success must be understood, so far as the living 
being is concerned, an aptitude to develop in the most diverse environments, through the greatest 
possible variety of obstacles, so as to cover the widest possible extent of ground. A species which 
claims the entire earth for its domain is truly a dominating and consequently superior species. Such is 
the human species, which represents the culminating point of the evolution of the vertebrates. But 
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such also are, in the series of the articulate, the insects and in particular certain hymenoptera. It has 
been said of the ants that, as man is lord of the soil, they are lords of the sub-soil”.458 
 
Up to this point, we see that we are facing a shared exclusivity. In terms of success, the 
species of the homo sapiens (or homo faber) and the order of the insect Hymenoptera are the 
apex of nature. Human intelligence and the insect’s instinct are compared in EC.II, but this 
does not mean that, as Bertrand Russell said, Bergson is defending the view that humans 
ought to live according to animal instinct. Bergson is saying that the exclusively human 
faculty called intuition has something of the instinct of the “perfect insect”, namely, the un-
mediation. This idea appears also regarding aesthetics in LR.III.  
Turning back to the idea of the success of these two versions of social life in nature, in 
humans and insects, which remains at stake in his next long essay,459 it has to be said that 
there is shared success. It is success in terms of dominion. Anyway, the great dominion over 
the world is meant to be uniquely human later in DS. There the biological approach becomes 
more spiritual and more cultural, focused on morals, politics and technology. As I argue in 4, 
the reduction of all of Life to two goals, in EC, tries to avoid an excessive anthropocentric 
approach. It seems to me to be a certain complex reservation concerning his own view or 
maybe a provocative suggestion. Thus, the success criterion implies the best adaptation to the 
greatest number of different environments. The real télos of nature is better indetermination. 
Human beings are both successful (adapted to every territory) and undetermined (which 
implies, we know, invention, freedom and intuition). Again, human beings are the only 
success in terms of indetermination. I think he is talking about this when he says: “The 
creative effort progressed successfully only along that line of evolution which ended in 
man”.460  
In DS, human invention (technology) appears as a non-shared position, regarding success and 
dominion.  
 
But the midpoint between the shared conception of success and the non-shared one is CV. 
There he recovers the divergent directions of Life. Hymenoptera and man are the culminating 
points of evolution, regarding instinct and intelligence, respectively. Both lines of 
culmination reach the social life. Bergson says: “The societies of ants and bees are admirably 
disciplined and united, but fixed in an invariable routine. If the individual is forgotten in the 
society, the society on its part also has forgotten its destination”,461 he says. There is no 
change forward “to a greater social efficiency and a completer individual freedom”. And he 
adds, in a deeply teleological way: “Human societies, alone, have kept full in view both the 
ends to be attained”.462 
 
• Genius	  as	  evolutionary	  goal	  of	  human	  societies: 
 
Finally, I want to refer to a major human historical peculiarity. In the context of the human 
societies there are for Bergson two kinds of individuals. There is the regular individual and 
the genius. I have talked about the analogy of the artistic genius in 3.1.d. The artistic analogy 
is so important for Bergson as a causal model. In the last quoted text, Bergson says about 
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artists that “richness and individuality of forms do indeed indicate an expansion of life”,463 
but “the standpoint of the moralist is higher”.464 
 
As we have seen, mankind is almost unique in terms of adaptation. Humans can share their 
dominion with other species, but in terms of freedom the uniqueness is indisputable. 
Freedom, intuition and invention are part of humanity. Now we can take a step forward. With 
human artists and, moreover, moralists, Life and nature reach the very apex. More or less like 
the contemplator of EN.X. 7-8 in Aristotle. That is the maximum of affirmation of nature.465 
 
The spiritual genius or moral creator fulfills the potentiality of nature in a totally new and 
unique way, like the philosopher in Aristotle, according to NE.X. 7-8.  
 
The next passage will convince us about the absolute uniqueness of mankind in nature and, at 
the same time, about the uniqueness of the genius among humans:  
 
“In man alone, especially among the best of mankind, the vital movement pursues its way without 
hindrance, thrusting through that work of art, the human body, which it has created on its way, the 
creative current of the moral life. Man, called on at every moment to lean on the totality of his past in 
order to bring his weight to bear more effectively on the future, is the great success of life. But it is the 
moral man creator who is a creator in the highest degree, -the man whose action, itself intense, is also 
capable of intensifiying the action of other men, and, itself generous, can kindle fires on the hearths of 
generosity. The men of moral grandeur, particularly those whose inventive and simple heroism has 
opened new paths to virtue, are revealers of metaphysical truth. Although they are the culminating 
point of evolution, yet they are nearest the source and they enable us to perceive the impulsion which 
comes from the deep”.466 
 
Invention and freedom are unique to human beings, in comparison with singular animals. 
Humans have freedom in a new qualitative dimension. The human brain, along with human 
language and human progress, are expressions of it. Intuition has elements in common with 
instinct, but it is still a human faculty. Intuition implies self-consciousness, and this is unique 
to human beings. Human beings are also fragile and can experience depression by thinking 
about their moral nature. The human is ambivalent, maybe fragile, but in society it is the most 
perfect among the rest of beings of nature. In terms of adaptive success or dominion and of 
newness, sometimes Bergson seems to give to humans a shared uniqueness with 
Hymenoptera. Nevertheless, in general terms human beings alone are the great success in 
creation. “Success” can be interpreted in terms of adaptation (success in relation to different 
environments) and, more importantly, in terms of spirit (success in relation to the past stages 
in the world history, regarding freedom). At last, we have seen that the human genius is 
higher in this scale than the regular human, since the aforementioned faculties are in their 
case more developed.  
 
In this sense, it can be said that for Bergson the human genius is the most perfect being. This 
is similar in the other model of immanent teleology that we know, the classic one. Only 
philosophers can establish analogies between them and god, for instance.  
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Bergson is a biomorphic author, and thinks that human beings are part of nature. Natural 
entities, like plants, animals and humans have irreducible goals. But human beings are not 
mere living beings. They live, as the others, but they (i) recapitulate the scale, and are also 
different in kind because of (ii) unique faculties. In my reading this implies a mitigated 
anthropocentrism, based on evolutionary theories of the epoch. The great difference with 
Aristotle is the evolutionary framework. That is because, in philosophical terms, evolution 
does not mitigate the anthropocentric assumptions, but, on the contrary, it strengthens the 
anthropocentric perspective.  
 
Bergson’s is not, however, an absolute anthropocentrism, because of his defense of 
biomorphism. First of all, Bergson is a defender of immanent teleology, and this implies that 
every being has its own perfection. Every living being can be conceived as a tendency toward 
action. This aspect of its existence is elemental and irreducible. As we know, from immanent 
teleology unfolds recognition of an innate value in every being. This is the basis for 
horizontal analogies and individual teleology. 
 
This can be seen in Bergson also from a global view. As I said, Life tends in many directions. 
Some of them are absolutely deviated from the one that Bergson finds more important. 
Bergson combines the Darwinian “tree of life” branching pattern with the Aristotelian natural 
scale. Both coexist in his view. There is no solid basis for Pearson’s statement: “On 
Bergson’s model no dominant tendency within evolution can be identified”467. There are 
many tendencies in evolution, that is true, but following certain criteria above we can select 
and value specially the particular lineage that leads to human beings. Without doing this EC 
would be difficult to understand. That is because that reading tends to see a tension between 
two Bergsons: on the one hand, there is pluralism. On the other, there is “residual 
anthropocentrism”. From the perspective of immanent teleology and mitigated 
anthropocentrism that is not a problem. Both are compatible. I address again the topic of the 
place of the human being in the cosmos in 4.2.b, applied to the phenomenon of evolution.  
 
We have seen the main features of Bergson’s human and its place in the cosmos. On the one 
hand, the human is a summary of different faculties in the living nature. The unavoidable 
evolutionary perspective of the beginning of the XX century puts this summary in historical 
terms. The natural scale, which is static and ahistorical in ancient thought, becomes 
chronological. To this extent, human beings represent the previous stages of natural history. I 
have pointed out the additional features of humanity in Bergson. The most remarkable ones 
are included in the section “Difference in kind”, since it addresses specifically human 
faculties, all related with freedom, creativity and intuition. “Difference in history” can be 
considered an addendum of the previous, since there I have given the account of the 
specificity of human history, given its unique natural capacities. Human history is only an 
outcome of human nature.  
 
Bergson’s entire conception of human beings, their superiority and uniqueness, is mitigated 
by his conception of nature in general. I have addressed the most important mitigating 
features in Bergson, but there is still one more to examine in detail: evolution is unpredictable 
and, thus, human beings and their physiology and habits were not pre-designed in any sort of 
providential plan. The vegetative, animal, and human form are, to a certain extent, 
contingent. Freedom, and not humanity as such, occupies the central place in Bergson’s 
                                                






worldview. Bergson’s global teleology combines what I called primary teleology, for regular 




3.3. The temporal dimension of teleology. Regularity and irregularity 
 
In general terms, we have seen that the first analogy, between one soul and one insect, is 
horizontal and conservative. The second analogy, the vertical one, is transgressive. 
Conservative teleology is conceptually linked to the classic developmental teleology, where 
the beneficiary is individual and concrete, and its goal is to persevere in being, in terms of the 
individual or the species.  
 
On the other hand, transgressive teleology is conceptually linked to the global teleology of 
contribution, since the individual is seen as a part of something bigger. But here there is 
neither an eternal cosmos nor a god inspiring all the perfections, but one compound entity 
called Life or élan. The gap between the teleology of contribution in Aristotle and Bergson’s 
version is considerable since in the first case it means eternity, while in the second, 
contribution means progress, and implies a growth of freedom.  
 
One rather illustrative example is found in how Bergson addresses the “law” of biology. 
When Bergson talks in MM about a “fundamental law of life”,468 it is implied that it is at 
work any time we conceive living beings. Although the term “law” is absent in Greek natural 
philosophy, Bergson’s conception of individual teleology in MM fits with primary teleology, 
as we saw in 2.1.d. But in his later work DS the temporal perspective of Life is different. See 
the meaning of the term “law” here: 
 
“We do not believe in the fatality of history. There is no obstacle wich cannot be broken down by 
wills sufficiently keyed up, if they deal with it in time. There is thus no unesacapable historical law. 
But there are biological laws; and the human societies, in so far as they are partly willed by nature, 
pertain to biology on this particular point. If the evolution of the organized world takes place 
according to certain laws, I mean by virtue of certain forces, it is impossible that the psychological 
evolution of individual and social man should entirely renounce these habits of life. Now we have 
shown elsewhere that the essence of a vital tendency is to develop fan-wise, creating, by the mere fact 
of its growth, divergent directions, each of which will receive a certain portion of the impetus. We 
added that there was nothing mysterious about this law”.469 
 
The biological laws, along with the fundamental law of life, make the living survive, 
reproduce and maybe also be well. There are no historical laws, since habits are contingent. 
Furthermore, there is one tendency, also called a law. It is historical, since it works in time. 
But he may avoid fatalism. Between the fundamental law of life in MM and the tendency-
law, there is a difference with respect to the temporal dimension.  
 
3.3.a. Primary teleology: regularity or perfectiveness for the most of the time 
 
As we saw, regularity is part of the argument of teleology in Aristotle. Nature regularly tends 
toward the best. The embryo, for instance, tends regularly toward the complete figure, the 
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growth of the teeth tends regularly toward a good development so that one can chew and bite 
correctly, and the spider regularly works quite sophisticatedly on its web for the sake of 
nourishment and survival. The regular succession of the seasons due to the sun is, ultimately, 
based on teleology, since it is the consequence of the regular movements of the heavens, by 
the perfective attraction to god, the regular aim of heavenly bodies. According to Aristotle, 
then, regularly, every being tends to fulfill its potency, just as humans tend to be happy 
during their lifetime. Regarding the notion of contribution in Aristotle, it is exactly the same. 
That is, everything tends toward its completeness for the sake of a general arrangement. 
Regularly there is reproduction, for the species are eternal. And regularly everything occupies 
its range in the best way. In the infralunary world everything happens aeì or hos epì tò poly. 
Moreover, the heavenly supralunary matters happen always.  
 
For Bergson there is a regular fulfillment in nature and society, and as we know he uses 
neither the concept of form nor that of éidos. The same goes with the argument of teleology 
as happening “always” or the “most of the time”. But regarding the latter, regularity is 
certainly implicitly used in his account. Bergson talks as if it had happened always. It is, so to 
say, a relative always. The basic claim here is that Bergson doesn’t use a historical paradigm 
regarding this very kind of teleology.  
 
Bergson deals with this kind of regularity in MM and the articles on mind and body in ES 
(like “The soul and the body”, “Dreams” or “Brain and thought”), in LR, in the pages of EC 
regarding adaptation, and in DS.II regarding closed society.  
 
Regularly or for most of the time the body tries to be adapted to its environment, for the sake 
of something good or in order to avoid something bad. Regularly, the embryo continues the 
life of the past in the future for the sake of maturity. Regularly, society reacts in a defensive 
way regarding dissolvent powers, such as egoism, fear of death or absurdity or vanity, for the 
sake of its conservation. For instance, in his talk on “Dreams” he says that wakefulness is 
“adaptation and choice”, “willing and striving” and that being asleep is “to be 
disinterested”. 470  Wakefulness is then a part of the so-called attention to life, which 
understands life in terms of functions: being and well-being. And, again, this happens always. 
When he addresses in MM “fundamental law of life”471 the regularity is clearly implied.  
 
Thus, the phenomena that Bergson is describing until now, in this section 2.3.a, are regular 
events. This doesn’t mean that there is some sort of eternity implied here. We already know 
that Bergson believed that there is not such an everlasting and permanent reality.472 But his 
approach is that of regularity. It is a relative regularity. Since we are talking about regular 
features, the classic approach does not vary: it happens that living things act always or most 
of the time for the sake of being or being in the best way possible.  
 
I have identified regularity with individual conservative teleology, but there is something 
important to add. In a complex system such as Bergson’s there are different aspects that are 
difficult to pin down. In Bergson’s global transgressive teleology, there is, certainly, one 
fixed property. That is, natural historical events like the plant or human form, or historical 
ones like the formation of new trends of the spirit, are an outcome of contingency. 
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Technically speaking they are unforeseeable. But Bergson’s teleological cosmology relies 
upon one “impetus of life [that] consists in a need for creation”. It is difficult to interpret that 
as if it was not a claim in terms of regularity. The perfective dynamic of that need of nature is 
also clear enough. Nature understood in the widest sense “strives to introduce into it the 
largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty”.473 Bergson does not say that the need 
and the goal are so sometimes, but always. This is not something unforeseeable or contingent. 
Hence in Bergson’s global teleology there is one element of regularity and also one element 
of irregularity. Therefore, the need and the goal of the cosmos is to be interpreted within the 
model of Aristotelian primary teleology, and the outcome of this need, is to be interpreted 
within the model of the secondary teleology that we saw in 2.1.d. 
 
3.3.b. Secondary teleology: retrospective perfectiveness, unpredictability and 
narratology 
 
In this subsection I address Bergson’s view on global teleology from the perspective of time. 
To the extent that I refer to some sort of globality, this means that I understand nature as a 
whole, and each individual now is a part of this whole, and contributes to it by fulfilling its 
task.  
 
The problem arises regarding the idea of progress and contribution in EC and DS, when we 
have the concept of Life, with capital letters. As we saw in Aristotle, entities regularly 
contribute to an eternal good. While in Bergson the wholeness cannot be thought in an 
eternal-like way, but only in historical terms, contribution, participation or imitation do not 
refer to any fixed or eternal ground of being, like the supralunary world or god. Now 
everything is perishable: there are no eternal items. Now there are no perishable individual 
entities that progress in some eternally fixed way, according to the general view of teleology. 
This leads us to the current problem: the time of teleology, because the universe, Life or 
history do not rely on fixed structures. Individual mutable cases of perishable entities are not 
expressions or examples of something eternal. There are no imperishable forms, there is no 
imperishable infralunary realm, there are no eternal, heavenly bodies and there is no prime 
mover.  
 
In EC, Life covers the realm of biology. It is the synonym of the history of evolution. It has 
not ascended eternally and it is not one event to be understood in some bigger framework in 
which it is only one case. To this extent, it is not regular. One could say, as Bergson does, 
that Life, and its history, is one storyline. We really do not know what biology will be like 
beyond this particular and unique historical development. Each part of Life’s narrative is 
unique too, since it will not be repeated again ever: that is what being historical means 
ultimately. This means, among other things, that it is not to be repeated.474 The temporal 
dimension is totally different now.  
 
Bergson has to deal with a new problem: the teleology of singular events. Unlike with 
Aristotle, in modern language we could say that for Bergson the idea of Life is linked to the 
sciences of the spirit, namely, to history. I will soon propose some features for this. 
Regarding this second kind of teleology, I will tackle the issue of “retrospective finalism”. 
Following Camille Riquier, I still defend a possible link between Aristotle and Bergson in 
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global terms. Although I admit that the speculative assumption is considerable in this case; 
also in this case I follow an already indicated interpretative path. In a word: in the 
Aristotelian framework there is room for retrospective finalism.  
 
The vital impetus or élan, and the idea of human history or progress, are different from the 
regular phenomena I have mentioned just above. The main problem of global teleology in 
Bergson is that it leads to fatalism, as we saw in 1.1.b. It leads to some kind of 
providentialism where there is no room for indetermination, just what happens to certain 
deterministic evolutionary views. If we accept that there is an objective constitutive progress, 
an ontological tendency forward, we see that mankind does not lead to its own future. 
Moreover, we individuals are just puppets of destiny. And destiny is this overarching 
tendency called by Bergson Life or élan vital.  
 
Bergson defends indetermination in nature and human indetermination at the same time. It is 
clear that during his career he progressively expanded the boundaries of indetermination. He 
started with human indetermination but his project of developing a philosophy of nature 
according to the model of immanent teleology entailed naturalizing almost all human 
features. This entails, in his case, also humanizing nature. Hence, freedom is not only to be 
found in our societies, but also in nature. Evolution is an expression of this nature. But he 
started everything from human experience.  
 
At the moment in which Bergson constructed his philosophy of nature he was positive about 
the fallacy of fatalism: our direct experience of life denies any kind of overarching 
determinism. Bergson defended individual freedom from the beginning of his career, in the 
third chapter of D.I. A hard critique of determinism was implied in EL and, moreover, it 
became the center of his polemic approach to duration in DI.III. To be alive, to endure, 
implies being for the sake of conservation. Duration, later on applied to embryos, is an 
example of conservative teleology. But this goal coexists with another one, called freedom. 
According to this goal, human life is for the sake of freedom, which is a transgressive goal.  
 
But in IM, EC and DS it seems that his position is on the verge of individual freedom and 
Life. In any case global teleology may lead to determination. Therefore, Bergson introduces 
natural contingency and human freedom or creativeness as part of the same anti-determinist 
feature of nature.   
 
“We cannot contemplate it [progress in societies]”, Bergson says “without saying that, here too, 
across innumerable obstacles, life is working both by individualization and integration to obtain the 
greatest quantity, the richest variety, the highest qualities, of invention and effort”475  
 
I will start with Life or history of evolution, including human history. In the universe there is 
need or also “exigency of creation”.476 Creation means unpredictability or “inflorescence of 
unforeseeable novelty”.477 Predictability is not one of the scopes of the sciences of Life, or, at 
least, of evolutionary biology. 
 
Also “there is progress, if progress means a continual advance in the general direction 
determined by a first impulsion; but this progress is accomplished only on the two or three 
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great lines of evolution”.478 Besides: “with the human being life of consciousness reaches, at 
least potentially, its highest state of emancipation from the restrictions imposed on it by 
matter”.479 In the last sentence from DS we have even a more bombastic statement on the 
same teleological ground. According to Bergson, humans should “intend to make the extra 
effort required for fulfilling, even on their refractory planet, the essential function of the 
universe, which is a machine for the making of gods”480 
 
But, if the universe or Life is defined as an exigency of creation, then he is talking about a 
need and a natural tendency. The outcome of this natural tendency is progress and we can 
also talk about a highest state. Clearly, this is a global teleology scheme. This is also primary 
teleology. On the other hand, we need creation and unforeseeable novelty. It cannot be the 
development of a pre-designer. The natural progressive tendency has to fit with 
unpredictability and creation. This is the temporal dimension of secondary teleology. This is 
the great philosophical tension in Bergson, in my view: to make primary teleology and 
secondary teleology compatible within his global framework.  
 
As Worms says, Bergson’s global finalism contains a retrospective and extraordinary original 
species of finalism.481  Bergson’s vision of the élan entails a constitutive and objective 
teleology: evolution is the outcome of a natural tendency to progress and perfection. Hence, 
once more, progress is real and at the same time it has to be unforeseeable. If not, there 
would not be creation. In fact, it would never be real progress. It would be just Spencer’s 
evolutionary visions (the inexorable “law of evolution”482) and ultimately we may fall into 
fatalism: this is “false evolutionism”. Bergson’s creative teleology should be the opposite. It 
tries to combine his naturalistic view and something that maybe we could call humanism.483  
 
His concepts of divergence in EC.II and dichotomy DS.IV meant to be precisely the 
avoidance of determinism. Life and history split into divergent branches, he says. There is not 
only one line of progress, but many.  
 
The objectivity and non-reflexivity (this is not heuristics), on the one hand, and 
unpredictability (contingency), on the other, are characteristics of the élan or creative 
teleology. There is a certain tension between contingency and perfection, but they are just 
compatible. We should add that it implies singularity and divergence. Life and history are 
something unique, they will never be repeated for Bergson, and is in constant creation of new 
goals by divergence.  
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We can see singularity. Life is one story.484 In its origin, that was one feature of our own life 
or duration, also in DI. Duration is a continuum of the heterogeneous and it is irreversible. It 
is also unique.485  Hee-Jin Han has pointed out this characteristic in “L’heuristique du 
vitalisme”.486 In the short text “False recognition”, Bergson writes: “yet we know full well 
that no life goes twice through the same moment of its history, that time does not remount its 
course”.487 In subjective terms, in MM he talks about two memories: a memory that imagines 
and evokes singular events and another that forgets the singular property and just knows how 
to repeat, like every habit.488 In EC, in DuSim.III and in DS he talks about a great singular 
historical and irreversible tendency.  
 
Since evolution is singular, it should be understood as one event. Predictability means that 
there are innumerable events that fit into some law-model. Life is not the case, so, in my 
view, it can only be an event. It is a complex event, one irreversible story. It can be 
interpreted by a narratology. Narratology is the method of the sciences of the spirit and does 
not aim to predict.489 Narratology interprets singular events. The singular events cannot be 
predicted, since prediction is so to say anchored around the repetition of some phenomena. 
The irreversible singular events can only be interpreted retrospectively as if they were 
narrated.  
 
When Bergson differentiates between the “science of matter” (physics, but also physiology 
and chemistry) and the “sciences of the spirit” (psychology and a “vitalist biology”), I think 
he is talking about an essential difference between two branches of knowledge. On one hand, 
there is measurement, predictability, and precision. On the other, there is the unpredictable 
and unique phenomena called consciousness.490 Consciousness (understood according to the 
various meanings it has in Bergson’s works) is always an irreversible singular case to be 
interpreted retrospectively because it is naturally directed towards change. In his view, 
matter is inertia, geometry and necessity, and life is indetermination,491 but also an impulse to 
higher efficiency.492 
 
It is important to insist on the idea that this retrospective global teleology is not entirely as if 
teleology, although it has elements of contingency; it is in any case grounded in constitutive 
teleology. However, when Bergson says that there is in the world an exigency of creation he 
means two things: i) there is a teleological impulse towards something; ii) it is constant, 
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which we call “world” as such. Creation is led by the direction of teleology. That is because 
human beings are the apex of that.  
 
There is still an important element of contingency there. That is, human beings are products 
of contingency. Although nature is directed towards something (creation), there is variation in 
the forms of that process and there are also failures. So, nature would be different, regarding 
the living species on earth, although the exigency would remain. In his view, however, in 
comparison with other possibilities, there has been a success, called human being.  
 
In short, teleology implies that creation is not chaos but indeterminacy. Teleology and 
novelty are compatible, while there is unpredictability regarding forms and the natural 
tendency or exigency remains. The teleological tendency of Life is certain: to seek 
indetermination. The outcome of that is purely unpredictable. There is indeterminacy and 
novelty to a certain extent (particular forms and species), because the exigency or tendency of 
the world does not change. This must remain.  
 
As I said, I follow Riquier in his enlightening consideration of the élan. I agree with him 
regarding the understanding of the élan itself: 
 
 “L’élan n’a pas pour finalité absurde de déjouer toute prévision. Ce serait prendre pour une fin en soi 
ce qui n’arrive que par accident. Il a pour finalité de réaliser la liberté dans la nature, finalité à 
laquelle il n’atteint que progressivement à cause de la contingence qui frappe son activité 
(indétermination au premier sens). Autrement dit, si les formes de l’évolution sont indéterminées 
parce qu’imprévisibles, l’évolution de formes est en revanche nécessairement déterminée: elle tend à 
créer des formes capables de servir de plus en plus de véhicule à l’activité libre et créatrice. Bergson 
est donc manifestement hostile au theme romantique de la vie luxuriante, d’où jailliraient des formes 
innombrables, riches et variées, qui manifestent sa puissance d’éclosion”.493 
 
There is a goal for nature: indetermination. The singular, irreversible process of striving 
toward that goal is unpredictable and only grasped by narratology. There is no law of Life 
that ultimately could predict everything. Life is singular and unforeseeable. Every moment is 
singular and takes part of a tendency in a certain historical context. The only axiom we have 
is teleology: tendency toward the best. Bergson shows that teleology; in this case, global 
teleology, is not necessarily determinist. Life is undetermined, apart from that. The state of 
the fauna of 1868 would not be predicted by anyone, as the evolutionist and determinist 
Huxley said.494 
 
There is a global teleology, which includes a global tendency to something good. Every part 
of the living realm has contributed to the progressive fulfillment of that good. To my 
understanding, the ideas of divergence and dichotomy do not have the central importance that 
other authors have given to them. In a divergence scheme the idea of height or progress is 
perfectly possible, as it is in EC. It just fits better with the Darwinian tree of life, that is, with 
the modern science account. Global irreversible progress is historical and singular. It cannot 
be compared with any event similar to it, so it is a narratology and not a law. It is a 
retrospective interpretation. It implies that the phenomena cannot be measured. There is no 
experiment possible, since the conditions have always changed.  
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Global, irreversible, progressive, historical and singular: these are the features of Bergson’s 
transgressive teleology. The, so to say, “optimistic” conception of history remains intact in 
EC, but it is not necessarily the case. It lasts to explain the last feature: uncertainty. 
Uncertainty means that Bergson’s conception of progress is not necessarily optimistic, but 
ambivalent. Although there is progress and a clear tendency in nature towards it, it is not 
assured. My point is that the exigency and tendency of nature understood as a whole, to the 
best or the higher development of its potencies, is for Bergson unquestionable, but it is not 
certain that in the future the progress will keep moving forward. It is not certain that this 
tendency to perfection will succeed. Stops, stagnation or decay are included among the future 
possibilities of our world. To some extent, this is something promising in one way since 
human history understood as progress, for instance, depends on us. In DS he writes: “the 
future of humanity remains indeterminate, precisely because it is on humanity that it 
depends”.495  
 
We have to make, or rather create, progress. This would be natural, since it would fulfill 
human capacities and also the original need of nature, according to Bergson. Uncertainty, or 
even risk, in this context, leaves room for real creativity. Leaving aside human nature and 
human needs, only regarding Life, the story of evolution has not ended. At some point, nature 
could overcome human nature. In a way, from the point of view of spirit and ethics, geniuses 
are the proof of that. These questions on the future, according to Bergson, cannot be 
answered. We have seen why: Life and history compose a single case. Every step beyond 
them is just unpredictable.  
 
I have talked about ascending all the time. Humans are the highest point in this trend. It is 
true that, in the past, for Bergson, the history of Life is clearly ascension. But his vision about 
the future is necessarily uncertain. The negative possibility of this uncertainty means 
basically that Life and humans can decay. In other words, although the progress is for 
Bergson more natural (or better) than retrogression, since we are talking about a singular 
event, the future remains open to different possibilities, better or worse ones. Although in EC 
and in CV the progressive and optimistic vision of Life and history seems quite central, in DS 
that changes. Namely the fourth chapter of DS, “Final remarks: Mechanics and mysticism”, is 
colored by a different mood. 496  Human choice is progress or decay, or even more 
dramatically, humans have to decide “whether they want to live or not”.497 
 
Bergson’s global teleology is global, irreversible, progressive, historical, singular, creative 
and uncertain.  
 
Again, Riquier gives us an important clue in his commentary of EC. He links the idea of 
retrospective teleology in Bergson with Aristotle. As he rightly points out, Bergson knew 
pretty well Aristotle’s notion of tyche or luck, where one could find the secondary teleology. 
He gave a course in the period of germination of EC, between 1902 and 1903, in which he 
commented on that issue.498  
 
                                                
495 DS, p. 299.  
496 I think this is quite illustrative regarding the problem of technology. In EC the future of the human being is 
unproblematically linked to technology and craft invention. In DS, after the First World War, his optimistic 
vision has changed. See Zanfi, Caterina. Bergson, la tecnica, la guerra. Bononia, Bolonia, University Press, 
2009. 
497 DS, p. 317. 







“Ne serait-ce pas qu’il trouvait dans cette quasi-cause qu’est la tyche le modèle pour commencer à 
penser le jeu spécifique qu’entretiennent les forces vitals avec les forces matérielles? À partir du 
moment où l’élan vital agit en vertu d’une finalité immanente, il doit y avoir dans sa rencontre avec la 
matière des effects collateraux qui n’étaient pas initialement compris en lui, effets qui arrivent non par 
soi, mais par accident (symbebekòs). L’évolution creatrice serait ainsi, comme la finalité et la chance, 
une finalité sans fin, c’est-à-dire una rencontre fortuite d’où procèdent des forms imprévisibles, mais 
susceptibles d’être expliquées rétrospectivement en termes de causalité méchanique ou finale”.499 
 
According to Riquier, these ideas of global retrospective teleology and tyche have a lot in 
common. Organic forms, Riquier says, “come from unpredictable forms, but liable of being 
retrospectively explained in terms of mechanic and final causality”. It is difficult to say 
whether Bergson was conscious of that or not; this remains in the field of speculation. What 
is beyond doubt is that he knew perfectly well chapters 4, 5 and 6 of Phys.II and taught them 
in several lectures on that subject. He also taught the neo-Aristotelian Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, and particularly the doctrine of On fate, where the Aristotelian doctrine of 
chance and luck is used.500 However, Bergson does not comment on it. So the most prudent 
position for me now is merely to suggest the similarities.  
 
The main problem and the main distance between the notion of eutychía in Phys.II.4-6, that I 
addressed in 2.1.d and the notion of élan in EC.I, II and III is threefold: i) Aristotle says that 
the cases of fortune are not just cases of the for the sake of. Bergson, on the contrary, thinks 
that evolution is for the sake of an innate natural function. ii) The cases of eutychía are 
beneficial not in an absolute sense, but in relation to the particular good of the individual 
involved. In EC the télos is absolute and non-relative, just like the general good in Aristotle’s 
global texts. iii) The case of eutychía and the tyche in general is secondary teleology.  In EC 
it is not an alternative, but an essential part of global teleology. They have three elements in 
common: i) retrospective finalism; ii) indetermination; iii) singularity. We can see that, in any 
case, contingency has a much more important role in Bergson than in Aristotle. But it is also 
important to see that in this case secondary teleology (history) is also derived from a non-
historical claim, thus primary teleology.  
 
According to Aristotle, the human is free to a certain extent. He or she is the principle of 
action and our actions depend on us (EN.III. 3-5). His teleological approach in EN.I. 7 or 
EN.I. 13 does not seem to be a problem for him. In general terms, all humans tend toward 
their natural goal, which is happiness, as we saw in 1.3. But their concrete future is 
contingent. Aristotle’s approach to deliberation, deliberated choice and voluntariness has 
nothing to do with chance,501 although they have in common the “ inherently unpredictable 
future” of the infralunary world of Aristotle.502 The personal goal-directedness of every 
human being seems to be both natural and non-deterministic.  
 
In Bergson every human being is goal-directed, but the paradox is that this requires 
transcending a previous step. This is not pure contingency, but a relative one. Bergson, as we 
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know, stresses the idea of creativity. Being free is to create oneself, as we will see in 3 and 4. 
Every personal life is a story of maturity, and, apart from dichotomy and divergence, it has 
the same features as the global teleology: Bergson’s global teleology is global, irreversible, 
progressive, historical, singular, creative and uncertain. As the history of Life and human 
beings, our personal story is to be interpreted retrospectively.  
 
I think that Bergson does not solve the problem I referred to regarding individual freedom. 
He defended the existence of Life as one assembly of entities. We can ask whose freedom is 
Bergson’s freedom in EC. If Life is free, then we individual free beings can be mere puppets 
of that bigger entity. Then, the problem would be the same as in determinism, with the 
difference that there is contingency and freedom in the world. But this freedom, transmitted 
to the world through individuals, would be always one. Bergson defended that every human 
being is historical, creative and singular, not just analogue to Life itself, but a prolongation of 







Conclusion of Chapter 3 
 
[A] Bergson emphasizes much more than Aristotle the vertical analogy. The cosmic passages 
in Aristotle establish analogies with compounds, like the army, or use analogical verbs, like 
to imitate or to desire. Aristotle also uses the vertical analogy for establishing analogies 
between humans and heavenly bodies and god. Only in one case he seems to accept the 
world/organism analogy. In contrast, in Bergson there are innumerable cases of 
microcosmos/macrocosmos, human/world. In Bergson there are no theological analogies and, 
naturally, no heavenly psychological bodies. 
 
In Bergson there are two kinds of analogies, horizontal analogies and vertical analogies. That 
is how I see the claim in IM about an “effort” to “dilate ourselves”.503 Horizontal analogies 
are held between one singular living entity, such as a human being, especially regarding his 
or her body, and another one, such as the amoeba, the embryo, the society. Vertical analogies 
are held between the human being, especially regarding his or her soul, and just one item: 
Life or history. The télos in the horizontal analogy is development or conservation and the 
télos in the vertical one is contribution or transgression. In the first case there is a clear 
beneficiary, in the second there is rather an aim.  
 
Like in Johnson on Aristotle, pluralism in Bergson can be understood can be understood in 
ecological terms, as Gunter did.504 This sheds light on the famous statement in IM, section IX, 
according to which “philosophy should be an effort to go beyond the human state”.505  
 
[B] The two models are biomorphist, since they defend immanent teleology, and in both there 
is a certain kind of anthropocentrism, what I called mitigated anthropocentrism. In my 
opinion, the anthropocentric reading of Bergson’s global teleology is maybe easier to defend 
than Aristotle’s one.  
 
In any case, in Bergson the evolutionary perspective means a peculiar case of mitigated 
anthropocentrism. On the one hand, it permits the teleological reading of the natural scale. On 
the other hand, Bergson understands evolution through the branching pattern of divergence, 
taken from the Darwinian framework. This means that Life tends in many directions, and 
only one (the most important) leads to the development of the central nervous system, and, 
ultimately, man. There is a third question: many aspects in the living world, and, namely, in 
man, have to be attributed to contingency. Humans are the goal of human beings insofar as 
humans are the best expression of freedom on earth.  
 
Regarding the place of human beings and human knowledge in nature a dualistic view can be 
found in Bergson. Biomorphism is the first aspect we should consider, since it is required for 
immanent teleology. Biomorphism is the basis of the horizontal analogy and implies the 
worldview of the model of immanent teleology: pluralism. Mitigated anthropocentrism would 
complete the account of Bergson’s philosophy, since the human being is the most important 
or the highest entity or species in nature. Bergson’s is not, however, an absolute 
anthropocentrism, since plurality necessarily entails the recognition of goals in nature that are 
not human. His progressive view of evolution reinforces his anthropocentrism, since the rest 
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of nature can be understood as a previous step towards the form human: vegetative faculties 
and animal faculties are summed up in human beings, who are for Bergson the most recent 
species. The development of the central nervous system is, in Bergson, a tendency towards 
freedom and spirit. Only human beings qualified as free beings. Besides the recognition of 
non-human goals in nature, we have to add that what I have said of humans does not imply 
that the general perfective tendency is directed to the human form. It means that humans are a 
relative success of this the tendency towards freedom: partially, the human form, like the 
pervious forms in the natural scale, is contingent. Regarding the former question of analogies, 
it is clear that the horizontal teleology relies on biomorphism while the vertical one relies on 
anthropocentrism. The human is a natural but unique entity. It is natural since it has basic 
things in common with the rest of the natural beings. It is unique since humans sum up the 
wide range of natural faculties and also add unique features, such as invention, freedom, 
intuition, self-consciousness. In terms of adaptiveness or dominion, humans share their label 
of success with the Hymenoptera. Like in the classic model, Bergson’s human beings are 
ambivalent and require living in society.  
 
 
[C] Temporality in both philosophers is definitely different. In Aristotle there are two 
grounds, the eternal one, which is better, and the perishable one. The perishable realm is 
equally eternal although the substances within are not. The teleological processes happen, it 
seems, always in the eternal realm and always or usually in the infralunary one. Individual 
teleology is thus regular, in Aristotle, and even more in the global one, since it involves the 
supralunary realm. That is not the case of Bergson. To be sure, regularity is not part of an 
explicit argument, as we find in Aristotle Phys.II. It is however implied in Bergson’s 
approach to individual teleology. It is also part of the basis of his global teleology, since he 
talks about a regular exigency, need or perfective tendency in the cosmos, but its outcome 
gives a central role to contingency. The history of Life, human progress and personal life 
qualify as individual and unpredictable events. Like the Aristotelian fortune, it is to be 
understood as retrospective secondary teleology. The main difference is that this sort of 
teleology is in Bergson at the center of his natural worldview. He puts exceptionality at the 
core of his framework.  
 
Bergson’s more accentuated philosophical dualism appears here too. Based on biomorphism, 
Bergson erects horizontal analogies as if they were absolutely regular. This means that the 
human body and habits, living beings and society regularly tend to develop themselves, to 
adapt themselves and to persevere on earth as much as possible. Secondly, Bergson holds 
vertical analogies, based on anthropocentrism as global, irreversible, progressive, historical, 
singular, creative and uncertain teleological process. Now the question is mixed. On the one 
hand, he considers nature as a whole in regard with a regular goal. But its outcome, Life or 
evolution, human history or progress and our own subjective history are unique stories. In all 




[D] Since the model of immanent teleology is grounded in analogies with human beings, it is 
also a reflection of humans. In Aristotle both development and contribution to perfectiveness 
can be easily understood as something simultaneous. The first is focused on the entity and the 
second on the relation between the entity and the whole. They both are grounded on the order 
of parts and wholes, something that is part of rationality. The order of development and the 





at stake. Bergson’s view is, again, more dualistic. In Bergson development is made by a vital 
force of every living being which endures, matures and functions, whereas contribution is 
made by general biological trends (lineages) or mutations and by human freedom. The first 
one is a classic teleology of the érgon, the second one is a teleology of freedom. The analogy 
is grounded on two different human faculties or perfective tendencies.  
 
As Bergson said, teleology is based on psychology or the human mind, and is doctrinally 
flexible. Also, we saw that notions, such as Life, imply that, if there is internal or individual 
teleology there is external teleology. In the first chapter I noted that Bergson talks about 
“effort”. The effort should extend itself beyond the notion of individual effort, which 
completes the notion of external teleology. The human mind, individuals and individual 
efforts are elements of the horizontal analogy, biomorphism and regularity. The human mind, 
Life, and human cultures take part in certain kinds of “external effort”, which is irregular, 
since it is unique. We have seen what means “going further” in structural terms. In Chapter 4 









4. Two domains of immanent teleology in Bergson 
 
 
This section casts the phenomena that Bergson explains in teleological terms, according to 
the previously seen ideas. One of the clearest ideas regarding the topic of teleology is 
Bergson’s acute dualism. It is however a general feature of his philosophy: all his approaches 
are deeply marked by dualism. On teleology, we have seen, that is clear. There are two 
teleologies, two domains of teleology. If I am not wrong, Bergson refers to this dualistic 
vision of what Life and individual human life are only in one passage. The biological realm 
counts with two peculiar directions or teleological strivings, impossible to find in physics. To 
my knowledge, CV is the only place in which he addresses this question directly. It could be 
said that in a way the text sums up the varied contents of EC in an elegant synthesis. It is 
definitely what the following passage does around immanent teleology, although it has not 
been noted for any commentator until now, as far as I’m concerned. The text is so important 
for us that I quote it in the original language and in English, just as I did with the few central 
passages on reforming teleology in the first chapter. 
 
The context is not far from Aristotle indeed. The text starts by establishing a sharp distinction 
between the artificial and the natural. Bergson asks how man could artificially imitate natural 
living entities. Like Aristotle at the beginning of Phys.II, Bergson thinks that there is one 
immanent principle in the living beings. This principle has to be understood in two ways, two 
main tendencies. Two main tendencies that can be found in human consciousness: 
 
 “[a] On imitera certains caractères de la matière vivante; on ne lui imprimera pas l’élan en vertu 
duquel elle [a.1] se reproduit et, au sens transformiste du mot, [a.2] évolue. Or cette reproduction et 
cette évolution sont la vie même. L’une et l’autre manifestent une poussée intérieure, le double besoin 
de [a.1] croître en nombre et [a.2] en richesse [a.1] par multiplication dans l´espace et [a.2] par 
complication dans le temps, [b] enfin les deux instincts qui apparaissent avec la vie et qui seront les 
deux grands moteurs de l´activité humaine: [b.1] l´amour et [b.2] l´ambition. [c] Visiblement une 
force travaille devant nous, qui cherche à se libérer de ses entraves et aussi à se dépasser elle-même, à 
donner d’abord tout ce qu’elle a et ensuite plus qu’elle n’a: comment définir autrement l´esprit?”.506 
 
“[a] We shall reproduce, that is to say, some characters of living matter; we shall not obtain the push 
in virtue of which it [a.1] reproduces itself and, in the meaning of transformism, [a.2] evolves. Now, 
reproduction and evolution are life itself. Both are the manifestation of an inward impulse, of the 
twofold need of [a.1] increasing in number [a.2] and wealth by [a.1] multiplication in space and [a.2] 
complication in time, [b] of two instincts which make their appearance with life and later become the 
two great motives in human activity, [b.1] love and [b.2] ambition. [c] Visibly there is a force 
working, seeking to free itself from trammels and also to surpass itself, to give first all it has and then 
something more than it has. What else is mind?”.507 
 
The passage shows again that Bergson’s conception of Life and living beings can also be 
found in human consciousness. That is certain, since from [a], biology, we leap to [b] 
psychology. Namely, on the one hand, Bergson is proposing a link between [a.1] 
“reproduction”, that is, “increasing in number by multiplication in space” and [b.1] “love”.  
On the other hand, Bergson defends the analogy between [a.2] “evolution”, that is, 
“increasing in wealth by complication in time”, and [b.2] “ambition”.  
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According to our analysis of teleology in the sense of hou héneka + tini (dative) in Aristotle, 
there has to be a beneficiary of a certain substance. The defenders of the individual biological 
teleology hold that, for instance, reproduction is something “good” for the individual. 
Conservation of the being (understood as individual conservation or specific conservation) 
and well-being are the basic models for the understanding of “perfection” or télos. This has to 
do with [a.1] and [b.1], that is, with “reproduction” and “love”. Teleology of hou heneka + 
tinos (genitive) is better understood regarding the relation between the individual and the 
universe, or the imperishable parts of the universe. The goal of the action or development or 
reproduction is not the conservation of any individual nor species, but the contribution to or 
participation in the whole. It has to do with [a.2] and [b.2], that is, with “evolution” and 
“ambition”.  
 
[a.1] and [b.1] represent two tendencies toward preservation of what exists, one in biological 
terms and the other in psychological terms. [a.2] and [b.2] represent two tendencies, one in 
biological terms and the other in psychological terms, of transgression. The conservation of 
what exists means necessarily a concrete goal: it implies repetition. The transgression of one 
species to another does not have a clear beneficiary, but it is rather Life itself or ultimately 
the cosmos. Transgression implies a general goal, which does not refer to any sort of limited 
being. There is no repetition, but change. Thus, in the repetition of the conservative tendency, 
the goal is the existence or persistence of what already exists; and in change understood as 
evolutionary progress, the goal could not be that persistence, since persistence is at issue, but 
the enrichment of the wholeness. The tendency to persist at the limit and the tendency beyond 
limits is, for Bergson, the simplest understanding of Life and also, of human life.  
 
Notice that in the passage, repetition is not seen in negative terms. Repetition or reproduction 
and transformation and evolution are seen both next to each other. They seem to be equally 
considered by Bergson. In EC reproduction or repetition could be reasonably considered one 
type of stagnation, a certain type of decay imposed to everything that exists. Always after 
newness comes adaptation, fixation and repetition. If one praises above all newness and 
creation with such an emphasis, automatically, the rest of the tendencies might be diminished. 
In EC the author talks about an “effort” which is different from that defended by the neo-
Lamarckians, the “effort” of individual adaptation. Bergson believes in an idea of biological 
effort “far more independent of circumstances”.508 
 
Although in MM Bergson’s scope is the “effort towards circumstances”, in EC he has found a 
second one much more important for him, the “independent effort”. Adaptation seems to be a 
secondary degree force, derived from the vital impetus. “But, if the evolution of life is 
something other than a series of adaptations to accidental circumstances, so also it is not the 
realization of a plan”.509 He devotes in EC one passage to the question:  
 
“The truth is that adaptation explains the sinuosities of the movement of evolution, but not its general 
directions, still less the movement itself. The road that leads to the town is obliged to follow the ups 
and downs of the hills; it adapts itself to the accidents of the ground; but the accidents of the ground 
are not the cause of the road, nor have they given it its direction. At every moment they furnish it with 
what is indispensable, namely, the soil on which it lies; but if we consider the whole of the road, 
instead of each of its parts, the accidents of the ground appear only as impediments or causes of delay, 
for the road aims simply at the town and would fain be a straight line. Just so as regards the evolution 
of life and the circumstances through which it passes - with this difference, that evolution does not 
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mark out a solitary route, that it takes directions without aiming at ends, and that it remains inventive 
even in its adaptations”.510 
 
At least two things need to be said. First, inventiveness can be found, according to the last 
line, in EC. It is, anyway, secondary in comparison to the “movement itself”. Second, 
something more general can raise (again) problems for any reader. In the passage Bergson 
says that evolution “takes directions without aiming at ends”. As I said, Life does not pre-
design anything, it creates unconsciously. But it does not mean that there is no teleology 
involved. In the previous paragraph we talk about the vital impulse (“movement itself”) as 
“an internal push that has carried life, by more and more complex forms, to higher and higher 
destinies”.511  
 
Once Bergson tries to link adaptation and change in EC, he stresses the value of change. It is 
also so in DS, since the open society is placed beyond and higher one more than the closed 
one. In CV he just refers to both, in a lyrical way, talking about love and ambition, as equally 
important. Equally unique to living beings and Life itself.  
 
Repetition plays the role of adaptation, like attention to life. It is something that appears 
exclusively in biology. It is a power of Life. In the passage from CV, four years after EC, we 
see then that even the repetition, as every kind of adaptation or “attention to life” is unique to 
living beings. Conservation or, in his poetical language, “Love”, is in its own right 
spontaneous biological driving force. In a higher degree we find transgression or freedom.  
 
In the next two sections I will address this twofold vision of Life and living beings. 
 
 
4.1. First domain of immanent teleology: conservative teleology 
 
4.1.a. Destination, function and adaptation 
 
The term “adaptation” is a genuine Darwinian concept. At least The origin of species 
emphasized its importance in a new way, regarding the previous transformist biological 
framework: namely, Lamarck’s. The historian of biology Gustavo Caponi has criticized the 
adaptive or Darwinian reading of Lamarck.512 Only neo-Lamarckism has included the notion 
of adaptation in his framework, after the publication of Darwin’s masterpiece in 1859. In 
rough terms, for Lamarck (as for Buffon) the organic form of the beings is, in different ways, 
an effect of the circumstances, and not cause of adaptation.  
 
Needless to say, the concept is absent in Aristotle, although there are references in the corpus 
in which he alludes to the link between the living being and the environment. In Darwin the 
struggle for life found in the fourth chapter of The origin of species implies a dramatic vision 
of adaptation, while in Aristotle every living being is by nature adapted to a fixed niche, in a 
certain environment. In Aristotle adaptation is not a problem for the species, as it were, while 
in Darwin it is the ultimate need for the sake of short and long-term survival. Given that, in 
Darwin the drive towards adaptation—that is, survival, reproduction and well-being—is still 
teleological. The télos in Darwin has some different features and also the entire framework 
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around, but it means perfection and good. Being alive is for the living being an absolute good 
both in the Aristotelian world and in the Darwin era.513  
Consequently, I apply to Bergson the teleological assumption of adaptiveness in living 
beings. Although Bergson talks sometimes about function, more emphatically he also uses 
the word “destination”. Undoubtedly, Bergson’s perspective may be understood in the 
Darwinian era, and adaptation is at stake in his works.  
 
From my view, destination or adaptation play exactly the same role as every other 
teleological term, such as goal, task or function. In the following pages I deal with Bergson’s 
idea of goal, task or function regarding environment. Hence, again, I defend that the concept 
of adaptation has an unavoidable teleological meaning. It includes survival, reproduction and 
living-well, which in a lyrical and anthropomorphic way is called “Love”, in CV.  
 
- Destination of the body and habits: attention to life 
 
The activity of the body and its habits is one of the main concerns of Bergson in MM and, 
later, in ES.514 So, action is the “fundamental law of life”,515 and living corporeal beings are 
“centers of action”,516 namely,  “useful”517 and “effective action”518. This kind of action aims 
“to adapt ourselves to a present situation”.519 That is the “purpose and function of our nervous 
system”: adaptation.520 The destination of the body and habits 521 that guide its actions, is the 
scope of MM, and that scope is adaptation. The key notion in MM is “attention to life”, 
which comes up in MM.III as the “cohesion in the normal work of the mind, as in a pyramid 
which should stand upon its apex”,522 and will be used a number of times in his posterior 
works on body, soul and individual consciousness.523 Regarding the close relation between 
adaptiveness and attention to life, in the text of ES “False recognition” Bergson puts both 
ideas aside. He refers to “attention to life and adaptation to reality”.524  
 
Along with adaptation we should include the nature of it: attention to life consists in 
spontaneous and unforeseen movements.525 As I mentioned, in “Dreams” he talks in a similar 
way about being awake. He notes another feature of attention to life: “its main function is to 
reply to you, for waking and willing are one and the same”. There is thus this voluntarist 
feature, related to spontaneity. He also relates attention to life with one of his most used 
terms, “effort”. Being awake or attentive is an “effort of concentration”526 and being alive is 
an “intellectual effort” in the “direction of effort”.527  
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Attention to life is something not related to our personal psychology, but with our organic 
constitution. Attention to life is part of biology, as Bergson understands it. Only the case of 
human attention to life is at stake there, but it could be in other animals. He says: “I do not 
mean voluntary attention, which is momentary and individual, but that continuous attention 
common to us all, imposed by nature, which we may call ‘racial attention’”.528 Since the 
original text in French says “attention de l’espèce”,529 it should be better to translate it for 
‘attention of the species’. Here the teleological element is implicitly posed. The attention of 
the species is deeply anchored in one specific form of life and flourishing, and not in mind or 
intelligence. It is an ontological feature and structure of living beings per se.  
 
Adaptiveness to reality and, more concretely, to already made environments and spontaneity 
or willingness, are basic features of “attention to life”. It is much deeper than the individual 
human mind. Function and habit, on the one hand, and organs, on the other, are linked. The 
brain is “the organ of attention to life”,530 and it is “the point of insertion of mind in 
matter”,531 it “secures at every moment the adaptation of the mind to circumstances”.532 
 
In MM Bergson talks about it in these terms, which maybe can give a useful general account 
for this panoramic view: according to Bergson, attention to life “enables us to adapt ourselves 
to the present situation; through it the actions, to which we are subject, prolong themselves 
into reactions that are sometimes accomplished, sometimes merely nascent, but always more 
or less appropriate. Habit (rather than memory) it acts our past experience but does not call 
up its image”.533  
 
In this context, habit refers to the tendency of the body, while memory refers to our spirit. 
That is, attention to life is for the sake of adaptation. Adaptation is its goal.  
 
Attention to life is also the key for understanding the “utilitarian origin of our perception of 
things”,534 from which all the epistemological problems and ontological problems in MM are 
derived. Although useful, attention to life also produces philosophical problems:535 we forget 
our past and we do not give to this dimension of time the ontological category we should, 
Bergson says.536 The past “is inhibited by the necessities of present action”.537 Hence attention 
to life can mislead philosophical enquiries.  
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Although, according to one astonishing statement of Bergson the past “preserves itself”,538 
this scheme implies that the past needs or seeks to be efficient.  Efficiency, action and, 
specially, attention to life are the very key of his structural vision of the living beings. In the 
case of the human beings, attention to life organizes the scheme of body and soul life, since 
both are “united inseparably to one another”.539  
 
Regarding the general structure of attention to life, as Hude has said, the philosophical 
approach behind MM (and its so to say doctrinal “appendices” in ES) is that of 
“hylemorphism”. A new version of the position attributed to Aristotle that invokes the unity 
of the soul and the body by appealing to teleology. The “attention-to-life-framework” is in 
my view absolutely teleological.  
 
The term emphasizes the goal of adaptation in the Darwinian philosophical context after 
1859. Also, Bergson’s attention to life plays a significant role regarding the philosophy of 
time that is at stake in MM. In the case of the human beings, attention to life is the aim of 
being fixed to the present and calculating the future. In Bergson, the brain and in general the 
body and its activities are our participation in the present, while the unconscious past, 
dreams, etc., are considered starting from the present. Thus, Bergson’s originality resides in 
the fact that he adds a philosophy of time to the framework of adaptation, a Darwinian and 
neo-Lamarckian topic.  
 
- Destination of the cells and instincts: cytology, reproduction, ethology 
 
As I said, all the varieties of conservative teleology are versions or expressions of attention to 
life. “Attention to life” pertains better to the human context of MM and ES, but we have seen 
in 3.1 that Bergson makes an analogy between animals (the amoeba, the herbivore) and 
human beings. In DI and LR there are also brief analogies suggested between animals’ 
hypothetical knowledge of the world and human knowledge.540 The attention to life is a 
general structure of Bergson’s conception of individual life, regarding the environment. It is a 
part (not the whole) of human consciousness. It is to be understood regarding the body and 
habits. We have seen one of these versions or expressions, language. This new subsection 
will be another appendix to the attention to life, but in the context of the philosophy of the 
organism, in EC.II. Now we are focused on non-human development and activities. Namely, 
Bergson talks about cells and instincts. Also, in the context of MM and ES the difference 
between body and habit wasn’t clear. As far as I’m concerned, Bergson does not deal with the 
difference between the organ and the function of the organ, since he considers both as parts 
of the teleological structure of attention to life.  
 
The first passages that I show here are on cytology or cellular biology, and ethology or 
animal behavior. The author himself defends the similarity of both grounds of biological 
inquiry: 
 
“When we see in a living body thousands of cells working together to a common end, dividing the 
task between them, living each for itself at the same time as for the others, preserving itself, feeding 
itself, reproducing itself, responding to the menace of danger by appropriate defensive reactions, how 
can we help thinking of so many instincts? And yet these are the natural functions of the cell, the 
constitutive elements of its vitality. On the other hand, when we see the bees of a hive forming a 
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system so strictly organized that no individual can live apart from the others beyond a certain time, 
even though furnished with food and shelter, how can we help recognizing that the hive is really, and 
not metaphorically, a single organism, of which each bee is a cell united to the others by invisible 
bonds? The instinct that animates the bee is indistinguishable, then, from the force that animates the 
cell, or is only a prolongation of that force. In extreme cases like this, instinct coincides with the work 
of organization”.541 
 
Following the analogy, the bee is the cell of the hive and the hive is an organism. The idea of 
community as organism for Bergson has been noted, also in the human realm, and we will 
come back to it soon. For the moment, we can focus on the cell and the bee. Both live for 
themselves and for others, their activities are defined by an interest in self-preservation, 
nutrition, reproduction and self-defense. Those are the “constitutive elements” of their vitality 
and vitality in general. As I have said several times throughout this work, Bergson has a 
hierarchical vision of nature. Just as attention to life among humans is different among bees 
or cells, they are all expressions of the same impulse for the sake of preservation.542  
 
As we saw in 1.2.4 Bergson rejects individual teleology. His own conception of reproduction 
leads him to reject Driesch’s exclusively individual teleology. I didn’t include this part, since 
the passage was long enough. I will recall it now. The context, basically, is how to delineate 
between individuals in biology. First, there is the problem of the compound: every living 
being is a compound of other living beings. Second, reproduction means that every individual 
comes from a cell from another body. He writes: 
 
“An organism such as a higher vertebrate is the most individuated of all organisms; yet, if we take 
into account that it is only the development of an ovum forming part of the body of its mother and of a 
spermatozoon belonging to the body of its father, that the egg (i.e. the ovum fertilized) is a connecting 
link between the two progenitors since it is common to their two substances, we shall realize that 
every individual organism, even that of a man, is merely a bud that has sprouted on the combined 
body of both its parents. Where, then, does the vital principle of the individual begin or end?”543 
 
The principle of living entities comes from other entities and the vital impetus must be global 
then. At the beginning of Chapter 4 we have seen that Bergson interprets the global tendency 
in two ways. One of them involves only members of the same species, reproduction, the other 
one covers the whole history of Life, from one species to another. Now it is time to focus on 
reproduction, since it is a conservative power, and defines it as a tendency of Life to “surpass 
itself”.544 It means the tendency to conservation not by one individual, but by one species. 
Like the previous one, reproduction tries to “give first all it has and then something more than 
it has”. For Bergson reproduction means “increasing in number multiplication in space”, and 
he calls it instinct. As we saw in 2.2.a survival of the species is for Aristotle one of the most 
basic and general levels of life, also applied to plants. For Bergson reproduction may have an 
additional evolutionary value: the dominion on earth is also made by the radiation of the 
same species all over the world.545 As in the classic model, reproduction can be understood 
from the point of view of the individual faculty, but also from the point of view of the 
species, that covers multiple individuals. In any case, survival of the species, in Bergson, as 
in Aristotle, has an immanent value. The goal at stake is clearly conservative, and covers one 
beneficiary or multiple ones.  
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In EC.II the author is more focused on ethology than on cellular theory and reproduction. In 
DI.II and LR.III Bergson talks, respectively, about insects and dogs’ experience of the space, 
and about wolves grasping their prey. In EC.II this approach to animal behavior is limited to 
entomology. As we have seen in the previous passage on bees, the insects of the order of 
Hymenoptera (like bees, wasps and ants) are the focus of EC. In Chapter 2.2 we showed that 
he considers them the perfection of instinct.  After having talked about bees, and based now 
on Jean-Henri Fabre’s then famous entomological reports,546 Bergson devotes a number of 
pages to the perfect expression of this type of attention to life called instinct in the wasps.  
 
Namely, he focuses on the digger wasp.547 In EC Bergson comments on the astonishing 
capacity of these insects to follow their instinct in such sophisticated ways, as Fabre relates. 
Bergson refers to every type of digger wasp as following a musical theme. That is how he 
considers “the paralyzing instinct of certain wasps”.548 In this context, the caterpillar is the 
prey of the wasp. Bergson asks how the wasp knows about the caterpillar. Then Bergson 
proposes the notion of “sympathy”, taken in its etymological sense. The wasp must feel the 
caterpillar’s nature. “This feeling of vulnerability might owe nothing to outward perception, 
but result from the mere presence together of the Ammophila and the caterpillar, considered 
no longer as two organisms, but as two activities”.549 The wasp’s activities are at stake here 
and are to be understood in the teleological sense, which is not intellectual, just like the spider 
in Aristotle. The wasp’s activity is for the sake of something good, that is to be understood as 
perfective. Natural perfection is behind this idea of sympathy. Sympathy is an instinctual 
power for the sake of survival, reproduction and well-being. 
 
Bergson’s conception of cells and Hymenoptera organs and functions is thoroughly 
teleological. The being is for the sake of some specific activity and this activity is its 
perfectiveness. Living beings are for the sake of their functions. Bergson even considers that 
a being is an activity, more than a thing (namely, organism). This activity could be summed 
up by the expression perfectivism. According to the model of immanent teleology being or 
being in the fullest form of being are the goals of any living being. 
 
- Destination of the human being (I): attention and language 
 
As I have shown in 3.1.d and 3.2.b individual creativity is the paradigm of the activity of the 
human soul in Bergson. However, there are also adaptive human faculties to take in 
consideration: namely, the attention to life. My point now is that attention to life has its own 
form regarding uniquely human activities. That is: human spontaneous activities should refer 
to conservation and adaptation. He focuses on human behavior, and the human expression of 
the attention to life.  
 
Some passages of MM.III put the example of the “man of action”, which is interesting for us. 
It shows in a way the ethical aspect of this adaptive teleology, since it points to a middle-
ground conduct for men. Between artistic creativity and animal adaptation there is an unique 
human activity that is a mixture of both. This hybrid form can be found only in MM.III, and 
refers to the virtuous middle term of the “well-balanced mind”550 by understanding mere 
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animal impulse or inattentive dream of the dreamer (and the mentally insane) as extreme 
middle terms. Although in general Bergson talks about human nature in heroic Romantic 
terms by stressing creation and breaking habits, here the philosopher holds a quite classic 
conception of the vita activa or prudent practical life.  
 
At one vicious extreme, there is the “man of impulse”, who, like the “lower animals”, lives 
“only in the present” and responds to a “stimulus by the immediate reaction which prolongs 
it”.551 Living in this way is like being led by “motor memory”, it is like being a “conscious 
automaton”, according to Bergson, like children and the so-called savages.552 On the opposite 
side we have the dreamer, who “dreams his life instead of living it”, led by a “contemplative 
memory”.553 The dreamer is the one “who lives in the past for the mere pleasure of living 
there” and is “hardly better fitted for action” than other people.554 He or she is maladjusted. 
The awake dreamers in Bergson are exemplified by the mentally ill persons he refers to in 
MM.II or the “men drowned and hanged” who finally saved their lives: close to the end and 
disinhibited by their attention to life, these people saw their entire past existence.555  
  
Bergson proposes that “between these two extremes lives the happy disposition of memory, 
docile enough to follow with precision all the outlines of the present situation, but energetic 
enough to resist all other appeal”.556 Between the extreme of the impulsive human and the 
maladjusted dreamer, there is the man of action: “The characteristic of the man of action is 
the promptitude with which he summons to the help of a given situation all the memories 
which have reference to it”.557  
 
That is, the man of action is in a virtuous midterm between the automatic instinctive 
spontaneity and the dreamer’s creativeness. Attention to life, and so the man of action, faces 
its present regarding its open future, and uses the past for the sake of its actions. 
 
The spontaneous effort or willing of the organic beings towards the performance of a certain 
activity or function upon circumstances imposed by nature is called by Bergson attention to 
life. It is his major concept in conservative teleology, and it is clearly related to the individual 
teleology of function. In the case of human beings, Bergson complexifies the human type of 
attention to life by claiming that there exists a virtuous middle term between two vicious 
extremes. It can lead to happiness, for human beings.558 This may be the fulfillment of the 
being.559  
 
Society and the brain are for Bergson just expressions of human superiority, as we saw. Like 
in Aristotle, language is automatically linked with our social dimension in Bergson: we are 
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political animals and linguistic animals at the very same time.560 The problem of language is 
part of Bergson’s philosophical discourse from the first line of his first published work. These 
are the first lines of DI: “We necessarily express ourselves by means of words and we usually 
think in terms of space. That is to say, language requires us to establish between our ideas the 
same sharp and precise distinctions, the same discontinuity, as between material objects. This 
assimilation of thought to things is useful in practical life and necessary in most of the 
sciences”.561 In the “Conclusion” of that same work, Bergson states that “there are finally two 
different selves, one of which is, as it were, the external projection of the other, its spatial 
and, so to speak, social representation”.562  
 
Leaving aside the concept of spatialization, we can see that this necessity of practical life is 
closely linked to social representation. Thanks to language we can “externalize our concepts 
in relation to one another, reveal to ourselves the objectivity of things. We do this in two 
ways: by getting everything ready for language and by showing ourselves an external world, 
quite distinct from ourselves, in the perception of which all minds have a common share, 
which foreshadows and prepares that way for social life”.563 We all share words in society, 
and these words are for the sake of adaptation. As far as I’m concerned, this idea doesn’t 
change in Bergson: our verbal dimension is a) useful and b) social.  
 
Language generates problems, for Bergson. Like society it has an important goal: adaptation 
and conservation. Language permits us to distinguish things and to communicate these 
distinctions in society. This means that, in the end, we can work in groups like no animal on 
earth. This group work of language becomes a quite complex but practical compound of 
symbols. Human domination of the environment and nature is due to society and language, 
and vice versa, since they can’t be distinguished. In DI, modern science is the ultimate step of 
this scale of dominion. As I say, this is seen by Bergson in a critical way, since positivism is 
trying to apply the successful scientific quantitative model to consciousness. He considers 
that this is wrong. But this exhaustive teleological reading of Bergson has to include also the 
destination of words, for the sake of survival and well-being. Language can be perfectly 
understood as part of our biological background, unable to grasp the self and duration, for 
instance, but necessary for practical and social life. Language is then part of the “attention to 
life”, a concept that he created seven years after DI. 
 
- Destination of the community: laughter, myths, animism 
 
As we know, Bergson devoted two books to human social life, LR and DS. The entire LR and 
one half of DS (especially its second chapter) can be read in terms of conservative teleology: 
they talk about corrections of dysfunctional cases of attention to life. This may mean that 
society is an entity that has to survive, or reproduce itself and even fulfill the tendency of 
living-well. It is certainly an entity that has to survive and to fulfill the best of its potency, 
and with society, all the members of it. As I said in the previous section on analogies, 
Bergson’s lectures of 1916 known as “La personnalité” or “On personality”, deal briefly with 
this conception of national communities and peoples.  LR is from 1900 and DS from 1932, 
but that so-called vitalist conception of society is implied there. Both are focused on the 
defensive tendencies of society, conceived as a whole living entity composed by human 
                                                
560 For Aristotle, speech (ho lógos) is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, and also what is just or 
unjust. Pol.I.2.1253ª5-20. 
561 DI, p.xix. 
562 DI, p. 231. 





individuals, and both are social reactions. Although in DS Bergson does not neither recall and 
nor even mention LR, in my view there is a clear continuity. Jokes in LR and myths in DS are 
collective creations of some living being called society.  
 
There is a leading analogy in both texts. In LR he states: “Let us go on to society. As we are 
both in and of it, we cannot help treating it as a living being”,564 and “we should see that 
vanity, though it is a natural product of social life, is an inconvenience to society, just as 
certain slight poisons, continually secreted by the human organism, would destroy it in the 
long run, if they were not neutralized by other secretions. Laughter is unceasingly doing work 
of this kind”.565 Laughter has to be considered from this vitalistic perspective: as we will see, 
it enacts a particular faculty of a whole called society. In DS we have a similar organic 
analogy: “… human society with its members linked together like the cells of an organism, 
or, what amounts almost to the same thing, like ants in an ant-hill, has never existed but the 
groupings of primitive humanity were certainly nearer the ants than ours are today”.566 
Following Aristotle, Bergson thinks that the philosopher has to search for function of any 
given organism, living being, or a part thereof. LR understands the laughter, the comedy and 
humor, as part of a society, the organism. LR is a book about the function or the special 
cause of laughter in the community. In the book, Bergson himself prefers to talk about 
function than about cause. He writes: “To understand laughter, we must put it back into its 
natural environment, which is society, and above all must we determine the utility of its 
function, which is a social one. Such, let us say at once, will be the leading idea of all our 
investigations. Laughter must answer to certain requirements of life in common. It must have 
a social signification”.567 And he adds: “Laughter must be (…) a sort of social gesture. (…) 
Laughter, then, does not belong to the province of aesthetics alone, since unconsciously (and 
even immorally in many particular instances) it pursues a utilitarian aim of general 
improvement”.568 The function and the signification have to be understood by means of 
general improvement or perfectionism. Laughter, ultimately, is read in teleological terms: that 
is, laughter improves society. Or, in other words, thanks to laughter society can fulfill its 
natural goal better. “What life and society require of each of us is a constant attention, an 
alert, that discerns the outlines of the present situation, together with a certain elasticity of 
mind and body to enable us to adapt ourselves in consequence”.569 
We will come back to DS, on religion and morality, but I want to say in advance that the 
Aristotelian search for function can also be found. Bergson wants to explain the existence of 
myths and the social pressure within them: “we have the right to proceed like a biologist, who 
speaks of nature’s intentions every time he assigns a function to an organ: he merely 
expresses thus the adequateness of the organ to the function. In spite of humanity’s having 
become civilized, in spite of the transformation of society, we maintain that the tendencies 
which are, as it were, organic in social life have remained what they were in the 
beginning”.570  
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LR is a book on the phenomenon of laughter, composed of three articles. In the appendix for 
the twenty-third edition Bergson quotes himself, from a recent article of 1919 about his own 
book, and says that the essay talks about the “procedure of the comic-making” or of 
“laughable” and about the “special cause” of that “defensive reaction, by a gesture that makes 
a light fear”.571   
 
The main scope of laughter is to fight the “distraction of life”,572 which is the opposite of 
“attention to life”. Thus, laughter is subordinated to attention to life. With Sibertin-Blanc,573 I 
believe that the basic thesis of the whole work is the special cause of laughter. Secondly, LR 
talks about the procedures or methods of laughter, which occupy most of the text. In fact, the 
perfective power of laughter is not explained in detail. In general terms we know the essential 
idea for us: that it strengthens attention to life.  
Bumping into something, eccentricities, or vanity are subtle distractions that are corrected by 
laughter. The man who is attentive to life is part of a group and he and the group laugh at 
those cases.574 My point now is to show that laughter’s function is correction of excessive 
liberties,575 repression of separatist tendencies,576 punishment,577 and humiliation,578 although 
in an indirect and subtle way. Near the end of the text, Bergson considers that “laughter 
doubtless exercises a useful function”.579 Laughter is understood by Bergson in a teleological 
way, since this psychological and social phenomenon is “made by” nature for the best of the 
individual. In this context, the individual is both the human individual and society itself, since 
it enhances the cohesive tendencies. “Here, like elsewhere, nature has disposed with evil and 
cruelty for the sake of the good. It is more especially the good that has engaged our attention 
throughout this work. We have seen that the more society improves, the more plastic is the 
adaptability it obtains from its members; while the greater the tendency towards increasing 
stability below, the more it forces to the surface the disturbing elements inseparable from so 
vast a bulk; and thus laughter performs a useful function by emphasizing the form of these 
significant undulations”.580 In the end the télos is again adaptation. 
In DS conservative teleology is called in general terms compulsion, obedience or impulsion. 
We saw it in 3.1.e. Since this book is the best articulation of the twofold vision of teleology 
in Bergson, each tendency has its own chapter. Bergson focuses on conservative teleology in 
DS.II. There we see how this organic society uses dysfunctional faculties of humans for the 
sake of the best.  
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DS.II leads to the search for “the first function of religion”.581 It is none other than “social 
preservation”.582 The myth-making function and static religion, closely linked, generate in 
societies eschatological myths, taboos, animism and magic against the “anxieties and 
temptations”, 583  produced by the intelligence (the depressing idea of death, selfish 
preoccupations, uncertain future, sexual policy, etc.). “The function that nature has assigned 
to religion”584 is thus defensive of the group or cohesive. In DS.II there are three similar 
definitions of the same idea of natural defense: “religion is then a defensive reaction of nature 
against the dissolvent power of intelligence”.585 Also: “It is a defensive reaction of nature 
against what might be depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for society, in the exercise 
of intelligence”.586  Regarding the practical life and animism and magic Bergson adds: 
“defensive reactions of nature against the representation, by the intelligence, of a depressing 
margin of the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect desired”.587   
 
As I said, society is conceived in DS as in LR like an organism. In both sociological accounts 
the author shows different ways of defending society against dissolvent elements. In LR these 
elements are less hostile, so the defense is soft, related to aesthetics: that is laughter. In the 
end, LR answers the question of the goal of laughter. It attacks distraction and vanity for the 
sake of a better cohesion and adaptation of the human beings, and, ultimately, for the sake of 
the conservation of a singular entity called society. In DS.II myth-making faculties cause 
eschatological myths, animism, magic and taboos. They attack some kind of social illnesses 
made by the faculty of intelligence among humans. The goal is, thus, similar to laughter: 
conservation, that is, being and, furthermore, living well, since communitary perfection 
should involve a certain kind of happiness (not the highest, though, as we will see soon).  
 
4.1.b. Embryologie: continuity and maturity  
 
In the epigraph above called “destination of the cells and instincts: cytology and ethology” I 
talked about the activities of different types of living beings, namely cells and bees. Just 
before, I talked about the human body, and, by analogy, about amoebas and herbivorous 
animals. This subsection just adds material to Bergson’s philosophy of organisms. It 
introduces a new concept. The previous sections on language, body, habit, instinct and 
cellular theory and communitarian behavior stress the notion of function or efficient activity. 
In this section I recall one passage we saw in Chapter 3.1.b on analogies between 
consciousness and the embryo, the most conservative cases of conservative teleology.  
 
Now Bergson refers to maturity. In my reading, it is not an expression of the attention to life. 
It is not a function or an activity. Maturity is certainly a type of perfection, it is a goal of the 
living being, but it is not an external action that the organism should perform. It has to do 
with Bergson’s philosophy of time, and namely with duration, as it is seen in DI.II, but 
transformed into philosophy of the organisms. The temporal perspective introduces this idea 
of maturity, which has nothing to do with attention to life.  
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“The cause of growing old must lie deeper. We hold that there is unbroken continuity between the 
evolution of the embryo and that of the complete organism. The impetus which causes a living being 
to grow larger, to develop and to age, is the same that has caused it to pass through the phases of the 
embryonic life. The development of the embryo is a perpetual change of form. Any one who attempts 
to note all its successive aspects becomes lost in an infinity, as is inevitable in dealing with a 
continuum. Life does but prolong this prenatal evolution. The proof of this is that it is often 
impossible for us to say whether we are dealing with an organism growing old or with an embryo 
continuing to evolve; such is the case, for example, with the larvae of insects and crustacea. On the 
other hand, in an organism such as our own, crises like puberty or the menopause, in which the 
individual is completely transformed, are quite comparable to changes in the course of larval or 
embryonic life—yet they are part and parcel of the process of our ageing. Although they occur at a 
definite age and within a time that may be quite short, no one would maintain that they appear then ex 
abrupto, from without, simply because a certain age is reached, just as a legal right is granted to us on 
our one-and-twentieth birthday”.588 
 
As I said in 3.1.b the feature here is no more activity than maturation and growth. The 
“perpetual change of form” which, as Bergson seems to think, has more to do with duration, 
appears as a pure flux. Like time in ourselves: it is a continuum. In this context, Bergson even 
says that “it is often impossible for us to say whether we are dealing with an organism 
growing old or with an embryo continuing to evolve”. Growing old seems to be here a non-
teleological expression, since “old” is not necessarily something good. Old can mean decay. 
In this passage the expression stresses “pure becoming” more than directedness. On the one 
hand, growth is, in the classical scheme of Aristotle, a teleological activity. First, it is linked 
to nutrition. Nutrition is for the sake of survival, and survival is good.589 As we saw, in a 
teleological framework the term “growth” means growth towards something, and 
“something” is fulfillment of the specific nature to be developed, that is maturity. As Bergson 
says, “[it] is often impossible for us to say whether we are dealing with an organism growing 
old or with an embryo continuing to evolve” seems to erase the line between becoming and 
fulfillment, between development and maturity. In this case maturation and growth in age 
become sort of what Bergson tried to explain about duration in DI.II: continuum and change 
at the same time. Nutrition is not here the cause of growth and change. There is not 
matureness on the horizon. Puberty and menopause are the events selected by him, and not, 
again, matureness.  
 
As I stated in 3.1.b the continuum flux and pure becoming are certainly features of duration, 
in Bergson. I add maturity, which is maybe less stressed in the first of Bergson’s essays. But 
even there, he highlights the importance of some moments of life in comparison to others. 
Bergson stresses in fact rare moments in life. He talks about the decisive moments of free 
choice and deliberation. As we saw, in DI his depiction of consciousness implies is a 
constantly changing and irreversible continuum of heterogeneous interpenetrated qualities. In 
short, this is pure progress. It is called duration. But in the last chapter of DI.III we see that 
also duration is directed to something: unforeseeable free choices, “the great and solemn 
crisis, decisive to our reputation with others, and yet more with ourselves…” 590 He calls it 
“the deep-seated self rushing up to the surface”, which expresses the “whole personality”.591 
In Bergson’s view the case of free-will in DI.III completes the account of duration in DI.II. 
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Given that we are “rarely free”,592 it seems that we complete our selves sometimes. I believe 
the teleological concept of maturity is implied in the young Bergson’s account in DI. 
Irreversibility points to maturity and maturity is associated with the moments of big 
decisions. Free-will in DI gives a hint of the notion of creation, in the next works. Free-will is 
the peak of every duration, since it is a moment of self-creation and, at the same time, a 
continuation of the whole personality. However, it is not part of natural philosophy and 
neither of the model of immanent teleology. I defend an implicit perfective element there, but 
it is sure that there are no analogies at use.  
 
In EC, teleological elements fall under the model of embryology In the text examined in 
3.1.b, Bergson discusses the idea of continuum, change and also maturity. By talking equally 
about embryonic life, puberty and menopause he is clearly stressing the idea of continuum. 
But growing old is not more than change and continuum, it is reaching towards something: a 
more perfect state. Perfection here includes past time. Maturity is then a sort of perfection 
here, for Bergson. It is situated apart from the other conceptions of conservative teleology 
because, although it does not imply transgression or evolution and it is certainly conservative, 
it has nothing to do with the fulfillment of attention to life. It means mere conservation in 
time, accumulation and duration. 
 
 
4.2. Second domain of immanent teleology: transgressive teleology 
 
As we saw at the beginning of 4, in CV there is a second “manifestation of an inward 
impulse” that can be understood “in the meaning of transformism”. It is evolution.  It is not 
“increasing in number and wealth by multiplication in space” but “complication in time”. 
This can be found in human psychology too. Besides “Love”, he says, there is “Ambition”. 
Ambition is the analogical psychological item, it is the work of the genius and the spiritual 
hero. The passage ends with an analogy between life and human psychology: “Visibly there 
is a force working, seeking to free itself from trammels and also to surpass itself, to give first 
all it has and then something more than it has. What else is mind?”593 Now we will see 
transgressive teleology, which implies “complication” in evolution, and “ambition” in 
psychology. This is the second domain of teleology. It includes all kinds of global teleology. 
Approximately, the place occupied by global teleology in Bergson’s philosophical works is 
proportional to the one devoted to individual teleology in Aristotle. In this sense, EC is to 
global teleology in Bergson what Physics is to individual teleology in Aristotle. In Bergson 
the teleological paradigm is the cosmic impetus of the élan and in Aristotle it is the individual 
substance. We have seen that the model of immanent teleology explains a great variety of 
phenomena, pertaining to different domains and areas of knowledge.   
 
The impulse for the sake of complication and ambition doesn’t fit perfectly with the global 
model, taken from Aristotle. This is not surprising, since we knew that Bergson is an original 
reformer. The second domain includes the cosmos, Life or the élan but also individual human 
free beings. In the passage above from CV we see that the transgressive teleology is to be 
found also in individual human beings. Only human beings are analogous to the 
macrocosmos. As I have said, Aristotle believes that man, to some extent, expresses the 
general order of the cosmos (2.1.c).  However, he doesn’t use that analogy for teleology. 
Furthermore, Bergson’s reform of teleology reaches its most original and its most interesting 
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philosophical problems and paradoxes points in this domain. In Bergson, global teleology 
becomes a combination of primary teleology and secondary teleology, and is grounded in 
freedom. Teleology of freedom is at stake now. Although at this point we should use the 
Bergsonian term: creativity.  
 
We have seen that creativity is one of the main topics in Bergson and it is extremely close to 
the question of freedom. Freedom is a creative power, and vice versa. According to different 
contexts, it has different terms. This idea can be found at the very beginning of his 
dissertation. One can understand DI, his first original book, as a response to his book on 
Lucretious, published earlier in 1883. Hence Lucretious is the first one of a list composed of 
the materialist physicians of DI, Leibniz, Laplace or Huxley in EC, as we saw in 1: 
Lucretious is the first of the deniers of the spirit. In Bergson’s account, for the Roman poet 
“everything consists and has always consisted solely of atoms, masses of atoms, and changes 
in the arrangement of atoms; atoms move on, eternally and inexorably; definite, changeless 
laws must govern the birth, growth and decay of things caught up and squeezed from every 
direction by the tight bond of necessity”.594  
 
Part of Bergson’s commentary on Lucretius deals with his philosophy and, as we know, he 
compares him with Darwin.595Bergson describes the origin and philosophical sources of this 
conception of the world, inspired “by what he assumes to be the basic idea of 
Epicureanism”.596 This worldview is again determinism. According to Bergson, it holds “the 
eternal rigidity of the laws of nature” and the “inexorable natural laws”.597 But especially, 
Bergson depicts Lucretius’ character and, namely, Lucretius’ philosophical anthropology, in 
the light of that natural philosophy. Determinism and the “inexorability of natural laws”598 or 
“inexorable laws of matter”,599 produces “compassion for mankind”600 and “melancholy”.601 
Unlike contemporary scientists, according to Bergson, Lucretius was a sensible enough to 
suffer coherently his own intuition of the world.  
As Bergson says: “The concept of the rigidity of natural laws reappears under various guises. 
This notion obsesses and saddens the poet; it explains his peculiar variety of melancholy that, 
in a manner of speaking, contains its own consolation. Unable to see anything in the universe 
except cumulative or compensatory forces and convinced that whatever is results naturally 
and inevitably from whatever has been, Lucretius takes pity on the human race”.602 Lucretius’ 
compassion, pity, dread, obsession, sadness, consolation and melancholy are due to the 
inexorability and rigidity of his vision of the place of human beings in the cosmos. Bergson 
seems to say: if I would have Lucretius ideas I would feel the same. But in Bergson there is 
neither sadness nor dread since there is creativeness. Creative, meaning freedom, is, for 
Bergson, the “sign of joy”. 
In Lucretius creativity is impossible. All is done and humans are just puppets of an inexorable 
destiny. In the end, Lucretius’ conception of the place of man in the cosmos was the source of 
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his own melancholy. Equally, one can think that maybe Bergson’s view of humans as 
creative and unforeseeable was the source of the euphoric buoyancy of some of his writings.  
Again, creativity is a major issue in Bergson, from the beginning until the end, and it comes 
into play in DI.III, where it faces the “principle of conservation of energy”.603 Freedom is a 
fact “if it is agreed to call every act free which springs from the self and from the self alone, 
the act which bears the mark of our personality is truly free, for our self alone will lay claim 
to its paternity. It would thus be recognized that free will is a fact”,604 is made by an effort.605 
It is a fact, and there is “none clearer.606 It is defined as “the relation of the concrete self to the 
act which it performs”.607 Spontaneity versus inertia:608 “All determinism will thus be refuted 
by experience, but every attempt to define freedom will open the way to determinism”.609 
Bergson relates freedom with causality.610 According to the conservative understanding of the 
world, “the same causes produce the same effects”.611 But according to duration there is a 
cause produced by effort, which is unforeseeable. Both causalities, the inertial and the 
spontaneous, the physical and the psychic, can’t be reduced one to another since he is not 
trying to elaborate a philosophy of nature. But the work of Lucretius and DI don’t link openly 
the question of creativity and the question of immanent teleology. As I have shown in two 
occasions, there are reasonable hints of it to be found in DI.  
There is only one passage on general causality in EC that must be addressed now.612 It is an 
obscure text for me, and doesn’t clarify much. Like Aristotle in Phys.II.3 and 7, surprisingly 
Bergson’s account of causality in his treatise on nature is illustrated only with human and 
artificial examples. We see here again that, according to the model of immanent teleology, 
Bergson considered human beings an expression of nature. As I said, EC is as focused on 
global teleology as Phys is focused on individual teleology, and this passage shows, I believe, 
precisely that.  
 
In EC Bergson tries to place human creative freedom in nature. As we have seen, he 
establishes an analogy between personal freedom and Life. In the first chapter of EC the 
causal model is not twofold, but threefold. Bergson himself talks about causality: 
 
“[1] A cause may act by [a] impelling (impulsion), [b] releasing (déclenchement), or [c] unwinding 
(déroulement). [a] The billiard-ball, that strikes another, determines its movement by impelling. [b] 
The spark that explodes the powder acts by releasing. [c] The gradual relaxing of the spring, that 
makes the phonograph turn, unwinds the melody inscribed on the cylinder: if the melody which is 
played be the effect, and the relaxing of the spring the cause, we must say that the cause acts 
by unwinding. What distinguishes these three cases from each other is the greater or less solidarity 
between the cause and the effect. [a] In the first, the quantity and quality of the effect vary with the 
quantity and quality of the cause. [b] In the second, neither quality nor quantity of the effect varies 
with quality and quantity of the cause: the effect is invariable. [c] In the third, the quantity of the 
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effect depends on the quantity of the cause, but the cause does not influence the quality of the effect: 
the longer the cylinder turns by the action of the spring, the more of the melody I shall hear, but the 
nature of the melody, or of the part heard, does not depend on the action of the spring. [2] Only in the 
first case, really, does cause explain effect; in the others the effect is more or less given in advance, 
and the antecedent invoked is—in different degrees, of course—its occasion rather than its cause”.613 
 
Following Troigtignon, I would say that the threefold vision of causality could be completed 
by the fourth type: teleological “attraction”. It appears in EC.IV, actually addressing 
Aristotle’s theology. I have mentioned this passage in 3.1.d and we will come back to it in 
4.2.d. Bergson thinks that in Aristotle, but also in major Greek and Alexandrian philosophers, 
there are two types of movement in the world, movement by mechanical impulsion and 
movement by aspiration or attraction to God. Attraction would be exerted then by something 
external and eternally fixed. In fact, impulsion has in EC.I and IV a similar sense. Impulsion, 
releasing, unwinding and attraction are the four types of causality that can be found and 
pondered in the whole EC. As I said in 3.1.d, after EC, in DS he incorporates “attraction” in 
his own terminology, for expressing the immanent power of the élan in our consciousness. As 
I will say in 4.2.d Bergson himself was not far from the two fluxes (impulsion/attraction) in 
some passages from EC. But attraction, as we have it in EC.IV, is part of theological 
causality. And the threefold passage in EC.I only deals with natural causality. We may focus 
on it now.  
 
In EC.I, the threefold passage, [a] impulsion is the efficient cause that explains [2], since the 
quantity and quality of the effect vary with the quantity and quality of the cause. Regarding 
[b] releasing and [c] unwinding there is a certain disproportion.  
 
In my view, with Troitignon and against Marietti, 614  for Bergson is “unwinding” or 
“déroulement” is the one which represents the “true finalism”, while “releasing” or 
“déclenchement” seems to be placed somewhere in the middle. 615  Is the key term is 
unwinding. EC is not focused on impulsion. Releasing fits with the metaphor of explosion 
that Bergson uses at the beginning of EC.II, but in the end, only unwinding contains the full 
scope of his work on global teleology. Following Troitignon, releasing represents a low 
degree of indetermination, such as spontaneity; attention to the life of the living beings and 
unwinding are better than genuine freedom or creation. It is more vital, so to speak, than 
mechanic impulsion, but is less than free unwinding. Releasing is midterm causality.616 
 
Unwinding means that although the quantity of the effect depends on the quantity of the 
cause, the cause does not influence the quality of the effect. The cylinder/spring and the 
“nature of the melody” compose an analogy of matter and Life or, in individual terms, of 
body and soul. This dualistic perspective is harder than the one we could find in the classic 
teleological perspective. But there is still a cylinder engine that exists for the sake of the 
melody, just as Bergson finds body for the sake of free choice or the material universe for the 
sake of indetermination. There is a difference in nature, between the matter and the spirit, but 
in the end, there is a coordination between the two. In the example of the cylinder engine 
there is subordination.  
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The passage from EC.IV is, again, obscure and open to different interpretations. I believe that 
genuine freedom or creation is to be understood only according to unwinding. As usual when 
Bergson addresses the topic in EC, this causal typology sheds maybe light only on creative 
teleology and does not include forms of conservative teleology that we saw in 4.1. Anyway, 
Bergson does not use this terminology later on, neither in the discourse within the book nor in 
any other text. It is just one possible typology, in the context of EC.I, of global evolutionary 
teleology. According to Troitignon, Life in Bergson is in between impulsion (mechanism) 
and attraction (theology). In particular, unwinding addresses better than any other type his 
emergentist conception of global immanent teleology.   
 
Section 4.2 is twofold, and, to this extent, shows two different kinds of unwinding causality 
or creativity. The first kind is anchored in individual free activities that exclusively involve 
human beings. The melody of the cylinder can be heard regarding free will and human 
culture. From my perspective, there is an immanent teleological model at stake, since it 
implies the coordination of different parts and means in accordance with one goal. The goal is 
creation. The télos of what I call transgressive teleology.  
 
The first kind of creation in Bergson is individual: personal creativeness and personal 
freedom. I will develop another view of human action different from 4.1.a. As we will see, 
there are three possible ways of understanding individual creative teleology in Bergson’s 
works. Keeping with the already mentioned metaphor, the cylinder is the human body and the 
melody is the human soul, created by free choices.  
 
The second kind of creativity involved in this view of creative teleology is much more 
ambitious and also philosophically problematic. Global immanent teleology is at stake here. 
It talks about nature as a whole and not about individuals. Namely, it addresses general drives 
in Life: following the musical analogy the cylinder is the material world, and the melody is 
biology; or the cylinder is the world, including matter and Life, and the melody is human 
freedom.  
 
In Bergson global teleology is teleology beyond individual living beings, but it only covers 
the progress of Life, in evolution, and human history. Mutations in biology, according to 
Bergson, can be understood teleologically. Biological lineages express direction and the 
essential drives of Life. They are not all, to be sure, progressive. On the contrary, in general 
terms, we have failure in Life, Bergson says, but there is room for global teleology. There are 
few but huge successes in nature. Namely, those that lead toward mankind. Note that Bergson 
doesn’t openly extend global teleology to elements, as we found in Aristotle in 2.2.b. The 
élan vital in biology and human progress are the two grounds for global creative teleology, 
although in fact they compose for Bergson different parts of the same picture: the emergence 
of consciousness in the world.  
 
I have divided global creative immanent teleology in three subsections. I ponder firstly global 
teleology within Life, regarding the different realms of biology. Plants, fungi, animals and 
humans take part of the one whole: history of spiritual progress. After I address the 
continuation of the doctrine of the élan: human history or progress. In DS, among other 
things, Bergson applies his approach of EC to history (although in EC he also talks about 
history): he repeats the mean features of his biological global teleology, but makes one 






I finish the set with cosmology, as we find it in EC, namely, in its third chapter. There I reach 
the widest scope around the topic of Bergson’s global teleology. In 4.2.d I tackle the notion 
of Life, apart from evolution. In EC and CV there are passages in which Life is understood as 
opposed to matter. The world is depited as the tension between two fluxes: I claim that this 
view comes, again, from Aristotle. It is Bergson’s view of Aristotle’s theodicy, heavily 
influenced, as is well known, by Neoplatonism and the19th century Hellenist Ravaisson. 
After this, we will see that in other places in Bergson it seems that there is a coordination 
between the two, and then matter could be understood teleologically, as the cylinder is 
teleologically directed to its function: the melody. In other places, Life seems to be 
autonomous.  
 
Creative immanent teleology involves one (human) entity or many (all the living), but its goal 
is always unpredictable indetermination. In all of its versions, creative immanent teleology 
faces the same paradox: the natural tendency toward overcoming.  
 
4.2.a. Individual creative immanent teleology: destination of the human being (II) 
 
The term “destination” appears in CV,617 but the meaning was implied in his previous work 
EC, which develops in a teleological and natural ground the conclusions of DI. As we saw in 
3.2 the creative freedom (which involves invention and also intuition) are exclusive faculties 
of the human being. Again, there is a certain dualism in Bergson. On the one hand, humans 
are the sum of natural conservative strivings and also add attention to life, which in my 
reading of 4.1.c implies a certain kind of midterm prudence for the sake of adaptation. The 
scope of man in EC has more to do with DI: the goal is not adaptation any more, but creation. 
We have reached the other dimension of human teleology: the ultimate transgressive goal of 
being is to create himself or herself, surely inspired by one spiritual inspiring model. 
Attention to life and creative freedom are not more opposed than active prudent living and 
contemplation in Aristotle. They are compatible.618  
 
If human nature in Bergson has to be understood in teleological terms, as I defend, human 
realization has to be made regarding the use and ultimate fulfillment of these faculties. 
Bergson’s framework is clearly eudaimonistic: the goal, within humans, entails happiness.  
 
As we saw, creative freedom is thus the basis of man’s superiority, and that implies that 
man’s goal is his or her own realization through this activity. Creative freedom and invention 
are outcomes of history, the history of the homo faber. Bergson defends intuition as an 
undeveloped faculty that, again, is linked not to instinct or feelings.619 
 
“Nature warns us by a clear sign that our destination is attained. That sign is joy”,620 Bergson 
says. The mother, the merchant, the artist and the spiritual hero exemplify different kinds of 
joy. The quality of that joy depends on the quality of the creation.  As the author says in the 
same place, “wherever there is joy, there is creation; the richer the creation, the deeper the 
joy”. In a way, for Bergson, that joy is supernatural, since is “the joy of a god”.621 Neither the 
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pleasure obtained from admiration nor vanity nor the pleasure from bodily satisfaction could 
be compared.  
 
Bergson’s ethical teleology is grounded in this idea of joy as destination. He gave hints of 
that in DI and in EC he doctrinally grounds this eudaimonic approach. But he only develops 
that in his last book DS, focused on ethics and heavily influenced by Christian religion. It 
seems that in the third chapter of DS the destination of the human being should be considered 
love and creation. First, love should be understood “not [as] love for any particular 
person”.622 Second, creation is a central issue in Bergson at least from EC. It has more 
Christian echoes in DS. Bergson says: “Creation will appear to him [to the intellectual who 
study the deepness of mysticism] as God undertaking to create creators, that He may have, 
besides Himself, beings worthy of His love”.623 I believe it is precisely from this point of 
view from which we should read the last sentence of DS.IV, according to which the universe 
is a “machine for the making of gods”.624 
 
In the end of DS Bergson returns to the notion of joy. To be sure, he had already mentioned it 
in the book, previously, when he talks about it as an unmixed joy, lying “beyond pleasure and 
pain”.625 The context of DS.IV is the context of an ideological promotion of asceticism. Joy 
means here self-sufficiency, creativity and is necessarily different from pleasure, vanity, and 
luxury. In DS.IV Bergson defends a return to a more sober life. There he says that “joy 
indeed would be this simplicity”.626   
 
As we already know, for Bergson “the creative effort progressed successfully only along that 
line of evolution which ended in man”.627 This exclusive being has for Bergson a concrete 
nature and only by developing its own nature humans can attain their goals. Words such as 
function appear in his speech. Bergson’s approach is deeply teleological. 
 
Although the idea of free creation as the main goal of human life appears in DI, it is an 
implicit eudaimonological and teleological perspective. The reader can interpret that from the 
whole text, although it is not openly stated. In MM the model is that of the virtuous middle 
term between two vicious extremes, but he does not develop this perspective. In EC, CV and 
DS Bergson develops his teleological anthropology that, by force, includes a doctrine of 
happiness. Freedom understood as creativity, invention and intuition are mankind’s 
characteristics. Bergson’s approach in EC relied on a notion of human nature. The only way 
in which nature could be completed should be through one of these activities. To sum up, the 
fulfillment of human life could only be considered regarding those faculties: 
 
“Even so with regard to the moments of our life, of which we are the artisans. Each of them is a kind 
of creation. And just as the talent of the painter is formed or deformed—in any case, is modified—
under the very influence of the works he produces, so each of our states, at the moment of its issue, 
modifies our personality, being indeed the new form that we are just assuming. It is then right to say 
that what we do depends on what we are; but it is necessary to add also that we are, to a certain extent, 
what we do, and that we are creating ourselves continually”628 
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Like Aristotle, in CV and DS, Bergson calls the major faculties unique to humans “divine”. 
But, more important for us, he erects a philosophy of happiness. Natural or material teleology 
points out what the nature is and, so, what the specific goal is, but also adds the concept of 
happiness. Happiness is the expression of metaphysical fulfillment. Although, in Bergson 
there is not a theory of virtue, there is a teleological framework regarding human life. 
Bergson uses the term “joy”, that is still linked to creativity. In his new religious and political 
context, he links joy with Christian love and communitarian austerity.  
 
In this level, there is one hard paradox at stake. This paradox is of real importance for us at 
this point. It can be formulated as follows: the goal of the human individual is to create his or 
her own goals. Human beings are teleologically oriented towards their own self-creation: that 
is ethical maturity. Can we be directed towards something that does not already exist? This 
problem re-appears in the next subsection in a wider context. In short, all the anthropological 
aporia of creative finality are translated into the cosmic domain.  
 
As I see it, the overarching term Life or élan can be found in tension with individual 
autonomy. The limits of global teleology are difficult to distinguish here. In the case of 
Aristotle, the tension was less hard to avoid: the individual and global are two dimensions of 
the same picture. Now, regarding freedom, the question becomes more problematic, since a 
strong theory of freedom like Bergson’s requires a great deal of autonomy. This autonomy 
fits badly sometimes in his view, since the boundaries between Life and individual man are 
blurred. In fact, Life is still emerging in culture. According to his account, Socrates and 
Christ express the nature of Life. Given that there is freedom in the world, it is unclear to me 
to whom this freedom belongs. 
 
There is one more thing to add now. Although, as I just said, DS sharpens the problem of 
freedom, Bergson also nuances his conception of free creation in human beings. In DS he 
distinguishes between the powerful unforeseen work of the genius, in morals or arts, and the 
derived creative power by average human beings. Bergson’s global teleology, as we will see, 
also leaves space for mimesis. In this framework, regular human beings are inspired by the 
great personalities. This tendency is perfective, since it moves regular people to contribute to 
and participate in progress.  In DS he proposes the model of attraction, imitation or aspiration 
that is, mainly, a midterm between pure genius, creativity and passivity. This complexifies 
and nuances his theory of creation.  
 
4.2.b. Global creative immanent teleology: destination of evolution 
 
Now we have to deal with the notorious idea of the élan vital. It appears in EC, the first of 
Bergson’s books that gives a philosophical account of biological transformism. One can find 
that as a sort of delay, insofar as Bergson was such an early reader of Herbert Spencer, for 
whom evolution was so central.629 For whatever reason, evolution is absent in DI, MM, LR or 
IM: but in EC he shows a considerable knowledge of the subject.630 Bergson was a lifelong 
reader of Darwin too and knew his work quite well.631 Furthermore, the book shows very well 
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the philosophical debate around 1907, called by one historian “the eclipse of Darwinism”.632 
The natural selection theory was hardly revised and criticized by different biological trends: 
French and American Neo-Lamarckians, Spencerians, monists, mutationists, the defenders of 
orthogenesis, Weissman genetics and vitalists. EC echoes all of these trends and many others.  
 
Bergson finishes EC.I by addressing the nature of the global tendency he calls Life and in 
EC.II Bergson considers the natural history of Life on earth by splitting into divergent 
branches or lineages. Conry, Kanamori and François have linked Bergson’s view with other 
thinkers of Life, in a number of cases, with teleological evolutionary biologists like Edward 
D. Cope.633 As Barthélémy Madaule has said: “In the Lamarckian concept of effort, capable 
of creating an organ through the exercise of a function, Bergson found an analogue to the 
creative power of his ‘vital impulse’. To the mechanistic Lamarck, whom he knew and 
quoted, Bergson preferred the Lamarck of the will favored by Cope”.634 
 
Teleology is a flexible philosophical model, as Bergson himself said: his view of global 
evolutionary teleology has certainly important traits in common with Cope’s view. However, 
my aim will be to analyze Bergson’s approach with regard to our already gained conceptual 
background. This section is quite long, and I have structured it in the following way, partially 
following EC’s discourse. First, we will see the main elements of the élan: it is one tendency, 
and its features are simplicity and unpredictability. Afterwards I will highlight one problem 
criticized by Bergson in the philosophy of biology: uni-linearity. Then I will discuss pluri-
linearity, which implies more features: namely, divergence, which reinforces unpredictability 
in my reading. As a result, I will claim that Bergson combines the Aristotelian natural scale 
and the Darwinian tree of life. He also combines primary teleology of regularity and 
secondary teleology of contingency. In the next three subsections I address Bergson’s history 
of Life. We will end this subsection with the paradigmatic global teleologic image of the 
cosmic army.  
 
- Life is a tendency: unity, simplicity, unpredictability 
 
With regard to the idea of tendency we can recall that in EC.I Bergson quotes Paul Janet and 
his book Les causes finales on the case of the evolutionary formation of the eye in biology. 
The “destination of the eye” is Bergson’s last example of Life in EC.I. The defenders of 
teleology recalled the case of the progressive formation of the eye: it was at that time a 
controversial case. The accidental and slow progressive formation of something so 
sophisticated and apparently coordinated as an eye seems like a weak response for the 
teleologist.635 In this context, Bergson starts by discussing a finalist perspective.  
“Two points are equally striking in an organ like the eye: the complexity of its structure and the 
simplicity of its function. The eye is composed of distinct parts, such as the sclerotic, the cornea, the 
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retina, the crystalline lens, etc. In each of these parts the detail is infinite. The retina alone comprises 
three layers of nervous elements—multipolar cells, bipolar cells, visual cells—each of which has its 
individuality and is undoubtedly a very complicated organism: so complicated, indeed, is the retinal 
membrane in its intimate structure, that no simple description can give an adequate idea of it. The 
mechanism of the eye is, in short, composed of an infinity of mechanisms, all of extreme complexity. 
Yet vision is one simple fact. As soon as the eye opens, the visual act is effected. Just because the act 
is simple, the slightest negligence on the part of nature in the building of the infinitely complex 
machine would have made vision impossible. This contrast between the complexity of the organ and 
the unity of the function is what gives us pause”.636  
According to Bergson, the accidental and progressive formation of the eye is highly 
improbable. But here comes the moment for Bergson distance himself from the finalist 
thinkers: 
 
 ”Just so with the relation of the eye to vision. There is in vision more than the component cells of the 
eye and their mutual coordination: in this sense, neither mechanism nor finalism go far enough. But, 
in another sense, mechanism and finalism both go too far, for they attribute to Nature the most 
formidable of the labors of Hercules in holding that she has exalted to the simple act of vision an 
infinity of infinitely complex elements, whereas Nature has had no more trouble in making an eye 
than I have in lifting my hand. Nature's simple act has divided itself automatically into an infinity of 
elements which are then found to be coordinated to one idea, just as the movement of my hand has 
dropped an infinity of points which are then found to satisfy one equation”.637 
As I interpret it, Bergson does not deny the finalistic element, that is, the natural global 
tendency toward the best. He states that for nature there is no rational coordination behind the 
eye’s structure: nature neither thinks nor deliberates. Bergson defends an immanent 
understanding of Life and there are neither demiurges nor divine plans at stake. Some 
anthropomorphic features for establishing analogies are just discarded. As we know, the 
model of immanent teleology can be rigorous regarding the analogies. Not any analogy is 
accepted. Hence, nature is neither a plan nor a plan maker. I think that when Bergson says 
that vision is “more” than the compounds and the coordination of them, he is referring to the 
immanent spontaneity towards perfection. Sometimes Bergson features the tendency towards 
vision in Life as a simple force. Notice that simplicity in Bergson is opposed to matter (since 
matter is always composed). It is by no means opposed to teleology. The simple wholeness 
that articulates the parts and pushes it spontaneously is the élan.  
 
Concerning the question of the eye, we can see that Bergson gives a lot of importance to the 
similarities between different lineages of Life. He says that the idea that such distant lineages 
such as mollusks (scallops, namely) and vertebrates have developed the eye is illustrative. 
This similarity between mollusks and vertebrates is for Bergson a sort of proof. They are, as 
he will say in EC further on, different variations of the same theme: “progress toward 
vision”.638 He writes: “For this reason, no matter how distant two animal species may be from 
each other, if the progress toward vision has gone equally far in both, there is the same visual 
organ in each case, for the form of the organ only expresses the degree in which the exercise 
of the function has been obtained”.639  
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After this approach, Bergson seems to be aware of his ambiguous position.  
“But, in speaking of a progress toward vision, are we not coming back to the old notion of finality? It 
would be so, undoubtedly, if this progress required the conscious or unconscious idea of an end to be 
attained”.640 
Divergence, progress and simplicity are features of a new kind of finalism and immanence 
and perfectivism are definitely part of the old finalism. Bergson claims to overcome finalism 
by his own doctrine, but progress-toward-vision still sounds pretty finalist.  
So, since there are neither forms in nature nor god as general aspiration, there is no “old 
notion of finality”. Bergson holds that the progress is “effected in virtue of the original 
impetus of life; it is implied in this movement itself, and that is just why it is found in 
independent lines of evolution”. Bergson is referring to the “old notion of finality” with 
something transcendental. But we know that the old notion of finality, if Aristotelian and not 
Platonic, is to be understood as immanent. However, Bergson thinks that progress toward 
vision is not old finality. In a way, that is reasonable. As we know well, the context of the 
evolutionary progress of the eye is just alien to ancient world-view.  
The next passage to quote is, to be sure, problematic and unclear. But it is important for us 
now, for the philosopher seems to seek to clarify his position regarding the problem of the 
“progress toward vision”. 
“[a] If now we are asked why and how it is implied therein, we reply that life is, more than anything 
else, a tendency to act on inert matter. [b] The direction of this action is not predetermined; hence the 
unforeseeable variety of forms which life, in evolving, sows along its path. [c] But this action always 
presents, to some extent, the character of contingency; it implies at least a rudiment of choice. [d] 
Now a choice involves the anticipatory idea of several possible actions. Possibilities of action must 
therefore be marked out for the living being before the action itself. Visual perception is nothing 
else: the visible outlines of bodies are the design of our eventual action on them. Vision will be found, 
therefore, in different degrees in the most diverse animals, and it will appear in the same complexity 
of structure wherever it has reached the same degree of intensity”.641 
Section [a] is clear for me, and is in fact the basis of my claim. Saying that Life is “a 
tendency to act on inert matter” is, to some extent teleology. That is to say that the essential 
fulfillment of Life is a certain function. In our context, it means that the more indetermination 
Life introduces in the material world, the more this goal is fulfilled.  Section [b] is more or 
less easy to understand, from my perspective. The natural tendency of Life remains but its 
outcomes are unforeseeable. Shortly before, regarding human goals, we faced the same 
paradox. Being a complete, joyful human being for Bergson implies fulfilling a natural goal, 
but a human natural goal is not concrete because the goal just can be formulated as follows: 
the télos is to create a télos. This implies a certain degree of unpredictability, but not a 
complete one. Given human form, human culture, and the past, newness is needed for the 
sake of attaining personal perfection. Unlike the previous one, section [c] is a bit unclear to 
me. On the one hand, Bergson talks about contingency. The contingent events are by force 
unforeseeable, so to this extent it completes [b]. But it is the idea of “rudiment of choice” 
which causes uncertainty in my vision. It connects the sentence with [d]. In [d] a number of 
statements remain obscure, but at least I can identify the perfective element: action. Vision is 
a way of acting. Vision is action upon the world. To this extent, it introduces indetermination 
in the world. That is, the eye fulfills the original tendency of acting on inert matter.  
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It is an evolutionary immanent global teleology. This tendency is simple, unpredictable and 
contingent. Intellectual models are useless for thinking about it, since unpredictability leaves 
room for a high variability of the outcomes. This evolutionary immanent global teleology 
implies one clear idea of télos: indetermination. Ultimately, the different degrees of 
complexity and intensity refer to degrees of indetermination. The more indetermination an 
organic structure can produce, the more complex it is. Spontaneity guides the animal’s use of 
vision. The more complex is the central nervous system of a being, the more spontaneous it 
becomes. The apex of this scale is to be found in humans, where spontaneity opens the stage 
for freedom. That is, the human brain is to human freedom what the eye is for mollusks and 
vertebrates.  
Bergson asks rhetorically “are we not coming back to the old notion of finality?” I think so, 
but only partially. Bergson’s modern notion of finality adds new elements. Namely, Bergson 
introduces unpredictability. When he ends the chapter by writing that he has defined his 
“attitude toward mechanism on the one hand and finalism on the other”, this affinity with 
finalism, clear in the case of the progress toward vision, remains vague. I’m sure that this sort 
of ambiguity in Bergson has misled many commentators.  
- Uni-linearity of the tendency: the natural scale 
EC.II, entitled “The divergent directions of the evolution of life. Torpor, intelligence, 
instinct” makes my philosophical point even clearer, even though, Bergson seems to put 
distance between his view and finalism. Furthermore, in this chapter of EC Bergson finds in 
Aristotle the founder of the scheme of understanding Life, even for the evolutionary 
philosophers. I will start with that. 
As we saw, when Bergson was developing these theories for EC, he taught a number of 
courses on Aristotle or Aristotelism at the Collège de France, and furthermore we already 
know too that he was deeply familiarized with the philosopher. Aristotle also occupied an 
important role in his non-monographic but historical courses at the Collège, such as the 
recently published Histoire de l’idée du temps and L’évolution de l’idée de liberté. In EC he 
is the more quoted author with Darwin, something quite outstanding in a book that is 
supposed to be on the theory of evolution in 1907. The centrality of Aristotle comes up in 
EC.II. The Greek philosopher is the founder of the concept of “natural scale” which is the 
basis, according to Bergson, of the conventional view of Life and Biology.  
 
“The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature, is 
to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational life, three successive degrees of the development of one 
and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as 
it grew. The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally, of degree, 
but of kind”.642  
 
The second text just completes the same idea:  
 
“If our biology [Bergsonian biology] was still that of Aristotle, if it regarded the series of living 
beings as unilinear, if it showed us the whole of life evolving towards intelligence and passing, to that 
end, through sensibility and instinct (…) But one of the clearest results of biology has been to show 
that evolution has taken place along divergent lines”.643  
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As we will see, the context of the first reference to Aristotle is the relationship between the 
three kingdoms, and in the second it is focused on the relation of instinct, the animal 
kingdom, and intelligence to which only humans belong. The main thing for us now is that 
the idea of “different degrees of life” is, according to Bergson, the mental vice of most 
“philosophies of nature”. As usual, I am afraid, the author does not specify which 
philosophical currents he is actually talking about. Arnaud suggests that Bergson is referring 
to Spencer, which is perfectly possible, but nonetheless uncertain.644 The crucial point for us 
is that within Bergson’s historical perspective Aristotle is the founder. I cited the two 
passages in the Aristotelian corpus in 2.1.c and, then, on Bergson, in 3.2.a I talked about the 
idea of making that vertical scale of nature a horizontal process. Now is time to nuance that 
claim.  
 
Although in EC.I the role of Aristotle is non-existent, in EC.II his name appears in the 
spotlight. Biological thought is extremely close to what Bergson considers the “Aristotelian 
theory of nature”.645 Bergson needs to confront not orthogenesis, Darwinians, Hugo De Vries, 
French or American neo-Lamarckians, as he did in EC.I, but rather old Aristotle. However, 
he does not quote his sources. In fact, he is not talking about Aristotle, but about evolutionary 
biology, without quoting anyone in concrete. It is difficult to attribute to Aristotle the idea of 
difference in degree/kind, since they are absent in his work, to my knowledge.  
 
Hence plants, animals and humans are the three realms, the three “successive degrees” in the 
same unilinear “tendency”. They compose the conceptual scale, the “cardinal error which has 
vitiated most of the philosophies of nature”, in Bergson’s opinion. Up to this point, we have 
seen that while Aristotle is the founder of biological thought, he is also the founder of a vice. 
 
Before we check what Bergson’s response consists in, I want to say something about his 
historical remark. As we have seen, according to EC.II, evolutionary philosophers use 
Aristotle’s model. It shows the importance that Bergson gives to ancient thought in general 
and, more concretely, to Aristotle. It is important to notice that Bergson used to refer to the 
metaphysical sources of contemporary science in modern philosophy (Descartes, Spinoza or 
Laplace), but ancient ascendency is much rarer in Bergson. By stating so, if I am not wrong, 
here Bergson constitutes a precedent of the theory explained by Arthur Lovejoy in the 
previous chapters of The great chain of being, published in 1936.646 That is, according to 
Bergson, the natural scale held by Aristotle in three basic stages (the nutritive or plant one; 
the instinctive or animal one; which involves desire, imagination and locomotion in Aristotle; 
and, finally, the rational or human one) is apparently, still alive among scientists in 1907. 
Now I explain why this is so.  
 
Bergson holds that, in general terms, the philosophers of Life took this vertical scale, which 
shows three successive degrees of perfection and interpreted it in a horizontal or historical 
way. In Aristotle, for sure, there is an a-historical perspective. In this way, he is opposed to 
evolutionary positions. But Aristotle held, as we have seen, a principle of continuity, which 
means that, in the sublunary realm, there is a progressive ascension from the lowest beings to 
human beings. According to this vision, intelligence is the apex of sublunary nature.  
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As I said, Bergson thought that this scale can be expressed in evolutionary terms as a trend 
or, as Bergson himself says, as a unilinear tendency. For certain authors of the 19th Century, 
the history of Life is the material succession from the non-living to plants, from plants to 
animals, and from animals to humans. Hence, the degrees in the scale become epochs, and 
the epochs, degrees. We have then the epoch of plants (nutrition), the epoch of animals 
(instinct) and the epoch of humans (intelligence) that make up the whole history of Life.  
 
Bergson affirms that this conception of “the series of living beings as unilinear” is wrong. 
Bergson is positive. We can figure out why. It seems that Bergson interprets Aristotle in the 
following way: since there is a scale of perfection, instinct is considered an impoverished 
intelligence. Just as plant nutrition is considered an imperfect instinct. In historical terms, this 
general progress towards intelligence is close to the type of finalism he is, actually, trying to 
avoid in chapter two. The Aristotelian scale leads to unilinear vision of Life, a unilinear 
vision of Life leads, in evolutionary terms, to a non pluralistic view of nature. Maybe it is 
Spen-er’s. Furthermore, that would involve intellect-centrism. And he, Bergson, thinks that 
human intuition (at stake in EC.II) has something of the animal branch too (what he calls 
sympathy).  
 
Bergson seems to prefer a pluralistic way of thinking of evolution. There are two Bergsonian 
concepts to note at this point. One is divergence and the other is the idea of difference in 
kind. I will show how he combines the Aristotelian model and the Darwinian one. He does 
not avoid the Aristotelian scale, but, once again, he reforms it.  
 
- Pluri-linear tendency: the tree of life 
 
Bergson states that “one of the clearest results of biology has been to show that evolution has 
taken place along divergent lines”.647 He uses the term “divergence”, which is, apparently 
supported by empirical discoveries. It will have an important role in his philosophy of 
history. The concept will become “dichotomy” in his later work on history DS.IV, as we will 
see further on. Apparently, the main philosophers of Life were at that time defenders of the 
scale in time, as we saw, but not of this “result” of biology.  
 
Divergence means that, over a long span of time, in a biological realm, Life splits into 
divergent branches. The concept contains, for his defender at least, two positive ideas that 
may reinforce contingency in nature. First of all, behind divergence is the branching pattern. 
This is the paradigm of the tree of life, part of the Darwinian world-view from the beginning. 
This image of a “tree of life” is referred to by Darwin himself in the first edition of The 
Origin of Species.648 In fact, Bergson mentions it in EC.I.649 To this, Bergson adds an element 
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that was certainly not in the gradualist evolutionary framework of Darwin: suddenness. 
Bergson thinks that this splitting is not necessarily slow and progressive, but sudden. He 
takes this idea from Hugo De Vries and the contemporary mutationists.650 Bergson defends 
the tree but challenges one of Darwin’s mantras: Natura non facit saltus (“Nature does not 
make jumps”).  
 
Divergence expresses the idea of unpredictability, one idea that he raised in talking about the 
unique simple tendency. Now it gains a clearer form, since divergence reveals the concept of 
contingency better and more intuitively than unilinearity.  
 
Along with divergence there is a second concept that I mentioned as “difference in kind”. 
This difference has to be noted in the evolutionary tendency that guides each branch:  
“Attempts to define the two kingdoms strictly have always come to naught. There is not a single 
property of vegetable life that is not found, in some degree, in certain animals; not a single 
characteristic feature of the animal that has not been seen in certain species or at certain moments in 
the vegetable world. (…) There is no manifestation of life which does not contain, in a rudimentary 
state (either latent or potential), the essential characters of most other manifestations. The difference is 
in the proportions. (…) In a word, the group must not be defined by the possession of certain 
characters, but by its tendency to emphasize them. From this point of view, taking tendencies rather 
than states into account, we find that Plants and animals may be precisely defined and distinguished, 
and that they correspond to two divergent developments of life”.651 
And this can be extrapolated regarding animals and humans.652 The same happens with the 
difference between instinct and intelligence. Bergson says: 
 “We have seen in the case of vegetable and animal life how they are at once mutually complementary 
and mutually antagonistic. Now we must show that intelligence and instinct are also opposite and 
complementary. But let us first explain why we are generally led to regard them as activities of which 
one is superior to the other and based upon it, whereas in reality they are not things of the same order: 
they have not succeeded one another, nor can we assign to them different grades”.653  
According to Bergson, the difference between the three kingdoms is not of degrees, but of 
kind. Thus, there is no superior faculty.  The three kingdoms are parts of Life, and that is 
because they are in different proportions, in every organism. They take part of the common 
origin of Life. They come to be by its sudden splitting.   
We can go back to the statement that makes Aristotle the founder of a centuries-old 
misinterpretation. 
“Vegetative torpor, instinct, and intelligence—these, then, are the elements that coincided in the vital 
impulsion common to plants and animals, and which, in the course of a development in which they 
were made manifest in the most unforeseen forms, have been dissociated by the very fact of their 
growth. The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of 
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nature, is to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational life, three successive degrees of the 
development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity 
that has split up as it grew. The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more 
generally, of degree, but of kind”.654 
 
Divergence splits Life into two tendencies first (plants and animals), and subsequently, the 
animal branch is divided into two,  instinct and intelligence. In conclusion, they are just 
different. If so, that can be interpreted as a pluralistic account. Hence, plants have a 
chlorophyllin function,655 animals are mobility and humans express intelligence.  
But, if in “the root of life there is an effort to engraft on to the necessity of physical forces the 
largest possible amount of indetermination”,656 then indetermination is a perfective concept, 
just as the Aristotelian intelligence. This must lead to superiority, necessarily: and only the 
human beings attain the step further in terms of perfection, or indetermination. That is, only 
humans are free.  
What I have not already shown is that Bergson claims the superiority of animals over plants. 
In short, although Bergson tries to avoid Aristotle’s triadic vision of Life, it is still in his 
work. In EC there is a triadic classification of realms and furthermore there is a hierarchical 
subordination.  
Bergson is one of those “philosophers of nature” that are influenced by Aristotle regarding 
the question of the scale. In the end, what I am doing is applying to Bergson himself what he 
says of the uncertain philosophers of Life. But as we have seen Bergson is an original 
reformer. The importance of the divergence and his hierarchical understanding of evolution 
produces a new framework.  
 
There is also another essential question to tackle at this point. The Ancient model of 
immanent primary teleology would find some problems when addressing the notion of élan 
vital for two reasons. First, it involves contingency and it is unpredictable. Second, it happens 
only once. Every event in natural history takes part in global teleology, but regularity is not 
the main feature anymore. The model of secondary teleology can help us at this point. In fact, 
what we have is a mixture of primary and secondary teleology. On the one hand, the tendency 
of Life is rooted in nature. There is not one form at stake but one natural function, need or 
tendency, the “need for creation” that “strives to introduce into it the largest possible amount of 
indetermination and liberty”.657 
 
There, as in a number of places, Bergson is describing a natural tendency of nature. It is 
natural and regular. The impetus expresses one dimension of nature for Bergson, as we will 
see in more depth in 4.2.c. Creativity is part of the cosmos, and is expressed in Life. We are 
for the moment in the realm of primary philosophy. In terms of its domain, it covers the 
whole of the living beings. Thus, it is global teleology.  
 
But notions like contingency, divergence, creativeness and uniqueness introduce a big 
distance between this paradigm and the ancient model of immanent teleology. Although the 
source and tendency of Life is expressed in regular terms, the outcomes of this tendency 
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could not be considered regular. History of Life is unrepeatable. It is made by singular 
creation in singular moments.  
 
This implies that there is as if teleology regarding the events within the history of Life, 
although not regarding Life itself. The plant form, the animal form and, more important for 
Bergson and for us, the human form are not necessary. They were not contained in any pre-
design. Within this framework anthropocentrism is severely mitigated: the human form as 
such is contingent.658 When Bergson displays his little histories of Life and humans, he is 
applying retrospective teleology or secondary teleology. EC.II, CV, DS.II and III contain a 
narratology with regard to the great deal of contingency involved. At the same time, all the 
events are selected for the sake of following one precise non-contingent story line: the 
fulfillment or decay of one original need or exigency: indetermination.  
 
The tree of life coexists with the natural scale and the natural global tendency with 
indetermination. Now we will see how this mixed model is applied to the data of science.   
- The scale, the plants and the animals  
I claim that in EC.II plants are part of a global historical teleology. They are described in two 
ways. There is a positive but subordinate one: they are a reservoir of energy to be partially 
used by others. There is negative interpretation of what plants are: they represent 
unconsciousness, sleep and torpor in the world. In the best case, plants are for the sake of 
animals’ activity. In the worst, they are deficient animals.  
 
In nature there is complementariness, and not harmony.659 It is the Bergsonian version of 
contribution, since harmony was neither perfect nor scientific enough for Bergson, as we saw 
in 1.1.b. Bergson’s global teleology could never be harmonious. Naturally, this 
complementariness means coordination towards something. Plants have a positive task or 
function here. They contribute in a certain way to the evolution or progress of Life. Plants are 
for their own sake and also are for the sake of animals, but, more importantly, animals are 
not for the sake of plants. Bergson openly talks about the natural scale: “What constitutes 
animality, we said, is the faculty of utilizing a releasing mechanism for the conversion of as 
much stored-up potential energy as possible into ‘explosive’ actions. In the beginning the 
explosion is haphazard, and does not choose its direction (…) But, as we rise in the animal 
scale, the form of the body itself is observed to indicate a certain number of very definite 
directions along which the energy travels”.660 
 
“Explosive actions” are the télos of this complementary action, since they imply more 
indetermination. The evolution of the sensory-motor system needs the chlorophyllin function, 
that’s out of question.661 No one said that the subordinates are not needed (for instance, the 
soul needs the body).  
 
Animals, as having a tendency, seem to be directed to what Bergson considers the best. And, 
thanks to complementariness, plants developed their subordinate capacity: amassing energy. 
Despite divergence, there is still room for complementarity: “series of characters opposed in 
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certain points, complementary in others, but, whether opposed or complementary, always 
preserving an appearance of kinship. While the animal evolved, not without accidents along 
the way, toward a freer and freer expenditure of discontinuous energy, the plant perfected 
rather its system of accumulation without moving”.662  
 
We can read this other example: 
 
“The evolution of life really continues, as we have shown, an initial impulsion: this impulsion, which 
has determined the development of the chlorophyllian function in the plant and of the sensori-motor 
system in the animal, brings life to more and more efficient acts by the fabrication and use of more 
and more powerful explosives”.663 
 
It is true that I have extracted this conclusion from the text, and it is not openly stated as 
subordination. It is logically implied. The negative definition of plants reinforces my 
position. 
 
In some passages, the plant kingdom is regarded as “torpor” (in French, “torpeur”). We have 
seen one sentence above. Bergson compares “vegetative torpor” with intelligence and 
instinct. To some extent, torpor as such is a negative feature. Torpor means lethargy. It is a 
lack, while instinct and intelligence are not. “Though the plant is distinguished from the 
animal by fixity and insensibility”, Bergson says, “movement and consciousness sleep in it as 
recollections which may waken”.664 Plants sleep. If one compares this with the heroic march 
of the animal kingdom towards mankind, one realizes that: “the vegetable falling asleep in 
immobility, the animal, on the contrary, becoming more and more awake and marching on to 
the conquest of a nervous system”.665  
 
Notice that, as I quoted in 2.1.c “Analogy consciousness/general consciousness”, the 
“elements of a tendency” are like “psychic states”.666 In this case, the psychic state is that of 
decay. Bergson clearly thinks so when he says that “the animal kingdom threatened with 
torpor, secured that, on some points at least, it should rouse itself up and move forward”.667 
When Bergson applies plant features to animal lineages he talks about parasites.668 
In conclusion, the plant kingdom is teleologically subordinated to animals. Bergson writes in 
EC.II that he is “more particularly interested” in animals.669 The reason is quite obvious: the 
scope of his inquiry is mankind, and animals are so to say closer to mankind than plants. 
Plants have their own goal, as any other living being according to immanent teleology. 
Secondly, there is a complementary goal: that of contribution to progress. Bergson states that 
plants and their tendency is different in kind. Furthermore, they are also inferior and the plant 
form, like the other forms of kingdoms, genera and species as such, is also an expression of 
contingency in nature.  
- The scale and humans  
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The latest vertebrate, the human being, seems to be one of the two culminating points of 
evolution,670 but, in the end, it is the culminating point. Despite of the rich plurality of the 
branching pattern and the room made for contingency, in the end, the scale persists. Between 
animal knowledge and human knowledge there is a difference of kind, and not a difference of 
degree, as we saw in 3.2.b. In this case kind means also superiority. He says that “science 
claims to resolve instinct completely either into intelligent actions, or into mechanisms built 
up piece-by-piece like those combined by our intelligence”.671 There is a difference in kind, 
and not of degree, and we can find it to be so in our consciousness. The rest of our instinct 
shows it to be so. 
We can ask whether instinct is situated in Bergson in a lower level than intelligence. In EC 
intelligence is more important than instinct in at least one sense. It means invention, freedom 
and intuition, and instinct just shares some features in common with intuition. Bergson 
considers his doctrine “a philosophy that attempts to reabsorb intellect in intuition”,672 and not 
instinct. We should not overemphasize the role of instinct in EC, which would be a 
misguided reading.  
Since Bergson’s approach is based on analogy, we find in our mind sleep, instinct, 
intelligence and intuition. Since Bergson’s view is deeply hierarchical he establishes different 
degrees, depending on the ontological importance that he gives to each one.  
It is time to ask whether Bergson avoids the conception of the natural scale within his own 
vision. My answer is clearly negative. In Bergson there is a scale of living beings, but 
developed in time. There is an epoch of plants, and epoch of animals, and an epoch of 
intelligence and, more important for Bergson, of intuition.  
The different realms/faculties are different in kind and they appear by splits, divergences or 
dichotomies. But there is still a gradation. Each degree implies better efficiency, that is, 
closer to perfection. It’s difficult to know what Aristotle would say about the idea of 
difference in kind and evolution, but in his corpus there are degrees of perfection. The 
ultimate one is god and in the infralunary world the ultimate one is the human philosopher. In 
Bergson there are degrees of perfection, and the ultimate one is the creative spiritual hero, 
and before him the regular human being.  
I would say that Bergson does not avoid the “scale model” by just saying that every realm is 
not more or less perfect, but different in nature or kind. First, Bergson’s text implies that 
plants, represented by two faculties, torpor and the accumulation of energy, are “for the sake 
of” animals, that is: animal movement and explosion of energy. Animals are superior to 
plants: they are placed by Bergson in an upper level of the scale. He himself mentions that 
scale, not just here in EC, but before in MM.673 When a lineage becomes increasingly 
vegetative, it means that, for instance, it becomes parasitic.674 
It is not totally clear whether Bergson considers intelligence better than instinct in this work, 
though I believe he tends to dismiss this equality here and, later, openly in EC. However, it is 
clear that intuition is in an upper degree, over instinct and intellect. In a way, it is like a 
synthesis of both. Part of the epistemological discourse of EC.II is for the sake of this idea. 
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The important aspect here is that intuition, which involves freedom, is exclusively possessed 
by human beings (I show that in detail in 3.2.b). 
 
Thus, Bergson does not reject the natural scale. The scale is to be found in many passages of 
his corpus, but he reforms it. He reforms the scale. First, he wants to make it a product of an 
unpredictable power. The divergence does it. The difference in kind stresses the same idea: 
unilinearity reduces reality. But at the same time, Bergson doesn’t avoid the idea of 
perfection or perfectibility. The energetic reservoir of plants, the energetic explosion of the 
central nervous system and the faculty of intelligence which leads to intuition can be 
perfectly understood in terms of perfection. Thus, nutrition or torpor, instinct or sensibility 
and intelligence and intuition form a new sequence. The main novelty regarding Aristotle is 
the addition of intuition and, maybe, the closeness between instinct and intelligence.  
 
We have already seen the teleological relation between plants and animals. We saw the 
difference between animals and humans. These three stages are different in kind, according to 
Bergson. But this difference is articulated in teleological terms, since every step is for the 
sake of the next one. And the next one is for the sake of the whole, that is, the general télos. 
This, I insist, does not reduce the goal of individuals or different branches of Life. As we 
know, immanent teleology recognizes the intrinsic value of all kinds of life since it is alive. 
Every kind of living being tends to some kind of perfection. Like in Aristotle, individual 
teleology and global teleology are compatible in Bergson. The latter even makes primary 
teleology and secondary teleology compatible.  
 
- Global teleology and the paradigm of the cosmic army 
 
After talking about the simple tendency of the élan (EC.I) and its divergences (EC.II), in the 
last section of EC.III Bergson comes back to address Life. Now he tackles the topic in the 
most general dimension; there are no biological concrete issues like the eye or the relation 
between plants and animals.  
 
Now Bergson emphasizes the most important features: the hierarchy and the idea of progress 
or emergence. Bergson’s hierarchical scale has to be interpreted in global teleological and 
historical or horizontal terms. The three stages form a scale in time, that is, a progress. The 
ultimate télos is, again, indetermination or freedom. That is the “exigence” of the whole 
universe, and it is its tendency because it is its natural tendency.  
 
In the following passage we can see the cosmic approach of EC.III. The natural global 
tendency that he calls Life is now seen within the solar system: 
 
“As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with it in that 
undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organized beings, from the humblest 
to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all places as in all times, 
do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. 
All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push”.675 
 
I think it is already clear that progress “from the humblest to the highest” can be understood 
in at least three stages. Their difference in kind and the splits in Life cannot avoid 
perfectivism.  
 
                                                





The next passage that I will quote closes EC.III. In a way, it can be said that it closes the 
book, since EC.IV is one addition, taken from one course in the history of philosophy. In 
terms of doctrine, the following text ends Bergson’s essay. It reaches the widest and most 
panoramic scope. In this central moment of the book, the idea of the cosmic hierarchy is 
illustrated by the image of the army. There are strong Aristotelian echoes here. As we know, 
the most important example of global teleology in Aristotle is to be found in the last chapter 
of Met.XII, where precisely the whole cosmos and god were understood as one army 
(stráteuma) and its general (strategós).676 This is how Aristotle illustrates the cosmic order or 
taxis.677 We also know that Bergson taught this passage at the Collège.  
 
The army of Bergson has no god as leader. It seems, better, that mankind is the official in 
charge of the great parade of nature. There is no divine entity inspiring order and perfection 
in nature. Bergson’s army becomes an emergentist metaphor, taken from the ancient world. It 
develops the idea of a global teleology, as we saw it in 2.2.b. In fact, he advances the “riding 
metaphor” in EC.I. There he says that “the essential thing is the continuous 
progress indefinitely pursued, an invisible progress, on which each visible organism rides 
(chevauche) during the short interval of time given it to live”.678  
 
Miquel says in his commentary of EC that “the “substantialist and spiritualist conception of 
duration and life” appears “particularly” in the closing paragraphs of EC.III.679 Surely Miquel 
wants to be far from the “spiritualist lobby” (Troitignon) among Bergsonists.680 It seems that 
Miquel’s “aporetic reading” of EC.III does not emphasize this passage because, 
substantialism and spiritualism in Bergson are not to be emphasized. This conception is not 
far from Pearson’s claims in the two articles quoted in 1. Whatever substantialism and 
spiritualism is for Miquel, I consider that the last suspicious lines of EC.III will complete our 
enquiry. I do not consider the last paragraphs of EC.III to come from a sort of mystical access 
point, but to be coherent summary of the essay, although, obviously, expressed in a lyrical 
form. It shows a clear example of evolutionary global teleology: 
 
“[1] The animal takes its stand on the plant, [2] man bestrides animality, and [3] the whole of 
humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of 
us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable 
obstacles, perhaps even death”.681 
 
The three stages of Life are clearly present in [1] and [2]. Although it is uncertain for me 
what Bergson means with beating down “perhaps even death”, there is, at least, one thing that 
is clear enough: the passage talks about three different degrees of evolution and ontology. 
Bergson notes three roles for three different types of being. They are situated hierarchically, 
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from “the humblest to the highest”. This army has no general. But the leader of the army will 
be one of the topics of DS. I will come back to this matter onwards.  
 
We can see from the passage in EC.III that plants are for the sake of animals [1] and animals 
are for the sake of humanity [2], since it “gallops” on “animality”. However, it is not a 
teleological reading of the natural scale as we found in the Stoics.682 I think [1] refers to that 
by “taking stand”, but also implies a sequence. Here animality splits from the 
unconsciousness of the plant world. In the same way, [2] I presume that taming and feeding 
animals is legitimate, but the main aspect there is that the central nervous system has been 
developed through animality. The human body is in a certain way the outcome of it. This 
development should be understood as a process towards freedom. It could have been in 
another way. Unpredictability implies contingency. But although there is room for 
contingency in Bergson, there is always implied the same global tendency towards freedom. 
There is progress, although it can be seen retrospectively, since the possible forms of Life 
were infinite and the success was uncertain.  
 
To some extent Bergson’s approach is anthropocentric and to some extent is not. In Bergson, 
new more perfect forms could come to earth. Man could lose its centrality. I agree with 
Troitignon in that “le but de la nature n’était  pas l’homme, mais le but essential de l’homme 
est de se comprendre et de se dépasser”. I add another useful remark: “Nous sommes pourtant 
la fin que la nature s’assigne à elle-même à travers les êtres naturels que nous sommes”.683  
 
This is a new variety of what I called in 2.1.c mitigated anthropocentrism. Human beings are 
the best on earth because they have the most important thing on earth: indetermination. 
Human beings are more creative than any other being, and this implies that even the analogy 
between wholeness and personal freedom can be established. They are better than the rest for 
the sake of indetermination. They contribute by their own actions to progress. And progress is 
the essence of the cavalry march of Life and culture.  
 
EC, CV and DS coincide in saying the same thing. In the first one, Bergson says: “With man, 
consciousness breaks the chain. In man, and in man alone, it sets itself free. The whole 
history of life until man has been that of the effort of consciousness to raise matter (…) But, 
everywhere except in man, consciousness has let itself be caught in the net whose meshes it 
tried to pass through”.684  
 
In the same page of CV Bergson writes: “In man alone, especially among the best of 
mankind, the vital movement pursues its way without hindrance thrusting through that work 
of art, the human body, which it has created on its way, the creative current of the moral 
life”,685 and that “Human societies, alone, have kept full in view both the ends to be attained”. 
This is the essential aspiration of Life. In DS he just repeats the idea: “the creative effort 
progressed successfully only along that line of evolution which ended in man”.686 
 
But then, finally, I have to address what Bergson does mean when he says in EC: 
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 “[a] It is in this quite special sense that man is the “term” and the “end” of evolution. Life, we have 
said, transcends finality as it transcends the other categories. [b] It is essentially a current sent 
through matter, drawing from it what it can. There has not, therefore, properly speaking, been any 
project or plan. [c] On the other hand, it is abundantly evident that the rest of nature is not for the 
sake of man: we struggle like the other species, we have struggled against other species. [d] 
Moreover, if the evolution of life had encountered other accidents in its course, if, thereby, the 
current of life had been otherwise divided, we should have been, physically and morally, far different 
from what we are. [e] For these various reasons it would be wrong to regard humanity, such as we 
have it before our eyes, as pre-figured in the evolutionary movement. It cannot even be said to be the 
outcome of the whole of evolution, for evolution has been accomplished on several divergent lines, 
and while the human species is at the end of one of them, other lines have been followed with other 
species at their end. [f] It is in a quite different sense that we hold humanity to be the ground of 
evolution”.687 
 
It is now the moment to face the problem whether there is any contradiction contained in 
Bergson’s account. In [a] he shows us that teleological terminology is still useful for him, but, 
again, in a special sense. What Bergson rejects definitely is to “regard humanity as pre-
figured in the evolutionary movement”. According to [b] there is no transcendent plan, that 
is, evolution is immanent. According to [d] there is contingency, so we humans “should have 
been, physically and morally, far different from what we are”. There is more to be said 
regarding [c] and [e]. 
 
Bergson says in [d] that we “struggle like the other species, we have struggled against other 
species” and then, that is because the “rest of nature is not for the sake of man”. He adds in 
[e] that “evolution has been accomplished on several divergent lines, and while the human 
species is at the end of one of them”.  But I don’t think that the struggle is necessarily a sign 
of teleology or not. Furthermore, he holds in other place, as we already know, that human 
beings have dominated the other species. Domination is the result of the struggle. It is, 
anyway, [e] the most problematic statement. In the two paragraphs above we have seen that 
for Bergson in EC, CV and DS man alone is the real fulfillment of nature, so in light of those 
affirmations we can ponder the term “accomplished” and the expression “one of them”, 
regarding the lineage that leads to human beings. But we have seen that man is not one of the 
ends of nature and that nature hasn’t attained its perfection through any other line.  
 
I will quote one more statement from EC, really similar to those from EC, CV and DS three 
paragraphs before, but with some useful insight regarding our current logical problem. It is, 
in fact, where Bergson wants to address the mentioned “special sense” in which “man is the 
‘term’ and the ‘end’ of evolution”. 
 
“From our point of view, life appears in its entirety as an immense wave which, starting from a centre, 
spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole of its circumference is stopped and converted into 
oscillation: at one single point the obstacle has been forced, the impulsion has passed freely. It is this 
freedom that the human form registers. Everywhere but in man, consciousness has had to come to a 
stand; in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, continues the vital movement indefinitely, 
although he does not draw along with him all that life carries on itself. On other lines of evolution 
there have travelled other tendencies which life implied, and of which, since everything 
interpenetrates, man has, doubtless, kept something, but of which he has kept only very little. It is as if 
a vague and formless being, whom we may call, as we will, man or superman, had sought to realize 
himself, and had succeeded only by abandoning a part of himself on the way. The losses are 
                                                





represented by the rest of the animal world, and even by the vegetable world, at least in what these 
have that is positive and above the accidents of evolution”.688 
 
Again Bergson talks about “man alone”. Thus, human species is at the end of one of the lines 
of evolution, but at the end of the most important one. Although in the previous paragraph, 
regarding [e], Bergson seems to consider human beings just one part, equal to the others, that 
is not his idea. What Bergson is trying to emphasize by this, to be sure, through excessive 
contrast, is that human beings are important not because of their form, but because of their 
contribution to history of freedom. “It is this freedom that the human form registers”, he says. 
It seems that “human form” in itself is not important, but his or her capacity to imitate or 
replicate the vital impulse. Man “continues the vital movement indefinitely”.689 In my view, 
this claim and the mention of the figure of the “superhuman” mean basically what the mystic 
genius will be in DS.  
 
So “the place we occupy in the whole of nature”690 is by all means exceptional, not ordinary. 
But it is due not to a pre-ordained plan. We are not the accomplishment of nature. Our form is 
not, so to say, the last step of the movement of nature. Nothing has ended yet. Besides, 
humans are not good per se, but only with regard to their faculty of creating: again, their 
contribution. If we increase this contribution to change (and that would involve, according to 
Bergson, the use of intuition), then we should attain a “more complete and perfect 
humanity”.691 
 
These texts clearly show that in Bergson there is a global teleology. It gathers every living 
being and articulates their existence for the sake of one goal. That is, Bergson uses the 
teleology of contribution, which in his particular case is a transgressive teleology. Particular 
animals and species do not contribute to eternity like perishable beings in Aristotle, but to 
progress and change. In my interpretation, Bergson falls into the precise problem that he 
criticizes: the Aristotelian idea of the three stages/faculties of Life becomes not a vertical 
scale but a horizontal progress. In Bergson there is a historical version of the three levels of 
life, but he is a reformer, so he introduces newness. First, there is divergence or contingency. 
Second, there is difference in kind, and not in degree. Third, he adds a new degree and new 
notions (torpor, explosion, etc.). For Bergson, there is the plant-torpor level, an animal 
sensory-motor level and human intelligence. As I said, Bergson adds the faculty of intuition, 
still to come fully on earth. Furthermore, Bergson has a hierarchical vision of Life, so he 
understood the different realms, all different in kind, all with irreducible types of télos but 
also unequal in value.  
 
Bergson wants to avoid excessive anthropocentrism and also pre-design, and that’s because 
he emphasizes the natural origin of man. In this sense, the human is the end of one of the 
branches of nature. His perspective is, however, that of global teleology. There is tendency in 
nature and that tendency comes to its fullest form. The final success and, importantly, the 
forms that appear in the process, are contingent. The human form is not a predesigned apex of 
any demiurge or god; it is important because of its freedom. That is its perfective power.  
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According to Bergson, and according to the model of immanent teleology in general, every 
being has its own goal (attention to life is its best expression, in Bergson). But still there’s 
room for hierarchy and even for subordination: they are all goals and souls, but some goals 
are better than others. Aside from the developmental teleology there is contribution teleology. 
In his nuanced way, we can say that, partially, plants are for the sake of animals, and likewise 
animals are for the sake of humans, but also humans are for the sake of consciousness.  
 
The whole material world is for the sake of consciousness and consciousness is a work in 
progress, as I show in section 4.2.d. Now we will turn to Bergson’s continuation of this trend 
in human history.   
 
4.2.c. Global creative teleology: destination of history 
 
The domain of global teleology continues combining primary teleology and secondary 
teleology in Bergson’s philosophy of history. We focus now on the leaders of that global 
army. This is found in his last long essay, DS, where the doctrine has some additions. In this 
section I find it useful to examine, at least roughly, the context of the philosophy of history in 
Bergson. Then I will address the subject in three different subsections, following the same 
structure as when I talked about natural history in 4.2.c. That is, first I will talk again about 
the tendency of the élan as one teleological impulse in DS. Then I will talk about dichotomy 
and other subjects that nuance his view of the teleology of history. Afterwards I will address 
the concrete account of Western history to be found in DS. In this case, instead of plants, 
animals and humans, in rough terms we have the primitive epoch, the pagan epoch, Christian 
medieval epoch and modernity.  
 
Throughout this work I have highlighted the affinity between Aristotle and Bergson; at this 
point it is necessary to emphasize their differences. As we saw in 2.2.a I do not support the 
teleological interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of history. It does not mean, like Bury 
says, that all the Greeks are simply alien or opposed to any idea of cultural or technical 
progress. 692 This is not the case with Aristotle. If Aristotle had a vision of history opposed to 
progress, we could find in the corpus a philosophy of history in the sense of necessary decay. 
Maybe this regressive vision of history can be found in Plato, as the historian suggests. 
Regarding Aristotle, my claim is precisely that he saw history from an empirical perspective 
and thus had no philosophy of history. In short, although Aristotle created the model of 
immanent teleology, that is not to be found in the domain of history in his work.  
 
I want to recall one more thing from 2.2. In that section I addressed historical teleology in the 
2.2.a, at the end, and not along with the other views of Aristotelian global teleology in 2.2.b. 
Now regarding Bergson, I consider teleology of history a global teleology. This needs an 
explanation. In the case of Aristotle, I consider that it is a mixed field, difficult to pin up in 
this sense. If teleology of history were included in the framework, it would be always related 
to individual entities. In the case of political teleology, the télos is the city, one individual, 
perishable compound of living substances. In the case of the poetics, a certain type of tragedy 
would be the goal. It would surely involve a number of substances (people) activity, all 
subordinated to a general good. However, it would fit with the label of contribution, and not 
development. This good would always be concrete and also perishable, whereas in all the 
                                                
692 I think Nisbet is right in this critique of Bury, John. The idea of progress. An inquiry into its origin and 
growth. McMillan & Co. London, 1920. See Nisbet, Robert. History of the idea of progress. Heinemann, 





cases of genuine global teleology there is a contribution for general stable good or táxis. I 
gave the examples of ecology or cosmology. In Bergson the universal goal to contribute is 
not stable in any case, but progressing. His view of history as one trend is a continuation of 
the natural trend in evolution and also in cosmology. The goal to attain in history is universal, 
and part of nature understood as a whole. In short, history in Bergson is what in Aristotle was 
cosmology. In Bergson the élan, in nature and in history, is always global transgressive 
teleology. It may be understood as a general contribution to the general good. In this case, the 
good or télos is indetermination or progress, and not táxis. That is the need and the exigency 
of nature. So, in the context of DS the key term is progress.  
 
Cultural or historical progress mean human perfectiveness, by means of intelligence, 
technology, adaptation, natural dominance, peacefulness, cultural improvement, etc. 
Furthermore, following classic teleology, modern progressive perfectiveness can also imply 
happiness (a general eudaimony). If the notion of progress emphasizes above all the latter 
outcome, happiness, then we could talk about a eudaimonological theory of progress. 
Regarding the former concept of perfectiveness, we should notice that it could also imply 
physiological improvement, that is, biological progress. There can be then cultural progress 
and material progress, eudaimonological progress and physiological progress. All these 
versions can be gathered together or in different proportions. Anyway, in general, progress is 
a highly familiar term to us, so common in ordinary language. Among other things DS deals 
with it and is the main textual source for this section. Material, cultural and eudaimonological 
progress are at stake. Maybe also the biological one.  
 
- Philosophy of History: in the line of Comte and Spencer 
 
In terms of the cultural context of this book of 1932, I find it important to call attention 
briefly to the classic historical account of the idea of progress by John Bury, written ten years 
before DS. I want to recall two aspects regarding the notion of progress as it is addressed in 
that essay. First, Bury considers the concept as primarily French.693 Throughout modernity, 
Bossuet, the Abbé Saint Pierre, Turgot, Condorcet, Madame DeStäel, Cousin, Saint-Simon 
and, finally, Comte built and developed the most important part of the doctrine of progress. 
Second, he establishes at the end of the essay three stages of the history of the idea of 
progress: paradoxically, the peak of progressive thinking is not French, but British, and, 
strangely, his account of it is extremely short. So, the first stage is conceived up to the French 
Revolution and Condorcet; the second one, after it, when a search for a general law began (it 
culminates with Comte). And now, the third one, which holds that the general apex of the 
idea of progress is associated with England (not with France). Bury devotes only one chapter, 
the last one, “Chapter XIX. Progress and evolution”,694 to the apotheosis of the idea of 
progress. Darwin and above all Herbert Spencer mix the idea of progress and the scientific 
theory of evolution. Bury writes that “in the seventies and eighties of the last century [19th 
century] the idea of Progress was becoming a general article of faith”.695  
 
We can turn back to DS. First, DS is to be understood as the prolongation of the French 
tradition, where the idea of progress was widely accepted, both in the positivist lines that lead 
to Comte and also in the spiritualist lines, such as Ravaisson or Renouvier.696 Second, Herbert 
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Spencer exerted a great influence upon Bergson during the 70s and 80s of the19th Century, 
Bergson’s formative early years.697 Maybe DS can be read as a response to Spencer’s view of 
history. DS, the work of a man who many years before was a French Spencerian, still 
contains a theory of progress, or, in my words, a global historical teleology of human culture. 
From my perspective, regarding the context, it should also be considered as a convergence of 
the two mentioned traditional lines of modern progressive thought.  
 
To this extent DS is to be understood in the line of modern progressive authors such as 
Comte or Spencer, for whom universal progress is a central concept. Both Bury and Nisbet 
consider Spencer the “supreme embodiment in the late nineteenth century of both liberal 
individualism and the idea of progress”.698 Bergson mentions both, and criticizes Spencer 
twice in DS.699 
 
My approach to Bergson’s teleology in 4.2.c is twofold, and follows the same scheme as 
regarding the natural history in 4.2.b First, I will show the internal dynamism of the élan 
throughout history. I will try to address roughly why and how culture progresses. In Bergson, 
history and human culture are moved by inner perfectiveness. This is part of the reform of 
classic finalism, advanced in Chapter 1. Second, I will also roughly discuss the whole picture 
of Bergson’s historical global teleology in three stages. His historical vision challenges the 
idea of progress as universal law. I claim again that Bergson does it by appealing to 
secondary teleology.700 
 
As we have been seeing throughout these pages, Bergson is not a passive receptor, but an 
active reformer. While using the same concept, in this case (beyond Aristotlianism) the 
modern notion of teleological progress, Bergson modifies some of its features. In Bergson, 
progress is a fact but not a law. It is, then, unforeseen and unpredictable. Again, his 
ascensional model must make room for creative freedom. I think of Bergson like a sort of 
transitional figure, between the great historical progressive systems of the 19th century and 
the more sceptical approaches regarding global perfectiveness from post-WWI era. That is, 
what Pierre Taguieff calls the “anti-progressive vulgata”.701 I find DS between two opposite 
directions.702 
 
As I said above, DS is also the convergence of the two domains of teleology in Bergson. We 
have already seen conservative teleology in DS, but we already need to tackle the creative 
one. To this extent, the issue at stake in this section is a continuation of EC and the doctrine 
of the élan.  DS prolongs the ascensional conception of nature in EC that we saw in the two 
previous subsections in 4.2. The book addresses the higher function in Bergson’s nature: 
mystic intuition.703   
 
                                                
697 PM, p. 12. 
698 Nisbet, Robert. History of the idea of progress. Op. cit., pp. 234-235. 
699 Bergson mentions Comte once in DS, in p. 117, regarding his law of “law” and “progress”. He also mentions 
Spencer once in DS, in p. 272-273, regarding the issue of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Bergson 
had already rejected this neo-Lamarckian theory in EC.I, but here it has important historical implications. Both 
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700 See chance and luck in 2.1.d. 
701 Taguieff, Pierre André. Le sens du progress. Flammarion, Paris, 2004, p. 265.  
702 Take the example of his influence in Sorel and De Chardin. 





Bergson developed in DS something contained in the last statements of CV, written 20 years 
before. In CV he said that human heroes are the “culminating point of evolution and they are 
nearest the source” and they “enable us to perceive the impulsion which comes from the 
deep”.704 To this extent, DS ascends even more in the scale of living beings: from humans to 
human genius.705 DS talks about biology in a “wide meaning”706 and, ultimately, all kind of 
law that Bergson would accept is biological, and not historical.707 In this context, biology 
refers to the teleological tendency to conservation. It is a law that appears equally in the 
beginning or in the end, for this author. To this extent, primitive societies and Western 
civilization are essentially the same. With historical laws he means a concrete development. 
But, again, at this point Bergson recalls contingency. The historical events unfolded from the 
beginning of the human being could not be pre-determined. Bergson is writing here against 
historical determinism, in all its forms.  
 
In sum, Bergson considers culture and spirit to be inside the concept of biology, widely 
understood. Cultural and spiritual matters are, so to say, biological outcomes of society, 
which is an organism, whereas human physiology remains fixed in comparison. Culture, 
including here religion, politics and the arts, are the most moveable parts of human life. DS 
tries to show that evolution, that is, the élan is at work in culture.708 
 
Ultimately, DS is a continuation of EC. Bergson is clear when he states in the former essay 
that progress’ “direction is exactly that of the vital impetus; it is this impetus itself, 
communicated in its entirety to exceptional men, who in their turn would fain impart it to all 
humanity, and by a living contradiction change into creative effort that created thing which is 
a species, and turn into movement what was, by definition, a stop.  Can it succeed? If 
mysticism is to transform humanity, it can only do so by passing on, from one man to 
another, slowly, a part of itself”.709 
 
Finally, regarding the continuity from EC to DS I want to reiterate one thing. Bergson repeats 
his critique of the retrospective illusion710 and the idea of divergence.711He also claims two 
important ideas for establishing global teleology: a global tendency towards perfection in 
nature and a concrete higher point or culmination of Life.  
 
Also, DS is the best articulation of the twofold vision of teleology in Bergson. Conservative 
teleology and creative teleology are both part of the same picture. Each perfective tendency 
occupies its own chapter in that book. While in EC conservation was seen as something 
clearly less interesting than evolution, here in DS conservation and evolution share the 
leadership. Both are perfective, although obviously, change or progress means a higher 
degree of perfection, since it implies not mere action for the sake of something good for an 
individual entity (one organism or one society), but a creation for the sake of contribution to 
something universal (the vital impulse or progress). 
                                                
704 CV in ES, p. 32.  
705 See DS, pp. 95-96. 
706“See DS, pp. 100-101. 
707 DS, p. 293.  
708 DS, p. 27: “… however much human society may progress, grow complicated and spiritualized, the original 
design, expressing the purpose of nature, will remain”. DS, p. 27. Leaving aside the question of progress and 
evolution, also in Aristotle the polis and human beings are part of nature.  
709 DS, p. 235.  
710 See Chapter 1. 






- The essential function of the universe 
 
What in EC has the name of “need” or “exigency” now DS has a much more openly 
teleological term: “function”. Bergson says in the last sentence of the book that the “the 
essential function of the universe” is a “machine for the making of gods”.712 This can recall 
the third type of causality that we saw at the beginning of 4.2 on the cylinder and the melody. 
Here the melody is none other than freedom and the universe is called “machine”. In this last 
statement of DS we see that nature is for the sake of perfection. I see it as a clearly perfective 
or teleological statement. Again, the destination of the world is freedom. Thus, universal 
history has for Bergson cosmic echoes, as evolution had.  
 
Regarding the culmination point it is also clear in CV, when Bergson writes that the “original 
and essential aspiration of life (…) could only find full satisfaction only in society”.713 As we 
saw, Bergson’s cultural philosophy relies on the exemplary figure of the hero. To this extent, 
societies should be understood for the sake of genius, since the genius introduces 
indetermination and freedom in the world. Here the mitigated anthropocentrism of EC is even 
emphasized. In the following passage Bergson says that man only “accounts for the presence 
of life on our planet”. Also, and especially interesting for us, Bergson says here that teleology 
is in between predetermination and accidentality: 
 
“It doubtless takes, by reason of the diversity of conditions in which it exists, the most varied forms, 
some very remote from what we imagine them to be; but its essence is everywhere the same, a slow 
accumulation of potential energy to be spent suddenly in free action. We might still hesitate to admit 
this, if we regarded as accidental the appearance amid the plants and animals that people the earth of a 
living creature such as man, capable of loving and making himself loved. But we have shown that this 
appearance, while not predetermined, was not accidental either. Though there were other lines of 
evolution running beside the line which led to man, and in spite of all that is incomplete in man 
himself, we can say, while keeping in close touch with experience, that it is man who accounts for the 
presence of life on our planet”.714 
 
The universe has a function: indetermination. Human beings, human societies and 
particularly, human geniuses partially fulfill that function. The tendency of Life or nature 
towards human beings, and particularly, human geniuses is not accidental. It is a natural goal: 
it is regular and perfective. These three features sketch out an unavoidable teleological 
model. Bergson considers it important to stress again that pre-design is not part of his global 
teleological framework. DS focused on the role of human societies and, moreover, human 
progress in this natural vision. There is, thus, a non-accidental tendency to fulfill a certain 
télos and it is unforeseeable. Regarding the natural scope of EC, human progress is at the 
very peak of nature. But like evolution, history is not pre-determined. We will see this in the 
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-Progress against progress: retrospective illusion, sudden leaps, and dichotomy 
 
In the insightful article called “Y a-t-il chez Bergson une philosophie de l'histoire?” Polin 
proposes two notions of progress.715 On the one hand, DS is a “rejection of progress like a 
principle of forecasting and like a real presence of one pre-existent direction and immanent to 
the historical becoming”. On the other hand, it’s a defense of progress in an original way. 
According to Polin, DS holds an “open progress”. It is discontinuous, undefined, 
undetermined. So, in Bergson, civilizations make progress regarding the second. The 
accumulation of intellectual inventions and the diffusion of the creations of the mystic love 
are to be called progress.  
 
Polin notices that the problem is not the word “progress”. The problem is not the concept 
behind that either. Bergson was in his early days a French Spencerian: he grew up with that 
concept, and he still supports its philosophical use. In rough terms, Bergson is a progressive 
author. Just as Bergson reforms global teleology in other areas, he does the same here. 
Bergson is a reformer of the concept of progress, and not a destructive critique. Polin shows 
very well that the problem is not general enhancement and perfectivism: for Bergson the 
problem is how to hold perfectivism and freedom at the same time. The global historical laws 
of the previous century are not useful for him now.  
 
The progress defended in DS should go beyond already made conceptual destinations and 
should be opened. Progress should escape from the “enclosedness”.716 Two years after DS, 
Bergson published the article PR. It is time to recall that there Bergson writes that from his 
philosophical perspective that “evolution becomes something quite different from the 
realisation of a program: the gates of the future open wide; freedom is offered an unlimited 
field”. Just afterwards he talks about the doctrines, “rare indeed in the history of philosophy”, 
that have tried to make “room for indetermination and freedom in the world”.717 His own 
doctrine is, beyond a doubt, one of those rare speculative proposals. Bergson defends 
progress, but open progress.  
 
As I have said, DS is a development of EC. It is clear why he recalls two major concepts 
regarding the vital impulse’s doctrine. The retrospective illusion or vis a tergo,718 and the idea 
of divergence:719 Bergson renames the term as “dichotomy”. It apparently brings about a 
materialization by a mere splitting up.720 Besides he also conceives the process towards 
freedom as non-gradual, but made by sudden leaps. Clearly, Bergson repeats the contents of 
EC.721 
 
Concerning our subject, DS merely continues what he said in EC. If we understand progress, 
then “ (…) we introduce into the things themselves, under the guise of the pre-existence of 
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716 Ibid.,, p. 40. 
717 PR in PM, p. 122, my italics. 
718 For the idea of illusion of progress: DS, pp. 72, 78-79, 267-268. 
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bergsoniennes, IV, 1956. 
720 DS, p. 296. 
721“And even then we should have to add that there had been, not gradual progress, but at a certain epoch a 





the possible in the real” and “this retrospective anticipation”. It seems that “each one 
[personal and contingent creation] has given rise to the one that follows it and if they appear, 
in retrospect, as continuations of  one another”.722 Recalling EC’s doctrine, Bergson states 
“that it is always possible to take the latest phase of renovation, to define it and to say that the 
others  contained a greater or lesser quantity of what the definition  defines, that therefore 
they all led up to that renovation. But things only assume this form in retrospect”.723 This is 
his theory of the vis a tergo in EC. Bergson puts it in this way in DS: “if there were really a 
pre-existent direction along which man had simply to advance, moral renovation would be 
foreseeable; there would be no need, on each occasion, for a creative  effort”.724 
 
“Step forward” is a metaphor that implies a misinterpretation, for Bergson. It shows history in 
retrospect. But history has “defied all anticipation”,725 because human effort and creativeness 
defies anticipation. Bergson proposes another metaphor that I have mentioned: “opening what 
was closed”.726 Bergson talks about a succession of creative efforts:  
 
“these successive efforts were not, strictly speaking,  the progressive realization of an ideal, since no 
idea, forged  beforehand, could possibly represent a series of accretions,  each of which, creating 
itself, created its own idea; and yet  the diversity of these efforts could be summed up into one  and 
the same thing: an impetus, which had ended in closed societies because it could carry matter no 
further along,  but which later on is destined to be sought out and captured,  in default of the species, 
by some privileged individual”.727  
 
Again, we are facing creative teleology. Dichotomy, as divergence and sudden leaps in EC, is 
the material expression of creation and contingency. There is no pre-determined goal or plan 
out of time, waiting for history to reach its plenitude. For Bergson everything in human 
culture is contingent and human beings are free. “We do not believe in the fatality of history. 
There is no obstacle which cannot be broken down by wills sufficiently keyed up, if they deal 
with it in time. There is thus no inescapable historic law”.728  
 
Bergson is talking here about history as a mere sum of accidents. We already know that that 
is not true. There is an “original tendency”,729 or “primitive tendency”730 but, as in any 
activity where freedom is involved, there is also real oscillation between opposites and 
contingency. Perfectivism and attraction might go hand in hand with contingency and 
freedom. Bergson proposes “to designate law of twofold frenzy the imperative demand, 
forthcoming from each of the two tendencies as soon as it is materialized by the splitting, to 
be pursued to the very end as if there was an end!”.731 
 
As evolution “while not predetermined, was not accidental either”, that’s the same that we 
should say about history. Bergson’s global teleology works at this middle term, full of risks 
of aporia and paradox. According to Bergson it “is man who accounts for the presence of life 
on our planet” and, moreover, in the cultural ground the Christian mysticism is the 
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culmination of human history, in DS.III, and at the same time we should talk “as if there was 
an end”.732  
 
The global natural function, on the one hand, and divergence and contingency of one singular 
event called history of mankind (or rooted in history of Life), on the other, compose a mixed 
model with regard to the temporal dimension of 2.1.d. It is primary teleology, since this 
vision of the cosmos presupposes a certain regularity: regularly the cosmos tends to fulfill its 
requirement. The global natural function is to be interpreted in terms of primary teleology. At 
the same time, the actual outcome of this tendency, split into divergent branches is different. 
It is different not only for its form, marked by contingency, but also for its singularity. The 
history of man is unique. Contingency and singularity imply that the outcomes of the process 
are not to be deduced from any law. That is because Bergson says that progress is not a law, 
since his global teleology has to be understood from secondary teleology too. In the end, 
however, it is not like an Aristotelian secondary teleology since this one is based on cases of 
fortune, and they do not constitute any sort of fulfillment at any natural degree. As we saw, 
only humans can have good or bad fortune. What I take from secondary teleology in Aristotle 
is the idea of as if teleology or making sense of unique and unrepeatable events. That is what 
I called narratology.  
 
Like in the case of Life in 4.2.b human history is unique and unrepeatable. It has something 
of the events of fortune of secondary teleology (2.1.d), but at the same time, it is led by the 
original tendency, which implies real fulfillment in the natural ground. In this sense, it is a 
mixture of two types of teleology regarding time. Bergson’s global teleology implies a 
primary natural teleology and a narratology regarding the outcomes. That is why he can say 
that, inasmuch as there is a tendency in culture, there is a genuine fulfillment. At the same 
time, every stage of the concrete historical becoming is contingent.  
 
- Three degrees of culture: on heroes 
 
History is not only non-accidental, but also not pre-designed. This means that there is a 
natural direction or impulse, but not a concrete end, already finished as a “possible” waiting 
to be “actualized”. In Bergson, history is neither chance nor plan. Bergson defends an idea of 
open progress. “Openness” is his metaphorical proposal. Opening means creation. Spiritual 
heroes move by attraction because their capacity of creating. They make everybody creator, 
in a way. This implies growth, ascension and perfectiveness.  
 
This is coherent with Bergson’s personal account of history of humanity. The same as his 
vision of history of philosophy in EC.IV which is quite systematic, and in DS there is a clear 
succession of efforts that lead to higher momentum. In my view, just as in EC.II regarding 
biology and in EC.IV regarding philosophy, one finds a general movement.   
 
My account will be undeniably rough at this moment, but still I think that a rapid overlook is 
useful for us, since it is illustrative. First of all, DS.II and DS.III talk about the past (primitive 
societies, pagan societies and early Christianity). The form that it draws is clearly 
ascensional. DS.IV talks about both the past and above all about the future of man in 
technological societies. The last chapter is extremely important for understanding Bergson’s 
view of history and freedom, but first we can start with the previous historical chapters.  
 
                                                





Bergson’s historical account in DS.II and DS.III can be considered a threefold historical 
model, and in this sense remains related to the 19th century models where the universal 
history schemes were ultimately considered in a triadic sequence. In my view, the primitive-
pagan-Christian cultures model is to be found in DS.  
 
In DS.II we see how primitive cultures fit with the conservative teleology or attention to life 
(the only “law of biology” that he admitted). Primitive cultures are the paradigm of the closed 
society. Closed society is not a thing (a society), but a social tendency. This tendency finds its 
goal in conservation, or in the defense of conservation.733  
 
Just after primitive cultures we tend beyond the “hands of nature” as he says. It means that 
progress starts and human culture starts growing. From now on, Bergson understands each 
cultural step in history as a contribution to progress. Every culture and, especially, every 
cultural or spiritual hero contribute to progress for the sake of indetermination, freedom or 
transgression.  
 
In the end of this chapter and during the first half of DS.III Bergson talks about paganism. It 
is a step further, in terms of perfection. The pagan society constitutes a progress, especially 
regarding philosophy. Contemplation is the goal of human beings for them. Pagans, and also 
Oriental societies, and even the briefly mentioned the Hebraic societies contributed to 
progress in a way.734 But they all take part of that intermediate step, around paganism. The 
pagan spiritual hero proposed by Bergson is clearly Socrates, a figure with whom Bergson is 
deeply familiar. Socrates appears in the first courses he taught. Socrates is a culmination of 
the pagan epoch and he opens new ways of feeling, thinking and moral living.  
 
Just afterwards comes the third lapse that goes from Christianity to Modernity. Bergson 
compares Socrates and Christ. As it appears in DS, I think that just as Socrates is a 
culmination of Ancient times, the Gospels are the beginning of a new era. Certainly, one of 
the most important and maybe striking historical statements of DS is that there is an 
“evangelic spirit” which goes throughout history and culminates in democracy and the rights 
of man. That’s why I think that the lapse between the Gospels and French Republics 
composes one sole step.735  
 
The Christian human model is not so focused on contemplation. It is, however, not opposed 
to contemplation. As in biological matters, each step further includes the previous. Intuition 
was, in biological terms, the highest faculty. Intuition includes or better presupposes (from 
higher to lower degrees) intelligence, instinct and locomotion, nutrition and torpor or 
unconsciousness. Now, in historical terms, we see that Christianity is a progressive tendency 
that leads to democracy, cosmopolitism and pacifism, but would not reach them entirely. 
There will also be a conservative tendency which is deeply anchored in our biology and part 
of the closed or primitive society. Closed society is not a useless tendency, since it promotes 
the conservation of each community. Anyway, there is a transgressive teleology that explains 
the tendency of going always beyond the fixed habits, institutions, ideas or sentiments. This 
means for Bergson real progress.  
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Socrates, who talks about spirit and incarnates mysticism in an exemplary way, incarnates the 
first step of this progress.736 Christ defends a new mysticism. What Christian mysticism is for 
Bergson is a complicated issue, and many scholars have studied it, so I will not enter into 
that. What is interesting for us now is that mysticism produces progress and transgression. 
Mysticism reproduces the élan vital. The outcome of it is the growth of freedom or 
indetermination, which is the function of all of nature. It is then superior to the pagan 
contemplative mysticism, that is why Bergson himself calls Christian mysticism “complete 
mysticism”, identified with “action”:737  
 
 “For the complete mysticism is that of the great Christian mystics. Let us leave aside, for the 
moment, their Christianity, and study in them the form apart from the matter. There is no doubt that 
most of them passed through states resembling the various culminating phases of the mysticism of the 
ancients. But they merely passed through them: bracing themselves up for an entirely new effort, they 
burst a dam; they were then swept back into a vast current of life; from their increased vitality there 
radiated an extraordinary energy, daring power of conception and realization”.738  
 
By stressing the importance of the notion of charity, for instance, Bergson is giving 
importance to the “superabundant activity”739 and creativity of the Christian human model.  
 
Now one can say that Bergson adds on new aspects to his theory of the élan vital in EC. 
Unlike Spencer, Bergson’s history is led by heroes and saints. Bergson philosophy of history 
is a doctrine of heroes, and not laws. Strong individuals incarnate the power of the élan. They 
are analogue to mutations, in the biological realm. They emerge suddenly and produce 
divergent branches in culture.  
 
The heroes move regular people by attraction and aspiration. They introduce in average 
people the unforeseen aim of perfection. The unknown primitive epochs progressed by 
unknown heroes up to the pagan world. The pagan world reaches its apex thanks to Socrates. 
The mysticism around the idea of contemplation or theorein is an outcome of progress, 
indeed, but is a static spiritualism. It does not promote or prolong the force that led to that 
success. Socrates produces aspiration in uncountable generations after him, but it is an 
aspiration of ataraxia, according to Bergson.  
 
Christ and Christian heroes attract average people in a different way. They move people to 
action. Strictly speaking, the Christian framework introduces history as such into human 
culture. And history, for Bergson, is above all progress. Christianity both discovers and 
promotes progress.  Christianity’s “mysticism agissant”, active mysticism, is “capable of 
marching on to the conquest of the world”.740 
 
As I said earlier, in DS he adds a mimetical model to his global teleology. The great artists in 
EC imitate the vital impetus that goes through Life and so do the heroes and saints in DS. In 
addition, Bergson finds out how regular people can contribute to the general good. They do it 
through imitation. This second-degree imitation is still a development of his theory of the 
élan, regarding only humans.  
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- Unpredictable future: open progress 
 
Until now, in this subsection we have seen the account of Western history in Bergson. Finally 
we can turn to DS.IV. As Ghislain and Keck say, that conclusive chapter IV, entitled “Final 
remarks: mechanism and mysticism” is a certain “caesura” with regard to the rest of the 
book.741 Its style and subject are different, as I said earlier. It is focused partially on the past 
too, but above all on the future. That is something different from the rest of the book. In 
general terms the author demands a moral reform and also the apparition of spiritual 
leaders.742 Regarding the past time, the chapter is his contribution to genealogy and the 
philosophy of technology.743 Leaving these interesting topics aside, our current concern is that 
this chapter addresses one of our major issues: unpredictability.  
 
Progress in Bergson is not a law but a fact. DS.I, II, III, especially II and III offer some 
examples of narratology or secondary teleology. They compose human history, including the 
history of philosophy. There is a natural tendency in nature and the human being is a 
fulfillment, and, among human beings, the heroes, and, among heroes, the mystic heroes, and 
among mystic heroes, Christian mystic heroes. These individuals attract the rest of the people 
and make cultures move suddenly forward. Chapters II and III show that this is precisely 
what happened. Chapters II and III are a philosophical description of what is history: a 
progress towards freedom.  
 
DS.IV adds new features of this past (especially regarding philosophy of technology) but also 
applies to what he said about the illusion of progress. It is important to emphasize that 
Bergson does not consider progress an illusion per se. That would render DS absolutely 
incomprehensible. What he is saying is that although progress is a fact, it is a singular event. 
Progress is ascension, but also openness. This is the second progress Polin was talking about. 
Bergson identifies progress as an “original tendency”. It is original because, again, Bergson is 
deeply rooted in nature. Ultimately the universe is expressed by progress. But he seeks to 
provide a much more sophisticated account of humans and history by making room for 
freedom and, then, for unpredictability.  
 
When Gilson says that “Bergson is a continuation of Spencer” he is right; when he states that 
“like Spencer’s, it [Bergsonism] is an optimistic evolutionism”744 I do not think he is entirely 
correct. Since open progress means not only room for freedom, but room for risk and, 
ultimately, risk of decay, morally or biologically speaking. It is true that Bergson’s view of 
human beings was more optimistic before the First World War. Coherently, this change of 
vision of mankind changed his vision of the future. Human beings are responsible, in his 
view. This is not necessarily an optimistic vision. It seems that, in his view in 1932, 
technology had developed much better than morals. Bergson says that material progress 
became a sort of menace for mankind, for the threat of industrial war and the decline of 
virtues and good habits: 
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“Mankind lies groaning, half-crushed beneath the weight of its own progress.  Men do not sufficiently 
realize that their future is in their own hands. Theirs is the task of determining first of all whether they 
want to go on living or not. Theirs the responsibility, then, for deciding if they want merely to live, or 
intend to make just the extra effort required for fulfilling, even on their refractory planet, the essential 
function of the universe,  which is a machine for the making of gods”.745  
 
Following Polin, we can say that there are two visions of global transgressive teleology or 
progress. There is closed progress, which is, in fact, a historical application of what Bergson 
called “radical finalism”.746 There is an open progress, a translation into history of the élan 
vital’s global transgressive teleology, where natural perfectivism and human responsibility 
are compatible. Open progress is nothing like a law, it is made by effort of powerful 
individuals and their inspired imitators. 
 
4.2.d. Global creative teleology: the destination of cosmos 
 
We have reached now the widest domain in Bergson: cosmology. I will tackle the idea of 
élan as such, without its history in evolution and progress. It is the most abstract step in 
Bergson’s worldview, to be found in EC. For Janicaud EC is an ambiguous theodicy.747 It is 
true that Bergson rejected in his famous letters to Tonquédec,748 any charge of pantheism, but 
he did not detail the ontological status of Life and avoided natural theology. Reasonably, 
Gouhier calls Life a “species of soul of the world”.749 Bergson himself defends in EC and also 
in his book on Einstein’s Relativity, DuSi, a cosmic global duration.750 It is difficult to 
disentangle these remarks. For the moment it is necessary to affirm that we will remain in the 
realm of cosmology: it covers only two items, Life and matter. Here I tackle the relation 
between them, to be found in EC, especially in its third chapter (there are hints of his cosmic 
approach in MM and IM). 
 
From my point of view there are two ways of seeing this relation: it is conflict or cooperation. 
Sometimes, it seems that Life itself is the only tendency to perfection (“ascension”, in this 
context) and matter is its obstacle. This ontological conflict, along with that of anima mundi, 
is the ground for the abundant studies of Bergson from Neoplatonism, and vice versa, from 
Bréhier onwards.751 There is a second relativist understanding of this relation between the two 
basic cosmic items. I think Miquel is a good example of it.752 Above all my aim is only to 
explain both perspectives in terms of global teleology, but I think that these two views are 
compatible. That is, Life and matter are two opposed tendencies, but the world is made of the 
two. Miquel is right suggesting the necessary relation of the two.  
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Secondly, I will address the source of this dual conception of the universe with regards to 
Aristotle. Bergson himself offers the textual basis in one passage in EC.IV, that we have 
already seen in 3.1.d on historical analogy (on attraction/impulsion) and also at the beginning 
of this chapter (on attraction). I defend that out of this specific theological framework they 
both fit with Bergson’s cosmology. I also tackle Bergson’s interpretation. As we saw in the 
section on evolution, Bergson considered Aristotle the founder of philosophy of biology, also 
at work in evolutionary biology. Now Aristotle is seen as the founder of philosophical 
theology. Although, his interpretation of the two Aristotelian books on theology, Phys.VIII 
and, above all, Met.XII, is peculiar. It comes from his course at the Collège, but I think it 
comes from Ravaisson’s Neoplatonic view of Aristotle as a system. Although Bergson’s 
reading of Aristotle in the course is really nuanced and based on abundant quotations, his 
synthetic account in EC.IV is quite violent. It is easier to find here more clearly the mark of 
both Ravaisson’s interpretation of Aristotle and also Plotinus. These two influence Bergson’s 
synthetic account of Aristotelian theodicy heavily.  
 
Like with regard to the case of the army, the cosmology of EC.III is suggested in advance in 
EC.I. Although EC.I seems totally focused on biology, there are some scattered remarks that 
show Bergson’s ultimate scope. In the first pages of EC.I the author compares our 
psychology (duration) with the Universe. This is a passage that shows relatively clearly an 
opposition between the two fluxes. He does not explain much about the nature of these two 
movements: 
 
“The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that 
duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new. The 
systems marked off by science endure only because they are bound up inseparably with the rest of the 
universe. It is true that in the universe itself two opposite movements are to be distinguished, as we 
shall see later on, ‘descent’ and ‘ascent’. The first only unwinds a roll ready prepared. In principle, it 
might be accomplished almost instantaneously, like releasing a spring. But the ascending movement, 
which corresponds to an inner work of ripening or creating, endures essentially, and imposes its 
rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it”.753 
 
While ascent is, genuinely, a teleological metaphor, descent cannot be a teleological 
tendency. It is obvious that Bergson is not talking about ascending in space, up in the air, but 
about ascension in value. Furthermore, he adds creation to ascension, the main télos in 
Bergson. He promises that “later on” the explanation of such an ambitious statement will 
come, but it does not. On the other hand, although it becomes much clearer, in EC the 
movement of ascent is, so to say, the leading characteristic: creative evolution itself 
incarnates that ascent. As we will see, matter incarnates the descent.  
 
The idea of descent is changed for that of fall later on in EC: “The whole history of life until 
man”, he says, “has been that of the effort of consciousness to raise matter, and of the more 
or less complete overwhelming of consciousness by the matter which has fallen back on 
it”.754 Matter is related to “the fall”. In this cosmological level, it seems that matter is the 
counterforce of Life, it is opposed to Life.755 
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Life, or Supraconsciousness is in conflict with something that is the opposite of creation. 
While Life ascends and remounts, matter “falls”, metaphorically speaking. In five pages of 
EC.III,756 Bergson addresses this opposition. Regarding the “whole of our solar system”, he 
says “the two most general laws of our science” are “the principle of conservation of energy 
and that of its degradation”. The latter is the second principle of thermodynamics. Regarding 
the descent movement, thermodynamics plays the role as evolution regarding ascension. In 
this way, they are symmetrical.757  
 
For Bergson the physicians Sadi Carnot, Rudolf Clausius and Ludwig Boltzmann add 
different aspects to the same “the law of the degradation of energy” which “does not bear 
essentially on magnitudes”. In sum, the tendency towards degradation or, at least in this 
discourse, entropy, incarnates the movement opposed to Life. It is not necessary for us to 
analyze Bergson’s interpretation of thermodynamics, I will quote just one passage where I 
believe Bergson shows, in general terms, what he thinks about this law and, more importantly 
for us here, the role that matter plays in his framework. 
“Essentially, it [the law of degradation of energy] expresses the fact that all physical changes have a 
tendency to be degraded into heat, and that heat tends to be distributed among bodies in a uniform 
manner. In this less precise form, it becomes independent of any convention; it is the most 
metaphysical of the laws of physics since it points out without interposed symbols, without artificial 
devices of measurements, the direction in which the world is going. It tells us that changes that are 
visible and heterogeneous will be more and more diluted into changes that are invisible and 
homogeneous, and that the instability to which we owe the richness and variety of the changes taking 
place in our solar system will gradually give way to the relative stability of elementary vibrations 
continually and perpetually repeated. Just so with a man who keeps up his strength as he grows old, 
but spends it less and less in actions, and comes, in the end, to employ it entirely in making his lungs 
breathe and his heart beat. From this point of view, a world like our solar system is seen to be ever 
exhausting something of the mutability it contains. In the beginning, it had the maximum of possible 
utilization of energy: this mutability has gone on diminishing unceasingly”.758 
This law is the most metaphysical law in physics because it expresses the irreversible 
direction or movement of the world. It is a tendency towards stability and repetition, and it 
means the diminishing and exhausting of mutability. As I said, EC.III defines Life in relation 
to this tendency, as a sort of counter-force.  
 
Sometimes, on the one hand, it seems that contingency is an effect of Life itself, and 
sometimes, on the other, it seems that it comes from the collision of evolution and entropy. 
To this extent, Life is “an effort to remount the incline that matter descends. In that, they 
reveal to us the possibility, the necessity even, of a process the inverse of materiality, creative 
of matter by its interruption alone. The life that evolves on the surface of our planet is indeed 
attached to matter. If it were pure consciousness, a fortiori if it were supra-consciousness, it 
would be pure creative activity. In fact, it is riveted to an organism that subjects it to the 
general laws of inert matter. But everything happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself 
free from these laws. It has not the power to reverse the direction of physical changes, such 
as the principle of Carnot determines it. It does, however, behave absolutely as a force would 
behave which, left to itself would work in the inverse direction. Incapable of stopping the 
course of material changes downwards, it succeeds in retarding it”.759  
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The degrading tendency suggests the idea of a thing unmaking itself and evolution would be 
the opposite. Now, we can come back to the special metaphor of EC.I, ascent and descent, in 
EC.III: “The vision we have of the material world is that of a weight which falls: no image 
drawn from matter, properly so called, will ever give us the idea of the weight rising. But this 
conclusion will come home to us with still greater force if we press nearer to the concrete 
reality, and if we consider, no longer only matter in general, but, within this matter, living 
bodies”.760 
 
There is also a more relativist view of the relation between matter and Life. In EC.II he refers 
to the harsh collision, again with regard to the inversion, but we see how Life, in the end, 
works upon matter. Matter is disposable to Life, it seems. We have seen the first sentence of 
the following passage throughout this work: 
 
“The impetus of life, of which we are speaking, consists in a need for creation. It cannot create 
absolutely, because it is confronted with matter, that is to say with the movement that is the inverse of 
its own. But it seizes upon this matter, which is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the 




Also: “If our analysis is correct, it is consciousness, or rather supra-consciousness, that is at the origin 
of life. Consciousness, or Supra-consciousness, is the name for the rocket whose extinguished 
fragments fall back as matter; consciousness, again, is the name for that which subsists of the rocket 
itself, passing through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms. But this consciousness, 
which is a need for creation, is made manifest to itself only where creation is possible. It lies dormant 
when life is condemned to automatism; it wakens as soon as the possibility of a choice is restored”.762 
 
This need is relatively fulfilled by biology and, moreover, by human spirit. But humans and 
evolution are, in the end, material.  Matter is here the opposite to duration/Life, and Bergson 
does not regard them as equal counter-forces. In short: Life tends to perfection, and matter 
does not. Duration and creativity are the basis of the cosmos. The need of the cosmos is life 
and perfection. This means that they are not mere opposites, different in kind, but also 
subordinated. Thus, Life possesses matter to create. This issue is, however, full of obscurity 
and it is unclear to me to what extent Life needs matter to create. Also, their union is unclear. 
For instance, we know that from the development of Life through matter contingency 
unfolds, but it is uncertain for me whether contingency arises from Life itself only or also 
from the collision with matter. I am inclined to support a combination of these two.  
 
I follow Miquel on saying that in our world Life is for Bergson relative to matter. It is finite 
and concrete. Sometimes, it seems that Bergson talks about matter as a lack and limit for 
something that, by nature, shouldn’t be. Also, it seems that Life is contingent in itself. At 
other times, it seems that matter’s opposition is the source of contingency and is necessary to 
understand Life. They are two complementary perspectives of a general subject, though, in 
any case, global teleology is at stake. Just as how the soul and the body take part in a 
teleology of development in individual teleology, survival and well-being, Life and matter are 
both parts of the same thing: a tendency towards creativity, newness and perfection.  
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We can now ask whether at this cosmic level there is any sort of teleology involved. There is, 
certainly, a global teleology at stake. Bergson stresses the idea that the Universe, as a whole, 
endures. That was his mysterious claim at the beginning of EC.I, which he will address again 
in EC.III and in DuSi. The Universe also ascends and creates. It means progression in time 
and directedness. As I said in advance, matter can be opposed in nature to Life, but it seems 
that everything in this world is a mixture of the two. It is reasonable to think that Life 
possesses matter, since it is hierarchically superior. Although it needs creation, it also needs 
matter.   
 
As François says in footnote 198 of EC.III with regard to the cosmic opposition between Life 
and matter, evolution and thermodynamics: “Bergson, ici, est au plus près des cosmologies 
plotinienne et ravaissonienne évoquées à la note 1 de la page 211, à cette différence près (et 
elle rend les doctrines inconciliables) que le principe qui “se defait”, chez lui, n’est pas l’Un 
immutable, mais du mouvant”.763 I agree with this scholar: ancient cosmology is here at stake. 
It is worth noticing that the next chapter of that book, EC.IV, devotes some interesting pages 
to ancient cosmology. Following François there may be some link then between EC.III and 
EC.IV. I claim there is.  
 
Nevertheless, my agreement with François is not total. I believe that his statement lacks one 
thing. I think that it becomes clear when reading EC.IV, on ancient cosmology. Although, 
maybe surprisingly, I think he should have included Aristotle along with Plotinus and 
Ravaisson. He is not in the footnote he mentions, but he certainly is in the cosmological 
account of EC.IV. In fact, it is a major issue in this account. If I am not wrong, it is not only 
the most important reference to theology in the book, but also the only one: he seems like the 
founder of theology.764 More important for us, I believe the ascension/descent view of the 
cosmos comes from a peculiar reading of Aristotle’s theology, influenced by Plotinus and 
Ravaisson. This is not so difficult to demonstrate, since in EC.IV he addresses Aristotle’s 
theology and cosmology in these terms, as we will see soon. Again, Bergson’s vision of 
Aristotle is deeply influenced by Plotinus.765 Also Ravaisson’s interpretation of Aristotle in 
Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote was a major influence regarding the Aristotle’s 
cosmology. It is surely a peculiar interpretation, but in the end, it is a reading of Aristotle. 
Moreover, it also comes from a direct, intensive reading of Aristotle.  
 
As the author himself says in a footnote, EC.IV is a summary of the lessons that Bergson 
gave in the course L’Histoire de l’idée de temps at the Collège de France, from the years 
1902 to 1903. Bergson devoted four lessons of this course to Aristotle: on the 16th of 
January, the 30th of January, and on the 6th of February and the 13th of February. The 
Aristotelian theological contents in EC can be found mainly in the lesson of February the 
13th.  
 
According to the philosophical scope in this historical research, Aristotle is conceived as one 
crucial step in a universal philosophical evolution that starts with Zeno and finishes in the 
19th century, with Fichte and Spencer. To this extent, Aristotle “develops” or, even “evolves” 
Platonic thought.766 But the most interesting aspect for us, regarding the cosmic teleology of 
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Bergson’s interpretation, can be found in the problematic question of the relation between 
cosmos and god. We already know the text, but it is necessary to quote it again: 
 
”There is, then, immanent in the philosophy of Ideas, a particular conception of causality, (…) 
Sometimes, indeed, they [Greek philosophers] speak of an attraction, sometimes of 
an impulsion exercised by the prime mover on the whole of the world. Both views are found in 
Aristotle, [a] who shows us in the movement of the universe an aspiration of things toward the divine 
perfection, and consequently an ascent toward God, [b] while he describes it elsewhere as the effect of 
a contact of God with the first sphere and as descending, consequently, from God to things (…) 
Everything is derived from the first principle, and everything aspires to return to it”.767 
 
Impulsion and attraction are the two main types of causality in Aristotle, according to 
Bergson’s view. In his opinion, Aristotle’s cosmic view can be summarized according to 
these two tendencies. He is referring to one classic topic: the influence of god upon the world. 
Bergson is using his own words for addressing two of the four causes at stake in this ground. 
Impulsion is the efficient cause and attraction the final cause. 
 
In Histoire de l’idée du temps, years before EC, he puts it in clearer terms. He also addresses 
the question by quoting the texts with rigor. There Bergson holds that “Aristotle says to us 
that the prime mover could be examined as final cause or efficient cause, and it is according 
to the second point of view he is in touch with the mobile”, that is, the cosmos.768 
 
“Therefore, we perceive God as efficient cause or as final cause, according to the point of 
view”, Bergson says.769 “Attraction” is nothing but final cause. As one can read in the 
passage, in [a], it means perfection, ascension and aspiration. That is: god is the cause of 
movement by being the most desirable being (“erómenon”, Met.XII. 7.1072b2). Tendencies 
such as rotation among the heavens and reproduction or even any kind of perfection 
(development) could be explained by this sort of metaphysical attraction. It is the standard 
interpretation of this issue among Aristotelians. For Bergson then the prime mover of 
Met.XII. 7 and 9 attracts all beings. It is certainly a “broad interpretation” of the prime 
mover’s influence.770 
 
The role given by Bergson to the second theological tendency, “impulsion”, which fits more 
or less with the notion of efficient cause, is more uncommon. Anyway, it is relevant to notice 
that important interpreters nowadays defend it as well.771  This vision implies that the 
Aristotelian god exerts power directly only upon the last heaven. Bergson proposes this 
interpretation in the course at the Collège, with the basis from texts such as Phys.VII. 2. and, 
especially, VIII. 5, where Aristotle also talks about this Prime mover, within the context of 
demonstrating the everlastingness of movement. The relation between god and the universe 
in efficient terms, by means of physical contact, is maybe more peculiar, but still based on the 
text. Moreover, Bergson is completely aware of the singularity of this interpretation at that 
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time.772 He is, on the other hand, convinced of its validity. Right or wrong, in 1902, Bergson 
states that this issue of the double chain of causality is the “fundamental principle of 
Aristotle’s philosophy”.773  
 
As I said, the text of EC is less rigorous and maybe the traits in common between Aristotle 
and Plotinus are overemphasized. But notice that in EC.IV Bergson doesn’t confuse Aristotle 
with Plotinus: he thinks that the latter and, in general, the Neoplatonists, continue some of the 
genuine Aristotelian traits. He says it openly: “The Alexandrians, we think, do no more than 
follow this double indication when they speak of procession and conversion”. 774  To 
Bergson’s eyes, the double causal chain is Aristotelian.  
 
This reading of Aristotle’s theodicy can be found in Ravaisson, to whom theodicy was central 
in Aristotle (despite his rejection of Aristotelian scholastics).775The cosmic “double chain” or 
double causality, and the causal “attraction” can be found particularly highlighted in the 
Essay on Metaphysics by Aristotle, published by Ravaisson in 1837. As we know, it is a text 
with which Bergson was highly familiarized from his early years.776 
 
On the “double chain”, check the following passages from Essai sur la ‘Métaphysique’ 
d’Aristote, where he relates aspiration/ascension with final cause and impulsion/descent with 
efficient cause: “la nature motrice (…) s’agit par impulsion. Dans la sphère des mouvements 
et des actions libres, c’est l’attrait de la cause finale ”777 Ravaisson talks openly about two 
chains of movement. The mechanical (downwards) movement and the teleological one 
(upwards): “double chaîne qui vient de lui [god] et qui retourne à lui [god], qui en descend et 
qui y remonte. D’un côté, c’est le système du monde dans l’ordre de la succession de ses 
parties élémentaires, depuis le ciel jusqu’ à la terre ; de l’autre, le système des puissances 
successives de la nature, depuis la forme imparfaite de l’existence élémentaire jusqu’ à la 
forme accomplie de l’humanité.”778 
 
Furthermore, Ravaisson talks about Aristotle’s scale of being in dynamic terms, definitely 
closer to Bergson. He talks about the general constitution of Aristotle’s cosmos, the 
ascending scale as the “progression ascendante”,779 or even as the “marche de la nature”.780  
 
So, I do think that this impulsion/attraction formula is part of the Ravassonian Aristotle. As I 
say, this is related to Bergson’s cosmic view of Life and matter. Bergson has got rid of the 
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mentioned Aristotelian theological aspects, since natural theology is absolutely absent in his 
works. The model descent/ascension could remain, remodeled, in EC.781  In this work 
“attraction” is not unwinding, or creative tendency. But, as I have shown, he uses it in DS.   
 
From the widest perspective, nature can be understood in Bergson from two perspectives: it is 
Life, and hence an unforeseen need for and tendency toward creation, perfection or 
indetermination. Or it is Life versus matter. According to this, matter slows down and 
concretizes the power of Life. It also could add contingency to the results of Life itself. But 
still in this last version, the teleological model would be equally teleological: matter is clearly 
subordinated to the real tendency of the universe, which is on the side of Life.  
 
The influence of god upon the material world is translated into modern language. Evolution 
and thermodynamics express, in our current context, two types of causality that come from 
ancient thought, and namely, ancient theodicies. Aristotelian final causality is based on god’s 
perfection, but as we already know well, it doesn’t imply providence. For Aristotle inspires a 
perfective tendency among individual supralunary and infralunary beings and there is no 
providence or prónoia. In Aristotle, God neither arranges nor even knows the world.782 As I 
have been claiming during this work, there is a deep affinity between this view and the 
Bergsonian conception of cosmology.  
 
When Riquier says that “d’un côté, la causalité ascendante de l’élan vital, renverse la 
causalité descendante de l’ancienne métaphysique et s’appelle plus proprement création” 
seems to forget that there is an ascensional causality for the Ancient thinkers. Bergson’s view 
implies creation, as Riquier says, but he replicates in modern terms the aspirational and 
perfective causality of the Aristotelian cosmos.  
 
The immanent tendency of nature towards indetermination or perfection, inspired in the 
broadest context by an élan vital is in my view global teleology. The Universe tends toward 
the best. At this level, there is no subsequent “for the sake of”. Indetermination, creation or 
freedom are considered the best in itself.  
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Conclusion of Chapter 4 
 
[A] While in 3 we saw the structural elements of this worldview, in 4 we have seen what 
perfectiveness concretely means. There, all the structural elements are more or less at work 
regarding concrete natural phenomena. As I did in Aristotle, I divide these phenomena in 
two. Based on one relatively clear passage from CV I have distinguished two basic domains 
of perfectionism.  
 
[B] Reproduction, attention to life and maturity are examples of what I call conservative 
teleology. There the beneficiary of the process of change is the substance involved, namely, 
living substance. It implies the fulfillment of one specific function of one organism, one 
human being. Like Aristotle, Bergson addresses communities as if they were organisms too.  
 
Bergson’s view of teleology in life does not need the term ‘form’. Perfection here refers to 
that ontological fulfillment and being in time, and to maturity. In the case of embryology and 
maturity, I think that the author is using the model of duration from his early philosophy: still 
in maturity, like in any other process of growth, there is teleology implied. This section aimed 
at showing that Bergson’s account of the world is pluralistic. There are multiple irreducible 
perfective trends in the cosmos.  
 
[C] The second domain of immanent teleology is called by me transgressive teleology. It is 
compatible with the other one. The télos or perfective feature here is not fulfillment or 
maturity, but contributes perfection to the whole of nature. In this case, stability is not the 
perfective item to contribute to, but rather change. I think that the model of global immanent 
teleology is here at stake, although this framework is to be understood within evolutionary 
thought. There is no god that exerts influence upon the heavens or cosmos. Here there is 
contribution for the sake of transgression. The set of phenomena here are to be found in four 
groups. They are individual freedom, evolution, history and cosmology. Every ground has its 
own peculiarity.  
 
[D] The destination of the human soul is in between individual conservative teleology and 
transgressive teleology. I have noted it in the two subsections: “Creation for the sake of joy”, 
which implies a beneficiary, as in the conservative teleology. The horizon becomes suddenly 
expanded within a global framework in the next subsection: “Joy for the sake of progress”. 
Individual freedom has this twofold structure between the two domains. In the end, the most 
important feature is creation, before any other notion, and that is because I included it in the 
second group. Here I give the first idea of how paradoxical Bergson’s view is as part of our 
modern understanding of human beings: fulfilling our télos implies creating our télos. The 
goal is here not specific, but personal.  
 
[E] The section of global teleology regarding the élan vital is the longest. It shows all 
Bergson’s problems for reforming the model of immanent teleology. The doctrine contained 
in EC is a mixture of different teleological issues. In this section I first define the idea of the 
global impulse to perfection and afterwards I show how it is applied to scientific phenomena. 
The global impulse is, according to Bergson, a global natural tendency. Bergson includes in it 
the feature of simplicity. Its nature is referred to by Bergson in terms of exigency or need. In 
the end, global teleology is at stake.  
 
He includes the concept of divergence, contingency and singularity. These features mean that 





not unilinear, but plurilinear. Life is also unpredictable, and any sort of pre-design must be 
rejected. There are multiple branches or lineages within Life. This fits with the idea of 
pluralism. Also, the idea of narratology or secondary teleology must be mentioned now. The 
forms in nature, which are an outcome of the creative evolution through spontaneous 
mutations, are contingent. This includes plants, animals and also humans. They are to be 
understood in a singular history full of unpredictable newness. This means that Life is 
unrepeatable and that it can be narrated, but never deduced from the beginning in all its traits.   
 
At the same time, against certain readings, I find one dominant trend in nature. EC makes 
clear that the narration according to which plants give energy to animals, and among animals 
one lineage tends to exploit more and more of this energy, points to one dominant trend. This 
trend is the development of the central nervous system. This lineage is understood by 
Bergson as ascension of the spirit, incarnated only by humans. When Bergson says that 
humans are the only fulfillment of nature, he is not appealing to secondary teleology or 
narratology, but to the primary one. This fulfillment is not contingency. Thus, in Bergson’s 
global teleology there are two different levels. According to the historical development of 
Life, there is a great deal of contingency. According to the goal of nature and its fullfilment, 
the statement is made in terms of primary teleology: the goal of nature is always 
indetermination, and human beings are a fulfillment of that. The human form is contingent, to 
some extent, but because of the freedom implied, it is the goal of the universe. To this extent, 
plants and animals are for the sake of freedom. This composes a new type of mitigated 
anthropocentrism: everything is for the sake of freedom and humans are the only species that 
can be called free.  Bergson combines the branching pattern of the Darwinian tree of Life 
with the hierarchical understanding of the cosmos of the Aristotelian natural scale. Finally, in 
this section I emphasize the importance of the cosmic army passage, a paradigm of ancient 
global teleology. It also comes out in the reformed Bergsonian framework.  
 
[F] Bergson’s teleology of history in DS is as subtle as his doctrine of evolution. I partially 
reproduce what I do regarding EC, although with little additions. Bergson considers a sole 
function in the entire world: indetermination. At the same time, he has to nuance this idea of 
global tendency in order to make room for real spontaneity. Dichotomy, the sudden leaps in 
history and the idea of the retrospective illusion nuance this global teleology.  Three stages of 
culture, produced ultimately by spiritual geniuses and their imitators, are the material of a 
narratology. This does not mean, again, that everything in history is contingent. Progress is 
not an illusion in Bergson, but a reality. It is certainly not a law. I think it is a fact, for him. 
The fulfillment of freedom in the world and through democracies is nothing contingent in 
itself, but grounded in nature, for Bergson.  
 
In DS Bergson does not merely focus on history: coherently he addresses the question of the 
future. Here is where Bergson illustrates his doctrine better, I think. He says that the growth 
of freedom may imply real progress and a real progress may imply the fulfillment of the 
function of nature. But progress in the future cannot be deduced, since there is real 
contingency. There is an open future. It is open to decay and failure.  
 
The main addition in DS is the mimetic model. Bergson’s view of history is deeply based on 
heroes: strong individualities that contribute to progress.  
 
[G] In 4.2.d I deal with the most obscure area in Bergson, the most abstract one: cosmology. 
Here I only consider two basic items: Life or the élan, and matter. At this level, Bergson 





descent tendencies. In this context, Bergson thinks that thermodynamics address rightly the 
nature of matter. It plays a symmetrically opposite role in Bergson’s cosmology. 
Thermodynamics is for matter in Bergson what evolution is for biology. In some passages, 
Bergson seems to consider the history of Life the outcome of the collision between matter 
and Life. The scope of this statement is rather unclear, but in the end, it means that, given that 
Life is ontologically superior to matter, the former possesses matter teleologically. Matter is 
for the sake of Life. Life in itself may include the feature of contingency, but surely an 
additional amount of contingency is unfolded from this clash.  
 
Furthermore, in this section I claim that this view is taken from Bergson’s peculiar reading of 
Aristotle’s cosmology. This interpretation is based on Bergson’s own reading of Aristotle, 
and hardly influenced by Neoplatonism and, namely, Félix Ravaisson, his master.    
 
 
[H] In terms of what I called the temporal dimension of teleology there is something more to 
say. Whereas conservative teleology implies a primary teleology, the teleology of regular 
events, the transgressive imply partially a secondary teleology. In his vision of Life and 
history the outcomes or actual forms that compose the whole are only contingent, while the 
teleological ground (fulfillment of worlds function) is addressed as if it were regular. This 
implies that whereas in Aristotle secondary teleology did not imply the fulfillment of one 
substance (since it was chance), in Bergson it is something natural. Contingency is placed by 
Bergson at the center of natural teleology, and not as an alternative to exceptions.   
 
The pluralistic vision of the world implied in teleology recognizes always the value of non-
human forms of perfection, as we saw. Bergson adds to that the recognition of the essential 
superiority of human freedom. The teleology of human beings is a teleology of creation, in 
the level of ethics. The paradox here is easy to expose: the attainment of something that 
someone has to create. Creation here is, however, part of immanent teleology. In bigger 
levels, such as cosmology, biology and history this paradoxical teleology without a goal in 
view is the same, but bigger. There is a second problem, which I find more acute. It is the 
clash between the individual creative teleology and the global one. In biology, the élan is an 
overarching figure. It is difficult to differentiate individual consciousness from nature. Even 
when Bergson talks about the genius he says that he or she is closer to the main source of 
creativeness. If the spiritual genius is just an emanation of Life, then personal freedom 
becomes something difficult to maintain. Contingency and our experience of freedom imply 
the existence of freedom, this is beyond doubt. What is not totally clear to me is whose 







General conclusion: The masks of Proteus 
 
 
The historian of philosophy and philosopher Nicolai Hartmann says in 1944: “traditional 
metaphysics have been frequently exposed in their core ideas and guidelines and have often 
been criticized for their mistakes, but they have not been investigated according to their 
intimate driving motive. I see this motive in the irresistible tendency to teleology, which, as 
Proteus, is harbored by innumerable figures, that often remain hardly recognizable, yet 
always the same”.783  I find this passage particularly pertinent. Here teleology or final 
causality is seen as something deeply anchored in metaphysical thinking. Even in the middle 
of the 20th century, teleology is seen by this author as something “intimate” to metaphysics 
and, at the same time, something “irresistible” to the philosophers who want to give a 
complete account of what nature is, beyond material physics, atoms and movements. Even 
more interestingly, Hartman also claims that teleology is a Protean concept.  
 
According to this very idea, this work has shown that teleology, and namely, the model of 
immanent teleology, can change, and at the same time remain "the same". We have seen that 
the "articulated intimate driving motive" that remains between Aristotle and Bergson is none 
other than perfection and the tendency towards it. We also have seen some of those 
"innumerable figures" in their discourses on nature and human beings. In my account, the 
series may be understood in a couple of opposites: transcendental teleology/immanent 
teleology, individual teleology/ global teleology, development teleology/ contribution 
teleology, beneficiary teleology/ aim teleology, teleology based on vertical/horizontal 
analogies, conservative teleology/transgressive teleology, primary teleology/secondary 
teleology. Eventually, there are hybrid cases that challenge those labels: the city in Aristotle 
or individual freedom in Bergson. All the masks of this Proteus harbor in the end the same 
ontological claim: there is a need to reach completion in this world, a need that is natural and 
by no means tragic. The model of immanent teleology that we have seen is an account of this 
fulfillment.  
 
We have seen in which sense Bergson thought that immanent teleology is essentially 
psychological, and according to the Protean status of the topic, why it is so flexible, extensible 
and comprehensive too. These questions appear in Chapter 1 and have been answered in 
detail all throughout the dissertation. It is psychological because it is analogical. It is analogic 
because humans are not an external spectator of nature anymore. Human knowledge is here 
integrated within nature. I have shown that there is a structural familiarity between human 
consciousness and the living.784 Finalism is flexible because it changes according to the 
conception of perfection that we want to apply. We can move from the world of forms and 
eternal stability to the cosmos, to creativity and continuous change, and remain perfectly 
finalistic. The world-view of teleology understands nature as a both plural and articulated 
drives towards activity and function.  
 
Although Aristotle, the founder, as we saw in Chapter 2, conceived teleology in the domain 
of regular phenomena, in an everlasting world, he also left open a path for reformers of 
teleology with his considerations on unpredictable events. I hope I have demonstrated to what 
extent Aristotle's framework is rich and comprehensive. We see in 3 how Bergson uses the 
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term perfection and analogy, how he also understands mitigated anthropocentrism in an 
evolutionary way and, finally, how he recombines primary secondary teleology. In his global 
accounts of Life and history he uses both temporal dimensions of teleology. The 
cosmological ground is regular, although the particular events within the process are 
contingent, a matter of secondary teleology. Hence Bergson introduces contingency at the 
center of his global conception of nature. Secondary teleology is not part of exceptional cases 
as it was in Aristotle, here it is at the core of nature. In 2.1 and 3 we can see the depth and 
complexity of the reformer of immanent teleology. We can see what he meant with going 
further.  
 
In general terms, in 2.2.a and 4.1 we have seen an important agreement between the founder 
and the reformer of immanent teleology. According to this model of thinking, Aristotle's and 
Bergson's philosophy of nature understand the world of life as plural, against 
anthropocentrism. Aristotle wrote against anthropocentric Platonism, but Bergson attacks the 
post-Cartesian tradition, in which analogies and anthropomorphism are rejected. I believe, 
with Johnson (2.1.c), that immanent teleology automatically rejects anthropocentrism by 
appealing to anthropomorphism. This fits with Bergson. I understand his natural philosophy 
as an attack on modern anthropocentrism, in which providential teleology is not the problem 
anymore but the mechanistic conception of the world. Bergson certainly did not think that a 
living being can be reduced to atoms moved by inertial determinate laws. 
 
The large set of phenomena gathered in 2.2.a and 4.1 show that immanent teleology considers 
life as an irreducible striving towards the fulfillment of one function as far as possible. 
Bergson highlights the Aristotelian teleological notion of function and got rid of that of form. 
Immanent teleology understands nature as a sum of functions. They are irreducible to each 
other. Each kind of living being has inscribed in its nature one type of completeness and 
perfection. Immanent teleology recognizes innate goals and perfection in the natural world. 
Among them, again, the human species finds itself within that plurality, and not outside. Thus 
survival, reproduction, well-being, destination and maturity are applied to embryos, wasps or 
mature humans. Bergson's approach is not evolutionary, in this sense, so it remains in 
primary teleology, as if living beings were always the same. The approach of both is not so 
different.  
 
This naturalistic philosophy can have some accounts that sound strange to our contemporary 
ears (namely, their understanding of cities or communities), but also has elements of great 
value. Like in the case of Johnson with Aristotle, my view of Bergson can be supported with 
solid arguments from environmentalist readings.785 Furthermore, more importantly from the 
theoretical point of view, teleology is a proper philosophy of life and biomorphism. This 
permits us to understand the ontology of life.  
 
The embryos movement and change, the wasp’s and human’s growth and behavior tend all to 
avoid death, the permanent menace of every living being, and they tend to reach the best of 
our potentialities, the permanent ambition. That is, living (or survival) and living-well are the 
goal of every entity from the moment it is alive. In a recent study on teleology from a modern 
perspective, the philosopher Hans Jonas developed this line in emphasizing the irreducible 
value between life and death.786 It is a value that could not be noticed beyond life. Only from 
the perspective of living beings could we finally understand the absolute value, the level of 
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perfection or telos, of being alive. As Aristotle says, “living is better than not living”.787 I 
think there is a teleological meaning in this line. From the moment something is alive, it 
understands this perfection spontaneously and not by any logical skill: there is the tendency 
to survive and reproduce. There is the teleological striving to perfection, to what is "better". 
In the most abstract terms, the ontology of life implies a natural non-conscious tendency to 
overcome death by flourishing. This is the immanent goal of every living being. The 
Darwinian term "struggle" dramatizes the process of survival and reproduction, but in the end 
it is based on a hard teleological claim. Life is for the sake of living in the best possible way. 
Aristotle and Bergson are both philosophers of pluralism, anthropomorphism and life. Death 
is not at the core of their philosophy. Aristotle has several commentaries on biological death 
and decay, and one short physiological treatise, but the most part of his huge biological work 
and his ethics is devoted entirely to life, led by his teleological perspective. By no means he 
followed his master in his speculations regarding the afterlife. Bergson's teleology expresses 
the same idea. Activity, maturity, emergence and flourishing were the center of the 
worldview of this reformer of teleology. Following Horkheimer, Benjamin has written "in 
Bergson there is no death".788 I interpret this affirmation as deeply right: Bergson focused his 
sight on being alive, on the télos and not the escháton.   
 
With the human realm, what we call goal, perfection or the for the sake of becomes much 
more complex. Not just survival of the individual or of the species is to be considered a goal. 
Among superior animals, the télos is well-being. Among humans, in Aristotle, that is called 
happiness or eudaimonía. In the realm of human ethics Bergson held a eudaimonistic 
perspective. On the one hand, we saw in 4.1 that Bergson addresses human life in 
conservative terms, namely, in terms of attention to life. But at the beginning of 4.2 we find a 
second way of addressing the goal of human beings, compatible with the previous. There I 
show how Bergson introduces transgressive teleology or freedom (production of 
unforeseeable novelty in the world). The distance between this faculty and attention to life in 
Bergson is comparable to contemplation and the rest of human faculties in Aristotle. 
Transgressive teleology means that the specific goal inscribed in the individual is precisely to 
overcome the general average conception of the human being for the sake of a self-made 
personality. In Bergson we find the only case in which transgressive teleology is individual. 
As we saw in 4.2.a this transgression can be understood from two perspectives. There is a 
beneficiary here, but at the same time there is a contribution to the whole.  
 
Bergson introduces free-will, seen as creativity, at the center of his ethics. This leads to the 
idea that in creativity lies the ultimate completeness and happiness of every human being. 
Now we have departed from the ancient framework and gotten closer to contemporary 
thought, more concerned with concepts like creativity. According to Bergson, happy maturity 
or, in his terms, deep joy implies self-creation. The teleology that understands well-being or 
happiness as freedom, transgressive teleology, implies the paradox of finalism without goals.  
 
The paradox becomes bigger when the domain of transgressive teleology becomes bigger. 
Between 2.2.b and 4.2 I have shown the conceptual roots of the modern term progress. In 
Aristotle we saw different kinds of global teleology, where perfection or télos must be 
understood as contribution. What in Aristotle is eternal, in Bergson is in constant change. 
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What in Aristotle is contribution to one order, in Bergson is contribution to one transgression 
to better subsequent stages. Teleology, seen as one static contribution, appears in the modern 
concept of ecology, but global transgression appears in the usual concept of progress. 
Regarding the whole cosmos or only mankind, the paradox of transgressive teleology 
reappears. It is, again, teleology with no télos.  
 
In 4.2.b, 4.2.c and 4.2.d we have the widest scope of Bergson's teleology. The proportion 
between the cases of individual teleology in Aristotle is directly proportional to the cases of 
global teleology in Bergson. This is one of the differences between our two treatises on 
teleology, Phys.II and EC. Furthermore, in Bergson the global passages are held with the 
macrocosmos/microcosmos analogy and this is not the case in Aristotle. This has to do with 
the fact that Bergson was closer to the notion of anima mundi than Aristotle. In 4.2.b and c I 
have demonstrated the cosmological roots of Bergson's view of Life or biology in EC. In 
4.2.d I show what Bergson does regarding history in DS. This global teleology is not inspired 
by any prime mover, as we found in Aristotle. So, this idea of the élan involves only its own 
perfective nature. This reformed model of immanent teleology challenges in other ways the 
classic one.  
 
Regarding its origins, I have noted to what extent the tendency to perfection is rooted in 
nature. The impulse called Life fulfills a regular need, exigency or function of the cosmos. To 
this extent, it is global teleology with no go. It qualifies as primary teleology since the nature 
of Life, consciousness or the élan is regular, and not contingent. According to Bergson it does 
not change. The cosmos and Life are always the same.  
 
Apart from completing Bergson's point, I have used the model of the secondary teleology, 
found in my Aristotelian account 2.1.d. This means that to some extent, the historical 
outcome of this force is to be interpreted retrospectively: because of its unpredictability 
(noticeable with the form of divergence) and uniqueness (every even in Life and history is 
unrepeatable). The plant form or any major historical event are all contingent. Bergson 
understands Life as “a tree” and took the Darwinian branching pattern. He transferred that to 
his account of history too. In sum, there are multiple lineages in Life. This nuances his view 
of global teleology.  
 
At the same time as he deals with such a great amount of contingency, he points to one 
lineage that is not accidental, nor contingent, but necessary. It is the development of the 
central nervous system: it leads to man, the only success in nature. Success means fulfillment. 
Notice that human form as such is contingent, but its freedom, its creativity, means a goal in 
nature. The goal of nature is creativity, but not human beings as such. Evolution has not 
stopped yet. As I said, Bergson combines in his vision of the élan primary regular teleology 
and secondary teleology for contingent events.  Contingency is not mere chance, but one 
main feature of Life. Bergson’s contribution to the model of immanent teleology is complex 
and sophisticated.  
 
This complexity is due to the aim of combining natural teleology and a hard theory of 
freedom. Teleology without a goal leads, as I have said, to one severe problem. Namely: it is 
impossible to define a possible Bergsonian goal of history, or even a goal of nature. Bergson 
applies coherently, I believe, ethics to cosmology. Free will overcomes any sort of limit. In 
cosmic terms, nature is also this openness to new evolution, to new transformation. Like any 
of our self-creations it is unpredictable. When we defend immanent teleology and creation at 





discourse. While there is a component of creativity, the goal cannot be already finished. This 
can be expressed regarding human beings, in a eudaemonist framework (our goal is self-
creation, and self-creation may imply completion and happiness). It can also be expressed in 
a cosmological framework: the Universe, and more concretely, Life, tends toward better 
expressions of its own essence.  
 
This idea comes from Bergson's view of global teleology as something philosophically 
sensible. This is, I think, a contemporary feeling. Descartes and Bacon saw providential 
teleology as something useless, but not dangerous. Bergson in PR considers that global 
providential teleology tends to annul human freedom and that a heroic philosophy has to face 
it.789 He coincides on that with Hartmann as well, and talks in the same terms.790  
 
In different contemporary philosophers and historians, I find a certain reluctance regarding 
the question of global teleology, even in cases of non-providential teleology. At different 
levels, teleology is seen as a philosophical risk that involves a rejection of pluralism and that 
impoverishes richer speculative perspectives.  Global teleology seems to impose tyrannically 
one principle upon the rest of nature. This is the case among recent interpreters of Aristotle, 
as we have seen in 2, but also regarding XIX history, closer to Bergson, like global 
teleologies of history791 and evolutionary thought.792 Global teleology is also considered to be 
potentially dangerous if it is taken to the political arena, where human individual goals can be 
subsumed for the sake of higher purposes. Partially, I believe that Bergson shares with 
contemporary intellectuals this suspicion regarding global overarching views, global 
teleologies among them. As we have seen, with a philosophical sensibility familiar to us 
nowadays, Bergson pointed out the risks of big systems with regard to ontological pluralism 
and also personal freedom. At the same time, he did not avoid the grandiose approach, 
although he endeavored to make it compatible with those two claims. 
 
At the same time, Bergson openly defends global teleology against other authors like 
Driesch, as we have seen in several occasions from the first chapter. Bergson rejects global 
providential teleology in the case of Leibniz, for instance, and also Spencer's progressive 
view. He just promoted another kind of global teleology based on a vertical analogy, from the 
part (human) to the whole (nature). I find a certain tension in his work with regard to this 
question, but he manages to combine the global immanent drive and openness. Like every 
defender of the model of immanent teleology, he recognizes plurality and freedom but a 
global drive through Life and history. In any case, there is no need among the Bergsonian 
scholars to adapt his doctrine to the current ideology, and to overcome their reluctance if they 
find it is so preposterous that there are dominant lines in evolution. Anyway, we have seen 
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that the roots of this global thinking are venerable and the approach at stake is, in many cases, 
modern and concerned with those problematic issues.  
 
There is still a second problem for Bergson. I think this problem is even philosophically 
harder. The paradox of teleology without a télos entails a certain obscurity, but produced by 
clear ideas: namely, the perfective spontaneity of nature, the naturalistic conception of man, 
the need for a creative free will at the core of ethics and, ultimately cosmology. Bergson's 
teleology with no goal is the product of naturalizing the human being (there is a function in 
man, as in every organism) and humanizing nature (there is indetermination and creativity in 
Life).  
 
But the second aporia comes from the tension within the theory of free will, the core of 
Bergson's thought. The problem is that one can ask whether there is a clash between his early 
approach to individual humans (from DI to IM) and his mature global approach (in EC, CV 
and DS). Roughly speaking, his mature grandiose understanding of nature as moved by a sort 
of soul of the world can be seen as a menace to the autonomy of the free individual human 
being. Bergson shows how teleology can be combined with unpredictability. This means that 
there is freedom and creativity. But in the end, it is unclear to what extent we are all 
independent, responsible sources of creativity. The genius is Bergson's paradigm of freedom, 
but in CV he says this is closer to “the source” of Life.793 It could be interpreted as if human 
freedom was an emanation of Life, since Life comes to be such an overarching entity. Given 
that there is freedom in the world, we can ask whose freedom this is. In general, Bergson 
talks about an overarching élan, but eventually he talks about a personal élan: that of the 
genius.794 It is difficult to know when Life’s impulse finishes and when human responsibility 
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Summary in English 
 
 
Several ancient, medieval and modern philosophers have used final causality or teleology in a 
transcendental way. This means that everything tends naturally toward its own completion, in 
harmony with the rest of the cosmos, because of some divine causation. In different ways, 
they claim that the individual developments and the convergence of all of them in a general 
equilibrium are made by one divine providential entity. In some of these frameworks the final 
cause can be conceived as a sign of god’s wisdom or a proof of its existence. However, final 
causality can also be understood in an immanent way, without the participation of any kind of 
divine artisan or creative god. From that perspective, nature is not seen as a passive matter 
upon which god works and introduces perfection, but as an innate tendency to completion 
and perfection. The tendency of a seed towards growth, and ultimately to reach maturity, or 
the general equilibrium in the cosmos made by the convergence of every perfective tendency, 
is understood by Aristotle, the father of this philosophical perspective, without the 
contribution of any providential god. I claim that, in the post-Cartesian and deeply Darwinian 
era starting around 1900, the influential philosopher Henri Bergson used final causality in an 
original way, applying it to the restricted field of the biological world.  
 
Although I address the big differences between the Aristotle and Bergson, my main aim is to 
show the common roots of immanent teleological thought. The main ideas behind this 
framework are: i) nature is something active, spontaneous; ii) perfection is not restricted to 
divine or human intelligence, hence nature is to be conceived as composed by an uncountable 
plurality of beings; iii) immanent teleology implies a naturalistic conception of human 
beings. For this reason, certain anthropomorphic analogies between humans and their 
surrounding nature are philosophically permitted. iv) there is individual immanent teleology, 
expressed in development, growth and plenitude regarding one substance (plant, animal, 
human). Furthermore, there is a global immanent teleology that makes all the particular 
flourishing processes converge in one general good. In Aristotle this good can be seen as 
equilibrium and its everlasting duration. Far from this view of global perfection, in Bergson 
there is a dynamic and progressive conception of the evolutionary world: life and, ultimately, 
human life are part of a process that tends toward freedom or contingency. Harmony and 
stability are not the goal of the cosmos, but rather complexity and freedom.  
 
In opposition to the widespread understanding of Bergson as a philosopher of pure becoming, 
in Chapter 1, I defend the claim that, in his view of the living world, everything has to be 
linked to its specific action. As I show in detail in this dissertation, non-human organisms, 
embryos, human souls, human societies and the whole cosmos are conceived with regard to 
specific actions, that is Bergson’s modern way of interpreting the abstract term “perfection”. 
Furthermore, I defend this claim by appealing to plenty of analogies between the human mind 
and different natural phenomena.  
 
In Chapter 1, I gather together Bergson’s critiques of the excesses of final causality. We can 
also find these critiques in Aristotle, but unlike to Aristotle in the Physics, Bergson focuses 
his philosophical considerations on teleology only with regard to global teleology. It is true 
that Bergson rejects certain analogies between nature in general (what he calls Life or the 
vital impulse) and a human artisan. In addition, he denies that there is any kind of general 
harmony in the world. I do not disregard these statements, but I believe that they have been 
overemphasized and we have to contextualize them cautiously. I think it is obvious that 





of nature, and not an isolated entity. So, he does not reject all kinds of analogy. As I show in 
Chapter 3, Bergson uses analogies constantly for the purpose of illustrating his original final 
causality. Secondly, Bergson by no means rejects all kinds of “general goals” by rejecting the 
idea of harmony. As I said, the general goal, function or end of the entire cosmos is freedom, 
according to Bergson. For this reason, Bergson sees the appearance of human beings as a 
relative success of this tendency. At this point, Bergson introduces another critique of global 
teleology. It is the most important critique, in fact: for him the global doctrine of final 
causality can lead to determinism or fatalism. Bergson’s theory of the vital impulse is both 
perfective and relatively unpredictable. Bergson combines openness and directionality, 
creating some philosophical problems far from Aristotle. It is part of what I call the reform of 
immanent teleology. In Chapter 1 I also stress the value of some passages from Creative 
evolution in which he finds himself as a reformer of both individual and global teleology. 
After refuting the a-teleologist readings of Bergson, it is necessary at this point to show what 
is the classic model of teleology, for having a clear idea of what a reform of it means.  
 
In Chapter 2, I analyze Aristotelian teleology, and also address two closely related topics (the 
natural scale and Aristotle’s theory of chance) that may have importance for Bergson. The 
line of argument in this long chapter prepares the structure of the following chapters. Section 
2.1 deals with Aristotle’s argument for endorsing teleology and its structural parts. I do the 
same in Chapter 3 regarding Bergson. Section 2.2 focuses on the fields of application of 
teleology in Aristotle; Chapter 4 follows the same order for Bergson.  
 
Aristotle’s structural elements of teleology have to be found within his theory of causality in 
Physics.II. The most important feature of final causality is perfection or completion. This 
term can be interpreted in multiple ways. In Aristotle, perfection is related to the form or the 
species, the metaphysical substratum of any natural item. For Aristotle one child is imperfect 
in comparison with its mature form, where the form human has attained the full definition. 
The form is necessarily linked with another notion, that of function. Attaining a form means, 
in Aristotle, attaining fulfillment regarding one specific action. Perfection, form and function 
have a circular relation in this context. Every species and every function is a different form of 
perfection in Aristotle’s pluralistic world.  
 
The second structural element is that of analogy. As I mentioned above, analogy means that 
human beings are part of nature. There is a plurality in the world, but also a common root that 
permits analogy. The analogy between the artisan and the process of growth is typical in 
Aristotle. To this extent, “art imitates nature” since it follows the same teleological model: 
the goal (perfection, form, function) is at the end of any rational activity. Health, victory and 
dwelling are the ends of walking, fighting and constructing houses, respectively. Aristotle 
defends anthropomorphism, if anthropomorphism means that there are features in our mind 
that can be transferred to the natural world.  
 
The third structural element is implied in the previous argument, and not openly stated. In 
Aristotle there is no anthropocentrism, since the natural world is not for the sake of human 
beings and the natural world can be thought with no reference to us. At the same time, 
according this philosopher, human beings are the most perfect being within the infralunary 
world. It means that they can establish special analogies with heavenly bodies, for instance. 
This third element nuances the feature of pluralism: there are multiple kinds of perfection, but 
some are better than others. The fourth structural element is regularity. It is explicitly used by 
Aristotle. Regularly, the natural items attain their ultimate goal, form and function. That is 





toward the good or the best. In this section I have also analyzed Aristotle’s theory of chance, 
since it will also play a role in the chapters on Bergson. He thought that non-regular events 
could also be reconstructed in the framework of teleology. That is what I call secondary 
teleology, against the primary teleology of regular events.  
 
The domains of teleology illustrate, with different forms, what perfection can mean. 
Regarding individual teleology, I ascend in the natural scale from the lower levels to the 
upper ones. Since Bergson will apply teleology exclusively to living beings, I have stressed 
Aristotle’s teleology in the biological realm. Survival (including nutrition and reproduction), 
and well-being among the superior animals (horse life for the horse) may represent perfection 
in this field. In the case of humans, well-being means happiness, which includes the 
fulfillment of the rational faculties. This can also be applied to the heavenly rotatory bodies. 
The peak of the scale is god, an entity that also has a function: thinking of itself.  
 
The second part of 2.2 shows how we should interpret perfection in the global teleology 
passages. This meaning is compatible with survival and well-being, although it establishes a 
second wider perspective. Individual perfection may imply in this context a contribution of 
some kind to the environment or the cosmos. The mere activity regarding the specific 
function implies participation in the general order. Also, reproduction implies the stability of 
the species in an eternal world: Aristotle thinks that through reproduction the individual, 
perishable, infralunary being participates in eternity. Aristotle uses the Platonic language of 
imitation when talking about this second form of contribution. In short, these obscure 
passages, with less use of human analogies, show that perfection can be seen beyond the 
boundaries of one substance or species.  
 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the structure of the teleological view. I show the different terms that 
Bergson uses by means of perfection, through analogy with human consciousness. I find four 
types of analogy in Bergson’s entire career. In general terms, two of these imply perfection in 
the sense of being, of the conservation of being. The other two refer to change, transgression 
and ontological progress. Bergson sees both tendencies in nature and in us as well. This 
chapter also deal with the peculiar status of mankind in nature, for Bergson. According to 
Bergson human beings are natural and, at the same time, special. I also define Bergson’s view 
as mitigated anthropocentrism: human beings are the summary of nature (now from the 
evolutionary perspective) but also add special faculties that imply special analogies. There 
are no heavenly bodies to be analogous with here, but every individual being, and especially 
geniuses, are similar to Bergson’s Life or élan vital, an overarching composite entity that has 
to be with the ancient soul of the world, something that is not found in Aristotle. In Chapter 
3, I also distinguish two levels of teleology. There is regular teleology, related to conservative 
teleology: survival and action is as regular among living beings here as in Aristotle. 
Furthermore, there is a global teleology involved in his view of history of Life and history of 
mankind. Bergson’s global teleology combines primary teleology (since the cosmos, and 
namely, Life, regularly tend toward contingency and freedom) with secondary teleology: 
history of Life and mankind is singular, unpredictable and contingent. Although there is 
directionality and perfection, the concrete forms, outcomes of this evolution, and the final 
attainment of the goal of the world is uncertain. In comparison with the rest of the living 
world, humans are a relative success, that is all. The future is open. 
 
In Chapter 4, I illustrate the different forms of perfection noted above. It plays an identical 
role as 2.2 did. Approximately, individual teleology is linked in Bergson with what I called 





living organisms, embryos, humans and societies are analyzed in this section. Concepts 
familiar to us such as survival, conservation or, a key Darwinian term, adaptation are at stake 
here. 
 
Furthermore in 4.2 I deal with transgressive teleology which is surely the most original part 
of Bergson’s approach, although it also introduces several problems. Apart from one case, the 
field of transgressive teleology is history of Life, history or cosmology, that is, global 
teleology. The non-global field is the human being. While in 4.1 I highlight human’s 
tendency toward survival and adaptation, here I address his or her tendency to overcome 
already-made limits. For Bergson, human being’s ultimate destination is to create something 
new and unpredictable. In his eudaimonistic perspective, maturity is self-creation: thus, to 
create something includes us. We are the product of our original choices. As we can see there 
is directionality, but still openness in this level. In the next levels—that of evolutionary 
biology, history or cosmology—this paradox is transferred to Life or Consciousness, 
understood as an overarching entity that progresses through individuals. In Bergson, 
transgressive teleology must be unpredictable and any success (like human beings) can 
become a decay.  
 
In my Conclusion, I defend the deep understanding of life that seeks immanent teleology. It is 
what Bergson took from Aristotle in first place. Bergson’s individual teleology is to be 
understood in terms of his concept of attention to life. Immanent teleology implies both a 
need to understand living beings beyond concepts and human rationality, and to understand 
human beings within nature. The organism tends toward life naturally, with no help of 
reasoning. Life, being on earth, is then perfection. Survival, living-well and all fulfillment of 
innate potencies are, against death or decay, irreducible notions for understanding the living 
being from the moment it is alive. Not only the coordination of the parts in view of the whole, 
but especially the particular good that the whole is seeking are important. These notions are 
to be found in our consciousness, but the philosophy of immanent teleology does not think 
that it should lead to a total refutation: human beings are part of nature, and, namely, part of 
life. Since the root of life is this tendency toward survival, etc., final causality may be thought 
of as biomorphism, rather than anthropomorphism.  
 
Secondly, transgressive teleology is more original to Bergson, since such a topic is alien to 
the Aristotelian worldview. While applied to individual persons it tries to combine 
directionality and eudaimonology with freedom, openness and unpredictability. The result is 
that happiness is to be found in pure creation. This upshot, expressed as the paradoxical 
notion of teleology with no goal, becomes much bigger when the field also becomes bigger: 
in the rest of the cases of transgressive teleology Bergson erects a global immanent 
evolutionary teleology that combines one regular element (the goal of the world) and 
contingency (the effective history of Life and mankind). Although submitted to innumerable 
contingencies and eventual decay, Life or the élan vital are directed towards what Bergson 
considers is perfect. It reproduces the previous paradox (teleology with no goal) in global 
teleology, a philosophical field seen as archaic and problematic nowadays. Moreover, within 
Bergson it introduces a new major problem. Given that Life is free, that is, unpredictable and 
creative, it is difficult to demarcate the limits between this overarching force and individual 
human beings. When Bergson talks about the heroes, the peak of freedom among humans, he 
says that they are closer than any other individual to the source of Life. While there is in 
Bergson an unpredictable creativity in the world, it is not clear whose freedom this is. 
Certainly, the borders between individual transgressive teleology and global transgressive 





Summary in Dutch 
 
Antieke, middeleeuwse en moderne filosofen hebben finale causaliteit, ofwel teleologie, 
transcendentaal gebruikt. Dit betekent dat alles van nature gericht is op zijn eigen 
vervolmaking, in harmonie met de rest van de kosmos, vanwege een zekere goddelijke 
causaliteit. Zij claimen op verschillende wijze dat individuele ontwikkelingen en de 
convergentie daarvan in een algemeen evenwicht veroorzaakt worden door één goddelijke 
voorzienige entiteit. In sommige van deze denkkaders wordt de finale oorzaak beschouwd als 
een teken van gods wijsheid of een bewijs van het bestaan daarvan. Finale causaliteit kan 
daarentegen ook begrepen worden op immanente wijze, zonder de invloed van enig soort 
goddelijke maker of scheppende god. Vanuit dat perspectief wordt de natuur niet gezien als 
een passieve materie waar een god mee werkt en waarin hij perfectie aanbrengt, maar als een 
aangeboren gerichtheid op vervolmaking en perfectie. De gerichtheid van een zaadje op 
groei, en uiteindelijk op het bereiken van volledige wasdom, of het algemene evenwicht in de 
kosmos dat tot stand komt door de convergentie van elke gerichtheid op perfectie, worden 
door Aristoteles, de grondlegger van dit filosofisch perspectief, begrepen zonder bijdrage van 
welke voorzienige god dan ook. Ik betoog dat in het post-Cartesiaanse en diepgaand 
Darwiniaanse tijdperk rond 1900, de invloedrijke filosoof Henri Bergson finale causaliteit op 
originele wijze heeft gebruikt door het toe te passen op het afgebakende domein van de 
biologische werkelijkheid. 
 
Hoewel ik hier de grote verschillen tussen Aristoteles en Bergson behandel, is mijn 
belangrijkste doel om de gemeenschappelijke wortels van immanent teleologisch denken te 
laten zien. De belangrijkste ideeën achter dit denkkader zijn: i) de natuur is actief en 
spontaan; ii) perfectie is niet beperkt tot goddelijke of menselijke intelligentie; daarom is de 
natuur te beschouwen als samengesteld uit een ontelbare veelheid van zijnden; iii) immanente 
teleologie impliceert een naturalistische opvatting van de mens; daarom zijn bepaalde 
anthropomorfe analogieën tussen mens en de omringende natuur filosofisch toegestaan; iv) er 
is individuele immanente teleologie, uitgedrukt in ontwikkeling, groei en volheid met 
betrekking tot één substantie (plant, dier, mens); daarnaast is er een alomvattende immanente 
teleologie die alle afzonderlijke processen laat samenkomen in één algemeen goed. In 
Aristoteles kan dit goed worden gezien als evenwicht en de eeuwige duur daarvan. In 
tegenstelling tot deze omvattende perfectie vinden we in Bergson een opvatting van de 
evolutionaire wereld als dynamisch en progressief: leven, ook menselijk leven, is deel van 
een proces dat gericht is op vrijheid ofwel contingentie. Niet harmonie en stabiliteit zijn het 
doel van de kosmos, maar eerder complexiteit en vrijheid. 
 
In tegenstelling tot de wijdverbreide opvatting dat Bergson een filosoof van het pure worden 
is, verdedig ik in Hoofdstuk 1 de stelling dat in Bergson’s visie op de levende werkelijkheid 
alles verbonden moet zijn met specifiek handelen. Zoals ik in detail laat zien in dit 
proefschrift, worden niet-menselijke organismen, embryos, menselijke zielen, menselijke 
samenlevingen en de gehele kosmos beschouwd in relatie tot specifieke handelingen – dat is 
Bergson’s moderne manier om de abstracte term ‘perfectie’ te interpreteren. Verder verdedig 
ik deze stelling door een beroep te doen op een groot aantal analogieën tussen de menselijke 
geest en verschillende natuurlijke verschijnselen. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 1 verzamel ik Bergson’s kritiek op extreme vormen van finale causaliteit. We 
kunnen deze kritiek ook vinden in Aristoteles, maar, anders dan Aristoteles in de Physica, 
concentreert Bergson zijn kritiek alleen op alomvattende teleologie. Bergson verwerpt 





élan vital—noemt), en een menselijke ambachtsman. Bovendien ontkent hij dat er enige 
vorm van algemene harmonie in de wereld bestaat. Zonder deze feiten te veronachtzamen ben 
ik van mening dat ze teveel nadruk hebben gekregen en dat we ze zorgvuldig in hun context 
moeten lezen. Volgens mij is het evident dat Bergson het gebruik van de analogie tussen 
geest en natuur verdedigde omdat voor hem de geest deel is van de natuur, niet een 
geïsoleerde entiteit. Hij verwerpt dan ook niet alle vormen van analogie. Zoals ik in 
Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien, gebruikt Bergson voortdurend analogieën om zijn originele opvatting 
van finale causaliteit te illustreren. Bovendien verwerpt Bergson met het verwerpen van de 
notie van harmonie geenszins alle vormen van ‘algemene doelstellingen’. Volgens Bergson is 
vrijheid het algemene doel, de functie van de gehele kosmos. Daarom ziet Bergson het 
verschijnen van de mens als een relatief succes van deze gerichtheid. Op dit punt introduceert 
Bergson een andere kritiek van alomvattende teleologie. Dit is de meest belangrijke kritiek: 
de doctrine van alomvattende teleologie kan leiden tot determinisme of fatalisme. Bergson’s 
theorie van de levensimpuls is zowel gericht op perfectie als relatief onvoorspelbaar. Bergson 
verbindt openheid en gerichtheid, waarmee hij een aantal filosofische problemen genereert 
die niet bij Aristoteles optreden. Dit is deel van wat ik de hervorming van de immanente 
teleologie noem. In Hoofdstuk 1 benadruk ik tevens de betekenis van een aantal passages uit 
De scheppende evolutie waarin Bergson zichzelf ziet als hervormer van zowel individuele als 
alomvattende teleologie. Na het weerleggen van a-teleologische lezingen van Bergson wordt 
het noodzakelijk om te laten zien wat het klassieke model van teleologie behelst, om een 
helder idee te krijgen wat de hervorming ervan inhoudt. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 2 analyseer ik de aristotelische teleologie, en behandel ik twee nauw 
samenhangende onderwerpen, nl. de natuurlijke hiërarchie (scala naturae) en Aristoteles’ 
theorie van het toeval, die van belang kunnen zijn geweest voor Bergson. De opzet van dit 
lange hoofdstuk wordt herhaald in de hoofdstukken over Bergson. Sectie 2.1 bespreekt 
Aristoteles’ argumentatie om teleologie aan te nemen, en de structuur ervan. Ik doe hetzelfde 
in Hoofdstuk 3 met betrekking tot Bergson. Sectie 2.2 richt zich op de toepassingsgebieden 
van de teleologie in Aristoteles; Hoofdstuk 4 doet hetzelfde voor Bergson. 
 
De structurele elementen van de teleologie van Aristoteles vinden we in zijn theorie van 
oorzakelijkheid in Physica II. Het belangrijkste kenmerk van finale causaliteit is perfectie of 
vervolmaking. Deze termen kunnen op verschillende wijzen worden uitgelegd. In Aristoteles 
is perfectie verbonden met de vorm of species, het metafysisch substraat van elk natuurlijk 
ding. Voor Aristoteles is een kind onvolmaakt ten opzichte van zijn volwassen gedaante, 
wanneer de menselijke vorm zijn definitie volledig waarmaakt. De vorm is noodzakelijk 
verbonden met functie. Een vorm realiseren betekent in Aristoteles vervulling realiseren met 
het oog op een specifieke handeling. Perfectie, vorm en functie verwijzen naar elkaar in deze 
context. Iedere species en iedere functie is een andere vorm van perfectie in Aristoteles’ 
pluralistisch universum. 
 
Het tweede structurele element is dat van de analogie. Analogie betekent dat mensen deel 
uitmaken van de natuur. Er is pluraliteit in de wereld, maar ook een gemeenschappelijke 
grond die analogie toestaat. De analogie tussen de ambachtsman en het groeiproces is 
typerend voor Aristoteles. ‘Kunst imiteert de natuur’ omdat het hetzelfde teleologisch model 
volgt: het doel (perfectie, vorm, functie) is het eindpunt van iedere rationele activiteit. 
Gezondheid, overwinning en wonen zijn de doelstellingen van respectievelijk wandelen, 
vechten en huizen bouwen. Aristoteles verdedigt anthropomorfisme, als anthropomorfisme 







Het derde structurele element is impliciet in het voorgaande. Er is geen anthropocentrisme in 
Aristoteles, omdat de natuurlijke werkelijkheid niet bestaat omwille van de mens, en omdat 
de natuurlijke werkelijkheid gedacht kan worden zonder verwijzing naar de mens. Tegelijk 
zijn mensen volgens Aristoteles de meest perfecte levende wezens in het ondermaanse. Dat 
betekent dat er specifieke analogieën zijn tussen mensen en, bijvoorbeeld, hemellichamen. 
Dit derde element nuanceert het kenmerk van pluralisme: er zijn vele vormen van perfectie, 
maar sommige zijn beter dan andere.  
 
Het vierde structurele element is regelmatigheid en wordt expliciet door Aristoteles ingezet. 
In de regel bereiken natuurlijke entiteiten hun uiteindelijke doel, vorm en functie. Daarom 
zijn mislukkingen in de natuur, zoals ‘monsters’, uitzonderingen. Voor Aristoteles tenderen 
natuurlijke dingen naar het goede of het beste. In dit hoofdstuk heb ik tevens Aristoteles’ 
theorie van het toeval geanalyseerd omdat het ook een rol zal spelen in de hoofdstukken over 
Bergson. Aristoteles was van mening dat niet-regelmatige gebeurtenissen ook konden worden 
gereconstrueerd met behulp van teleologie. Dat noem ik secundaire teleologie, ter 
onderscheiding van de primaire teleologie van regelmatige gebeurtenissen. 
 
De domeinen van de teleologie illustreren in verschillende vormen wat perfectie kan 
betekenen. Ten aanzien van individuele teleologie bestijg ik de ladder van de natuur van de 
lagere tot de hogere niveau’s. Omdat Bergson teleologie alleen zal toepassen op levende 
wezens, heb ik de nadruk gelegd op Aristoteles’ teleologie in het biologisch domein. 
Voortbestaan (inclusief voeding en voortplanting), en—onder de hogere dieren—welzijn (het 
paardenleven voor een paard) kunnen dienen als voorbeeld van perfectie in dit domein. In het 
geval van mensen betekent welzijn geluk, inclusief de vervulling van de rationele vermogens 
van de mens. Dit kan ook worden toegepast op de omwentelingen van de hemellichamen. 
Aan de top van de piramide staat god, die ook een eigen functie heeft: zichzelf denken. 
 
Het tweede deel van sectie 2.2 laat zien hoe we perfectie moeten interpreteren in de passages 
over alomvattende teleologie. Perfectie is compatibel met voortbestaan en welzijn, hoewel 
het een tweede, ruimer, perspectief opent. Individuele perfectie kan in deze context ook een 
of andere bijdrage aan de omgeving of de kosmos betekenen. De activiteit ten aanzien van de 
specifieke functie op zichzelf impliceert al deelname aan de algemene orde. Reproductie 
impliceert bovendien de stabiliteit van de species in een eeuwige wereld: Aristoteles meent 
dat vergankelijke individuele ondermaanse levende wezens door reproductie deelhebben aan 
de eeuwigheid. Aristoteles gebruikt de Platoonse terminologie van imitatie als hij over deze 
tweede bijdrage spreekt. Kortom, deze obscure passages die minder gebruik maken van 
analogieën met de mens, tonen dat perfectie gevonden kan worden buiten de grenzen van één 
substantie of species. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 is gewijd aan de structuur van het teleologisch wereldbeeld van Bergson. Ik 
behandel de verschillende termen die Bergson gebruikt voor perfectie, in analogie met het 
menselijk bewustzijn. Ik vind vier typen van analogie in Bergson’s carrière. In algemene 
termen impliceren twee ervan perfectie en behoud van zijn. De andere twee verwijzen naar 
verandering, overgang en ontologische vooruitgang. Bergson ziet beide tendenzen zowel in 
de natuur als in ons. Dit hoofdstuk behandelt tevens de bijzondere status van de mensheid in 
de natuur volgens Bergson. De mens is volgens Bergson natuurlijk, en tegelijk bijzonder. Ik 
identificeer Bergson’s visie als gematigd anthropocentrisme: mensen zijn de samenvatting 
van de natuur (nu vanuit evolutionair perspectief), maar ik voeg daaraan ook speciale 





met hemellichamen, maar elk individu, en de genius in het bijzonder, lijkt op Bergson’s leven 
of levensimpuls, een overkoepelende samengestelde entiteit die in contact moet staan met de 
aloude ziel van de wereld—iets wat we niet bij Aristoteles aantreffen. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 onderscheid ik ook twee niveau’s van teleologie. Er is reguliere teleologie, 
verbonden met teleologie van behoud: voortbestaan en handelen zijn net zo regulier onder 
levende wezens bij Bergson als bij Aristoteles. Verder is er alomvattende teleologie in 
Bergson’s opvatting van de geschiedenis van het leven en de geschiedenis van de mensheid. 
Bergson’s alomvattende teleologie combineert primaire teleologie (de kosmos en vooral het 
leven zijn in de regel gericht op contingentie en vrijheid) met secundaire teleologie: de 
geschiedenis van het leven en de mensheid is singulier, onvoorspelbaar en contingent. 
Hoewel er gerichtheid en perfectie is, zijn de concrete vormen, de uitkomsten van deze 
evolutie, en het uiteindelijk bereiken van het doel van de wereld onzeker. In vergelijking met 
de rest van de levende werkelijkheid zijn mensen relatief gezien een succes, dat is alles. De 
toekomst is open. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 4 geef ik illustraties van de verschillende vormen van perfectie die hierboven 
werden genoemd. Het hoofdstuk speelt dezelfde rol als sectie 2.2. Bij benadering is 
individuele teleologie in Bergson verbonden met wat ik teleologie van het behoud noemde. 
Hier gebruik ik de term einddoel (destination). Het einddoel van levende organismen, 
embryo’s, mensen en samenlevingen wordt in deze sectie geanalyseerd. Hier komen bekende 
concepten als overleving, behoud, of (met een Darwiniaanse term) adaptatie aan de orde. 
 
In sectie 4.2 behandel ik de overgangsteleologie (transgressive teleology) die zonder meer het 
meest originele aspect van Bergson’s benadering is, hoewel deze ook met problemen komt. 
Met één uitzondering is het domein van de overgangsteleologie de geschiedenis van leven, of 
kosmologie, ofwel alomvattende teleologie. Het niet-alomvattende domein is de mens. Waar 
ik in sectie 4.1 de menselijke tendens tot overleving en adaptatie benadruk, bespreek ik hier 
de tendens om bestaande grenzen te overstijgen. Volgens Bergson is het einddoel van de 
mens om iets nieuws en onvoorspelbaars te creëren. In zijn eudaimonistisch perspectief is 
volwassenheid zelf-creatie: iets creëren omvat onszelf. Wij zijn het product van onze 
originele keuzes. Er is gerichtheid, maar ook nog steeds openheid op dit niveau. Op de 
volgende niveau’s—die van evolutionaire biologie, geschiedenis of kosmologie—wordt deze 
paradox overgedragen naar Leven of Bewustzijn, begrepen als een overkoepelende entiteit 
die voortgang boekt middels individuen. In Bergson moet overgangsteleologie 
onvoorspelbaar zijn en kan ieder succes (zoals mensen) vergaan. 
 
In mijn conclusie verdedig ik het diepe inzicht in het leven dat de immanente teleologie 
zoekt. Dit is wat Bergson vooral aan Aristoteles ontleend heeft. Bergson’s individuele 
teleologie moet begrepen worden in termen van zijn concept van de aandacht voor het leven. 
Immanente teleologie impliceert zowel de noodzaak om levende wezens te begrijpen los van 
concepten en menselijke rationaliteit, en om mensen te begrijpen in de natuur. Het organisme 
is van nature gericht op leven, zonder hulp van redeneren. Leven, bestaan op aarde, is dan 
perfectie. Overleven, welzijn en het vervolmaken van aangeboren potenties zijn, anders dan 
dood of vergaan, niet verder te reduceren begrippen om het levende te begrijpen vanaf het 
moment dat het leeft. Niet alleen de coördinatie van de delen ten opzichte van het geheel, 
maar vooral het specifieke goed dat het geheel nastreeft is van belang. Deze begrippen zijn te 
vinden in ons bewustzijn, maar in de filosofie van immanente teleologie leidt dit niet tot een 
weerlegging: mensen zijn deel van de natuur, en vooral, deel van leven. Aangezien de bron 
van het leven dit streven naar overleven etc. is, kan finale causaliteit eerder gedacht worden 






Overgangsteleologie is nieuw bij Bergson; zo’n wereldbeeld is Aristoteles immers vreemd. 
Toegepast op individuele personen wil overgangsteleologie doelgerichtheid en eudaimonisme 
verbinden met vrijheid, openheid en onvoorspelbaarheid. Het resultaat is dat geluk gevonden 
moet worden in pure schepping. Deze conclusie, uitgedrukt als de paradoxale notie van 
teleologie-zonder-doel, krijgt meer betekenis zodra het domein groter wordt. In de resterende 
toepassingen van overgangsteleologie ontwerpt Bergson een alomvattende immanente 
evolutionaire teleologie die een regelmatig element (het doel van de wereld) verbindt met 
contingentie (de feitelijke geschiedenis van Leven en van de mensheid). Hoewel het Leven en 
de levensimpuls onderhevig zijn aan ontelbare contingenties en uiteindelijk vergaan, zijn ze 
gericht op wat Bergson als perfect beschouwt. Dit reproduceert genoemde paradox 
(teleologie-zonder-doel) in alomvattende teleologie, een filosofisch onderwerp dat heden ten 
dage als ouderwets en problematisch wordt beschouwd. Bovendien introduceert het in de 
context van Bergson een belangrijk nieuw probleem. Aangezien Leven vrij is, dat wil zeggen 
onvoorspelbaar en creatief, is het moeilijk om de grenzen te bepalen tussen deze 
overkoepelende kracht en individuele mensen. Wanneer Bergson spreekt over de helden, het 
toppunt van vrijheid onder de mensen, zegt hij dat zij dichter bij de bron van Leven staan dan 
ieder ander individu. Hoewel er in Bergson een onvoorspelbare creativiteit in de wereld is, is 
het niet duidelijk wiens vrijheid dit is. De grenzen tussen individuele en alomvattende 
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